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ABSTRACT.
Bonar Law was a much more capable and tenacious leader than 
most previous accounts have suggested. He had inherited a very 
unfavourable position with the party badly demoralised and 
frustrated: few members had greeted his selection as leader 
with enthusiasm, and both Long and Chamberlain were hopeful of 
replacing him in the near future. Bonar Law's response was to 
try and regroup the party, and his own position, around a tough 
campaign to resist Home Rule. A campaign which he hoped would 
force an election, principally on the issue of whether Ulster 
should be forced under a Dublin Parliament. This line he 
pursued with great determination: though he remained sensitive 
to party tensions and differences, and always concerned with 
the public perception of party tactics. Yet it was a perilous 
course to follow; threatening the Government with support for 
civil war in Ireland if it did not hold an election before 
implementing the bill: an approach to opposition rarely 
contemplated by the party both before and since. Though one we 
are denied seeing the full consequences of with the sudden 
outbreak of war in Europe and Britain's entry into it on August 
4th 1914.
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INTRODUCTION.
This thesis is a study of the Conservative leadership and its 
responses and resistance to the third Horae Rule bill. It 
focuses upon the dozen or so Tory leaders, influential 
observers and pressmen (such as F.S.Oliver and J.St Loe 
Strachey) and powerful above-party enthusiasts like Earl Grey 
or Lord Milner, for it is amongst these circles, with their 
inter-play of competing ambitions, personalities and anxieties, 
that those responses evolved. It is not a study of Government 
policy, but a study of the reactions to that policy within the 
Tory leadership. It is not concerned with public opinion or the 
opinion of Conservative organisations in the country, but they 
have relevance and importance whenever they impinge upon or 
determine the responses of Tory leaders. Nor is it concerned 
with the militarisation and development of Ulster*s resistance, 
except where it figures in the calculations (as it frequently 
does) of the leaders. And it is not concerned with backbench 
Tory opinion, unless that opinion shapes actions at the top. 
What it does seek to do is threefold. First to re-examine the 
leadership of Bonar Law over these years, rescuing him from the 
shadows of the brighter lights of Carson, Balfour, F.E.Smith
and Austen Chamberlain and to reveal the steps by which he 
successfully consolidated his leadership. Second, to chart the 
significant party divisions on Home Rule and Bonar Law*s 
ability to keep the various strains together, preventing 
independent action along the lines of 1911. Third, to emphasise 
that the struggle over Home Rule was not a struggle over 
Ireland or even over Ulster, but a struggle to force the 
Government to a General Election. Though not directly concerned 
with the debate on the so-called ”crisis of Conservatism”, it 
does come to a more positive conclusion than many other 
accounts, if only on the grounds that the Liberals were far 
worse off by 1914 than the Tories.-And, though largely ignoring 
international comparisons, the sense here is that the 
Conservative party was not heading the same way as other 
European parties of the right, and was in fact displaying 
democratic qualities and appeal, amongst many leaders with the 
hope of future electoral success.
Three points of method also need mention. The first point 
concerns structure. Most Chapters will start with a brief 
survey of events before moving on to analyse political affairs. 
The purpose of this is to aid clarity and set the analysis upon 
a firm chronological bed. Second terminology. Labels never 
capture exactly the variety of political shades which make up a
party. Yet for narrative and analytical reasons a degree of 
artificial coherence must be imposed. A basic three-way 
division has therefore been used which in broad terms correlate 
to the consistent responses towards Home Rule from within the 
party leadership. First Diehards or rightwing elements; 
secondly Federalist or Devolutionary sympathisers; and last the 
solid majority who tended to follow the official leader: the 
moderates or centrists. Yet it needs to be reiterated that 
these labels are artificial: Carson for instance, clearly found 
support from the Diehard wing, yet was recognised as a 
devolutionist by many of its supporters and even, after his 
advocacy of Ulster exclusion as a viable compromise, won some 
sympathy amongst moderate sections of the party who saw 
partition as the best means of settling the issue. Lables are 
not then fixed but fluid; individuals may float from one to 
another. Equally, within themselves, such terms produce various 
definitions. A Federalist is something slightly different to a 
devolutionist, as the differences between Chamberlain and 
Lansdowne show; yet enough common ground existed for them 
actively to cooperate with each other.
The second point concerns methodology. The approach consciously 
adopted here is a ’High-Political1 one: a scepticism of 
political rhetoric; an assumption that leaders do matter, and
are basically tactically orientated; that Parliament is the 
focus of events; and the primacy of private papers, diaries, 
recollections etc since they are the closest we have to the 
politician himself: if the "bare-bones" are anywhere revealed 
then it would be here. Though largely absorbed into mainstream 
historiography, high politics still suffers criticism. This 
stems largely from a misunderstanding of the approach. Sceptics 
berate it for diminishing the potency of ideas, values and 
private character in the public art of politics. But high- 
politics is not so exclusionist, There is no denial that 
political motivation can have any number of sources:- public 
opinion, backbench unease, friendship, personal dislike, "felt" 
rules or guidelines, beliefs and aspirations or even genuine 
concerns. Political D.N.A. is infinite and all are fair game in 
the search for causation as long as they can be empirically 
supported. To move away from the empirical to the a priori in 
determining political action is to inject telelogy into 
explanation, to sanitize with hindsight instead of rooting the 
politician in his own world of timing, slant, emphasis, 
audience-reaction, persuasion and ambition. Only high-politics 
reveals the full complexity of historical events. A second 
criticism limits the relevance of the high-political approach 
to specific periods of unusually fluid party relations: 1866-8; 
1884-6; 1915-24; 1939-45. Party is a brake upon high-political
assumptions, certainly outside "fluid" periods the accumulated 
baggage of party values, instincts and prejudices is a drag 
upon tactical option, to the extent that the audience is less 
persuadable. Yet this assumes a degree of conformity within 
parties which simply does not exist. The work of Sykes, Ball 
and Williamson suggests that even in traditionally polarised 
periods, party is much more a Broad Church than a Baptist sect. 
Even in periods of the most homogenous party sentiment, actions 
and responses are a continous process of internal debate, 
compromise and bargaining which a high-political study can 
illuminate. A third criticism is that high-political activity 
does not occur during quiet periods (since there's nothing to 
play for) nor during periods of intense crisis (when there's 
too much to play for). The four years before the Great war were 
a period of dramatic and bitter political crisis, more akin to 
politics of 1689 or 1760 or 1830-2 than twentieth century 
forms. But to assume that political behaviour therefore 
disappears seems foolhardy, as the studies by C.Hazelhurst and, 
more recently J.Turner show. To continue to 'play the game' 
under such conditions is clearly not for the faint-hearted; 
only those politicians with steel in their veins would excel, 
which explains the pre-war emergence of characters such as 
Bonar Law, Carson, Lord Milner, F.E.Smith and (amongst the 
Liberals) Lloyd George and Churchill. Therefore high-political 
assumptions are relevant to this period and to this crisis.
CHAPTER ONE
I
It was rejection of the Peoples budget, prompting the general 
election of January 1910 which brought Ireland back to the centre 
of politics. Ireland was already becoming central to political 
debate during the struggle over the budget in three particular 
ways. First, an important consideration for Unionists in deciding 
to reject the budget was that if the party did not win outright 
(and many Tory strategists reckoned on two elections to remove 
the Liberals from office) they could reduce them to reliance on 
the Nationalists so returning the Liberals to the state of siege 
of 1885 and 1892. Second, the Peoples' budget of April 1909 
included duties on whisky which the Nationalists greatly 
disliked. This served to bring out the essential conservatism of 
the Nationalists. They were already protectionist to a man and 
disliked the general "socialist" direction in which Lloyd George 
seemed to be taking the government. For some, notably Garvin, the 
Unionist editor of The Observer, this suggested common ground 
between them and Tories and even the possibility of future 
cooperation. Lastly, the settlement in South Africa in 1909 acted 
as a great stimulus and example of what could be achieved if 
practical minds were applied to problems of Empire. Milner's 
kindergarten (Amery, Kerr, Grigg, Brand, Robinson, Hitchens) who 
had played an important part in the early formulation of the 
South Africa Union Act of 1910, were at the forefront of this 
enthusiasm. Once back in England the group looked to continue the
11
constructive enthusiasm by founding the Round Table Movement in 
September 1909*. This attracted many influential people: 
F.S.Oliver, Garvin, Lord Brassey, Lord Dunraven, young Tory M.P.s 
like Bob Cecil and Steel-Maitland, and a smattering of ex­
colonial men, Lords Howick, Hythe, Lovat and Grey. Their aim was 
to draw the British Empire closer together by reorganising it on 
a more stable basis. The rise of this constructive Imperial 
debate fed strongly into the long-running sore of Irish Home 
Rule, particularly in suggesting the idea of a federal scheme for 
Ireland. Ireland, then, was increasingly on the political agenda 
before the general election of January 1910.
The result left the Nationalists strategically dominant. The 
Liberal majority was wiped out, falling to 275, just two seats 
more than the Unionist party. Labour improved to 40 seats thus 
leaving the balance of the House once again dependent on the 82 
strong Irish Nationalists. Using the budget as a bargaining 
counter, they forced Asquith into a resolution on April 16th that 
he would suspend the Lords power of veto (the so-called corrupt 
bargain of Unionist demonology) so opening the door for the 
future passage of Home Rule. Unionists were themselves far from 
comfortable at their political prospects. Divided over Tariff 
Reform and with an increasingly assertive right-wing preventing 
agreement over an alternative reform package to the veto 
resolutions, Balfour, as did Asquith, siezed upon the sudden 
death of Edward Vll in May, to move into conference with each 
other. The chance to settle the Lords issue through cooperation, 
allowed both leaders to escape from their extremists as well as 
delay a second election, given the House of Lords rejections of
12
Asquiths' veto resolutions. The conference held twenty meetings 
through-out the summer and autumn and lasted until October but 
failed to reach agreement: Ireland, amongst other things, proving 
the rock to break the attempt, although not before Lloyd George 
had tried to broaden the political moratorium with the idea of 
a coalition Government . It came to nothing and with the 
conference failure so a second election became inevitable to 
break the constitutional deadlock. December 1910 the country went 
again to the polls.
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The result of the January 1910 election encouraged enthusiasm for 
federal or devolutionary solutions to the Irish Question. The 
dominance of the Irish Nationalists raised the prospect of a 
hard, drawn-out Parliamentary struggle, and the balance of the 
two parties was interpreted as a popular rejection of extremes 
and a desire for compromise. Moreover, the Unionist party's 
apparent hesitancy to agree a constitutional package of reform 
for the Lords, during the early months of 1910, made a federal 
alternative attractive.
Pressure on the Unionist leadership to move in this 
direction came from several quarters. Earl Grey wrote to Balfour 
on February 23rd calling for the 'federalisation of the U.K' as 
a way of cutting down Irish representation, settling the House 
of Lords question and securing better relations with Canada and 
the U.S. 'A policy worth working for and to be required in the 
interests not only of the U.K. but of the Empire' . Grey
13
established contact with the Round Table movement; under his 
influence the Round Tablers increasingly came to argue that 
federation of the Empire ought to be preceded by federation at 
home, thus trying to focus on Ireland’. The group looked to 
initiate a Royal Commission on Parliamentary congestion and the 
devolution of power in an effort to place their federation-at- 
home approach above party politics. Yet no Royal Commission came. 
Grey himself was abroad until 1911. And the Round Tablers were 
still very much backstage workers, Bob Cecil and Steel-Maitland 
being the closest to power but not keen supporters of Grey's 
federation-at-home views.
Two other sources were more influential than Grey and the 
Round Tablers. First, Garvin, who had The Observer to guide 
opinion but who was also in close and regular contact with 
J.S.Sandars, Balfour's private secretary. In January 1910 Garvin 
began to recommend to Sandars the advantages of cooperation with 
the Nationalists, based around the adoption of federalism5. 
Garvin argued forcefully that both parties were opposed to the 
budget and supported Tariff Reform. Federalism would save the 
Lords veto and bring the Tories back to office to carry out other 
more critical reforms. It might also lead to improved relations 
with the U.S.A., a factor Balfour had long taken seriously. And 
the breakaway O'Brienites seemed to disprove the notion of the 
Nationalists necessarily relying on the Liberals, advocating a 
return to Parnellite tactics of the early 1880s. Garvin sensed 
the opportunities which the Liberal-Nationalist struggle over the 
budget offered: 'The House of Commons containing a majority in 
principle agreeing with Unionist views on education, licensing,
14
Tariff Reform and above all food tax, it would be our plain and 
most imperative duty to exchange views with Mr Redmond.. to 
make., a real working majority in practise'8. On February 14th, 
April 9th and April 21st he again pushed these ideas7. Nor were 
these the isolated speculations of an unusually fertile mind. 
Lord Cromer expressed fears to Salisbury of just such a manoeuvre 
being effected8. Walter Long hoped that the rumours of such
Q
alliances were unfounded , and Sandars told of similar movements 
in the party towards such an alliance, especially amongst the 
more ardent Tariff Reformers, in which Garvin could be counted.
1 It is taking us back to the famous Carnarvon interview of 1885 
and that kind of Randolphian scheming which did us as a party so 
much damage'^8.
Second, pressure for a devolutionary scheme came from Milner 
and Oliver. Oliver was a prolific publicist and close to leading 
constructive Unionist politicians, notably Chamberlain. Under his 
pseudonym "Pacificus" he began to write letters to The Times 
through May and June 1910 suggesting settlement of the Irish 
question through United Kingdom devolution^. Milner was more 
influential through-out Unionist circles. On April 17th he 
approached Balfour: 'I don't suppose the Unionist party can go
in for H.R. in any form, but if it comes in spite of us not much
1 ?harm would be done by provincial Home Rule'14.
Yet none of the Unionist leaders, least of all Balfour, 
publicly moved in this direction during the early months of 1910. 
Garvin's tactical advice, though ingenious, was unlikely to be 
heeded. Balfour thought the proposal was 'eating dirt'. He was 
more concerned with bolstering the cabinet moderates (Sir Edward
15
Greyv Crewe, Haldane, Loreburn) through Francis Hopwood, the
under-secretary at the Colonies, than with making overtures
1 •}
towards the Nationalists10. Also political attention was too 
fixed on Second Chamber reform and at the end of February when 
Lloyd George promised that veto resolutions would be brought 
before the House backed up by guarantees insuring their passage. 
This indicated that a deal with the Nationalists had been done. 
'The government have surrendered. Asquith has eaten his words 
again', wrote Chamberlain**.
However, with the convening of the Constitutional conference 
in June 1910 federalists saw their cause advance. Garvin and 
Oliver had been openly calling for a conference of party leaders 
to solve the constitutional problems facing Britain; a 'truce of 
God' was how Garvin described it*5. The meetings began on June 
17th and totalled thirteen in all before they rose for the summer 
on the 28th of July. They reconvened on October 11th for a 
further seven meetings*5. It was during the intervening period 
that devolutionary/federalist sympathies began to spread out from 
the editorial bridgehead into the centres of political power.
By late July there was an increasing fear that the 
conference was beginning to break down over Ireland. Sandars 
informed Garvin of this at the start of October who, to keep 
party cooperation going, used The Observer to argue strongly in 
favour of federalism as a scheme to cure the Irish problem on
17which both Unionists and Liberals could agree1 . Under the same 
fear Lloyd George, during the summer recess, devised a memorandum 
arguing that the conference should reconstitute itself as a 
coalition government to solve the constitutional deadlock,
16
disentangle the Irish problem and remedy many other pressing
issues: 'An ad hoc super cabinet to guide the passage of an
10
agreed plan of legislation'10.
Both Lloyd George and Garvin began to exert pressure within 
Unionist circles during October 1910. Garvin (who knew of Lloyd 
George's offer) spearheaded a broad press campaign of support. 
His article of the 9th was extended on the 16th in into one 
entitled "The Case of A Larger Settlement", calling for a 
convention to settle the outstanding issues of the day in a non­
partisan spirit^. Oliver resumed 'Pacificus', writing a series 
of letters to The Times between October 20th and early November. 
Editorials in The Daily Mail and The Times became more
70sympathetic to The Observer's views . And the Round Table 
movement turned their monthly journal towards a strong advocacy 
of non-party government to unify the Empire.
By early October moves towards a federal alternative were 
also coming from within high-political circles. On the 10th or 
11th of October, before the conference was reconvened, Lloyd 
George, having told selected cabinet colleagues, informed Balfour 
of his plan. Balfour did not dismiss the plan (nor did he 
immediately reject the devolutionary solution for Ireland which 
the Chancellor made) but clearly wanted time to think and confer 
with colleagues. At the same time (the 11th) Balfour received a 
long memorandum from Oliver on "The Conference and its 
Consequences", arguing for the formalisation of the discussions 
into a wider Convention to deal, principally, with Ireland in a
71devolutionary manner41. Balfour also received letters on the
7717th and 18th from Garvin urging a similar course . It is hard
17
not to detect a coordinated plan behind these moves to win over 
Balfour; Lloyd George was, after all, in close and regular 
contact with Garvin, who in turn was corresponding with Oliver.
Alfred Lyttleton and Sandars, who both came out strongly for 
the federal alternative at this time, had more influence with 
Balfour. Lyttleton, moved by Garvin's article of the 16th, 
informed Balfour the next day that his own enquiries had found, 
'a very great sympathy with local federation among our younger 
intellectuals' . Also, 'two of our most important pro-consuls 
Grey and Milner.. (and). . some of our best young men. . . lean that 
way' . He ended by warning Balfour of the consequences of 
breakdown: 'I dread the submission to the electorate of the H of 
L's question - never an advantageous one for us' . Sandars 
employed similar arguments. 'We shall hug a delusion if we 
imagine that Home Rule will alarm the average voter of 1911 as 
it did in 1886 and 1895'^. Federalism was a far better election 
platform than the Lords question or a traditional defence of the 
Union. Like Lyttleton, Sandars emphasised the attraction 
federalism had for the 'young men' of the party. 'He (Amery) 
thinks a scheme of that kind may well be considered - he would 
do much to avoid an election now, consequently upon the naked 
failure of the conference. He says many of the young men of the 
party are of this opinion'^.
Both Sandars and Lyttleton were sources in whom Balfour 
trusted and whose opinion he respected. Nor was Balfour initially 
hostile. To Lyttleton he replied on the 20th, 'on the question 
of devolution or provincialism or Home Rule all round.. I say 
nothing at the moment. I doubt whether most of those who talk
18
about it have thought it out. Certainly I am not prepared to 
dogmatise on the subject' . And Balfour's letter to Chamberlain 
on the 22nd, though sceptical, did not reject the step. 'I did 
not take up a non-possumus attitude upon any of them. I think it 
quite possible though perhaps improbable, that a modus vivendi 
might be arrived at on the substance of a common policy, if the 
enormous initial difficulties of a coalition could be 
overcome1^ . Balfour's concern was that the "move" was not yet 
practical politics rather than that the "substance" of the offer 
was inherently unthinkable. He was more concerned with how the 
coalition would come into existence than with the nature of the 
compromise over Ireland. Balfour even, in a highly prescient 
letter to Chamberlain on the 24th of October, showed a 
willingness to cooperate in a solution for Ireland. 'In many 
respects it would be far easier to promise our support to the 
Government if they were prepared to defy the Irish and their own 
extremists than to offer to form a coalition': the same course 
he would advocate in October 1913 and March 1914^. Balfour was 
not rejecting the suggestions outright. He was simply waiting on 
events and sounding opinions and advice.
By the middle of October there was still life in the 
initiative. Garvin on the 20th, the 22nd and the 25th tried to 
recruit Chamberlain^®. From the beginning, the latter was 
inclined to a devolutionary solution for Ireland. 'There is 
indeed little' Chamberlain assured Garvin on the 21st, 'with 
which I disagree in what you have written' . But, like Balfour,
he was hesitant to take the first step towards it. Showing that 
innate conservatism which was to be such a feature of his
19
political outlook, he told Balfour on the 25th that 'all this is 
very dangerous and we must walk warily' . F.E.Smith was more 
enthusiastic. He acted as Lloyd George's mouthpiece in Unionist 
circles, having, along with Winston Churchill, been among the 
first to learn of the Chancellor's plan. As with Churchill, it 
was 'a religious conversion', a golden opportunity to solve all 
the problems and deficiencies of state, and for them to jump over 
many heads (the "duffers" as Smith described them) into high 
office. One of the first he sought out was Bonar Law whom he 
found sympathetic33. He also pressed Chamberlain, writing on the 
20th that 'to refuse this offer at this crisis would almost be 
a crime against the Empire'3*. Smith argued strongly that to 
give way on Ireland (to grant federal Home Rule) would enable the 
party to gain much:- National Service, big Navy, Fiscal reform, 
closer Colonial ties, cooperation on social reform and Poor Law 
reform. Nor was Chamberlain unreceptive, writing back: 'I have
never been averse in principle to very considerable changes in 
Irish government and I see that it would be safe and wise to go 
further as part of a National settlement'33. Smith also wrote to 
Balfour on the 30th: 'I do not think in the history of England 
such terms have ever been offered to a beaten party and I am 
confident that in accepting them you would carry with you the 
country and the party'33. This he sweetened with a more partisan 
thought: 'if you agreed tomorrow to the terms offered in
conference it would smash the Liberal party. The extremists of 
Labour will never give us concern'37. Smith was clearly eager to 
move his leaders towards Lloyd George's plan. But of particular 
interest is his attitude to the Irish problem at this stage,
20
defining it as ’a dead quarrel for which neither the country nor 
the party cares a damn, outside of Ulster and Liverpool'2®. The 
claims of Ulster could be sacrificed for 'what he saw as a 
greater gain for the United Kingdom', not something he would be 
declaring a year hence2®.
Smith was active elsewhere in Unionist circles. It seems 
probable that as the unacknowledged leader of the "young men" 
in the party, he was instrumental in extending sympathies in this 
quarter*®. Sandars also reported him as trying to win over 
Carson**. Carson was a natural target for such overtures, not 
only as a leading Tariff Reformer but, since February 1910, 
leader of the Irish Unionists. 'F.E. said1 wrote Sandars, 'that 
Carson frankly admitted that there was much to be said in favour 
of the policy (federalism) and he quite realised the changed 
conditions in Ireland; but that he., considered in his position 
in Ireland he was not free to entertain the question, at all 
events, at the present time'*2. Carson's attitude appears close 
to that of Balfour. He by no means (pace Gollin) 'disagreed with 
the very idea of federalism'*2.
By mid-October a definite pro-devolution movement had built 
up within Unionist circles. The movement had backing from 
sections of the press. It attracted many of the "young men", as 
well as various intellectuals and Round Tablers. Most important, 
it had won converts at the top of the Unionist party: Milner, 
Chamberlain (hesitantly), Bonar Law, Smith, Lyttleton, Goulding 
and other highly placed individuals such as Garvin, Amery, Earl 
Grey, Sandars, Oliver and Dunraven. But for all the frenzied 
activity, the federalist initiative was smoke without fire.
21
Balfour had not dismissed the coalition plan nor the idea of 
devolution immediately. He waited to see what prevailing opinion 
was, consulting close colleagues; and by late October the 
opinions coming back were unfavourable. On the 31st Sandars 
informed Garvin that 'he's gone back a bit. He shrinks from the 
federal issue1; (Sandars clearly thought that he had earlier gone 
forward a little)**. On the 4th of November he was more emphatic 
that Balfour would not advance towards federalism or the 'larger' 
settlement. By the 8th, according to Gollin, 'the game was up' 
and the last meeting of the conference on the 10th simply 
recognised this*8.
In fact, such an outcome was likely from the beginning. Not 
all the press had fallen in behind Garvin and Northcliffe. The 
Telegraph, The Morning Post, The Spectator and The Express had 
no truck with federalism, and welcomed the end of the conference. 
Irish Unionists were alarmed at the sudden lapse by many Tories 
in their Unionism. Balcarres noted 'Ulster members are firing 
blank cartridges about devolution, banging the orange drum and 
denouncing in future those of us who may concede something to 
Nationalism1*8. Balfour, ever sensitive to their anxieties, 
noted the publication of several letters in the papers written 
by two Irish Unionists, describing them as 'the first drops in 
the storm which will assuredly break over us if any new departure 
be admitted1*^ . At a meeting of the shadow cabinet on the 8th of 
November Midleton, Londonderry, Salisbury, Curzon, Selborne 
(rather surprisingly) Long and Carson ('the Sanhedrin') all came 
out strongly against Lloyd George's offer to settle the Irish 
question on federal lines*8. Amongst the leadership there was
22
nothing like as much support for federalism as there was 
opposition to it, particularly among the 'Unionist four1, as 
Garvin called them: Chamberlain, Lansdowne, Akers-Douglas and 
Acland-Hood, the Chief Whip . This was enough to sway Balfour.
More important, the initiative failed because Balfour and 
Chamberlain mistrusted Lloyd George. He had misled Smith on how 
the conference was breaking up on the issue of devolution: as 
Balfour, Chamberlain and Cawdor all admitted, the issue had never 
been before them. Nor was there any indication of how Asquith 
felt on these matters; could they trust Lloyd George actually to 
deliver a coalition as he promised?^® Balfour and Chamberlain 
slowly gained the impression that it was simply a trap to make 
them show their hand on Ireland before the inevitable election. 
As Chamberlain warily told Balfour: 'all this is rather
dangerous. . for there is trouble in the statement from which they 
start, that there has been a real change in the Irish situation 
which it would be safe and even wise for us to recognise if the 
Liberal party recognise it also'^. Gwynne put it more 
succinctly: 'it is either the most astonishingly generous offer 
ever made by one political party to another or it means an astute
Cl
and cunning move towards some gigantic fraud' .
In many respects the supporters of a coalition Government 
had been speculating well beyond the conference remit. 'What we 
have been considering there', Chamberlain told Smith, 'is not 
what changes in our system of government should be made but how 
such changes should be effected. This is a wholly different 
though perhaps a not unrelated question'^. And as yet there was 
no solution agreed on how such changes should be effected. Hence
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Balfour's concern, 'I saw no object in a detailed discussion 
about the pattern of the wall-papers which are to adorn this new 
political structure when the foundations have not been laid'**. 
The likes of Smith, Garvin, and Milner had been carried away by 
the "idea" rather than the "practicality". They had swallowed 
Lloyd George's bait. 'The whole situation is too obscure’, 
Chamberlain wrote to Balfour on the 25th, 'and I deplore the 
earnestness with which our friends speak and write before they 
know what the government intend'**.
The federalist movement which reached something of apogee 
by the autumn of 1910 slowly melted away over the course of 1911, 
though leaving tracks in the snow which would reappear in the 
autumn of 1913.
Ill
In response to the rise of devolutionary sympathy, those forces 
devoted to a staunch defence of the Union were initially slow to 
mobilise. The dominance of the Lords reform issue over the first 
five months of 1910 occupied the time of such traditional 
exponents of the Union as Salisbury, Curzon, Midleton and Hugh 
Cecil. This was an understandable diversion. It was by no means 
clear that the government were willing or even able to cripple 
the Lords. The January 1910 election was not a resounding victory 
for the radicals. This prompted a rearguard action by Grey, 
Haldane, Loreburn, Crewe and Morley for reform of the upper 
chamber rather than abolition of its powers. The Lords issue 
stood a chance of breaking up the Liberal Government and so
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naturally monopolised political concern. And, after all, if the 
second chamber could be reformed, leaving most its powers in 
place, then the most effective source of resistance to Home Rule 
had been preserved.
The establishment of the constitutional conference in June 
raised their anxiety. Balcarres greeted it with ill-disguised 
foreboding: 'while the party is ready enough to enter into a
conference, few are prepared to effect any large compromise'^. 
As it continued into the summer these anxieties grew. 'But what 
can they be doing', he wrote on July the 6th, 'for the life of 
me I cannot hazard an opinion, for the whole thing is so 
paradoxical and one might say so absurd that none of us can guess 
why this talk of compromise is so seriously accepted’^ . At the 
root of this anxiety was a suspicion about what their leaders 
might agree. Willoughby de Broke believed that 'a minority on 
both sides eyed the locked door of the conference room with very 
grave misgivings. A real quintessential Diehard., never entirely
CO
trusts his leaders not to sell the pass behind his back130. And 
Salisbury, writing to Selborne, echoed this mistrust. 'The most 
alarming feature however in the situation.. is that our 
representatives do not seem to have any clear limits in their 
minds. They are in search of formulae but without much view as 
to what they want'^. These doubts were shared by Maxse, the 
extreme right wing editor of The National Review. 'Great parties 
can't play fast and loose with their principles as many Unionists 
are now doing' he told Goulding^®. But such anxieties were more 
instinctive than empirical; they were also unrepresentative. 
Members reposed on their estates and political comment in the
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clubs was muted^. 'How dull everything is at present1, Carson 
wrote to Lady Londonderry, 'I wish the conference was over or the 
king would fall in love or Arthur Balfour would get into the 
divorce court1®2. And when by late July the conference was 
widely rumoured to be at an impasse over Home Rule, this proved 
heartening to many of the sceptics. With the reconvening of the 
conference in early October new anxieties arose.
The federalist surge of October intensified the Right's 
suspicions of the conference with strong calls from elements in 
the press for a constructive settlement and increasing mention 
of the federal alternative. Letters from F.E.Smith, O'Brien, Grey 
and Oliver suggested a devolutionary settlement; the loose talk 
in the clubs of "arrangements" and "compromises", and the 
continued silence of Balfour and Lansdowne, served to increase 
apprehension. Salisbury, Long, Hugh Cecil, Curzon and Midleton 
all reacted strongly against such tinkering with the Union, 
agreeing with Arthur Elliot's view that 'federalism for the U.K.; 
it is absolute downwright Tom foolery'^. Long's response was 
predictably hostile, seeing any such dramatic shift of policy as 
likely to split the party. Along with Carson and Willoughby de 
Broke he signed a letter to The Times on November 10th supporting 
a single Parliament at Westminster^. Chamberlain in his letter 
to Balfour of the 25th of October mentioned that such 
constructive changes would 'shock the older ones'®®. Similarly, 
Gwynne warned Balfour that the 'mass of the party' would not be 
displeased to see the conference ended and devolution dropped®^, 
sentiments echoed by Balcarres and Sandars: 'I quite agree that 
federalism will not be popular with the more Conservative section
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of the party'®7. The creation of the Reveille group towards the 
end of October suggested to the leadership that this discontent 
was taking an institutional form. The group was designed to spur 
the leadership but was interpreted as a means of thwarting any 
concession over the Union.
It was from the Irish Unionists, and more particularly from 
the Ulstermen, that the most hostile reaction came. Their 
belligerence developed early in 1910, as a result of the renewed 
tactical power of the Nationalists at Westminster. This in turn 
led to developments in Ulster. Arms began to trickle into the 
province; a new, vigorous Orangeism began to revive; and within 
the Unionist clubs a determined Unionist spirit revived®®. With 
the onset of the conference, the Ulstermen were amongst the most 
vociferous of those opposed to it. But it was the brief 
flirtation by some Unionists with federalism which served really 
to galvanise the Ulstermen. William Moore, M.P. for North Armagh, 
wrote a bitter letter to Goulding on October 28th. 'It is 
monstrous that we who have borne the fight for the Unionist party 
for years should be thrown to the wolves because your friends 
wish to pander to disloyalty1, clearly a reference to Smith®®. 
Carson complained to Lady Londonderry: 'I am sick to death of 
this Home Rule tragedy.. It (federalism) will split the party to 
pieces and should it turn out to be true I earnestly hope the 
Conservatives will never again be in office during my 
lifetime'7®. Although, as we have already seen, Carson was not 
necessarily as dogmatic against federalism as he appears here. 
The events of October led to several ominous developments inside 
Ulster Unionism. The trickle of arms since early 1910 was, in
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November 1910/ placed under the supervision of a secret committee 
established to procure arms on a larger scale. And it was from 
this committee that F.H.Crawford worked over the summer to buy 
in Germany some 2,000 weapons, laying what Jackson argues was 
'the groundwork for civil war'7*. Late 1910 was an important 
stage in the rise of militant Ulster Unionism.
Clearly, then, Balfour's shift from a wary hesitation at 
Lloyd George's proposal and the idea of federalism, towards a 
more forceful rejection, occurred against a background of growing 
agitation amongst more traditional and right wing elements in the 
party. It probably served to reinforce his own inclinations. 
Certainly Carson had few doubts. 'There is no fear', he told Lady
Londonderry, 'of A.J.B. being likely to concede anything on Home
17Rule' . By early November, with the final rejection of 
federalism and coalition, the conference was quickly wound up and 
a general election became inevitable.
IV
The party now began to prepare for their third election in five 
years. The circumstances were not propitious. No policy on reform 
of the Lords had been agreed. Tariff Reform remained the only 
initiative the party was committed to, but for many even this was 
tarnished by food taxes. Few organisational improvements had been 
implemented, and a general apprehension was evident at all levels 
of the party. 'The outlook is bad', confided Sandars to Lady 
Londonderry, who earlier had received similar views from Carson: 
'I gather it (election) would probably be disastrous'7^ . It was
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in this atmosphere of foreboding that the leadership sought to 
put their policies in order.
An agreed plan of reform for the Lords was rapidly brought 
forward. Lansdowne's resolutions for joint sittings for contested 
bills, a referendum for special ’constitutional1 bills and 
removal of the Lord's power to alter budgets, were introduced 
into the Lords on the 22nd and 23rd of November. As a by-product 
the idea of a referendum recommended itself to some Tory peers 
as a means to emasculate food taxes. Lord St Aldwyn was amongst 
the first openly to call for it to be applied to food taxes, but 
it quickly drew support from other free-fooders: Cromer, the 
Cecils, Strachey of The Spectator and (surprisingly) Garvin. When 
therefore Bonar Law, a leading Tariff Reformer, wrote to Balfour 
just three days before his Albert Hall speech, recommending the 
referendum on food taxes as a means to sweep Lancashire, Balfour
74seized the opportunity to remove the incubus . On the 29th of 
November he announced his willingness to submit food taxes to the 
verdict of the people if the Liberals would do the same with Home 
Rule.
The majority of Unionists supported the decision, as did 
most of the press, although the internal effects of this were 
submerged for the time being beneath a pre-election need to 
present a united front. Yet Balfour had done more than simply to 
remove food taxes. He now challenged the Liberals to show equal 
trust in the people by putting Home Rule to the popular verdict. 
This placed the government in a difficult position. Most Liberal 
candidates ignored the challenge. But by ignoring Balfour's offer 
and avoiding mention of Home Rule during the contest, the
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Government gave Tories the powerful argument for the future that 
the issue of Home Rule had never been before the electorate and 
thus had no popular mandate. Despite the ambiguous constitutional 
status of a popular mandate, it subsequently became the 
cornerstone of Bonar Law's whole strategy against Home Rule after 
1912: Home Rule first had to receive the electorate's approval, 
and failure to secure this would justify support for civil war 
in Ulster.
Ireland was prominent during the election in other ways. 
With the Lords veto now clearly threatened, the spectre of Home 
Rule behind it became more visible. Tories sought to raise this 
fear by firmly tying the Lords issue to Home Rule. Also over the 
summer Redmond had been in America fund-raising, and this exposed 
the Government to attack for being reliant on American dollars. 
The image of the "Dollar-Dictator" was employed widely from 
Unionist platforms, and proved an effective cry. Whatever the 
Tories later claimed, Home Rule was more of an issue in the 
second 1910 election. Yet despite its prominence the results of 
the election were disastrous.
The party gained just two seats, although registering a 
definite swing towards them in Lancashire. London, the Celtic 
fringes and Yorkshire all proved disappointing. Unionist fortunes 
now reached an all-time low with three election defeats in 
succession and the Government more confident and better 
positioned. As a result the party collapsed into bickering. Many 
questioned party organisation, deficiencies in which Selborne 
found 'too amazing for words'7^. Others criticised the leaders 
or the lack of clear direction7^ . Walter Long was outraged at
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77moves to assimilate Liberal Unionists into the party . Some 
thought that the referendum proposal had come too late. 
Chamberlain, Lord Ridley and 'the Morning Post gang1 criticised
70
it for coming at all .
Ireland temporarily faded from direct political debate at 
the start of 1911. The most pressing issue for the party now was 
to agree a coherent reform scheme for the Lords as an alternative 
to the Government's bill. But as the experience of 1910 
suggested, agreement over the Lords was a difficult catch to bag. 
And even when a weak reform package (along the lines of 
Lansdowne's resolutions of November 22nd) was finally agreed and 
introduced into the Lords on May 8th, so far had events moved on 
that it created little more than a ripple. Sanders thought the
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proposal 'has fallen very flat* . The momentum now lay firmly 
with the Government's bill to abolish the Lords veto.
The realisation, made painfully clear by the poor reception 
of Lansdowne's scheme, that the Government would not be steered 
into the calmer waters of reform, led to a gradual division in 
party opinion from May onwards. On one side stood those who would 
"hedge"; they would fight as hard as they could, but in the end 
would pass the bill on third reading in the Lords. On the other 
side were those who were 'very keen for fighting every inch1 as 
the only way to preserve the unity and fighting image of the 
party; they would reject the bill and force the Government, if 
it dared, to create Peers®^.
The roots of this cleavage lay less in ideology than in 
tactics and in how to respond to the Government steam-rollering 
the bill through Parliament. This schism did not fall along
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orthodox fault-lines in the party: traditional Unionists versus 
more constructive ones (a label variously encompassing 
Chamberlainites, Whole-hoggers, federalists, Liberal Unionists 
and Social Imperialists). Instead, the division saw sections of 
these two groups cooperating around the diehard stance of 
rejecting the bill, against a majority of party moderates and 
followers of the official line who saw the inevitability of 
passing it. Balfour of Burleigh, from the traditional wing, in 
recommending Diehard tactics to Robert Cecil, noted that, 
'curiously enough I find that to be the opinion of the advanced
Tariff Reformers, rather than of the moderate men with whom I
01
have greater pleasure in acting1 . The so-called Diehard revolt 
of 1911 was the product of a rare collaboration between 
traditional and Constructive Unionists.
V
One side of this collaboration, the traditional right, had 
emerged during the course of 1910, as a result of, amongst other 
things, threats to the Union. Their suspicions of the 
constitutional conference had been realised by the outburst of 
federal sympathy in the autumn. In reply Long, Carson, Salisbury, 
Curzon, Hugh and Robert Cecil, Balfour of Burleigh and the 
Ulstermen had rallied the party back to the pure milk of 
Unionism, making its defence a central theme of their election 
campaign.
After January 1911 these sections became more aggressive. 
Three electoral defeats in a row, concern at the directionless
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quality of Balfour and Lansdowne’s leadership, combined with the 
sense of frustration at the normal inter-play of politics and 
heightened by the party's seeming inability to halt the
remorseless progress of the Parliament bill, all helped generate 
an increasingly martial tone. Though arguably it was the growing 
threat to the Union, which the opening of the Parliamentary
session in 1911 brought with it, which did most to agitate the 
Right. Asquith, debating the address on the 16th of February, 
brought this threat clearly into view when he declared that Home 
Rule would be 'the first business after the veto'®^.
By May, with Lansdowne's reform plans falling flat, fear 
grew on the right that the leadership were now moving towards 
accepting the bill's inevitable passage. Sanders recorded a
conversation with Acland-Hood just days after Lansdowne's bill 
was introduced. 'Hood says the Lords' tactics will be to move one 
or two important amendments and try and get every concession 
possible, but to eventually cave in'®®. Without a clear sign
from Balfour to the contrary, the Right freely canvassed opinion, 
argued for strong action and whispered revolt if their leaders 
sold out. July confirmed their worst suspicions, when Asquith 
announced to the Commons on the 20th that he had the King' s 
pledge to create Peers. Lansdowne urged submission by abstaining. 
Salisbury, Halsbury and Willoughby de Broke moved quickly to 
rally opinion in the Lords for rejection and against their own 
leaders, organising the Halsbury dinner for July the 26th which 
raised the standard of revolt.
This stance was not simply a reaction by a few medievalists 
in the upper House. It was a line with which many in the party,
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both in Parliament and outside it, sympathised. Sanders
calculated an 'overwhelming backbench majority for holding 
out1®4, a view Bridgeman endorsed: 'there seems to be a majority 
in favour of the creation of a considerable number of Peers'®®. 
Without such a show of fight and a little red blood on the floor, 
Conservative morale would slump. Many on the Right were convinced 
that the Government threat to use the King's prerogative was 
bluff, which if called would result in another election rather 
than 'making their filthy Peers'®®. Rejecting the Parliament
bill and forcing another constitutional impasse, as with
rejection of the budget, was designed to prompt another election, 
but this time with Home Rule the dominant issue. 'If beaten in 
December', Dicey wrote just before the election, 'we shall 
assuredly triumph when in April or May the Parliament bill or the 
Home Rule bill is referred by the Lords to the nation'®7. This 
was essentially the approach Bonar Law was to take with Home Rule 
after 1912: creating a constitutional impasse to prompt an
election on a favourable platform. And yet for Salisbury and 
others, even if Peers were created this would only entail a
'creation of sufficient Peers to force the Parliament bill
OQ
through', not a wholesale swamping of the Lords00. 'It is 
impossible to conceive that the King will consent to create more 
Peers than are necessary to pass his Parlt bill'®®. If swamping 
was not a likely consequence, so the immediate passage of Home 
Rule, after the veto bill, was an illusion. Their Lordships 
therefore had nothing to lose, but much to gain, by rejecting the 
bill.
The other side in the collaboration against the Parliament
34
bill came from constructive sections of the party. This nebulous 
group looked warily to Chamberlain for leadership, and included 
ex pro-consuls (Milner and Selborne); ardent Tariff Reformers 
(Carson, Smith, Wyndham, Goulding, Amery, Page-Croft and 
Winterton); and influential pressmen (Garvin, Oliver, Blumfield 
and Ware). 1910 had been a successful year for them. The budget 
united the party behind Tariff Reform for the first time and the 
election had been subsequently fought on its full programme. In 
the summer came the constitutional conference, which seemed to 
herald what many constructively minded politicians from both 
parties had long wanted, a "ministry of all the talents". By 
autumn this spirit of national efficiency had materialised into 
a formal offer of coalition from Lloyd George, and greeted by 
Smith, Garvin, Milner and (initially) Chamberlain with 
enthusiasm. Central to this cooperation was the solution to the 
Irish problem by federating the United Kingdom. But the heady 
atmosphere was not to last. In an effort to reassert traditional 
Unionism, Balfour swung decisively against a federal solution. 
This ended any dallying with ideas of coalition. And on November 
the 29th Balfour introduced the referendum, as perhaps the final 
part of a wider move to shift the party back to a more 
traditional style of Unionism.
Balfour's decision to adopt a referendum created a great 
deal of anger among Tariff Reformers. Chamberlain, feeling 
betrayed, countered the pledge by claiming, at Buxton on December 
16th, that it was only on offer at the current election. But to 
no avail: the pledge would remain party policy as long as Balfour 
remained leader. The logic of this situation became increasingly
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clear over 1911: either Balfour had to be moved to embrace a new 
policy or he had to be removed. The seeds of the later revolt 
against his leadership were sown during the December election 
campaign. From January onwards Chamberlain, annoyed and 
disgruntled, waited his chance to attack Balfour. The growing 
split over the Parliament bill was the type of situation he could 
exploit.
Chamberlain, along with Smith, Carson and Selborne, began 
over the spring and summer of 1911 to work with those forces 
dedicated to defending the Lords. 'I and other strong Tariff 
Reformers', Chamberlain wrote with some surprise, 'found
ourselves now in hearty agreement and close cooperation with Lord
QOSalisbury and his two brothers' . At the fateful shadow cabinet 
on the 21st of July when the decision to abstain was taken, 
Chamberlain, Wyndham, Carson, Selborne and Smith voted with 
Salisbury and Halsbury 'for driving the government to create 
Peers'^. The Halsbury dinner - in honour of the ancient focus 
of the no-surrender revolt - was arranged by these individuals 
working together. The Cecil scene of July 24th had been 'an 
organised outcry' of Hugh Cecil and Smith . And it was with the 
support of the Chamberlainites in the Commons that Halsbury led 
114 Peers in opposition to the express wishes of Lansdowne. It 
is hard not to detect behind Chamberlain, Smith and Carson's 
cooperation with Salisbury and his brothers an attack on 
Balfour's leadership. They were defending aristocratic privilege 
where they had earlier called for radical reform of the second 
chamber. Nor could they argue that resisting the Parliament bill 
was in the best interests of the Union, since just months earlier
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Smith and Chamberlain (but not Carson) had been quite willing to 
barter it away for a coalition. And if the leadership was the 
target for Chamberlain, then alliance with the likes of 
Salisbury, Bob and Hugh Cecil and Halsbury would improve his 
chances. It brought him greater influence throughout the upper 
and older echelons of the party, indicated perhaps by the growing 
hostility of Walter Long to him. 'Balcarres tells me1, wrote 
Chamberlain, 'he (Long) is furiously jealous of you and hates you 
like poison1^ . Long's antipathy to Chamberlain was the clearest 
gauge of the latter's rising authority within the leadership and 
with many backbenchers. But Chamberlain, Smith and indeed Carson 
might have supported rejection for other reasons. As with the 
traditional Unionists, driving the constitution once again to an 
impasse would bring the benefit, not of another election but of 
the reconvening of the 1910 conference to settle the 
constitution.
The alliance between the Chamberlainites and the Cecils 
(between the constructive and traditional wings of the party) was 
a marriage of convenience, united in tactics but differing in 
ultimate intentions. The union dramatically came together on 
August 9th in the crucial division on whether to insist on 
amending the bill along the lines of Lansdowne's May reform 
proposals or abstain and let the bill be passed as it stood. 114 
Peers voted against the official line of abstention, and would 
have carried the day if 10 Bishops and 31 Unionists, led by 
Curzon and Midleton, had not voted in the bill's favour. Balfour 
was heavily criticised, not least for his decision to leave for 
Bad Gastein before the result of the division was known. The
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summer recess, it was hoped, would defuse passions and restore 
loyalty to the official leadership.
The danger for Balfour was that the alliance might prove 
both enduring and popular in the party. The Halsbury dinner of 
July 26th and subsequent formation of the Halsbury club suggested 
that the alliance would have a more permanent basis. The club 
strove to find a common policy programme of a diehard flavour and 
then to agitate inside the party for it, to act as a "ginger" 
group along the lines of the Fourth Party of the 1880s. This was 
a clear sign of mistrust in Balfour's ability to defend what they 
saw as vital institutions of state. And it was as part of the 
Halsbury Club's attempt to invigorate and rouse the party that 
Ulster and the threat of Home Rule became an increasingly live 
issue from the early summer of 1911 onwards, largely as a result 
of two of the leading Halsburyites, Carson and Hugh Cecil.
VII
In Ulster plans for self-defence were already well under way. The 
election defeat of December 1910 gave these plans an added 
momentum. The Ulster Unionist Clubs were reorganised in January 
1911 by the president of their organisation, Lord Templetown. By 
April the new organisation was preparing to launch a propaganda 
offensive in Britain, and by May over 125 new clubs had been 
formed, with 5 twinned with English clubs^. Along similar 
lines, the Unionist Associations of Ireland (UAI) sketched out 
in January plans for a major campaign in Britain, creating 4 sub­
agents to coordinate 9 local groups over the distribution of
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literature, the direction of speakers and the control of funds. 
Also in January, an executive committee of the Ulster Unionist 
Council (UUC) was created to coordinate activity between the
qc
Ulster clubs, the Orange lodges and the U.U.C. . But it was the 
smuggling of arms into Ulster which increasingly became the most 
pressing concern for the Ulstermen. Craig, writing to Crawford, 
the U.U.C.'s procurement officer, confided in April: 'I am
strongly of the opinion that the fishing rods should be got in 
at once as secretly as possible... My great fear is that the game 
will be up before anything is done. It is a mere matter of 
time'56. With the threat of a mass creation of Peers, Home Rule 
could be a matter of just months away. Craig and the entire 
Ulster Unionist machine was galvanising itself into a state of 
preparation to meet this eventuality. By the summer of 1911 
Ulster was increasingly looking to her own for protection.
Carson's prominence in the no-surrender movement had much 
to do with Ireland. Elected leader of the Ulster Unionists in 
February 1910, he had been of all the Chamberlainites the most 
lukewarm towards federalism when it arose in October, though had 
admitted its value under certain circumstances. With defeat at 
the second election Ireland was now exposed much more visibly to 
the threat of Home Rule. From early January 1911 he began to 
think of the significance of the new political situation. 'I have 
a lot of plans as to what might be done1, he wrote to Lady 
Londonderry', I only wish I was younger and stronger for the 
fight'^7. Realising that Home Rule was the clear intent of the 
Government once the Parliament bill was passed, he was dismayed 
at the course Lansdowne and Balfour were taking from June
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onwards. Recognising that a House of Lords with no veto was of 
no value in resisting Home Rule, he was drawn into the no­
surrender movement. He believed the Government were bluffing and 
would only create enough Peers to pass the Parliament bill, still 
leaving a huge anti-Horne Rule majority. He also believed that a 
show of force and backbone would rally the party and country 
firmly behind the coming campaign against Home Rule. Balfour's 
tactics on the Lords issue suggested serious consequences for 
future resistance to Home Rule. If they gave way on the House of 
Lords what was to stop them giving way over the Union? This 
mistrust led him by the summer to see that Ulster had to look to 
her own. 'If anything is to be done the Ulstermen must do it
QO
themselves'70.
Carson tried to raise the threat of Home Rule and the 
profile of Ulster over the spring and early summer of 1911. Yet 
his attempts fell rather flat. On June 3rd he complained to Lady 
Londonderry, 'I feel so despondent about the Home Rule 
campaign'^. And later in the same month, ' I am so depressed 
about the Home Rule question.. I am also concerned as to whether 
we can raise sufficient money for a really big effort and I do 
not see much sign of the younger men taking up the work'*^. 
However, by July these early forebodings were beginning to give 
way to a much more positive attitude to Ulster and Home Rule. 
After Asquith's revelations that he had royal guarantees and 
Lansdowne's finally recommending a policy of abstention, things 
began to change. Central to this change was an active cooperation 
between Carson and Craig.
This was to be a pivotal relationship throughout the next
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three years. Carson was already in contact with Craig, but it is 
unclear whether he had inside knowledge of Ulster developments 
or how far he himself was willing to take events. From July 
onwards, under Craig's influence and with circumstances changing 
in regard to the Parliament bill, Carson became much more 
involved with the brewing Ulster revolt, learning of preparations 
on the ground and replying to the growing militancy of Ulster in 
kind. 'What I am very anxious about', he told Craig, 'is to 
satisfy myself that the people over there mean to resist. I am 
not for a mere game of bluff... We will., be confronted by many 
weaklings in our own camp, who talk very loud and mean nothing 
and will be the first to criticise us when the moment of action 
comes. For this we must be prepared'1®*. Craig saw the immense 
benefits which the close alliance with Carson, a powerful and 
influential figure within the Tory party, would have for the 
cause of Ulster. If Carson was willing to fight tooth and nail 
for them, as his letter of July 29th suggests, Craig was quick 
to draw him into affairs. He informed him of the steps already 
underway in Ulster, strengthening loyalty through complicity. 
Craig also flattered Carson, arranging a massive demonstration 
in September at Craigavon as much for winning over Carson as for 
convincing the outside world of Ulster's determination. Craig 
described the meeting as one 'to.. tender you (Carson) personally 
as leader in the forthcoming struggle a hearty and generous 
welcome to the North but also prove in the most emphatic way that 
we could conceive, that you had at your back in a solid phalanx 
the very best of all Ulster'1®^ . Thus by the time the Parliament 
bill passed into law, Carson was closely linked with Ulster's
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plan of resistance.
Support for a vigorous Ulster campaign also came from Hugh 
Cecil. Cecil was another leading advocate of the Halsbury group 
in which circles he had made contact with Carson. His attacks on 
the Parliament Bill as a breach of the constitution and a 
suspension of any referral mechanism moved him to justify 
rebellion in Ulster in defence of their rights. 'The contest 
about Home rule', he informed the Commons on August 9th, 'will 
not be decided in the city of Westminster at all. It will rather 
be decided in the city of Belfast’ . Cecil saw that Ulster 
could also provide the means to drive the Parliament bill into 
the sand; to show it as an unworkable and dangerous innovation 
by sparking a grave constitutional impasse. He therefore urged 
Ulster to prepare. Early in September he sent Craig a memorandum 
concerning the raising in Ulster of a plan of campaign. Craig 
told Carson that 'Lord Hugh's letter and Memorandum., admirable 
and practically follows a course of action which some of us have 
had mapped out'*®*. Carson agreed with many of Lord Hugh's ideas 
and was keen to involve him in affairs: 'what our people fear
however is that there may be no opportunity of showing the 
validity of their opposition.. by resistance until a bill is 
passed.. But some organised way must be found.. I am so glad you 
are interested1*®®.
By September 1911 Carson and Cecil, respective 
representatives of the traditional and constructive wings of the 
party, were working to encourage Ulster to 'make a big effort., 
to stir up some life over this Home Rule fight'*®®. Both were 
motivated by a suspicion of the existing leadership. As Carson
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wrote to Lady Londonderry towards the end of August, ’I feel very 
doubtful about the way our leaders intend to fight Home Rule, but 
in any event I will lead for myself this tirne'*^. Both realised 
that if Home Rule could be defeated, then the Parliament Act 
would have been dealt a mortal blow. And both saw the advantage 
of channelling the sense of outrage and anger at events of the 
summer into a new, tough, energetic movement of resistance. 'The 
country is calling out for a strong man', Carson wrote on August 
29th. And again on September 16th: 'I am sure the whole party in 
the country is crying out for something more than the 
"gentlemanly party"
VIII
Balfour therefore faced a serious situation by the autumn of 
1911. His leadership over the Parliament Act had been severely 
questioned by many in the party. The "Frondeurs" had founded a 
club to institutionalise their revolt and keep the spirit of 
defiance alive inside the party. And now a diehard stand was 
brewing up over the expected introduction of Home Rule. All 
leaders at some time face such factionalism and Balfour was no 
stranger to it; but the events of the summer were a more serious 
threat for several reasons. First, because it was a combination 
of constructive Unionists as well as more traditional Tories, who 
ought to have been amongst Balfour's natural supporters. Second, 
the Halsbury club was looking to agree a set of policies which 
it would then promote within the party. Implicit here was a 
mistrust of Balfour's leadership and judgement, hence the desire
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to limit his freedom to exercise both. The clearest example of 
this was the emerging Ulster campaign by the summer of 1911. 
Carson, Craig and Cecil viewed Balfour’s leadership with 
scepticism: 'milk and water' was how Carson described it to Lady 
Londonderry1®®. He lacked the backbone with which to make a firm 
stand against the coming Home Rule bill, and would, if not 
checked by a solid, immovable force, follow the same tactics as 
over the Parliament bill. Historians have been little surprised 
that, after such disputes and the reservations felt about his 
direction of the party, Balfour resigned the leadership early in 
November.
However, Balfour's resignation may not have been the simple 
and inevitable consequence of grave party tensions that many have 
assumed. As we have seen, the Halsbury club was badly divided by 
September 1911, and new issues were rising to replace the Lords 
question. Home Rule, in particular, was such an issue, and one 
where Balfour could be a force for inspiration rather than 
division. The timing of his resignation was peculiarly well- 
placed to injure the prospects of the leading contender for his 
post (and organiser of the Diehard revolt)- Chamberlain- and so 
provoke a damaging leadership contest. This might have been 
Balfourian pique, or may have involved the even more 
Machiavellian ideas of throwing the party into a state of turmoil 
from which he would reemerge as solely capable of reunifying the 
squabbling Tory factions. Odd snippets and comments lend an 
element of plausibility to this latter interpretation11®. And 
though this may be to push tactical calculation a little too far, 
it serves as a corrective to the idea that Balfour necessarily
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glided effortlessly and without rancour from the leadership.
A similar distortion shapes our impression of Bonar Law and his 
replacement of Balfour as leader of the Tory party. He is 
portrayed as the compromise choice, who reached the top through 
fortuitous circumstances. Like Baldwin, who acquired the 
leadership after a "slice off the top", Bonar Law is seen as 
having replaced Balfour because Chamberlain and Long cancelled 
each other out.
Yet in many respects he was the obvious successor. Of all 
the candidates, only Bonar Law had support from all wings of the 
Tory spectrum. His wobbliness on Tariff Reform, in supporting the 
Referendum, recommended him to more traditional Conservatives. 
And his support for Lansdowne over the Lords question, in a 
forceful letter to The Times, endeared him to the official 
leadership111. He avoided involvement in the Halsbury club and, 
alongside Walter Long, helped with the Devonshire House group, 
which sought to rally the leadership behind Balfour in July and 
August 1911. For the constructive right, Bonar Law was still a 
senior Tariff Reform leader, with a tough debating manner, in the 
mould of Joseph Chamberlain. He had been active in the 
Confederate movement and closely associated with the 
Chamberlainites until the breach over the Referendum. Despite 
this he retained much sympathy amongst the forward elements in 
the party; as Maxse said, 'you are the only one who the diehards
117would have accepted' . Bonar Law had the ability to straddle 
the various party cliques. It was a balancing act of great 
importance for his leadership prospects. He also possessed a 
powerful and recognised platform and Commons style. This appeared
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all the more impressive in a Parliamentary atmosphere which, from 
1909 onwards, was increasingly tense and bitter. He had none of 
the brash self-confidence of Smith and was more liked as a 
consequence; and, though a symbol of new money, he declined the 
ostentation of the nouveau riche. Bonar Law occupied a prominent 
niche in the Tory Pantheon.
History, of course, is littered with great men who never 
reached the very top. How did Bonar Law utilise his undoubted 
qualities? In the shifting events which immediately proceeded 
Balfour's retirement, Bonar Law played a shrewd hand. Sensing the 
hostility against Chamberlain from inside the party and aware 
that, as a consequence, another candidate would stand in 
opposition, he recognised the strength of a "unity" contestant. 
Meeting him towards the end of October 1911, Chamberlain noted,
'Law here gave the conversation a personal touch by saying that 
I personally..ought not to wish that Balfour should not retire 
now as the Halsbury Club militated against me it had thrown some 
men into Long's arms and Long would just now collect too many 
discontented men to admit of my being chosen if a vacancy 
occurred...I think that B.L.(Law) does feel that if Balfour 
retired and I (Austen) were too unpopular with a section of the 
party to be chosen to succeed, the leadership must fall to
himself and I have no doubt he would like it in exactly the same
111
sense as I should'1 . Clearly Bonar Law was sensitive to the 
opportunities which lay before him.
It was not an easy hand to play. There was nothing to stop 
the two main candidates carrying on to the very end. It assumed 
a substantial anti-Chamberlain sentiment. It also could have
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turned many in the party against him, dismayed at this sudden 
display of ambition, though he covered his tracks well by 
claiming to simply be 1establish(ing) a qualification for the 
future'***. More seriously, the strength of third place stemmed 
from an evenly divided party. Bonar Law was reliant on a credible 
alternative stepping forward, who could mount a serious challenge 
to Chamberlain.
In this he was fortunate: Walter Long entered the leadership 
fray. Long's candidacy was widely predicted by most party 
observers. Few doubted the weight he carried in party circles; 
his influence amongst the landowning and Tory sections of the 
Unionist party amounted to a solid block of support. He was 
fierce in his condemnation of Chamberlain, and by raising the 
Tory standard against allegedly disloyal Liberal-Unionists (a 
move to blame Selborne and Chamberlain for Balfour's 
resignation), he sought to rally the traditional Tories. Long was 
the ideal candidate from Bonar Law's point of view. 
Unpredictable, cantankerous with a love for political intrigue, 
Long ensured that the contest would be bitter, schismatic and 
without the prospect of later being healed.
A contest between Long and Chamberlain was the perfect 
scenario for Law to play the 'third person..; in such 
circumstances the tertium quid will probably be the right 
solution and the tertium quid can only be Bonar Law'**^. Not 
only did they divide the party fairly evenly but along a much 
deeper and dangerous rift; Liberal Unionist versus Tory. More 
ominously, whoever won the leadership could expect little 
cooperation from the loser. As early as October 11th, Chamberlain
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had admitted, 'I could not yield opinions to Long as I had 
yielded them more than once to Balfour; nor would he yield to 
me'^. The Tories faced the prospect of a bloody crisis of 
succession, more suited to a fourteenth century Italian court 
than a modern Conservative party.
Bonar Law's role as a unity candidate was not passive. 
Certainly, the strength of his position relied on a sequence of 
events occurring; but instead of assuming the leadership, we 
should talk of Law taking it. His great source of strength was 
that his candidacy fatally wounded Chamberlain's chances. Though 
shrouded in disloyalty, Chamberlain was still a powerful 
contender and for many the obvious replacement. He drew support 
from Tariff Reform and forward sections, and from party 
wirepullers such as Steel-Maitland, Balcarres and the Whips room. 
He even captured some moderate and centrist Tories, who, though 
angered at the Halsbury Club business, were fearful of their 
party being led by Long. The result of a straight fight between 
Chamberlain and Long would have been exceedingly close. With 
little concrete evidence, beyond vague partisan exaggeration, 
both candidates stood an "evens" chance of winning. Bonar Law's 
intervention, however, tipped the scale decisively in Long's 
favour, by drawing off Chamberlainite support. Law's opportunity 
was Chamberlain's difficulty.
As a leading Tariff Reformer, Bonar Law secured a small but 
influential body of sympathy from this wing. Goulding, Alfred 
Lyttleton, Beaverbrook, Worthington-Evans, Griffith-Boscawen and 
Harry Chaplin all indicated support for him. Those moderates who 
had been moving towards Chamberlain through sheer disbelief in
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Long as leader now saw Bonar Law as an attractive alternative. 
And with The Daily Express vigorously plumping for him, he had 
the nearest equivalent to a leadership campaign.
Chamberlain and his friends saw the damage Bonar Law was 
doing. 'I aim furious with him', Balcarres told Chamberlain, ’of
117course it injures your chance' . Chamberlain replied in a
classic example of understatement: 'I confess I feel a little
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grieved1 . Nor did the protestations, made to him, to retire 
in Chamberlain1 s favour, make any difference. He was determined 
to stand and so ruin Chamberlain's opportunity. It is hard to see 
this as simply staking a claim for the future. He had his eyes 
fixed rigidly on the present. By doggedly remaining in the 
leadership contest, Bonar Law was working to limit Chamberlain's 
support, by forcing him to choose between allowing Long to take 
the leadership or retiring in his favour. At this crucial time 
in the careers of both men, Law showed the greater political 
ruthlessness and so reaped the larger political prize: a
difference Chamberlain was well aware of. 'I don't think that if 
our positions had been reversed I could have acted as he 
did'119.
Chamberlain then faced two options: first, to retire in
favour of Long. This had much to recommend it. If he had carried 
on regardless, with Law's implacable candidacy, it seems he would 
have lost. Yet by handing his main opponent the crown, which in 
any case he could no longer win, Chamberlain would gain several 
advantages. He would re-establish his own credibility amongst the 
more traditional elements of the party. Such an act of selfless 
sacrifice, in the name of party loyalty, would bring him the
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cross-party sympathy he had always lacked. So when Long quickly 
undermined himself as leader- a widely predicted and far from an 
unrealistic assumption- Chamberlain stood to take the leadership 
unopposed and at the head of a united party. Long was also in 
poor health, so that even if he had overcome his own 
limitations, illness might have removed him from the stage. It 
was a tantalising possibility, which both Balcarres and Sandars 
recommended. Chamberlain also considered it, but rejected it as 
'satan's suggestion'^®. Whatever demonic influence there was in 
the strategem, three temporal speculations might explain 
Chamberlain's refusal.
First, could Chamberlain swallow the bitter pill of defeat, 
to serve under Long, however brief the experience? Second, Could 
Chamberlain trust the unpredictable Long to be predictably 
incompetent- especially with Home Rule casting its shadow over 
British politics? As an ex-Chief Secretary, ex-leader of the 
Ulster Unionists and Chairman of the Ulster Defence League, Long 
could use the issue to consolidate his leadership. Home Rule was 
perhaps the one topic on which Long had a degree of credibility 
and so his leadership might not have been the bungling affair so 
widely forecast. Third, with Balfour still hovering in the wings, 
it was far from certain that Austen would be the natural 
successor. Long would certainly have been more inclined to see 
Balfour replace him than Chamberlain. Also, Balfour's immense 
pedigree over Home Rule and the strong support he still 
controlled in the party, perhaps made him the more likely choice 
to succeed Long.
The second option, which Chamberlain decided to follow on
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November 10th, was to force Long into a joint-retirement in 
favour of Bonar Law. The only doubt was whether Long would co­
operate. There was little real substance to this qualm. 
Chamberlain had earlier sensed that Long would prefer Law to 
become leader if Long himself could not succeed. Since Long was 
invoking loyalty as a weapon against Chamberlain, a refusal on 
his part to support the unity candidate might well have thrown 
support behind Chamberlain and revived his prospects. And with 
Bonar Law at the helm, the party had, Chamberlain assumed, a more 
committed Tariff Reformer. Inexperienced and ignorant in many 
areas of policy, Bonar Law would be heavily reliant on advice. 
'Without being leader1, his brother Neville told Chamberlain, 'a 
man can have the predominant position within his party, as we 
know'^. Austen might play his father's role; and Bonar Law, 
like Long in the alternative strategy, might be regarded as a 
stop-gap.
Chamberlain's great act of generosity, in suggesting a dual 
retirement, was a considered tactical move, forced upon him by 
Bonar Law's determined candidacy. Law's standing for the 
leadership meant that Chamberlain could not win. His only option 
was how to lose. A quarter of a century later Chamberlain's 
bitterness was still evident. 'He (Law) was not mildly ambitious
but intensely ambitious- I sometimes think he was the most
177ambitious man whom I have ever known in politics' .
Towards Walter Long, Bonar Law revealed a similar 
determination. After all, he had the power not just to diminish 
Chamberlain's chances but also to enhance them. If he retired 
from the contest, as Carson had done, most of his support would
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have moved over to Chamberlain. This was certainly how the Chief 
Whip saw it. Worse still, he might publicly recommend his 
supporters to transfer to Chamberlain, gravely impairing Long's 
prospects. In regard to Long, Bonar Law had an equally strong 
bargaining position.
This strength was magnified by Long's own attitude to the 
leadership. His overriding concern was to prevent Chamberlain 
replacing Balfour, rather than his own acquisition of the post. 
In fact, there is some substance to the view that Long did not 
actually desire the leadership. 'I suspect that if you peep into 
all our houses today (Nov 12th) you would find Walter Long not 
a little relieved that he is not to be put to the test'*22. This 
would account for the rumours suggesting that after a first 
ballot for the leadership, if neither candidate held an outright 
majority, Long would retire from the contest, recommending that 
his supporters now support Law. Balcarres noted that, 'Austen 
says that Walter Long has abandoned claims for the leadership and 
has settled to put forward Bonar Law as his nominee when a
194vacancy occurs' .
One must be careful here not to adopt the Chamberlainite 
version of events too readily. He was more interested in relaying 
a "conspiracy" theory than a balanced assessment. Yet the idea 
of some form of arrangement between Long and Law can be pieced 
together from other shreds of evidence. Chamberlain, writing to 
his wife, a neutral player, mentioned that 'he (Long) will throw 
all his weight into the scale against me and might get Bonar Law
lie
c h o s e n ' . After a meeting between Law and Long, on August 14th 
1911, Goulding wrote to Law: 'I hope your interview confirmed the
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resignation talk, if so there is much for serious 
consideration'*7^ . On November 10th Long, having decided to 
retire in Law's favour, shows none of the brooding frustration 
of Chamberlain over the decision. 'As far as I am concerned I can 
assure you that you will have my wholehearted and loyal 
support..you are the only man who can unite the party'*77. In 
the same letter, Long seems to let the cat momentarily out of the 
bag. 'Remember it is not a fight between individuals, it is 
really a case of Conservatives versus Liberal Unionists.. .neither 
side will give way now and after an election much mischief would 
prevail' *7®.
The notion of some form of arrangement fits in with the 
wider interpretation of events. From Long's point of view it 
provided insurance against Law retiring from the contest. For 
Bonar Law, it insured two things. First, that Long would readily 
withdraw in Law's favour. Second, that even if the leadership 
struggle went to a first ballot, he stood a good chance of 
winning on the second. Law took the leadership not only because 
of his unique qualities but because he had executed a manoeuvre 
of great nerve. As a determined third candidate, on the centre- 
right of the party, he prevented Chamberlain from becoming 
leader. The possibility that he might reverse this decision 
assured him of Long's support. The idea that he was simply a 
compromise candidate ignores the complex manoeuvring which 
surrounded the transfer of power in November, and underrates Law 
as a politician.
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CHAPTER TWO
I
To the outside world, Bonar Law's election as leader of the 
Conservative party in the Commons was sudden and unexpected. High 
Society positively shivered at the thought of an iron-merchant 
replacing the urbane Arthur Balfour. Lady Londonderry scarcely 
hid her disdain: 'I should have thought England and the Tory
party might have produced an Englishman to lead the latter1*. A 
close friend informed Winterton, 'I am concerned at dear Bonar's 
apparent ignorance of country life now that he is leader of the
9
country gentleman's p a r t y .  Arthur Lee, who had entered 
Parliament at the same time as Bonar Law, and was clearly 
jealous, commented that 'after the aristocratic elegance and 
courtly bearing of A.J.B., Bonar's commonplace and commercial 
appearance, his apparently ready-made clothing and almost 
aggressive lack of distinction made them (blue-bloodied Tories) 
feel vaguely uncomfortable'J. Bonar Law was a Presbyterian by 
religion and held no land, in a party strongly Anglican and still 
politically dominated by the landed classes. 'No Tory less 
resembled a Cavalier'4. Chamberlain summed up the position well: 
'He had no connection with the great Tory families; he was 
unknown outside political circles...To the ideas of the landed 
gentry, so influential and still so numerous in the Tory ranks, 
he was a stranger'^. Yet he did little to improve his position. 
He neither patronised the ancestral homes of the aristocracy nor 
concerned himself with the social calendar. This might appear a
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noble disregard for aristocratic pretension, but in the world of 
Tory politics it was a weakness, if not a mistake.
In addition Bonar Law had to tread carefully amidst the 
bruised egos on the opposition front bench: Chamberlain, Carson, 
Long, Lyttleton and Wyndham. He had first entered Parliament in 
1900 and had held no Cabinet post. Now, eleven years later, to 
be "leap-frogging" over men of greater ministerial experience did 
little to cement his leadership. This was made more difficult by 
his obvious deficiency in many areas of policy. 'How Bonar Law 
can help us without any knowledge of Foreign Affairs, Navy, 
Church questions or Home Rule, the Lord alone knows!®. Foreign 
Affairs were a particular worry, with Balfour out of the House 
and with the recent death of Lord Percy, previously an under­
secretary at the Foreign Office. Bonar Law was not, it should be 
noted, known for his association with the cause of Union. The 
Irish Times commented on November 11th that 'Irish Unionists 
would no doubt have preferred that the choice should fall upon 
Mr Long' and could only vaguely reassure their readers that, 'he 
is held to be a sound Unionist'7. Ronald McNeil referred to 
Balfour's retirement as a 'calamity' and greeted the new leader 
with reticence:'Mr Bonar Law whose great qualities as 
Parliamentarian and Statesman had not yet been revealed'®. John 
Lonsdale was less cautious. To Balcarres he admitted that he was 
'furious' at the outcome. 'In my opinion', he wrote, 'he is 
wanting in knowledge of statecraft...he has never been a cabinet 
minister and is nothing like as able a Parliamentarian as Mr Long 
and Mr Chamberlain'®. Irish Unionists had wanted Carson and in 
his absence Long. What they got was Bonar Law, who was associated
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with the Tariff Reform wing of the party and had flirted with 
federalism in 1910.
Backbench Conservative reactions to his accession is harder 
to gauge. There was a great sense of bonhomie at the manner in 
which the new leader had emerged. Yet signs of anxiety can also 
be observed. Sanders reported that the Liberal Unionist section 
was far from happy at the arrangement*®. Bridgeman, recently 
appointed to the whips office, detected similar murmurings. 
Writing on November 10th, when the compromise had been agreed, 
he noted that 'there is now a greater feeling of discontent about 
than at any previous time, and many of the supporters of each 
protagonist think their man has been jockeyed out. I fear that 
Mondays meeting may now be a stormy one' **. The same day 
Balcarres noted in his diary talks with various Long supporters. 
Their 'last and chief objection; that B.L. would not be the free
selection of the party, that his choice is arranged, undemocratic
l?etc1 . And just two days before the meeting at which Bonar Law 
was formally adopted he informed him that 'there was undoubted 
discontent amongst those who think they are baulked of their 
prey' **.
Balcarres, disturbed at the prospect of open criticism, 
exerted the full weight of his office to stifle discussion from 
the floor. 'Up till the last moment there was a real risk that 
one indiscreet comment or one pointed question might have given 
rise to debate which, once started, could not readily have been 
controlled. The result of any discussion whatever would have been 
wounding. . .1 put every man on his honour, whatever may have been 
his motives or desires'**. He also canvassed the help of George
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Cave to 'pour oil on troubled waters if necessary' and Chaplin 
to silence Lady Londonderry^. At Monday's meeting the unifying 
speeches of Chamberlain, Chaplin, Carson and Walter Long were 
vital to ensure Bonar Law's formal selection was carried 
smoothly. Long's speech, in particular, was of rare quality, 'a 
masterpiece of plain speaking and noble devotion to the best 
interests of the party and country'^. He was clearly aware of 
the dangers that faced Bonar Law. Any protest or criticism from 
members would have impaired his position and kept the question 
of the leadership open. This would have worked to Chamberlain's 
advantage, with the Halsbury episode forgotten after his initial 
retirement in Bonar Law's favour. In the end, with the party 
machine behind him, Bonar Law was unanimously selected. But it 
was a far from contented party that left the meeting. 'On 
breaking up', Balcarres noted in his diary, 'men consented to 
sink their differences and to work harmoniously under the new
17leader'; hardly a glowing endorsement of the new leader1 .
In such circumstances apprehension and suspicion of Bonar 
Law amongst the party leadership was inevitable. Balcarres, a 
Chamberlainite, felt some bitterness towards him for having 
pressed his candidature so hard and refusing to retire in 
Chamberlain's favour. F.E.Smith, another supporter of 
Chamberlain, remained on frosty terms with Bonar Law; 'he thinks 
Smith has most to fear from him'*®. In response, the new leader 
quickly moved to appease Smith by inviting him on to the 
frontbench. Lansdowne was always correct in his relations with 
Bonar Law, but scarcely friendly or particulary helpful in this 
early period. Carson was suspicious of the new leader, unsure of
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his stance on Home Rule. Austen Chamberlain remained aggrieved, 
although his position was far from hopeless. He had time, and 
could wait for Bonar Law to trip - a not unrealistic expectation- 
while gradually increasing his influence over policy and his 
standing within the party. And if Balfour had been entertaining 
thoughts of a return to the leadership in the future, then the 
selection of Bonar Law as leader could hardly have deterred him. 
Other, less significant, leaders were no more supportive. Curzon 
was condescending. Arthur Lee was dismissive and jealous, and 
Salisbury and his two brothers were far from impressed. 'One 
cannot say', Lord Hugh Cecil wrote to Lord Robert, 'that it is 
a good plan to select your third candidate; but on cool 
reflection I am inclined to think it will suit you and me'^.
Bonar Law's position was also complicated by the leadership 
being shared with Lansdowne. It was by no means clear that a 
Unionist ministry formed at any time before the 1914, would have 
been led by Bonar Law. Certainly it was more than possible that 
the King would have sent for Lansdowne, given his ministerial 
experience, or even have sent for Balfour - still held in very 
high regard by the king. This weakened Bonar Law's standing. If 
he was not the automatic or even the likely choice as Prime- 
Minister, his position in the Commons had a temporary quality 
about it. Both his main rivals had admitted they did not regard 
the November 1911 solution as permanent, and saw him as a stop- 
gap". His leadership was more than normally on trial, so was 
forced by the weakness of his position to "cut a dash", to win 
his spurs and throw restraint to the winds in order to 
consolidate his hold over the party. This situation gave his
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capable colleagues room to advance their own prospects at his 
expense. It seems clear that by early 1912 the leadership 
question was still not settled inside the Conservative party. ’It 
must however be remembered1, warned The Irish Times, 'that Mr Law 
will not step into the place occupied by Mr Balfour. He will 
become simply the leader of the party in the Commons... The
question of the general leadership of the party, however, may be
71expected to remain for some time in abeyance' .
On assuming the leadership, Bonar Law faced severe 
difficulties. He lacked overall control over the direction of the 
party, and he inherited Balfour’s shadow cabinet where his 
personal influence was nil and Chamberlain1s quite strong. He had 
few close colleagues to rely on. His one supporter within the 
shadow cabinet had been Alfred Lyttelton, whose influence was 
limited. Nor could he quickly bring forward his own supporters
77(Goulding, Aitken, Gilbert Parker, Worthington-Evans)^. And 
without a power base within the shadow cabinet Bonar Law was at 
the mercy of this unofficial body over tactics or policy, at risk 
of being pushed into the background and with little chance of 
earning respect for his ability to guide the party. 'Bonar Law 
will not I think really lead,' thought Hugh Cecil, 'it will be 
done by a committee' . It was important, then, that Bonar Law 
strengthened his position against these constraints. This he did 
by calling shadow cabinets as infrequently as he could, and then 
only when it would rubber-stamp his views (as with the Tariff 
issue and Ireland) or on topics of which he had little knowledge 
or interest (India, Foreign affairs). He also tended to allow a 
particular position to emerge from the leadership or party on its
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own accord and then give it his authority/ taking no fixed 
initial line but allowing the party to decide where it wanted to 
go. This can be seen over the payment of M.P.s, National 
Insurance and, most dramatically, in his pirouette over the 
dropping of food taxes late in 1912. In this way he established 
much closer contact with backbenchers who felt, after many years 
of Balfour's distant rule, that their opinions now mattered. His 
leadership (except over Ireland) might thus seem essentially 
pragmatic, even Baldwinite, adjusting to the shifts and gusts of 
party opinion rather than moulding it to his own outlook. Yet 
this had the danger of making him appear indecisive when that 
opinion either did not formulate itself or could not be 
perceived. 1B .Law shrinks from facing the difficult problems 
ahead on which difficult pronouncements will ere long be
91demanded- referendum, food taxes etc1 .
In these circumstances, Bonar Law became the focus of 
various personal ambitions. These required delicate handling: 
frustration of political ambitions could easily create enemies, 
as Balfour had found to his cost. Aitken might have coveted the 
post of Parliamentary secretary to Bonar Law, but this was 
swiftly resisted by Balcarres. Goulding pressed F.E.Smith's 
claims on Bonar Law, which the new leader accepted, recognising 
the opportunity of converting a dangerous challenger. Bonar Law 
also invited Robert Cecil onto the front bench, after the 
latter's victory at Hitchin on November 23rd. This was a shrewd 
move, shifting the balance in the shadow cabinet away from 
Chamberlain and absorbing a dangerous critic of Conservative 
fiscal policy. Others, too, had to be treated with care. Curzon
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pressed his claims on the new leader, envisaging a kind of Junta: 
'I hope Lansdowne, you and I may have a confidential talk before 
long on some aspects of the political situation'2®. Arthur Lee, 
recognising a lack of specialist knowledge on Army matters on the 
opposition front-bench, hoped to fill such a role2®. And perhaps 
Milner, a little angered at Balfour's neglect of him, also hoped
77to play a larger part in Tory affairs .
Leadership did not come naturally to Bonar Law. Shyness
often made him appear distant to the less informed Parliamentary 
member. His visits to London clubs were irregular, preferring as 
he did to return home to his family. He remained an infrequent
patron of the Commons tea and smoking rooms. Such reticence gave
the impression that he was indifferent and lazy: 'the Viscount. .. 
says B.L. is a slacker, well I have often thought the same, but 
his domestic affliction must explain much of his indolence'2®. 
Nerves were also a problem: he felt keenly the responsibility of 
his new position. At the Carlton Club meeting 'his (Bonar Law's) 
speech was the feeblest of the day. He was evidently moved and
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nervous'". Chamberlain criticised his Albert Hall speech of 
January 1912 as being too undisciplined in its accusations of 
political corruption by the Liberals. And during the debate on 
the address, in February 1912, Bonar Law made a serious mistake 
over National Insurance which 'caused much trouble'®®. These 
early nerves were not helped by the ridicule he received from 
Asquith: 'His scorn about the "new style", his patronising airs, 
and a provocative attitude of supercilious superiority - all 
these were small and mean1®*. Such belittlements did not assist 
Bonar Law's quest for approval and standing. Nor did it endear
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him to other Tory leaders, many of whom may have shared Asquith’s 
disdain.
Over-compensating for his early nerves and his isolation 
from the leadership, Bonar Law was too deferential towards his 
colleagues. Hugh Cecil wrote of the new leader that he ’was the 
nicest and most amiable of men and also unfortunately very 
modest'; not qualities which inspired authority and obedience . 
These features were exacerbated when Balfour returned to the 
Commons. ’His presence I am afraid a little overwhelms and 
oppresses B.L.... consequently the presence of Arthur makes him 
feel his immeasurable inferiority' . With Lansdowne he was also 
careful, deferential in tone, ensuring that any decision was 
taken jointly. He also leaned heavily on Balcarres for guidance, 
information, organisation and advice, and he assiduously kept up 
a regular correspondence with other Tory leaders, asking for 
views and comments. It was all very different from Balfour.
His leadership might have been even more precarious were it 
not for several favourable circumstances. The whole episode of 
having chosen a new leader was itself enough to raise morale, a 
sort of cathartic experience from which the party had now 
emerged. Second, a string of by-election victories greeted the 
new Tory chief. The Tories gained seats from the Liberals in 
South Somerset and North Ayrshire, and Oldham and Hitchin were 
retained with enlarged majorities. The Government also appeared 
to be in serious difficulties during the first months of Bonar 
Law's leadership. National Insurance was proving a grave 
political liability; the suffrage question openly split the 
cabinet, with Asquith pitched against most of his colleagues; and
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there were problems over the formulation of the Home Rule 
bill^. All of these helped to improve Tory party spirits. 
Steel-Maitland could tell the Birmingham Conservative club of the 
'extraordinary improvements in the prospects of the Unionist 
party., in the last month or six weeks'^.
II
Nevertheless, Bonar Law's early position was not helped by the 
series of policy decisions which needed to be taken. Most 
pressing was the question of the referendum pledge given by 
Balfour at the December 1910 election. Austen Chamberlain 
immediately began pressing for its removal and for the 
introduction of the full Tariff policy. On November 11th 1911 he 
informed Bonar Law that 'we start afresh. The party will not and 
ought not to go back to its old position...I could not., join a 
government which proposed to handle Tariff Reform in that 
way 1^ . The alacrity with which Chamberlain exerted such 
pressure was good tactics. Bonar Law was "bound" to him after his 
retirement from the leadership contest, and forced to lean on 
other close colleagues for support in the shadow cabinet. He was 
in no position to counter sustained pressure from Tariff 
Reformers. Equally, Chamberlain must have seen the benefit of 
someone else's bringing in the full Tariff Reform programme, 
allowing Bonar Law to become the focus of much free-food and 
wider party antipathy, so weakening his leadership. Chamberlain 
would gain the policy, so enhancing his own position, but without 
incurring the hostility of sections of the party.
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.Chamberlain was challenged by elements on the traditional 
Right and from the Unionist free-fooders. Led by Long, the 
Cecils, Curzon and St Aldwyn, it was a determined movement to 
remove the food tax incubus once and for all. Despite Bonar Law's 
long association with Tariff Reform, this group was confident of 
success. He was seen as a pragmatist who had initiated Balfour's 
referendum pledge; he was also at that time weak. And, more 
significantly, the free-fooders believed that if the food tax was 
to be removed without splitting the party, only a Tariff Reformer 
could carry out the process. Like the Tariff Reformers, the free- 
fooders saw the first months of Bonar Law's leadership as the 
most suitable moment for effecting such a change. 'He will be 
accessible', wrote Lord Hugh to his brother Robert, 'and not 
unreasonable and sitting as he does for Lancashire he will as the 
election approaches at any rate understand the difficulties of 
Tariff Reform'^.
Bonar Law met these pressures by patching together a 
compromise. At the first Shadow cabinet meeting under his 
leadership on February 22nd 1912, with Lansdowne’s support he 
agreed to drop the Referendum without dropping the food tax. At 
first sight this was a victory for Chamberlain: the referendum 
was gone, and full Tariff Reform was once more party policy. 
However, to keep the loyalty of the free-fooders, the alteration 
was not to be made public and a future removal of the food taxes 
was not ruled out by Bonar Law. If anything, without the 
referendum as a screen the move was bound to harden opinion 
against the taxes. It was, then, a fragile compromise, but one 
which held for the next nine months. It was also a shrewd one.
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Bonar Law had managed to extract both an agreement as well as to 
delay any final decision. This was vital. He could not impose a 
settlement so early in his new office, when his position was weak 
and before opinion had properly formed on the subject. Through 
delay, he hoped that a clear line of policy would emerge from the 
backbenches to which he could then give a lead. His handling of 
this problem emphasised the pragmatic nature of his leadership, 
although the issue was to have near-disastrous consequences later 
in the year.
The problem of the House of Lords exercised many in the 
party but little agreement was possible. Since 1910, the issue 
had divided those who wanted to preserve from those who would 
boldly reconstruct. Bonar Law and others avoided concrete reform 
plans and focused attention on the Government's undermining of 
the Constitution, and the methods used to implement the 
Parliament Act. This was a position around which the party could 
unite, evading the need to think constructively about the Upper 
chamber. And emphasising the Government's abuse of power was an 
effective platform for attack: in fact, so powerful was Tory 
discontent over the treatment of the Second Chamber that much of 
the anger towards Home Rule later can only be understood in the 
light of the constitutional methods employed by the Government 
to enact Home Rule.
More problematical for Bonar Law was National Insurance. 
When first introduced into the Commons in May 1911, it had evoked 
a fairly warm response from the Conservative benches. However, 
the decline in party relations following the Parliament Act, and 
the resistance from certain vested interests and working-class
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communities, prompted many Tories to move against it. As a 
consequence, Bonar Law inherited a difficult situation. On the 
one side stood the supporters of the bill, centred around 
F.E.Smith and the U.S.R.C. They argued its importance for Welfare 
provision and for portraying the Tories as a party with a social 
conscience. On the other side, a growing number of Tories opposed 
it, observing its effect on the Insurance companies, the higher 
taxation needed to cover it, the system of patronage and 
appointments established by the scheme, and the coercive nature 
of the proposals. This division lay behind Bonar Law's 
embarrassing slip in the Commons, when Asquith extracted from him 
a rash pledge to repeal the bill; a pledge he was pressured to 
withdraw, in The Times, by Smith and Chamberlain.
Nonetheless, he managed to salvage the situation with some 
skill. While accepting the principle of National Insurance, he 
rejected this particular scheme as over-hasty and unworkable. 
Also, the manner in which the bill had been steam-rollered 
through Parliament, via the guillotine and closure, became an 
excuse to reject the bill. Furthermore, when the bill went to 
the Lords, Bonar Law and Lansdowne decided to allow it through 
instead of delaying it through rejection. This had two benefits. 
Constructive Tories were appeased, with the bill now on the 
statute book; at the same time, the popular backlash against it 
worked to the Opposition's electoral advantage. It gave the 
Tories an effective campaigning issue, rallying to the party 
those grumbling working-class voters who already had insurance 
cover, together with many aggrieved middle-class interests, 
Doctors, Insurance clerks and officials, worried at the drift in
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Liberal social policy. Judging by Central Office publications, 
anti-insurance feeling was seen as the biggest vote-winner for 
the Tory party over 1912 and 1913^.
Bonar Law, then, handled potentially dangerous policy 
decisions well. His leadership was a combination of pragmatism, 
delay and a focus on topics sure to unify colleagues and raise 
morale. His relative surefootedness added to the general 
improvement in party spirit. ’The confidence of the party has 
greatly risen during the last month. Men who distrusted B.L. have 
revised their views. They like his demeanour and find him far 
more attractive as a speaker than was anticipated' .
But it was, as Balcarres suggests, Bonar Law's attraction 
as a speaker which was the single most important factor in the 
consolidation of his position. Reputations were still made and 
unmade on the floor of the Commons, and here he had a great 
advantage over Chamberlain, Long and even Balfour. He was already 
renowned as a very able Parliamentary speaker with a tough 
debating style: Amery compared it to a ’steel-riveter’*®, Simon 
to ’having handfuls of fine, stinging gravel thrown in one’s 
face’**, while for Garvin he was ’brilliant in opposition’^ . 
These qualities were now put to good use. He attacked the 
government with little reservation or regard, often employing 
language that was blunt, rude and extreme: ’A leader who,
whatever his private misgivings, was prepared to sally forth and 
deliver hard, and if need be low, blows at the government’ . He 
introduced a note of bitterness and animosity, evident in his 
first public speech since becoming leader, at Bootle, where he 
informed his audience that Nationalists ’are just now the mildest
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mannered men that ever cut a throat or scuttled a ship'**.
This "new style" of Bonar Law’s achieved a number of 
purposes. It appealed over the heads of the Tory leadership to 
the rank and file members in Parliament, to the young men on the 
backbenches keen for a fight, and even to the local associations 
and the mass of party activists, agents, canvassers and
supporters outside Parliament. He thus built up his influence and 
support within important sections of the party, acting perhaps 
as a counter-weight to his relative weakness within the 
leadership. It also brought him closer to party opinion. By 1911 
party sentiment was changing under a variety stimulants: three 
election defeats, the loss of the Lords' veto power, a
constitution in suspense, innovatory Liberal financial 
legislation and a general belief that the Government had broken 
many of the 'dominant British values of fair play, free speech 
and toleration'^. As a result the Parliamentary party was angry
and frustrated. There appeared to be from 1909 onwards a
qualitative change in the nature of Conservative responses to 
such developments; a general shift to the right by all Tories. 
Something of the diehard spirit of 1911 had entered mainstream 
party sentiment. In this situation, Bonar Law's strong language 
found a receptive audience. 'The party, in its subconscious way, 
likes Bonar Law's attitude precisely because it lacks those very 
qualities which in a Gladstone or a Balfour would conform to high 
Parliamentary tradition...our friends in the country like Bonar 
Law because his attitude is uncompromising'^.
His tough new style also distinguished him from Balfour. 
This was of no small importance, especially after the latter re­
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entered Parliament in the spring of 1912. Balfour still attracted 
the sympathies of many within the party and had the 'old gang1, 
as Balcarres and Lee noted, agitating against Bonar Law for his
J 7
return to the leadership . Balfour was also aided,
unconsciously, by Asquith, who belittled the new leader. In 
portraying Bonar Law as an inexperienced upstart, Asquith
exacerbated Tory leadership problems by commending moderate and 
implicitly Balfourian virtues. Assuming a new style enabled Bonar 
Law to meet this threat, and align a sizeable number of the 
backbenchers behind him: accordingly the returning Balfour
appeared out of tune with the party. By the middle of December
Balcarres could note that 'A.J.B.'s absence passes unnoticed'*®. 
A bold approach also united the party. Many on the traditional 
Right slowly welcomed Bonar Law's defiant tone, recalling the 
days of the great Lord Salisbury, whilst Milner, Selborne and 
Smith began to see Bonar Law as a leader they could follow: as, 
perhaps, the real heir to Joseph Chamberlain, a view which 
implicitly weakened Austen. It also drew Carson and Ulster 
Unionists towards him, no small consideration with Home Rule soon 
to be introduced.
It was, then, his pugnacious style which enabled Bonar Law 
gradually to cement his position. He slowly earned the party's 
loyalty. The effectiveness of his response to the more polished 
Liberal performances served to raise morale and his own standing, 
and a determined lead gave the party a sense of unity.
Ill
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However, the revival of Conservative fortunes over this period
had much to do with by-election victories, Government splits and
National Insurance: Tory high spirits had a temporary quality
about them. The Government, on the other hand, with four years
before the next required election, would soon regain its
momentum, with such radical reforms as Home Rule,
Disestablishment and Land Reform on the horizon. By contrast,
Tories faced the prospect of four years in opposition. They were
divided over Tariff policy, and they had little new to offer to
counter Liberal social radicalism. What was new, such as the
4Qvarious proposals of the U.S.R.C.” , were likely to provoke as 
much party resistance as support. Most demoralising of all was 
their inability to stem the course of Liberal legislation in the 
circumstances created by the Parliament Act. This latter 
constraint was of critical importance to the party over these 
last years of peace; it was the source of much antipathy towards 
the Government, and was the origin of notions widespread within 
Tory circles that they were in the midst of a silent revolution. 
Balfour, speaking at Haddington on October 8th, said that the 
nation was experiencing a 'ministerialist revolution1^ ®. Such 
feelings helped to weaken obligations to conform to normal 
Parliamentary behaviour, to enhance the attractiveness of extreme 
methods, and even to question the basis of constitutional rule 
itself. The party was in danger of spiralling out of control or 
even becoming unleadble.
Under these circumstances, Bonar Law considered several 
strategic decisions as necessary to ensure his survival as 
leader. First, the need to locate a single, all-embracing cause
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with which to "stump" the country and rally support among large 
sections of the electorate. The policy needed to be high-profile 
yet unlikely to divide the party. Second, to aim to return the 
Conservative party to power as quickly as possible. Only office 
could enable them to set about repairing the constitution, heal 
their internal wounds and allow Bonar Law to build up his own 
prestige and authority within Tory ruling circles.
National Insurance might constitute such a cause; widely 
unpopular amongst key social groups which the Tories would need 
to win over, it was an effective issue on public platforms. 
However, it divided the party, especially when alternatives to 
the Liberal scheme were required; Bonar Law had slipped badly on 
this issue in February. And, given the complexity of the measure, 
it was difficult to establish a clear line of attack. By 1912 it 
had passed into law, and its electoral value was therefore a 
diminishing return. He turned instead to the issue of Government 
corruption. This was more effective, since it avoided the detail 
of legislation but made for a clear theme of attack. It could 
draw on a range of topics: the Government's broken promise on the 
preamble to the Parliament bill; their bargain with the Irish 
over Home Rule and the fact, so Tories argued, that that issue 
had never been before the electorate in December 1910; the 
patronage system established by National Insurance; and the 
payment of M.P.s. At Bootle on December 7th, Bonar Law referred 
to the payment of M.P.s as a 'back pay grab., as narrow an 
approach to personal corruption as has been seen in the House of 
Common's for a hundred years'. The coming Home Rule bill was 'a 
skeleton in the cupboard. . one of the most dishonest things which
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has ever been done by any political p a r t y ' O n  January 26th, 
at the Albert Hall, he noted the Government's skill in 
'electioneering and the small trickery of politics., the methods 
of the Artful dodger may succeed in small things they will never 
succeed in big issues' . They were a 'revolutionary committee.. 
(and)... revolutionary governments are always corrupt. They have 
succeeded in six years in creating a political spoils system 
which already rivals that of the United States... they are not 
only gamblers but gamblers who load the dice. They must at all 
costs pack the jury, for the one thing they dare not do is to 
face the electors whom they have deluded'^.
The issue of Government corruption was a good choice. It 
gave latitude to Bonar Law to engage his debating style of 
'biting phrases and.. incisive exposure'^; it avoided 
statements on policy, and thus potential divisions; and it 
satisfied Tory frustrations. As The Morning Post commented, 'the 
harder Mr Bonar Law hits the better his followers will be 
pleased'^. It won him increasing sympathy from the backbenches, 
although it upset some of the more staid elements within the 
party, particularly the 'old gang' who looked to Balfour^. More 
importantly, the attacks on Government corruption during the 
winter of 1911 fed automatically into his attacks on Home Rule. 
In some respects his stance on corruption was never dropped, but 
instead absorbed into the growing debate over Home Rule, and it 
was Home Rule which offered Bonar Law the best relief from all 
the problems he faced. It was an issue which drew on deep veins 
of sentiment within Conservative circles, one with which he could 
unify the party. It was a cause to take to the country and rally
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popular opinion, and it offered a possible means, as we will see, 
of returning the Conservatives to power before 1915, the latest 
date for the next election. Home Rule presented Bonar Law with 
an issue of enormous advantage, both for the Tory party and for 
his own position as leader.
IV
The campaign against Home Rule predated his accession to the 
leadership. Since 1910, Ireland had intermittently been at the 
centre of Westminister politics. With the passing of the 
Parliament Act, attention now focused much more clearly on 
Ireland. Diehard sections which were angry and frustrated after 
August 1911 eagerly needed a new crusade; Carson, sensing this 
frustration, lamented to Lady Londonderry of the ’depth of
despair and dissatisfaction' within the party. He therefore
57sought to give 'something more than a gentlemanly lead' . At 
Craigavon on September 28th he launched a fresh attempt to re­
muster the diehards and so propel the party in a more vigorous 
direction. He channelled the spirit of resistance into a new 
struggle against Home Rule, and into the defence of Ulster: 
Ulster was to be the new last ditch. This reorientation of the 
Tory Right towards a firm line on Ulster can be detected in the 
Halsbury Club's announcements on October 12th and 18th of its 
decision to continue, 'To become a fighting body for the 
furtherance of Unionist policy' and 'in particular stress is laid 
upon the necessity of the position in Ulster being made clear to 
the electorate'^.
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Ulster had much to recommend it to diehard elements. It was 
an area fiercely loyal to Britain, displaying all those martial 
qualities many thought had been extinguished by soft, liberal 
measures: grim determination, industriousness, loyalty to the 
crown, and a willingness to fight to stay within the British 
state. Ulster was also the achilles heel of any Home Rule bill. 
Without the industry or finance of the northern counties a self- 
governing Ireland was thought to be inoperable^. As Carson told 
a Dublin audience on October 10th, 'if Ulster succeeded Home Rule 
is dead. Home Rule for Ireland was impossible without 
Belfast'^. The central question was how to ensure that Ulster 
was excluded. Here, Craig and his orchestration of Ulster's 
resistance to Home Rule was crucial. Such preparations would 
force the Government to back down or to offer a compromise which 
would, in practice, destroy the bill. Alternatively, it would 
force the Government to coerce Ulster into the bill, a course 
which would destroy the Government's liberal credentials and 
involve the certainty of popular outcry. 'Which horn of the 
dilemma', Strachey wrote in The Spectator, 'they will impale 
themselves upon it is not for us to say positively but that they 
must be impaled on one is clear
If Home Rule could be stopped in its tracks, as Carson and 
other leading diehards like Cecil, Wyndham, Willoughby de Broke 
and McNeill believed, then the Parliament Act would be shown as 
unworkable, prompting its repeal and the restoration of a more 
powerful second chamber. This factor strongly appealed to many 
diehards. Writing to his brother Robert, Hugh Cecil felt that 
'political action in all directions should be subservient to the
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chief object of restoring an effective second chamber.. never
62must the constitutional question be allowed to be forgotten' . 
Also by making Home Rule and Ulster central to a new diehard 
initiative Carson was bidding for the leadership of the Tory 
Right. Chamberlain, the unacknowledged leader of these sections 
after his actions over the summer, was imprisoned and 
increasingly isolated in Tariff Reform. As that issue lost much 
of its appeal with prosperous conditions by 1912, and was 
eclipsed by Home Rule, Carson's star replaced Chamberlain's 
amongst the forward elements. Evidence of this came from 
F.E.Smith, who had previously rarely left Chamberlain's side but 
was now recruited as Carson's lieutenant at the start of the 
Ulster campaign.
The campaign worked in two directions. First, it aimed to 
awaken English and Scottish constituencies, as Willoughby de
Broke said at Morecombe, to 'find some means of dragging this
61radical government before the bar of public opinion' . Craig
readily admitted the difficulties that this involved; 'living as 
they do over here (GB) the people are accustomed to the cry 
"wolf, wolf" (ie) no Home Rule and no-surrender. It has been 
cried so often that it takes a bit of doing to persuade them'^. 
Ulster was the means to persuade them that 'they are up against 
the real t h i n g T o  this end, activity amongst the various 
Unionist associations was increased. The Joint Committee of the 
U.A.I. continued their saturation campaign in mainland Britain. 
By December 1911 481 meetings had been held at various locations 
and 734,850 leaflets handed out, at a monthly cost of over 
£2000^. They were aided in this by the Women's Ulster Unionist
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Association, under the guidance of Lady Londonderry, which sent 
women platform speakers to various constituencies®7. At the same 
time, the U.U.C. executive called for an increase in the number 
of Unionist clubs linked with ones on the mainland under the 
guidance of the U.C.I. (Unionist Clubs of Ireland), which by 
February 1912 claimed to have 68 such links®®. The U.U.C. also 
encouraged clubs to send Nationalist newspapers to prominent 
individuals in Britain, to reveal the true face of Irish 
Nationalism beneath the moderate, law-abiding one Redmond 
revealed on English platforms. Ulster was not just relying on 
itself, as it claimed, but was actively trying to influence the 
British electorate.
More dramatically, Unionist leaders such as Carson, Long, 
Smith, McNeill and James Campbell launched upon a series of 
public speeches. Carson toured Scotland in early December, and 
spoke almost continuously through the end of 1911 and into 1912 
at various locations in England and Ireland. Long spoke at 
Manchester on October 4th, at Stockport on the 19th, and at the 
Leeds party Conference on November 17th where he moved the 
resolution against Home Rule. Long's star, like Carson's, was 
rising at this time, largely as a result of his actions over the 
leadership but also through his solid Irish connection. Balcarres 
noted that he 'seems to have established much popularity'®®. 
Smith too rose in public (though not party) esteem, sharing the 
platform with Long at Manchester, speaking at Glasgow on the 11th 
and at Bedford on January 9th7®, and even engaging with Redmond 
in a controversy in the pages of The Times.
This series of high- profile speeches against Home rule
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culminated on January 22nd and 23rd in a massive Unionist 
campaign throughout Lancashire and Cheshire. Most of the Tory 
leadership took part: Carson, Chamberlain, Smith, Wyndham, Long, 
McNeill, Willoughby de Broke, Campbell, Middleton, and Hugh and 
Robert Cecil. This northern campaign was timed as a lead-up to 
Bonar Law's Albert Hall speech on January 26th, and as a warning 
to the Government before the reopening of Parliament. Yet even 
at this early stage their speeches reveal a range of different 
opinions: differences which would become marked later in the 
struggle. Long and Middleton studiously focused on opposing Home 
Rule for the whole of Ireland rather than concentrating solely 
on Ulster. Chamberlain seemed to favour a devolutionary scheme, 
while Carson stuck firmly to Ulster grievances, as did Smith in 
words strangely prescient of Bonar Law's later Blenheim palace 
pledge: 'there is no length to which Ulster will not be entitled 
to go, however desperate or unconstitutional in carrying on the
quarrel. . in any resistance to which Ulster might be driven. . she
71would command your support and she would command my support' .
The second direction taken by the campaign was that in 
addition to an interest in electioneering in England and 
Scotland, Ulster continued to organise its own defences. In 
January the various Ulster associations were centralised when the
Belfast Corporation agreed to let the old town hall as a central
7?H.Q . A new Unionist Defence Fund committee was set up in 
January 1912 under Lord Dunleath7^ . This would not only raise 
extra finance from Belfast and the surrounding areas, but would 
also coordinate spending throughout the various branches of 
Unionist activity7*. Most importantly, concrete plans for a
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provisional government began to be drawn up by a select group,
nz
the 'commission of five' . At Omagh on January 5th Carson 
admitted that if Home Rule were forced on them, they would 'take 
matters into their own hands and keep it in their own hands until 
they were admitted back to what was their birthright'7®. Craig, 
on the same day, repeated that ' there remained nothing now to be
77done but calmly and steadily make preparations' . The
commission of five was also to coordinate all the preparations
in Ulster and to keep Carson informed of developments. 'Broadly
speaking', Craig informed Carson, 'we are making it an Ulster
Question'7®. To this end, arms continued to enter the province.
Craig admitted to Carson in mid-September 1911 that 'our efforts
at importing arms have at last been crowned with success'7®. The
extent of this should not be over-emphasised at this stage: the
imports were still small, and seizures frequent. In September,
arms were stopped by customs, and it was decided to halt
importations for a while®®.
Making it an Ulster, rather than an Irish, question created
uneasiness amongst Southern Unionists. It was significant that
when Carson spoke to a Dublin audience on the 10th of October,
he explained Ulster's role as simply the best weapon to defeat
the bill and the establishment of a Provisional Government as a 
01
last resort . Carson was leader of the Irish Unionist party and 
a sitting member for Dublin University, not an Ulsterman. His 
campaign had therefore to be against Home Rule for all of Ireland 
not just in favour of the exclusion of the Northern province. Yet 
Southern Unionism remained suspicious. The idea of a Provisional 
Government smacked of an independent Ulster allowing the other
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three provinces to go their own way. The Times correspondent in 
Dublin noted in October that 'Ulster and the South attach 
different values to different parts of the Irish Unionist
policy'®^. The Irish Times noted that 'the programme of the 
U.U.C. may not have the approval of all Unionists even in
Ireland... (some) may think he (Carson) has said too much and
gone too far... it will be time enough to talk about the last
fUditch when the last ditch is in sight' . Carson was worried
about such divisions within Irish Unionism, confiding to Hugh 
Cecil that 'the difficulties have been that the older leaders 
such as Sinclair fear it may look like an abandonment of the rest 
of Ireland'®*. From the autumn onwards, Carson was increasingly 
associated with Ulster as opposed to Irish Unionism; which 
explains why distinct defenders of Southern Unionism arose a 
little later in the shape of Midleton, Long and Lansdowne.
The autumn and winter of 1911/1912 saw the escalation of the 
Ulster revolt. Craig and Carson had committed the province to 
resisting government legislation when it was implemented, and to 
preparing for armed insurrection. They drew overt support from 
some backbench Tories, and the private sympathies of many more. 
Any leader of the Conservative party (when the revolt was 
initiated it was still Balfour) would thus be severely 
constrained in determining Home Rule policy. This constraint had 
been the objective of Carson and Craig: the former telling Lady 
Londonderry towards the end of August that ' I feel very doubtful 
about the way our leaders intend to fight Home Rule but in any 
event I will lead for myself this time'®®, and (early in 
October), still with Balfour in mind, that 'milk and water won't
83
satisfy the thirst of the party'^.
The accession of Bonar Law did not seem seriously to 
prejudice Carson's campaign. Carson thought him inexperienced on 
Irish affairs and therefore likely to defer to his judgement. 
Bonar Law was seen as weak, and unable to challenge the drive 
towards a diehard stance. He faced then a difficult situation, 
with a surge to the right by sections of the party, led by an 
increasingly powerful Carson trying to dictate policy. It was the 
situation Balfour had faced after 1906 with Tariff Reform, and, 
more explosively, with the diehards over the summer of 1911.
V
The re-emergence of the Home Rule issue in late 1911 also 
involved the Tory federalists. October 1910 had been the high- 
point of their initiative; the general election defeat and the 
inexorable progress of the Parliament bill shifted Tory 
sympathies to the right, and away from federalism. By late 1911, 
however, events made for a more favourable political climate. The 
Parliament Act left a constitution in suspense and a second 
chamber in need of repair. November brought the removal of 
Balfour, with his traditional views of the Union, and the arrival 
of a leader known for his support of Tariff Reform, his previous 
attendance at several Round Table moots, and his close 
acquaintance with such federal sympathisers as Chamberlain, 
Goulding, Beaverbrook and Garvin. W.B.Johnston, writing to 
Milner, reflected that 'the advent of a new leader of the 
Unionist party appears to be an opportune time for calmly and
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fearlessly reviving our programme and strengthening the weak 
places'1^. And the rise in Ulster of an extreme sectarian 
campaign against Home Rule provoked support for a moderate cross­
party agreement.
Support came from a variety of sources. Late in 1911
Dunraven published The Legacy of Past Years, in which he argued
00
that a federal solution was essential for Ireland00. Moreton 
Frewen, a keen federalist with strong contacts with Unionist 
leaders, wrote to Long inviting him to meet with himself, 
Dunraven and Healy. Although this offer does not appear to have 
been taken up, it suggests a perception of Long as more flexible
QQ
and constructive than his later reputation suggests. Earl Grey 
wrote to Bonar Law, urging him 'not to take up a non-possumus 
against all forms of Home Rule1: 'we can now consider, without
any reproof from our consciences, the expediency of granting to 
the people of Ireland powers of local self-govt, somewhat similar 
to those enjoyed by the people of Quebec'9®. Milner's acolyte 
Amery, having recently returned from a fact-finding visit to 
Ireland, flooded The Morning Post with seventeen articles 
attacking Gladstonian- style Home Rule as incompatible with 
federal Home Rule9*. And Horace Plunkett, the veteran Irish 
civil servant, through the good offices of Robinson, editor of 
The Times, requested a meeting to impress on Bonar Law the merits 
of positive proposals92.
It was the activities of Milner and Oliver which were most 
significant. Oliver was keen to prevent a federal solution for 
Ireland being swamped by a revived diehard campaign led by 
Carson. He contacted Bonar Law and Chamberlain, urging the latter
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to avoid ’trumpeting all over the country against a Home Rule 
bill1 and to steer a different course to Carson^. He also urged 
Garvin and Robinson to take up a devolutionary line in their 
papers . 'Ulster shouting and drumbeating and treasonable Tom 
Foolery', Oliver declared to Robinson. 'I am pleased to see the 
Irish Times has been pole-axing Carson and co'^. He was 
evidently not successful, since he wrote to Robinson two weeks 
later regretting the support The Times was giving to Carson: 
'But, but, but, but you must, must, must make up your blooming
AC
mind where you intend to go to' . This off-the-cuff comment by 
Oliver reveals much about the federalist mind: that Carson's 
strategy was a hopeless one which would end in civil war whether 
Home Rule was implemented or not, whereas federalism provided a 
more coherent and safer approach. Selborne, in a letter to Lady 
Londonderry, concurred: 'a year's fighting with a vengeance will 
knock them about tremendously but we shall not beat them in the
qc
House of Commons nor force them to a dissolution1’0.
Milner, however, thought more strategically about 
federalism. He wrote to Oliver on October 13th: 'you are right
to abstain from immediate, direct advocacy of federal Home
Q7
Rule' . The time was not as favourable as many had thought. 
What was needed, Milner explained, was a sense of crisis such as 
had existed late in 1910. 'It may be that an intransigent 
attitude on the part of Ulster, if it takes a responsible and not 
its present untenable form, is a necessary element in the working
qq
out of a settlement on our lines' . In this way, Milner drew 
Oliver away from his hostile stance to Carson's "plan of 
campaign", and made him and others think about the long term
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prospects of their mission. Carson's campaign was useful to prove 
that Gladstonian Home Rule was unworkable. Garvin thought along 
similar lines: 'It is no good offering terms which Ulster [?]
would certainly reject [?] So they (events) will get worse before 
they will get better and we shall come nearer chaos though I hope
QQ
not into it'” . George Wyndham wrote to Chamberlain in support 
of 'ultimately... a federal U.K... meanwhile for a line of 
vigorous criticism and attack'*®®.
What had emerged by early 1912 was a consensus amongst 
certain influential federalists about Carson's campaign in Ulster 
and an ultimate federal solution to the various constitutional 
problems. They were not incompatible, as Earl Grey, Dunraven, 
Frewen and the Round Tablers thought, but complementary: Carson 
would build up a crisis to which a federal alternative would 
become a viable and attractive alternative. Oliver, convinced by 
Milner, urged on Chamberlain 'silence on federalism'*®*, and to 
Steel-Maitland, himself a sympathiser, put the strategic case for 
federalism most clearly. 'I am against preaching or even hinting 
at federalism at the present time.. This is not so much for the 
sake of the Unionist party as for federalism. If you go spouting 
at everybody the Government will be forced to go one better. . The 
time for federalism is not now but later when you have got 
yourself locked in a constitutional impasse'1®^ .
Other federal supporters disagreed with the strategic 
federalism of Milner and (later) Oliver. The extremism exhibited 
by Carson would alienate public opinion: 'Carson has done more
harm to Irishmen...than Redmond has. The British elector has a 
nose for rotten arguments1*®^ . It would also throw moderate
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Liberals or even Nationalists back into an extreme position, 
lessening the chance of a compromise. As Earl Grey warned: 'the 
refusal of the Unionist party to even consider H.R. made it 
necessary for Redmond.. contrary to his own inclinations to fall 
back upon the extreme p a r t y ' I f  the Tory party signalled a 
moderate and pragmatic attitude to some form of Irish self- 
government, it might strengthen the hands of Churchill and Grey, 
as Balfour had tried to do early in 1910 over Lords reform.
But opinion was moving firmly in the opposite direction. For 
strategic federalists, the opening of the new session in 1912 
brought little positive response. Carson ridiculed the idea of 
Home Rule all Round, referring to it as 'an old false and 
ridiculous argument., when dug out of the grave., it smelled 
b a d l y T h e  Government were not likely to move at this early 
stage. Nationalists remained highly suspicious, seeing in 
Federalism the negation of their ideal of an independent Ireland. 
Nor did Labour sympathise. The Parliament Act held the 
opportunity for remedial legislation to be passed quickly, and 
they had little incentive to support a reformed, and more 
conservative, second chamber. Nonetheless, Milner, Oliver, Amery, 
Wyndham, Garvin and possibly Chamberlain were all thinking 
federally but thinking about the longer term. In the meantime 
they supported the violent lurch to the right precipitated by 
Carson, since it made the spectre of civil war loom a little 
closer and promised conditions where federalism might become 
popular.
VI
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Bonar Law worked out his stance on Home Rule gainst the 
background of Carson's Ulster revolt and the sympathy by many for 
a tough, militant campaign. In the months leading up to the 
bill's introduction on April 11th 1912, he took a number of 
decisions about how to oppose it. He decided to resist Home Rule 
on the constitutional ground that the issue had never been put 
to the British electorate, and that until the people were 
consulted it had no Parliamentary mandate. This stance allowed 
him firmly to support Ulster and the position of resistance she 
was taking up: if Home Rule was unconstitutional, Ulster was
entitled, even obliged, to oppose it. Bonar Law's line was 
therefore simple: either the Government held an election, or 
Ulster resisted Home Rule and provoked civil war in Ireland, 
supported by himself and a Tory party which he committed to that 
policy in July 1912. It was power-politics in its purest form, 
stripped of its Parliamentary veil. Ulster would be the means to 
force the Government to an election and to return the Tories to 
office.
Bonar Law's tough ideas on Ireland had been evident before 
he became leader. In a letter to The Times on July 26th 1911 he 
suggested that the Home Rule bill could be countered by 'delay. . 
the Expiring Laws Continuance bill or the Army Annual 
bill..(to)., make the continuance of the Government impossible 
and compel an election'1^ . On August the 8th, in the Commons, 
he stated that: 'I say this with absolute deliberation if the
people of this country decide that they will make the experiment 
of Home Rule then... I should say to the loyalists of Ireland
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"you. have got to submit". On the other hand, I say equally 
deliberately if this or any other Government try to force through 
a measure on which there is good reason to believe that the 
people of this country are not agreed.. I would never, if I were 
one of those Irish loyalists consent to have such a system forced 
upon me as part of a corrupt Parliamentary bargain. I believe if 
this or any other Government attempts it they will find they have
broken up the foundations of society in this country and they
107will not carry their bill1 . Bonar Law was committed, early 
on, to an extreme line over Ireland and saw in the issue the 
possibility of bringing the government down.
He was not won over to the cause of Ulster by Carson and the 
Ulstermen. He certainly received a flood of letters from leading 
Ulster Unionists; Carson, Nicholson of The Times, Cope-Cornford 
of the U.D.L., Sir John Lonsdale, and Tom Sinclair had all 
written before the end of November urging a lead on Ulster and 
Home Rule. This does not prove that Bonar Law was moved by their 
pressure, although it shows how worried the Ulster Unionists were 
about his leadership. In any case, Bonar Law was also the focus 
of federalist pressure: Oliver, Milner and Earl Grey all wrote 
to or dined with the new leader to cultivate a "constructive" 
alternative.
Two influences in particular shaped Bonar Law’s approach to 
resist Home Rule. First was his early stand against Government 
methods and corruption, particularly their departure from 
constitutional methods, extending into bringing forward major, 
controversial bills. His speeches at Bootle on December the 7th 
and the Albert Hall on January the 26th were especially zealous
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on these themes. His approach to Home Rule therefore grew out of 
his attacks on the Government's unscrupulous handling of the 
constitutional issue. Second was Bonar Law's contact with
Strachey of The Spectator. Four days after he was elected leader
1 flfiStrachey sent him a long letteriW0; in it, he urged Bonar Law 
'to concentrate upon a demand that any county in Ulster shall 
have the right to refuse to go under a Dublin Parliament' since 
this tactic ’will wreck Home Rule’ and ’drive them either to 
dropping the bill or to having a dissolution to get them out of 
their difficulties’*®®. Strachey outlined the clear tactical 
benefits of concentrating on Ulster: 'if this demand (exclusion) 
is pressed in season and out. . one of two things must happen. 
Either the Government must yield in which case the Home Rule bill 
will be killed - Mr Redmond and his friends would never accept 
it with the contracting-out clause - or the Government must 
refuse to pass that clause.. In that case the moral right of 
Ulster to resort to passive resistance will be enormously 
strengthened**®'. Ulster, then, would put Asquith in an 
intolerable position (what Strachey referred to as a 'reductio 
ad absurdum argument') from which the only escape would be an 
election. Bonar Law was clearly moved by such arguments. The next 
day he sent a copy to Carson, though receiving a frosty 
reply***; and he invited Strachey to Pembroke Lodge for a 
private talk**^.
Whatever the role and importance of Ulster in defeating Home 
Rule, Bonar Law had to be cautious in associating himself too 
closely or too quickly with any one section of Unionism. Within 
Unionism there were powerful and vested interests other than
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Ulster. Thus, at his speech in Bootle on December 7th, he avoided 
any direct reference to Ulster: 'There will be no shrinking from 
strong action... from any action which we think necessary to 
defeat one of the most ignoble conspiracies which has ever been 
formed against the liberties of free-born men 1^ .  At the Albert 
Hall on January 26th, he said: 'we who represent the Unionist
party in England and Scotland have supported and we mean to 
support to the end the loyal m i n o r i t y T h e s e  were relatively 
ambiguous words, designed to veil his concentration on Ulster.
His speeches in Belfast on April 9th 1912 and on the first 
reading debate on the 16th were more explicit. But not until July 
1912 did the Ulster question come to dominate his attack on Home 
Rule. To the Duke of Sutherland he confided by July the 2nd: 'as 
you know the real key to the position is Ulster and the hostility 
of Ulster to Home Rule'*^. At Blenheim Palace he went further, 
and gave an unequivocal pledge to defend the rights of Ulster. 
His open-ended declaration of support, so criticised by 
contemporaries and historians alike, had come slowly and after 
much consideration of tactics and party opinion; it was not 
forced upon him by influential leaders. Nor was it a rash 
decision made out of inexperience; it was a strategic decision 
taken with a full understanding of the consequences.
How would playing the Ulster card achieve a general election 
before 1915? This, Bonar Law believed, would arise from the 
inherent contradictions of Gladstonian Home Rule proposals. At 
one level the contradiction was one of principle. If Ireland was 
to be granted self-rule on account of its cultural and religious 
distinctiveness, then the same arguments could just as easily be
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applied to Ulster. The Government chose to ignore this 
incongruity in their justification of Home Rule for Ireland, an 
omission all the more glaring, as Tories were quick to point out, 
given their support for oppressed minorities across the world.
Ulster also involved practical contradictions. If Ulster was 
determined to stay outside any Home Rule arrangement, then 
realistically there was little the Government could do. This was 
made more obvious after 1910 by the increased militarisation of 
the province. Forcibly to include Ulster would provoke civil war 
in Ireland, grave political instability at Westminster, and 
destroy the cabinet's pretensions to a Liberal conscience 
together with any popular support they might have had. 'How are 
you going to overcome that resistance?' Bonar Law taunted Asquith 
during first reading debate*^. But excluding Ulster was equally 
hazardous: without Ulster's wealth, self-government for Ireland 
was thought to be unworkable. Popular sentiment in Ireland would 
never accept such an outcome, especially given the growth of a 
more radical republican sentiment during this period. Nor would 
opinion in the USA, from whence Redmond obtained much finance, 
take kindly to this change. Any attempt permanently to exclude 
Ulster or a sizable segment of it would drive Nationalists to 
oppose the bill.
The Ulster problem would, one way or another, destroy the 
attempt to give self-rule to Ireland, and by destroying Home Rule 
force the Government to an election, either as a way of escaping 
from a politically impossible situation or as a means of re­
establishing public support for their bill. To this Ulster 
difficulty Bonar Law directed his attack: 'The thing is
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impossible. All your talk about details, the union of hearts and 
the rest of it is a sham. This is a reality. It is a rock and on
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that rock this bill or any bill like it will make shipwreck'1 . 
This was the crux of his whole approach to Home Rule and the 
Ulster question: that it could secure an election. For, only if 
he achieved this objective could he keep the party together. The 
Tories, by 1912, were not just 'sick with office hunger', but 
were beginning to question the value of their party and the 
political system when they could no longer defend them from Lloyd 
George and could keep such a government in power*1®. There were 
dangerous centripetal forces brewing both in the party and within 
wider Conservative opinion. The desire to keep the Halsbury Club 
going, the seemingly open dissatisfaction with the Parliamentary 
system from Milner, Willoughby de Broke, Page-Croft and 
Winterton, and the popularity of Carson and his campaign, all 
illustrated such fissiparous tendencies. An electoral victory was 
vital to weld back together these disparate and disaffected 
sections of the party. Herein lay the problem: Home Rule might 
well secure an election; but what was the likelihood of their 
then winning it?
This has been established as the major problem facing the 
Edwardian Conservative party11®. The two solutions which had 
recommended themselves to the party under such circumstances in 
the past seemed obsolete. One was to fall back on the Balfourian 
method of awaiting the swing of the political pendulum. In 
ordinary times this would be a sensible, long term strategy. But 
Liberal Governments of the Edwardian period were seen as a grave 
danger to the class interests which many in the Tory party
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represented. There was a very real sense of desperation by 
1911/1912 about removing the Liberals from office. Many Tories 
felt that they simply could not wait for the pendulum to return - 
if it ever would. A second possibility was the injection of new 
ideas: Peel's Tamworth Manifesto, Disraeli's Imperialism and
Social Reform, Randolph Churchill's Tory Democracy and (later) 
Baldwin’s New Conservatism, all demonstrated the effectiveness 
of this approach. But Bonar Law's party was barren of new ideas 
and policies. Tariff Reform, their main constructive policy, 
caused division and was of declining value as prosperity 
returned. Liberals were outdistancing them upon social policy, 
in spite of the attempts by the U.S.R.C. to project a uniquely 
Tory social programme. In any case, the Tories were faced with 
the problem of how to pay for social reforms, given their 
reluctance to increase taxes (the Liberal way) and the practical 
flaws in Tariff Reform as a source of revenue. More ominously, 
Lloyd George was preparing a radical Land Campaign to sweep the 
countryside out of the control of Tory squires.
Neither of the above options were relevant for Bonar Law in 
1911. Instead, he adopted a third course to shift the party from 
its electoral trough, one which took it sharply to the right, 
embracing a tough stand against Home Rule founded on the Ulster 
question, and away from the moderate, centrist path along which 
most other revivals had occurred (Peel in the 1830s, Disraeli in 
the 1850s, Baldwin in the 1920s). This was essentially a negative 
approach to winning public support, appealing to what people did 
not want rather than providing what they did. It sprang from the 
absence of anything else as effective and as impressive; it hid
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the vacuum of positive ideas and constructive planning.
But championing Ulster and a tough line against Home Rule 
did evoke a number of traditional and popular images and 
concerns, making it an effective campaigning issue. It 
incorporated Imperial sentiment, the democratic rights of 
minorities, opposition to political deceit, anti-Popery and the 
defence of religious toleration, employment and economic 
prosperity, British citizenship, the protection of property, 
National defence and resistance to lawlessness. It was a classic 
Conservative appeal to traditional group sentiments over 
sectionalist and un-English changes. It was able to attract 
support to the party on account of the variety of concerns it 
raised on a broad social and regional basis; it was an issue on 
which the Tories could sweep through a variety of different 
constituencies and rally support in strategically important 
areas: Lancashire, Scotland and, perhaps, London. Ulster touched 
the Non-Conformist conscience. There was little chance of 
converting many of these sections permanently to Conservatism, 
but by arousing the Ulster nerve they might be persuaded to 
abstain from supporting the Government at the election. 
Abstention was a 'potent weapon of protest in a plurality system1 
as the favourable results of 1874 and 1895 testified^®. 'I am 
sure you are aware', Tom Sinclair reminded Bonar Law, 'that the 
great obstacle in our way in defeating H.R. lies in the attitude 
of English Non-Conformists. . nevertheless. . now that the H of L's
question has been dealt with they may now be more willing to
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listen to appeals from their non-episcopal brethren11 . Here, 
then, was a line which responded to the party's Edwardian dilemma
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by offering a means to force an election and the ability to win 
it.
This approach to Home Rule/ however, entailed considerable 
risks. First, what if the threat from Ulster was mere bluff? 
Everything hinged on Ulster convincing Asquith that he could not 
proceed with Home Rule because of fear of civil war. Yet parading 
with wooden pikes, frequent outbreaks of sectarian unrest and 
even, perhaps, 'the frothings of Sir Edward Carson' did little 
to convince opinion that Ulster meant business*22. This might 
explain why it was not until his Blenheim Palace speech in July 
1912 that Bonar Law felt confident enough to hitch the Tory party 
to the Ulster wagon. However, once he was committed, the prestige 
of having the leader of the Conservative party backing the Ulster 
cause was of great importance, inspiring activity, raising morale 
and encouraging Ulster actually to 'go to any length' . Bonar 
Law's unconditional pledge at Blenheim did much to make the 
Ulster threat a real one: at the very least, it dramatically 
raised the stakes if Asquith thought Ulster was still bluffing.
Second was the danger that the Ulster campaign and its 
sympathisers inside the Tory party could not be controlled. With 
regard to Ulster itself, Bonar Law could do little beyond 
reiterating in speeches the need for order and "cool heads", and 
maintaining regular contact with Craig and Carson. With elements 
inside the Tory party, Bonar Law exerted control by placing 
himself at the head of their shift to the right, adopting a tough 
stance to assimilate the diehard movement to the official 
leadership and avoiding being marginalised by Carson and his 
campaign. These political considerations are often ignored by
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historians, who feel that his 'public recklessness in 1912 cannot 
be justified'*22. As Balcarres shrewdly noted, 'had Bonar Law 
confined himself to polite expressions of sympathy and regret, 
the responsibility resting on his shoulders would be increased 
tenfold by the ultimate catastrophe'*2*.
However, assimilating, by championing, the threat from the 
Right was dangerous. There was no certainty that Bonar Law could 
divert or regulate passions to keep them within constitutional 
boundaries. Nor could he be sure he would not become a prisoner 
of those forces. Most serious was the question of how public 
opinion would react to such a growth of extremism led, 
apparently, by him. Party spirits might well be revived, but that 
would be of little comfort if the party lost support in the 
process. These problems were to be met by the clear limits he 
placed on his extreme language and pledges of support to Ulster: 
everything was conditional on a general election. An election was 
his basic aim, but it was also a constitutional sheet-anchor 
designed to allay public anxieties about Tory extremism, to lock 
the Right into a constitutional trajectory while simultaneously 
giving him the rhetorical scope to appeal to their martial 
instincts. 'A Revolution', he told his audience at Bootle, 'can 
only be carried out in one of two ways: it could be carried with 
difficulty by armed forces: it could be carried if the clear and 
the decisive views of the people of the U.K. were given for 
betrayal of their fellow subjects in Ireland. It could be carried 
in one of these ways; but believe me it cannot and never will be
lie
carried by fraud1 . Harnessing everything to an election is 
the clearest evidence that Bonar Law was following a subtly
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different course to Carson and the Ulster Unionists, and was not 
their captive: the Ulstermen were not constrained by such
irrelevancies as an election. This point was made by Bonar Law 
on April the 16th: 'If this bill were openly submitted to the
people of this country there would be a difference between the 
Unionists in England and the Unionists in Ireland. Now there is 
none. We can imagine nothing which the Unionists in Ireland can 
do which will not be justified against a trick of this kind. And
lie
you will not succeed1 . Unconstitutional behaviour had become, 
for Bonar Law, a defensible response to the Liberals' own 
departures from probity.
By stressing the Ulster difficulty, he risked creating a 
third problem: that Asquith might introduce an amendment for some 
form of separate treatment for Ulster. This would be difficult 
to oppose: Ulster would have been saved, and a moral victory won 
against the implementation of full Home rule. But such a 
compromise would conflict with Bonar Law's concealed purpose of 
exploiting the Ulster problem to provoke an election. The 
likelihood of Asquith actually being able to reach such a 
compromise was uncertain; it depended upon Nationalist agreement 
to the exclusion of Ulster. This was something that Bonar Law 
came to believe was not possible, especially since his tough and 
extreme language would help provoke the Nationalists into an 
equally tough and uncompromising stance, restricting Asquith's 
ability to win them over to exclusion. Earl Grey touched the 
essence of this when he warned Bonar Law that 'the refusal of the 
Unionist party to even consider Home Rule made it necessary for 
Redmond.. contrary to his own inclinations to fall back upon the
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171extreme party' . Bonar Law's determined stance actually helped 
limit Asquith's line of retreat over a compromise offer.
Asquith had another potential line of retreat: a coalition 
of Liberals and Tories to force a solution on Ireland against 
both Irish parties. The conference of 1910 had left lingering 
support for this method: the second chamber was still unreformed, 
and federalist sympathy was prominent in political circles, a 
clear basis of cooperation existed. With the Government also 
facing industrial action and Suffragette protest, a pro-order 
coalition seemed an attractive possibility. One historian has 
even gone so far as to stress the centrifugal tendencies within 
both parties over these years, leading inexorably to the 
coalition of 1916: 'In the climactic crises which followed over 
Ireland.. the coalition was consistently the first resort of both 
the distraught and insurgent politicians'^®. But such collusion 
would have split the Tory party, driving Carson and the Right 
into open revolt (as happened in 1915/16) and weakening Bonar 
Law's own position. Amidst the more brilliant lights of 
Churchill, Smith, Lloyd George, and Balfour, and marginalised by 
a hostile Asquith angered at the pretensions of 'the wee Glasgow 
Bailie', Bonar Law's power would have been severely 
circumscribed. Coalition would also allow the Government to 
escape from their Irish imbroglio without the need to call a 
general election, thus negating Bonar Law's point in following 
a tough Ulster line in the first place. Here again, his bitter 
language and uncompromising stance worked to his advantage, 
convincing Asquith that such a pro-order alliance was not 
possible. Adversarial politics over Home rule, as with Lord
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Salisbury in 1886, polarised the two parties, thus precluding any 
centrist or collusionist inclinations. It kept Asquith impaled 
on his acute dilemma of civil war or an election, a dilemma with 
which Bonar Law enjoyed taunting the Prime Minister. 'I say to 
the Government and I say to the Hon Member for Waterford you will 
not carry this bill without submitting it to the people of this 
country, and, if you make an attempt, you will succeed only in 
breaking our Parliamentary machine' .
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CHAPTER THREE
I
The third Home Rule bill was introduced on April llth 1912, and 
first reading lasted for three days. Second reading started on 
April 30th, and finished on May 9th (seven days) before moving 
into committee at the beginning of June. Progress on the bill was 
slow, though this was due as much to the Government's over­
loading the timetable as to Tory delaying tactics. Important 
sections of the bill (finance) remained undebated when Parliament 
rose on August 2nd. The Committee stage was therefore carried 
over into the autumn session, and a closure resolution was passed 
when Parliament reassembled in October to expedite the process, 
in spite of Asquith's pledge to allow the bill 'free and 
unfettered debate'. Progress of the bill thereafter became 
mechanical, even punctual. This inculcated lethargy on both 
sides, though only after several interesting incidents. The first 
was an amendment by Agar-Robartes, a Liberal, which sought to 
exclude the four Protestant counties of Armagh, Antrim, 
Londonderry and Down from the workings of the bill; it was 
defeated by a reduced Government majority of 69. More 
spectacularly, on November llth, the Government were defeated by 
21 on a major financial resolution, provoking uproar and 
resulting in Parliament being suspended for a week. On New Year's 
day 1913 Carson, on behalf of the Ulster members, introduced 
another exclusion amendment, this time for all nine counties of 
Ulster. Again the Government chose to see Ireland as a "seamless
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garment", and rejected it. With the rejection of Carson’s 
amendment, apathy returned to the proceedings. The report stage 
finished on January 13th 1913, and third reading wound up two 
days later. The bill went up to the Lords on the 27th. On January 
30th the upper house unsurprisingly rejected it, on second 
reading, by a majority of 257.
The Parliamentary struggle against the bill was paralleled 
by a campaign of protest outside. This campaign over the spring 
and summer of 1912 climaxed in September with a series of mass 
demonstrations across N.E.Ulster, ending on the 28th with the 
signing of the Covenant in Belfast. The renewed activism against 
Home Rule of the Tory leadership served to invigorate the party 
at all levels, and to dilute (or at least paper over) the strains 
of the previous two years.
For Bonar Law, the first circuit of 1912 was perhaps the 
high-point of his pre-war leadership. By-elections were running 
the Tories’ way, the Government were visibly in trouble for most 
of the time, the party was enthused, his style was universally 
praised in Unionist circles and loathed in Radical ones, 
concentration on Tariff Reform was receding, and Home Rule held 
out the opportunity for removing the Government.
However by December 1912 the Government was still in office 
and Tory strains over Irish policy were slowly beginning to 
emerge. The Land issue was rising as a new panacea to win back 
lost Liberal supporters. Most dramatically Bonar Law, by 
indicating, rather vaguely, that the referendum would no longer 
apply to Tariff Reform, threw his party into internal strife and 
his own carefully nurtured leadership into question.
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II
Tory opposition to Home Rule operated on two levels: inside
Parliament and outside it, the latter well under way since the 
Craigavon rally back in September 1911. The fight inside had to 
wait until Asquith finally introduced the bill on April llth. 
The Home Rule bill was similar to those introduced by Gladstone 
in 1886 and 1893. It called for the establishment of an Irish 
Parliament and an Irish senate. These would have power over 
certain local affairs including, unlike the 1886 and 1893 bills, 
the Post Office, and Customs and Excise and Judicial 
appointments. Reserved to the Imperial Parliament were: control 
of the Army and Navy, Foreign policy, temporary control of the 
Irish constabulary, taxation (though the Irish were to have some 
powers to raise taxes), Land Purchase, and pensions and National 
Insurance. In addition, the Imperial Exchequer would grant to 
Ireland, through the Transferred Sum, monies which it could spend 
as it saw fit (although an Exchequer board was constituted to 
oversee financial relations). Also, Parliament was to have an 
absolute veto, exercised through the Lord Lieutenant, over all 
Irish legislation (a "right" Parliament had over all colonial 
Governments, but one rarely used). A residue of 42 Irish 
representatives were to remain at Westminster, thus avoiding the 
confusion of the famous "in/out" clause in the 1893 act. As with 
its two predecessors, no special treatment was offered in this 
Act to Ulster or to the northern Protestant areas: ’we cannot
admit1, Asquith announced, 'the right of a minority of the
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people... to veto the verdict of the vast body of their 
countrymen'*. The 1912 bill was to be, however, so Asquith 
professed when introducing it, ’the first step and only the first 
step in a larger and more comprehensive policy1 . In other 
words, it was the first step towards a federated United Kingdom.
The 1912 bill was following Gladstonian precedents. What was 
markedly different in 1912 were the circumstances in which the 
bill was introduced. Ireland was now relatively prosperous. 
Ownership of land was more widely spread. Social discontent had 
waned since the days of the Land League and the Plan of Campaign. 
Outrages, boycotts, maiming etc were still reported (notably by 
the Unionist press), but few could deny the decline in their 
occurrence. In Ireland a moderate body of opinion had developed, 
looking for a gradual and consensual remedy to Ireland's 
problems, and typified by such agencies as the All-Ireland League 
and the Irish Landowners Convention of the early 1900s. In 
Britain too the situation had changed. Irish affairs tended to 
weary rather than to excite the electorate . Much the same might 
have been said of the Unionist party. A new generation of Tories 
sat on the green benches, without first-hand knowledge of the 
events of the 1880s and 1890s, and more sympathetic to 
constructive solutions than the preservation of the status-quo. 
Most important was the fact that the Tories were now operating 
in a post-Parliament Act landscape, where the House of Lords no 
longer controlled the ultimate destinies of the Empire. Instead, 
the Government (and, for Tories, the Nationalists) were firmly 
in control.
Several parts of the bill were particularly vulnerable to
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Tory attack. The first of these was the Government’s claim that 
the bill was to be a stepping stone to full federation of the 
U.K. This could be exposed as a sop to the more anxious Liberal 
members. 'It is put forward', Carson declared, 'simply for the 
purpose of pretending that you are only giving to Ireland 
something which you would also give to England and Scotland... 
you are only pretending'4. And, if the Government's plan really 
was Home Rule all round, 'was there a mandate for this at the 
last election?’ Carson asked the House on the llth. 'Was there 
a mandate for Home Rule for England?'®. Equally, giving Ireland 
power over the Post Office, and her own Customs and Excise, was 
incompatible with Home Rule all round and, according to Balfour,
'depart(ed) from all English speaking federal practice. Why when 
the federal scheme is completed and we have before us a 
systematic edifice of a separate England, Wales, Scotland and 
Ireland (should) one of these should have its own patronage and 
its own post office'...®? It was, as Balfour put it, 
'introducing diversity into u n i t y .  It was also bizarre to deal 
solely with Ireland and to ignore the rest of the U.K. 'What 
would have been thought of the founders of the American 
Constitution', he asked the Commons, 'if they decided first on 
the powers of Massachusetts and left the powers of New York 
undecided for some remote future'®. Most damning was that few 
true federalists believed the bill to be anything more than a 
grant of self-rule to Ireland. Lord Dunraven wrote to Carson: 'I 
differ from you about Home Rule in the abstract: but I agree to 
a great extent with your views on the present bill'®. Attacking 
the bill's federal pretensions proved a successful line for the
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Tories. It embarrassed the ministry, and showed them to be 
clearly under the Nationalist thumb. And if it could be shown 
that there was little real federal substance to it, then Liberal 
federalists might be moved to oppose the bill, if not to line up 
behind the Unionist forces.
A second aspect of the bill which provoked much Tory 
criticism were the financial arrangements. The Spectator 
commented that, apart from Ulster, 'finance is the most important 
of all the questions raised by the Home Rule bill'*®. The 
reserved services, such as National Insurance and Pensions, 
aroused most antipathy on the Tory side: they would cost the 
British taxpayer £5 million, and could not be fully covered by 
Irish tax revenues. The threshold of the latter was £3 million 
(Irish tax was paid into the Imperial Exchequer, and thus not 
under the control of a Dublin Parliament). This 'bounty' of £2 
million did not include such invisible expenses as the cost of 
Naval and Military expenditure, and contributions towards the 
National Debt and Foreign representation which, according to The 
Spectator cost an extra £4 million, and brought the total bill 
for granting Home Rule to Ireland to £6 million. This allegedly 
unmasked bogus Government claims to Colonial precedents or 
national self-determination for Ireland, and contravened the 
fundamental principle of no taxation without representation: the 
Imperial Parliament was to grant money to Ireland over which it 
had no control. Chamberlain seized on this: 'I do raise the
strongest objection to voting British money for an Irish 
Parliament in Dublin to spend, not as we direct, but as they 
choose and as they direct'**.
Ill
Other aspects of the financial arrangements provided 
opportunities for undermining the bill. Hayes-Fisher ably 
demonstrated, on first reading, the danger which Home Rule 
presented to future Irish prosperity. 'Breakup the Parliamentary
Union between Great Britain and Ireland', he warned the Commons,
11'and you will destroy the credit of Ireland' . Amery, on second 
reading, explored the complicated tax relations between Britain 
and Ireland. These (he argued) amounted to the Irish Exchequer 
having the power to raise taxes and customs, but not to lower the 
Imperial ones which were already operating. This was a would be 
potential hornets-nest in dealings between the Irish and Imperial 
Chancellors of the Exchequer. 'In a domain of finance', Amery 
declared, 'this bill is not going to lead either to economy, co- 
operation or finality' . Nor were the financial plans of the 
Government made easier when, on the 19th of April, it rejected 
its own advisory committee on Irish finance (the Primrose 
committee), which recommended that the Irish Government should 
control its own taxation. Few would have questioned The 
Spectator's analysis that 'if the bill is bad from a 
constitutional point of view it can only be described as mad from 
a financial one1^ .
Tory opposition also managed to rise above detailed clause- 
by- clause criticism of the bill. Two approaches in particular 
came to dominate many of their speeches, both of which drew 
inspiration from the lead given by Bonar Law. The first focused 
on Ulster: the Lords' veto had gone, and changed conditions in 
the south of Ireland made self-rule a more realistic prospect 
and, consequently, made Southern Unionism less effective. Ulster
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was more central to Tory opposition in 1912 than it had been in 
1886 or 1893. Forceful outlines of the Ulster problem came from 
Bonar Law, Carson, Balfour, Smith and Craig at various stages of 
the bill’s progress. But the most effective intervention came 
from Hugh Cecil on April 15th: 'I am astonished that the
Government really believe it to be possible to force the people 
of N.E.Ulster to come under the control of a Nationalist 
Parliament. I think their resistance would be a righteous 
one 1^ . Others also stressed the impossibility of including 
Ulster: Harry Lawson posed the unanswerable question ’how are you 
in these days, these democratic days in this democratic age and 
in this democratic country to force a million men into a system 
which they refuse to join'^?
The second approach was peculiar to the struggle of 1912: 
concentration on the method by which the Government was 
introducing the bill. Carson touched on the heart of this 
criticism; ’You are bringing it (Home Rule) in, while the 
Constitution of the country is in suspense... while the lying
17preamble remains unrepealed’1'; while the constitution was in 
suspension, the Government had no right to bring forward major 
legislation which would further alter it. In addition, the 
Liberal party had avoided all mention of Home Rule at the 1910 
elections, and so the people had never given their considered 
opinion on the issue. Worse still, Asquith had once said that he 
would never bring in Home Rule when reliant on Nationalist 
support. Finally, there was the speed and manner with which the 
bill was being forced through Parliament, via the guillotine and 
closure resolutions and with, so Tories thought, no attempt by
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the Government and their supporters to meet their arguments. In 
short, the passage of the Home Rule bill highlighted how far the 
Government were abusing the Constitution. In this lay the Tory 
justification for their support of Ulster and their willingness 
to go to any lengths to secure a general election: the only 
acceptable constitutional course before the bill became law. 
Austen Chamberlain, in his first speech on Home Rule during 
second reading, asked: 'what moral right has the Government to
claim obedience to legislation of this character passed in this 
way? What were the preliminary steps which they paved their way? 
A conspiracy hatched in secret, nurtured in fraud and trickery 
by which you snatched support from the electors'.*®- words he had 
only a few months earlier criticised Bonar Law for using. In 
Glasgow, at St Andrews Hall, Bonar Law was more explicit: 'There 
is a determination in certain eventualities to resist the 
Government, a determination the seriousness of which no one 
recognises more fully than I do... They (the Government) are 
responsible not because of their policy but because of their 
methods, not on account of what they propose to do but in the way 
in which they propose to do it'*^ . This sentiment again draws 
attention to a distinction between Ulster Unionists and 
Conservatives: the former would be extreme in their resistance 
whatever the Government's constitutional methods.
Ill
First and second readings thus saw a variety of not unsuccessful 
arguments against the bill. As Parliament was breaking for
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Whitsuntide (23rd May to 4th June) The Times wrote of 'the 
remarkable change in the position of the Government over the last 
six months' . Since the new year, by-election results had shown 
a steep fall in support for the Government, and at South 
Manchester the Liberal candidate was defeated by a Unionist. 
Signs that ministerial ranks were unsettled appeared. Both 
Churchill and Grey, during second reading, had acknowledged 
Ulster as a serious obstacle, and had implied a willingness to 
grant some form of separate treatment, remarks which greatly 
agitated the Nationalists. And some Liberals - Sir George Kemp, 
Captain Pirie and Agar-Robartes - had abstained on both readings, 
while Sir Clifford Cory had voted with the opposition^. The 
Tory party clearly had the upper hand during the early stages of 
the bill's first circuit: 'I am at this moment', Bonar Law
exclaimed, reflecting on the strong position, 'at a loss to 
understand what the professed object of the Government is and I 
think many Hon. gentlemen opposite would like to know'LL.
Yet the bill continued unaffected on its journey, entering 
Committee on June llth where detailed examination would, so The 
Times felt, reveal the bill's 'weakness and absurdity1^ . A 
problem that was looming on the horizon for the Government was 
the tightness of the Parliamentary timetable, with three major 
bills (Home Rule, Welsh Disestablishment and Franchise Reform) 
needing to pass through the Commons before the end of the 
session. They were constrained, however, by the number of days 
left in the session and by their previous announcement that 
debate on Home Rule would not be restricted. The Times drew two 
conclusions from this situation. Either one of the bills must be
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dropped (but this would be 'fatal to the solidarity of the 
coalition')^; or 'we may thus before long expect to renew our
nc
acquaintance with "guillotine" and "Kangaroo"' . Before the 
summer recess the Government continued valiantly (if rather 
foolhardily) without recourse to closure. But this entailed 
carrying over the committee stage into the autumn, by which time 
the pressure on the legislative progress was such that Asquith 
was forced to pass a closure resolution.
Tories did their best to upset this cramped timetable. Many 
amendments were tabled, although one demand was persistent: the 
need for an appeal to the people before the bill was passed. 
McNeill, Tullibardine and James Hope moved amendments to postpone 
implementation of the bill until after a referendum. The 
inevitable rejection of these amendments served to advertise the 
Government's lack of trust in the electorate and to validate Tory 
claims that the Government were passing Home Rule behind the 
backs of the people. Captain Sandys moved a useful amendment on 
the fourth day of committee (June 19th), calling for the bill to 
be split into two: the first part to deal with Irish
constitutional arrangements, the second with changes to the U.K. 
Parliament. If refused (as it was), the amendment would reveal 
the hollowness of the Government's claim that its bill was a 
stepping- stone to a federated U.K^.
However, the most interesting amendments on the bill came 
from the Government side. On June llth Agar-Robartes moved his 
amendment to exclude Down, Armagh, Antrim and Londonderry from 
the bill. It was a move reflecting a growing wariness within 
certain Liberal quarters at the lack of recognition of the Ulster
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problem. The move also came at a time when by-elections were 
going steadily against the Government, and when the Tories had 
the upper hand in debates. The amendment thus fitted into a 
pattern of Government disappointment, but it also posed several 
problems for the Tory leadership. The Times initially saw it as 
a measure designed to wrong-foot the Tories, and draw from them
an embarrassing admittance or denial: 'nothing more than a
77tactical move without substance or serious import1 . Having 
played the Ulster card so vigorously, to refuse it would expose 
the Tories to charges of expediency. It would have given the 
Government an excellent excuse to continue with their bill as it 
stood, and to deny the Tory party any sort of legitimacy when 
supporting future resistance by Ulster. It would also have made 
the party appear uncooperative and unreasonable. This concern 
about public perception (vital if Bonar Law was using the issue 
to secure an election) was a major worry for the Tory leader, and 
would return in the autumn of 1913. On the other hand to accept 
the amendment, however good for public image, would signify that 
Home Rule for the rest of Ireland was acceptable, a suggestion 
abhorrent to many Tories and Southern Unionists and liable to 
split the party if implemented.
Bonar Law decided to support it. Replying to Birrell's 
refusal on the llth, he claimed, somewhat tortuously , that 'I 
am going to vote in favour of this amendment. I am going to vote 
in its favour not for a moment that it would take away my 
opposition to Home Rule. . . But while we oppose this bill root and 
branch... we will support any amendment which, bad as the bill 
seems to us to be, would make it less bad than it was before the
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amendment was introduced140. It was a negative endorsement of 
the lesser evil. Balfour and Hugh Cecil followed Bonar Law's 
line. And on the 13th Carson, after consultation with Irish 
Unionist colleagues, similarly accepted the amendment in a speech 
full of qualifications. In fact the only section in which he 
actually recorded his support followed the Speaker's 
interruption, asking him to be more relevant: 'I can only say', 
Carson replied, ’ with great respect that I am surprised if I am 
not entitled to show why these counties in Ulster cannot trust 
the majority and give that as a reason why they should be
iq
excluded from this bill' . Carson was acutely aware of his 
position as leader of the Irish Unionist party, and of the 
reaction which his acceptance of the amendment would create in 
Southern Unionist circles.
Acceptance of the amendment was not, however, 'the 
significant point at which the British Unionists tacitly conceded 
the principle of Home Rule, by concentrating on Ulster'^. 
Unionists had already been concentrating hard on Ulster. As 
already shown, the tactical considerations were heavily weighted 
in favour of acceptance. Certainly, internal problems were 
created by accepting the amendment, but a broad sense of unity 
was maintained, by stressing the wrecking nature of their 
support. Few Tory leaders doubted that the Nationalists would 
refuse it, and Bonar Law went some way to ensuring this. By 
quickly declaring his support for the amendment as leader of the 
opposition, rather than offering a free vote, he ensured a 
division on party lines, with consequently little chance of the 
amendment succeeding.
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The consequences of the amendment were beneficial to the 
Tory party. It had clearly revealed the strength of Nationalist 
power over the Government, and the latter's determined refusal 
to contemplate partition of Ireland. 'Mr Redmond would never 
accept Home Rule without the inclusion of Ulster', said The
Times. 'He claimed Ulster and therefore he must either get it or
01
the Government must go' . The day after the amendment was 
rejected by an embarrassingly low Government majority of 69, 
Bonar Law pinpointed this reliance upon the Nationalists. 'I am 
not going to say anything about the subserviency of the 
Government. There is no need to tell the country about that.
Everybody has seen it... they are carrying Home Rule at the
00
dictation of the Nationalist party' . On the one hand, they
were being increasingly threatened by Ulster if they continued 
with their bill as it stood. On the other, the Nationalists were 
eager to prevent any retreat from the original bill. The Irish 
strait-jacket seemed to be tightening around the Government. It 
certainly reinforced Bonar Law's confidence, with his strategic 
approach to Home Rule.
But Agar-Robartes had done even more. It laid bare the 
dissatisfaction on the Government side. The drop from a normal 
110 majority to 69 was a clear sign of disgruntlement; The Times 
spoke of 'considerable disquietitude' amongst ministerialists . 
The amendment had commanded much support from Scottish Liberals, 
as well as from the abstainers on first and second reading- with 
the significant addition of both Churchill and Lloyd George. At 
the other end of the spectrum, the Nationalists, though relieved 
at the outcome, can hardly have gained much faith in their
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Liberal partners. The episode, then, revealed clear fault-lines 
within the parliamentary coalition. And that favoured Bonar Law's 
strategy of intimidating Asquith into an election. At St 
Dunston's Lodge on June 28th, he spoke of recent events: 'so far 
things are going well with us. I am convinced they are going to 
be much better for it seems to me that every day shows more 
clearly that the Government are getting tied up into a knot which 
cannot be severed by any method except suicide'^. In addition, 
the Government's rejection of the amendment was interpreted, by 
Carson among others, as 'a declaration of war against Ulster'^5. 
It allowed Ulster Unionists to 'take a step forward in their 
campaign' and gave moral justification to their preparations for 
resistance^. It also opened the way for them to introduce an 
exclusionary amendment of their own, which Carson presented to 
the House on January the 1st 1913, calling for all nine Ulster 
counties to be excluded. Such a motion coming from the Unionist 
benches gave added public sympathy and justification for Ulster's 
cause.
Liberal disillusionment continued through the remainder of 
the summer session, and manifested itself in falling Liberal 
attendance. On June 25th, just six days after the rejection of 
the Agar-Robartes amendment, the Government majority fell to 22 
on a budget resolution. A month later, on July 25th, their 
majority fell to just 3 on supplementary estimates. 'If our men 
had played the game better', Sanders lamented, ’we should have 
beaten them easily'^. The incident showed what The Times noted 
as 'the curious dependence of the Government on the Nationalist 
vote’ . Nationalists regularly turned out in the Government
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lobby, clearly worried about its survival in an atmosphere of 
general Liberal disaffection. Yet for all the waning interest and 
dwindling Government majorities the bill continued mechanically 
on through the committee stage. By the summer adjournment on 
August 2nd, committee remained unfinished and so was carried over 
into the autumn session which began on October 4th. The recess, 
however, did little to raise Liberal spirits. The opposition 
dominated the holiday period. First, there was Bonar Law's 
dramatic pronouncement at Blenheim on July the 29th, then the 
Ulster campaign at the end of September, ending in the signing 
of the covenant on the 28th. The momentum which the Unionist 
forces built up over the recess was in stark contrast to the 
relative quiet of the Government; there was no triumphal campaign 
across Britain to whip up support for Home Rule; and the only 
prominent ministerial speech, from Churchill at Dundee on 
September 12th, advocated a federal system for Britain in place 
of the present Home Rule bill. When the House reassembled, the 
Government faced a difficult Parliamentary situation. Time was 
now very tight, particularly since the Trade Union bill had been 
added to the legislative programme as 1 a sop to the Labour 
p a r t y T h i s  made for four major bills requiring passage 
through the Commons, with time still needed for debate in the 
Lords. There was much truth in The Times editorial at the start 
of October: 'The Government enter upon a difficult and
overcrowded session with no very great political capital and no 
very great driving force behind them'4®.
The Government opened the new session with two changes. 
First, the present sitting was to continue into the next year,
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making March 1913 the end of the 1912 session and thus giving the 
Government an extra couple of months: an 'extraordinary
expedient' which showed to 'what straits the Government are 
reduced and with what cynical contempt of constitutional 
practise... some people are prepared to act'41. This development 
increased the bitterness between the parties, already running 
high after the fireworks of the summer. But it was as nothing 
compared to the Government's implementation of the closure 
resolution on the Home Rule bill in contradiction to previous 
statements. The closure resolution now speeded up the progress 
of the bill through committee, but drew a very hostile response 
from Bonar Law.'This is the first fruits of your Parliament Act 
and the fact that this resolution is proposed at all is the 
clearest evidence that that Act can never work unless the 
majority are willing to make this house cease altogether to be 
a legislative assembly and to become instead a machine for 
registering the decrees of the Government' . The Times also saw 
it as 'totally destructive of the powers of the House of 
Commons', but hoped that the Unionist party would confine their 
protest to 'Parliamentary protest'41. But there was little that 
the opposition could do; powerlessness bred frustration, which 
in turn fuelled more animosity. 'Quiet staid men', Sanders wrote 
in the second week of the autumn session, 'like Bigland got 
absolutely wild. Monsell very nearly came to blows with Eustace 
Fiennes as they went out'44.
But all was not lost from the opposition armoury; several 
tactical lines presented themselves to the Tory leadership. The 
first was to continue an approach which had been building since
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April. The tight legislative timetable and the general weariness 
of Liberal backbenchers had enabled the Tory whips to engage in 
Parliamentary trench-warfare. Constant scrutiny of attendance, 
refusal to pair, well-planned "rushes" to London, secret pass­
words, members hiding in the Commons toilet or lingering 
expectantly at St Stephens tavern for the "snap" division, all 
fatigued the government forces and (it was hoped) would tire them 
of the interminable pressure and lead them to "throw in the 
sponge". In June and July the Tories had run the Government close 
on two divisions which might have gone the other way 1 if our men 
had not been late'^. 'In the House of Commons', smother whip 
wrote in his diary, 'they are thoroughly uncomfortable. They 
never know when we are going to turn up'^. By the autumn, with 
a new and inexperienced Liberal Chief Whip (Percy Illingworth), 
and with Liberal members already flagging, conditions seemed ripe 
to spring just such a snap. On November llth, as committee wound 
on, a surprise amendment by Sir Fredrick Banbury on one of the 
financial resolutions of the Home Rule bill caught the government 
short in the division lobbies by 22 votes. It marked the 
successful climax to six months’ hard work by Balcarres and his 
whips. But it also brought to a head another approach, which had 
gained increasing support inside the party.
The idea of some type of direct action in the House, in the 
form of a walk-out, unruly behaviour or even a replay of the 
"Cecil" scene of August 1911, had been mooted in Diehard circles 
since the beginning of 1912. The increase in party bitterness 
during the summer fanned the attraction of such a course. But it 
was Asquith's closure resolution at the start of the autumn
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session which prompted these ideas to surface again. The Times.
on October 10thf reported rumours of 'violent measures or violent
naction' . On October the 8th, Lord Balcarres wrote in his 
diary: 'many of them especially Irish Unionists are anxious to
do so on the ground that nothing short of suspension following 
turbulent scenes will impress England with the depth of their 
conviction'*®. Bonar Law revealed the prospect of party disorder 
to an audience at the Hotel Metropole on the 25th of October: 'It 
is intolerable to many of our supporters who, I know, are not 
satisfied either with the position or with our action. They want 
something dramatic. They hold and there is something to be said 
for their views, that a revolutionary committee... can only be
4Q
overthrown by a counter-revolution' . Elements within the party 
were bent on continuing the summer excesses into the 
Parliamentary arena, a prospect which Balcarres saw as 'most 
prejudicial'®®. Bonar Law, however, fearing public reaction to 
such methods or the use the Government might make of it, managed 
with the help of the whips' office to control his party. His 
tough, bitter, reply to Asquith's closure motion on October 10th 
(Balcarres wrote of many 'angry passages' ) was enough temporarily 
to assuage the martial temper of the diehards®^. However, on the 
day after their snap victory of the 11th, when the Government 
moved to rescind the defeat 'contrary to all precedent and 
practice', the reserve and control of many Tories broke®^.
Asquith was heard by the House, but minsters trying to 
follow him, such as Harcourt, were shouted down. Sir William Bull 
was told to withdraw after calling the Prime Minister a traitor, 
and 'the tumult became so continuous that the House was
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adjourned1^ . The sitting resumed an hour later, but tempers had 
not cooled. Sir Rufus Isaacs was howled down, and the sitting was 
suspended for the rest of the day. As the chamber emptied, Ronald 
McNeill threw a copy of the standing orders at Churchill, hitting 
the First Lord on the head. Such was the atmosphere 'that it 
would have taken very little to make a general fight' along the 
lines of 1893^. The following day, in a calmer House, Asquith 
agreed to follow Parliamentary precedent and to 'negative his own 
financial resolution and then introduce another'^. Parliament 
was then adjourned for the rest of the week. Comment on the 
Tories' action was generally supportive. Most felt that, as a 
single incident, the fray was reasonable, given the Government's 
provocative measures; but repetition was another matter. 'I 
hope', Bonar law confided to Stamfordham, 'the proceedings in the 
House of Commons will now go on in the ordinary way'^. 
Bridgeman, by no means a Diehard, felt that it was 'amply
justifiable on the ground that now the rules of 300 years were
57to be broken there was no other form of protest left to us' . 
Balcarres concurred: 'it will be found that our conduct... will 
have saved the House of Commons from being prostituted to the 
cabinet of the day'^®. Not all, however, rejoiced at such 
methods. Dicey, Vinerian Professor of Law at Oxford, 
constitutional expert and fanatical Unionist, complained in The 
Times that 'the cause of Unionism may be ruined' by such 
action^. The Times also 'regretted that the opposition allowed 
themselves to be goaded into the unseemly demonstrations... and 
it was probably an error in tactics as well'^, although five 
days later their tune had changed: 'the opposition have good
reason to be proud of the success with which they have upheld the 
practice and the customs of the House'^.
Despite the fireworks and the war of attrition inside the 
House, the Home Rule bill had progressed fairly smoothly along 
its path. By December 12th the committee stage was completed. It 
had taken 36 days, during which 202 lines of the bill and 76 
amendments had been discussed, and 935 lines and 988 amendments 
had passed undiscussed. A further seven days were given over to 
report (which was completed on January 13th) and third reading 
(on the 15th and 16th) before the bill moved upstairs to the 
Lords at the end of January.
IV
'The battles at Westminster', said The Times in May, 'are seldom 
of decisive importance... An opposition must therefore not only 
oppose in the House of Commons but must devote its best efforts 
to rallying public opinion in the country'^. The arguments used 
to rally public opinion had to be clear, plain and hard-hitting. 
Ulster figured large in all attacks on Home Rule, and here a 
particularly promising line was to pose the question of what were 
the Government going to do if Ulster did, as she threatened, 
resist the bill. 'They (Ulster) say they will not submit to Home 
Rule. How are they to be made to submit to it?' Bonar Law asked 
an audience in St Andrews Hall, Glasgow. 'If left to herself 
there is no power which by any possibility could overcome the 
resistance of Belfast. Is that resistance to be overcome by using 
British soldiers to shoot down men whose only crime is that they
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refused to be driven out of the Union. To attempt to do that 
would be to exercise a tyranny as unjustifiable and cruel as has 
ever been seen in the world* . Smith, writing in The Times on 
October 30th, developed this question. 'Is this Government 
prepared to take this step (coercion) now? Will it be prepared 
to do so in two year's time? Will it ever sanction the use of 
artillery? Will it order volleys of ball cartridge and bayonet 
charges to be directed at citizens marshalled under the national 
flag and singing the national anthem? Is the reconciliation of 
the Democracies to be founded upon a Belfast shambles..?'^.
Raising the idea of Ulster being coerced into the bill 
promised to tie the ministry into tactical knots. Publicly to 
admit a willingness to coerce Ulster (which they never did), or 
even to say nothing on the subject (silence was labelled by 
Tories as affirmation), might lose them popular sympathy and 
provoke a backlash. 'England will not permit Ulster to be 
coerced', Bonar Law confidently exclaimed^. On the other hand, 
a Liberal denial that they would ever coerce Ulster would have 
effectively sealed the fate of the bill, revealing a weak 
Government unwilling to carry out the basic function of upholding 
its authority. And such weakness would have thrown them into 
conflict with the Nationalists and with large numbers of their 
own Liberal supporters.
Another clear, accessible and hard-hitting argument used on 
the public platform was the unconstitutionality of Government 
methods, to which an appeal to the people was now the only 
appropriate response. At Blenheim Palace on July 27th Bonar Law 
affirmed that 'we do not acknowledge their right to carry such
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a revolution by such means. We do not recognise that any such 
action is the constitutional Government of a free people. We 
regard them as a revolutionary committee which has seized by 
fraud upon despotic power... We shall use any means whatever 
means seem to us likely to be most effective'^. Demands to 
trust the people and to hold an election gave the Unionist cause
a populist image and a strong platform position.
The main campaign outside Parliament by leaders did not get 
under way until July, before the summer recess. Carson and Smith 
dominated this campaign, well-supported by a motivated group of 
Tory Diehards: Hugh Cecil, McNeill, Lords Londonderry, Abercorn 
and Beresford, James Campbell and the Ulster Unionists. Bonar Law 
spoke less often, but when he did he usually created a great stir 
by his extremism. Carson, particularly, caught the public 
attention, his air of dogged determination complemented by his 
hard, chiselled features: 'Carson, with his face, was bound to
be Christian martyr; he would not have been born like that 
otherwise’^ . As the Tory leaders’ public stature (and
notoriety) rose, so did their influence within party circles.
Carson, especially, was building a dominant position for himself 
on the Tory Right: J.S.Sandars felt that Carson had 'advanced'
eg
while 'Bonar Law (is) looking on and... Austen resting'00.
Yet to concentrate on these big set-piece speeches is to 
ignore the extent of activity which was already taking place in 
British constituencies. The I.U.A., in conjunction with the 
U.D.L., had been ceaselessly active since late 1911, distributing 
literature, canvassing electors and arranging speakers at the 
local level. By-elections had seen concentrated efforts, with
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organisers and canvassers arriving in advance to swamp the 
locality with anti-Home Rule propaganda. The St. Rollox by- 
election of late February 1912 saw ten canvassers and two agents 
descend on the constituency^. With the holiday season 
approaching, plans were laid to focus on popular resorts, to 
raise the profile of the issue and to keep the political struggle
70"live" during the recess . By September 1912, after a full 
year's work and six months into the bill's life, over 91 
constituencies had been worked, 2178 meetings addressed, and
71517,119 doubting voters canvassed . As leading politicians 
engaged in national pyrotechnics, the slow, hum-drum war against 
the bill was being waged.
The first three months of the bill's progress had seen 
leading Unionists make some sorties into the country, whenever 
the rigors of Westminster allowed. On April 9th Bonar Law had 
been received in Belfast at an enormous anti-Home Rule rally. 
Nervous, and perhaps overwhelmed by the numbers and the intensity 
of feeling encountered, he delivered a rather disappointing 
speech. Carson, more attuned to Belfast audiences, gave a rousing 
and bellicose oration, indicating what was to come in the months 
ahead. The end of the second reading in May provided another 
opportunity to move out from Westminster to address the people. 
On May 10th Bonar Law spoke to the Primrose League at the Albert 
Hall, assuring his listeners that 'they (Ulster) shall not trust 
us in vain and we shall take any steps - whatever steps seem to 
us likely to be effective - to put an end to the conspiracy which 
is directed against them'77. On the same evening Carson spoke to 
the 1900 club in equally determined language, though introducing
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a new element into the rather well-worn arguments. After 
dismissing the idea that people in England would allow the 
coercion of their 'kith and kin1 in Ulster he asked the audience: 
'what would be the effect on the Army? Many officers would 
resign; no Army could stand such a strain'7®. Carson was raising 
the political stakes for Asquith, if the latter continued with 
the bill. The Irish Unionist leader relished controversy, seen 
again at the beginning of May when he engaged in a public 
exchange of letters with Will Thorne in The Times about Carson's 
extreme language (which Thorne believed justified his removal
7i
from the Privy Council) .
However, despite the pugnacious - even seditious - speeches 
of Carson, Smith and Bonar Law, the country had stirred little 
against Home Rule. Sanders noted on the day that both Carson and 
Bonar Law spoke that 'there is no sign of any considerable 
feeling against the bill in the country'^. Amery lamented in 
mid-June that 'we must get steam up quickly if we are ever to get
7 £
the country interested and the Government out before 1914' .
The Times noted that 'the general public are apparently looking
77on in mere bewilderment - if not in mere boredom1". The five 
by-elections between April and June had shown a general decline 
in the government's support, but it was National Insurance and, 
for Sanders, Welsh Disestablishment, more than Home Rule, which 
had affected the Government's standing7®. On top of this dismal 
outlook came news of violence in Belfast. Tensions had been 
running high since Churchill's visit in February: by the time the 
Home Rule bill was introduced in April, 'feeling there (was)
70hotter than it (had) ever been before' . Late in June violence
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erupted in the Belfast shipyards, causing sporadic assaults in 
Nationalist parts of the city. The temper was made worse by the 
approach of Orange Day on the 12th.
Sectarian outrages in Belfast were a serious concern to 
Carson and Bonar Law. They undermined the image of Ulster as the 
aggrieved party and gave the Government a 'law and order1 
justification to clamp down on the various demonstrations and 
plans in the province. On July 11th Carson wrote a letter to The
on
Times calling for 'self control and discipline'ou. Smith, 
speaking on the 12th in Belfast, in the course of denying that 
the government had the nerve to deploy the Army against Ulster,
urged Ulster to 'maintain that impression of self-restraint and
01
reserve force' .
It was with the problems of lack of popular outrage and 
unrest in Belfast in mind, as well as to repl to Asquith's speech 
in Dublin on July 19th, that Bonar Law made his famous Blenheim 
speech on July 27th. It was a dramatic statement of support for 
Ulster to awake public opinion on the mainland and to reassure 
Belfast that their struggle was being waged with determination 
by the Tory party. Buoyed up by news of a Unionist victory at the 
Crewe by-election on July the 26th, Bonar Law made a pledge 
unique in British political history. He unreservedly committed 
the Conservative party to disobedience of the law, even to civil 
war, if the Government did not hold an election before imposing 
Home Rule on the loyalists of the North. 'In my opinion if an 
attempt were made without the clearly expressed will of the 
people of this country.. . to deprive these men of their 
birthright they would be justified in resisting by all means in
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their power, including force., and I say now, with a full sense 
of the responsibility which attaches to my position, that if the 
attempt be made under present conditions I can imagine no length 
of resistance to which Ulster will go in which I shall not be 
ready to support them and in which they will not be supported by 
the overwhelming majority of the British people' . It was the 
language of 1642 emanating from a quiet Glasgow iron merchant. 
'I never hoped for such a strong statement from Bonar Law1, Lady 
Craigavon wrote in her diary; 1 it really does put heart into 
one'^. A shocked Asquith denounced it as 'reckless 
rodomontade'®*. Churchill, worried at the long term 
consequences, wrote a denunciatory letter to The Times accusing 
Bonar Law of a 'frantic manner' which '(is) foreign to the 
instincts of the party which he leads'®®. In analysing the 
speech, however, we must be careful to avoid embracing Asquithian 
moral indignation. Most of what he said had been taken from 
previous speeches, and had been spoken from a written sheet 
(unusual for him), indicating the care with which he chose his 
words®®. He firmly anchored his pledge to a constitutional 
remedy. His tactics were to intimidate the Government into an 
election by showing the impossibility of implementing the bill. 
The reaction of Churchill and other ministers suggests that this 
wasn't an altogether foolish line to adopt. Furthermore, as Lady 
Craigavon's diary extract implies, it helped to tie Ulster closer 
to the Tory party, so aiding control and discipline in the 
province. It provoked reaction in the press, not all of it 
favourable but at least forcing the issue into greater 
prominence, even if it meant risking popular resentment at his
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immoderation. It also helped the Right stay behind the official 
party line: that line was now sufficiently extreme.
Blenheim injected an extremism and bitterness into political 
affairs. Asquith and Bonar Law clashed in the Commons over the 
speech, the latter refusing to retract any part of it, indeed 
repeating the pledge inside the House to the accompaniment of 
loud cheers from his own side. When Parliament rose on August 
2nd, the Government hoped that the two months recess would mute 
passions. But as The Times ominously commented on the 3rd, the 
situation in Ulster 'will not remain stationary during the coming 
recess' and events in the province will soon 'compel the
87attention of the Government' . On August 17th details about the
planned demonstration in September were published in the press,
88listing dates, venues and speakers00. On the 22nd, there was a
rumour that the coming demonstration would see the announcement
8Qof plans for a Provisional Government . A good omen in the 
build up to the Ulster campaign came in news of the overturning 
of two key Liberal seats: N .W .Manchester on the 8th of August, 
and Midlothian on September 10th. 'When a Liberal Government is 
beaten in Midlothian', Bonar Law exulted, 'the end of that 
Government must be at hand'^®. When Carson, accompanied by 
McNeill, arrived in Belfast on September 16th spirits were 
therefore already high. For the next two weeks Carson led a team 
of Unionist leaders in a speaking campaign across Ulster. It 
opened at Enniskillen on the 18th, moving onto Lisburn on the 
19th, Derry on the 20th, Coleraine on the 22nd, the Botanic 
gardens in Belfast on the 23rd, Portadown on the 25th and 
Ballyroney on the 26th. The finale came on Saturday the 28th with
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the signing of the Covenant at the City Hall, Belfast, in front 
of the world's press. Carson, followed by Lord Londonderry, 
signed his name to the Covenant on a table draped in a Union Jack 
as thousands of Ulster men and women followed suit across the 
province. The dramatic events of the Ulster campaign were not 
over, for on Carson's return journey he was met at Liverpool 
docks by a crowd of 150,000, singing hymns. On the same day he 
spoke at Shiel park, described by The Times as 'Belfast all over 
again' and, in the evening, to the Liverpool Conservative
Q1
club . Later that night he travelled north to the other centre 
of Orange sentiment on the mainland, Glasgow, where on the 1st 
of October he addressed another mass meeting.
The press made much of September's political bonanza. The 
Times wrote of the depth of feeling expressed against Home Rule: 
'we believe that these Northern gatherings have brought that 
conviction home to many thousands of Englishmen' . On October 
the 4th it was still banging the Orange drum, describing the 
signing of the Covenant as 'a definite and irretrievable step in 
the opposition to the Home Rule bill'^. Carson had similar 
feelings; 'our action has made a profound impression through-out
qj
the U.K.'” . Even the pessimistic Sandars noted that 'the Ulster 
Covenant business has certainly had a good deal of effect'^. 
The campaign appeared to achieve several of its objectives. 
Massive press attention had been focused on the problem of 
Ulster; Carson had won national recognition, and a degree of 
control had been extended over Belfast by the act of signing a 
Solemn League and Covenant. This was particularly important 
following the shipyard riots of July and the Celtic football
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ground riot of September 14th, where 100 people were injured. 
This amelioration did not, however, extend to the Parliamentary 
sphere where Carson's "jihad" in Ulster raised to a new pitch the 
bitterness between the parties.
Yet despite all the theatricals and fireworks, the bill 
progressed along its well-defined trajectory. The country 
appeared not to have been roused. On October the 24th Lord St 
Aldwyn, considering the campaign against Home Rule, felt that 
'there must be a very different state of feeling on the subject 
if it is ultimately to be prevented from becoming law'^.
Sanders also believed that Home Rule had not rallied the English
Q7constituencies in the way that National Insurance had . By- 
election results confirmed his view that Insurance was the 
dominant issue where Tory majorities rose steeply: 'The Insurance 
Act has been the most important factor against them (Government) 
in the country, and though it may be true that the country has 
now no great repugnance either for Home Rule or Welsh 
Disestablishment, certainly there are no votes to be won by 
either measure'^. Inside the House, Conservative tactics had 
certainly worn the Government down, achieving a notable triumph 
on November the 11th. But the bill had not been dropped or 
radically amended, nor had the Government been forced to resign. 
In any case much of the problem with falling Liberal attendance 
had less to do with dissatisfaction with the Government's 
programme than the tightly packed legislative timetable for 1912 
and the loss of so skilled an operator as Elibank as Chief Whip 
in August. And recourse to such Parliamentary trench-warfare 
suggests a degree of frustration within Unionist circles and
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their powerlessness at the political centre, which the campaign 
outside had done much to mollify but little to alter. More 
ominous still, the party's relative unity began to dissipate.
Differences of opinion over how to resist Home Rule became more 
defined and prominent by early 1913. Some elements in the party 
were unhappy with their leaders' resort to extreme language and 
unlimited pledges of support for Ulster. Some disliked the 
bitterness Bonar Law had injected into his speeches; F.S.Oliver 
told Bonar Law, a week after Blenheim, that 'public opinion... 
is very perturbed by and opposed to certain things which have 
been said in regard to Ulster not only by Carson, Smith and 
others but also by yourself'®®. On November 12th, Balcarres 
noted a group 'of straight-laced and ill-informed purists' who 
were upset by Tory actions *®®. And Bridgeman spoke of 'a small 
body of the old brigade' who criticised their leader 'for being 
too outspoken. . . and who belittle Law in order to try and get
Balfour back'*®*. The Times, often a barometer of elements on
the Tory backbenches, at various times criticised the party for 
its extremism. Bonar Law's challenge to the government at 
Blenheim was described as 'grave and explicit; perhaps in view 
of its gravity more explicit than was altogether desirable or
I AO
necessary'1 . It was certainly with an eye to agitating Tory
moderates that Churchill attacked the tone and style of Bonar
Law's leadership, in a letter to The Times on August the 15th. 
'Surely these are strange tactics for the leader of a great
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party. Surely they are peculiarly inappropriate tactics for the 
leader of the conservative and constitutional party... Why not 
win honourably? Why not win patiently?.. Why squander the estate 
in disputing the inheritance? Why capsize the boat in jostling
1 AO
for the tiller?lwJ' It was an emotive appeal to deep Tory 
convictions, and one which must have twinged a few consciences, 
although it was ironic for Churchill to play the role of defender 
of the true Conservative faith. But it does show that Churchill 
was keen, even at this early stage, to build bridges to moderate 
sections of the Tory party, followed up a month later with his 
appeal at Dundee for a federal solution for the U.K.
Other moderates attacked the sectarian nature of their 
leader's opposition. Oliver, again, asked Steel-Maitland to 'urge 
your Tom fool followers to keep off two things- religious 
intolerance and treason. Carson has done more harm to Irishmen 
in the last months than Redmond has. The British elector has a 
nose for rotten arguments'^ . Aubrey Herbert, newly elected at 
the December 1910 election, was 'saddened' by the 'strong and 
abusive line with regard to Irishmen and Catholics'^ . And (a 
more surprising source) a letter appeared in The Times from a 
Presbyterian minister in Ulster. 'We deeply deplore', he wrote, 
'the sectarian bitterness and strife that are being engendered 
by Sir Edward Carson'^. Ulster was not, then, as rock-solid 
against Home Rule as Carson suggested. In October, Bonar Law
received another complaint from Lady Ninan Crichton Stuart,
107criticising the attacks made on Catholics1 . Signs of 
unhappiness with the sectarian tone the leadership was using thus 
sprang from various quarters; perhaps to meet them, Bonar Law
137
invited the Duke of Norfolk, the leading Anglo-Catholic, onto the 
platform at Blenheim.
Other Tory moderates argued in favour of an immediate 
settlement over Home Rule, particularly along the lines of 
exclusion for Ulster. The Duke of Sutherland and the Earl of Mar 
both wrote to Bonar Law urging such a solution*®®. Strachey had 
also offered similar advice, although he sweetened the pill by
1 nq
stressing the tactical advantages of such a manoeuvre1 , and he 
championed exclusion from the pages of The Spectator. 'The 
cabinet could get rid of the Ulster problem by introducing a 
clause into their bill allowing any county which so desires to 
stand outside the Home Rule bill1**®. This approach was 
reinforced by the Agar-Robartes amendment in June and from the 
sympathy which Churchill and Grey showed towards the Ulster 
problem.
But these various strains of moderate opinion never 
crystallised into a strong movement. This nebulous group lacked 
political weight, and a recognizable focus, within the 
leadership. Balfour was perhaps their most obvious potential 
ally; he still had great influence in the party, and in committee 
had appeared to endorse the idea of excluding Ulster: everything 
you gave to Ireland 'could be applied with double force to the 
case of Ulster'***. He declined, however, to play such a role at 
that moment, aware that so early in the bill's life was the wrong 
time for such manoeuvres, and relishing during 1912 his freedom 
from responsibility. It was not, then, practical politics to 
espouse moderation in 1912, especially when the party was 
enjoying its first taste of unity and success for nearly three
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years. First circuits were not the time for compromise, and 
Churchill was not the man, for Tories, to suggest one from the 
Government benches. In any case, many Tories may have thought 
that a tough campaign made for a more equitable settlement later 
on, or that (as Bonar Law argued) the bill was unenforceable, so 
that a tough campaign to destroy it could open the door to a more 
realistic cross-party compromise in the future. Extremism was 
thus not necessarily incompatible, in the short term, with an 
eventual compromise- although some members and not a few
historians despaired at the apparently unlimited nature of their
1 1 ?leader's pledges1 . These considerations might explain why 
there was not more moderate sentiment in the party during a 
period when the leadership adopted unusually immoderate political 
methods.
Overlapping with these moderates were the federal 
sympathisers, who, from their peak of influence between 1910 and 
1911, had by 1912 dwindled in both supporters and importance. The 
start of 1912 found federalists desperately trying to shape the 
forthcoming Home Rule bill in a devolutionary direction; but to 
no avail. The shift by the Liberal Government towards a 
Gladstonian type of self-rule marked something of a defeat for 
them, much to the annoyance of Scottish and Welsh Home Rulers in 
their own party. Their fortunes were not helped by the increased 
polarisation of politics and injection of a sour tone into public 
affairs. Moreover, many Tory federalists had already decided that 
the best tactical approach was for a tough campaign to drive the 
system to an impasse.
Much of the federalists' activity during the early months
139
of the bill's life was of a more limited character: to disprove 
Asquith's claim that Home Rule was the first instalment of a 
wider devolutionary scheme. On April 30th, May 8th and May 9th 
Oliver published articles in The Times under his pseudonym 
'Pacificus', showing the bill to be a contradiction of federal 
beliefs. Likewise, Garvin, in The Observer on April 28th showed 
the incompatibility of Home Rule with federalism1 . Gilbert 
Parker mounted a series of attacks under the title of 'Home Rule 
the Colonial analogy' in The Morning Post***, and, in the House 
Chamberlain, Mackinder and Amery sought to prove, on second 
reading, that the bill had little true federal basis. This 
essentially negative approach was vital to tactical federalists 
like Amery and Oliver. They believed that the bill had to shown 
to be unworkable before a constructive substitute became 
practical politics, otherwise the Bill might well gull Tory or 
Liberal federalists into believing it was a genuine attempt at 
a federal solution. By May this tactic appeared to have worked; 
few on either side saw it as a federal bill. Scottish Liberals 
such as Pirie, Macdonald and Ferguson grew increasingly 
dissatisfied with the legislation, especially after the refusal 
of the Agar-Robartes amendment in June. Pirie even went so far 
as to introduce a similar motion to exclude all nine Ulster 
counties*1^ . Asquith himself might have unwittingly encouraged 
this trend by his statement on May 9th that 'no cast iron pattern 
would be appropriate', which implied that his scheme was specific 
rather than generic^. The Times, by May 10th, could comment 
that the belief that it was a stepping stone to federalism 'has 
ludicrously broken down'^.
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Nonetheless, a few indications of more positive 
devolutionary sentiment can be detected during the early stages 
of the bill. Both Churchill and Grey put out feelers during the 
second reading. Significantly for later developments, Austen 
Chamberlain, speaking in the Commons on May 7th, appeared to 
support local government for Ireland, and stressed the 
impossibility of a real federal system when the Post Office and 
Customs were not operating on a central basis. Also, a federalist 
channel remained open to Bonar Law through Moreton Frewen. Frewen 
acted as a go-between with Lord Dunraven, keeping the Tory leader 
abreast of ideas and opinion from that moderate Unionist quarter 
in Ireland**®. Frewen was also a means of drawing the 
O'Brienites closer to the party. Both Dunraven and Frewen were 
thinking in terms of a coalition of Tory federalists, moderate 
Liberal devolutionists and O'Brienites, who could introduce a
devolutionary plan as an alternative to the more radical Home
11QRule scheme on offer . Bonar Law never moved towards or 
encouraged such plans, though Frewen remained a useful conduit 
of information. But in spite of these hopeful signs there was no 
orchestrated campaign to rouse federalists in the early months 
of the Bill. Not until the events of the summer did interest 
rekindle itself, as Bonar Law's speech at Blenheim shocked many 
into searching for a federal solution sooner rather than later. 
It was Churchill who set this new initiative in motion.
Churchill had long been seen as ripe for federalist 
conversion. Close to Smith and many of the Round Tablers, he had 
been one of the enthusiasts for the late 1910 flirtation with 
coalitionism. He recognised the Ulster problem as a major
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handicap, but with only the support of Lloyd George, Grey and 
Birrell in cabinet, those fears were not translated into a 
legislative compromise. Blenheim moved Churchill to renew his 
efforts. 'I am shocked at the threats of Ulster violence', he 
wrote to Garvin on August 10th 'which are made by Conservative
leaders. Have they no policy for Ireland except to make it
17flungovernable'..? . Five days later, in The Times, he attacked 
Bonar Law's leadership. That summer, he was in contact with the 
Round Tablers Edward Grigg and Lionel Curtis, spending a weekend 
at Cliveden and then meeting them on board The Enchantress. With 
the dismal by-election news from N.W.Manchester and, more 
dramatically, Midlothian on September the 10th, Churchill decided 
to act. At Dundee on the 12th he launched his 'heptarchy kite'
which, according to Kendle, created 'furore in both parties and
171thrust federalism to forefront of political debate'141.
Blenheim had also upset some Unionists circles. Oliver 
warned Bonar Law on August 20th against upsetting public opinion 
with extremism: 'I don't think the country will stand
unconstitutional methods... until the constitutional weapons 
which appear to it to be so powerful have been used and have 
failed' . Only the return of a Tory Government would be able 
to legislate for a truly federated U.K.; nothing should therefore 
endanger its return to office. Moreton Frewen, similarly 
unsettled by Blenheim, was again active, calling on the 24th of 
August and September 3rd for cooperation with the O'Brienites and 
a coalition of moderate forces in Ireland: 'the Dunraven
influence and the attitude of our newspaper has got this small 
party fairly in revolt against the Home Rule bill'^. On the
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8th of September Dunraven pursued a similar theme, trying to draw 
Bonar Law away from 'the violence of Carsonism1 and towards 'a 
conference of some kind on the whole constitutional
q u e s t i o n ' M o d e r a t e  opinion is in Ireland desperately shy
and in the face of the violence of the Molly Maguires on the one 
side and Carsonism on the other the most that can be expected of 
it is silence Bonar Law was little moved by such
entreaties, remaining firm to the Ulster line. More serious for
him was a letter to The Times by a Mr Hawkins. Referring to the
Constitutional Conference of 1910, when both parties had nearly 
come to a devolutionary solution over Ireland, it claimed (not 
unreasonably) that Lansdowne and Chamberlain were opposed to the 
hard line Bonar Law (who was not at the 1910 meetings) was now 
taking towards Ulster10. Who was behind this revaluation is 
unclear, but it was highly important in publicising that Tory 
sympathisers of devolution or a moderate solution ad a focus to 
look to within the leadership.
Churchill's 'kite' at Dundee therefore addressed federalist 
sensibilities, already anxious at the extremeness of Blenheim. 
The Ulster campaign of September, and the intense party political 
bitterness at the start of the autumn session, did much to 
enhance this federalist anxiety. A close confidant of Dunraven's, 
Lord Hythe, complained to Bonar Law in October: 'the party of
which you are the leader are sacrificing the party, the interests 
of England and the Empire to the Ulstermen.. Settle the H.R. 
problem on Canadian or federal lines'^7. He followed up with a 
letter to The Times on the 17th, reiterating that the problem 
would only be solved along Canadian lines^. On October 21st
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The Times published a letter signed by 24 Dublin businessmen, 
including Dunraven, calling for a conference of all views to 
reach a constructive settlement, 'deeply deplor(ing) the 
distortion and embitterment of the whole question by a revival 
of sectarian prejudices and animosities’*^. The Times editorial 
of October 26th supported this declaration: 'Lord Dunraven has
already played a mediatory and public-spirited part in Irish 
politics and he may yet be able to play this part again!*^, and 
Lord Macdonnell and Horace Plunkett lent their weight to the 
demands of the Dublin businessmen. By October, support for an 
immediate solution to the Irish question in the face of rising 
sectarian bitterness seemed to be more vocal
Yet behind all this federalist pressure there was little 
real likelihood of their solutions being adopted. The initiative 
and mood of the party was being set by Bonar Law and Carson on 
an opposite course, which appeared successful. And with such 
apparent success, few Tory members were going publicly to oppose 
their leader's line, however much sympathy they might have 
privately felt for federation. Just as first circuits were not 
the place for compromises to be hatched, so they were not the 
place to change onto a federalist track. And those who advocated 
such a move during this period (Dunraven, Frewen, Earl Grey, 
Hythe) viewed the issue as an administrative problem rather than 
an intense political struggle for power. It was this difference 
of practical politics which separated them from the likes of 
Oliver, Milner, Selborne, Smith, Amery and Chamberlain. In any 
case, a strong attack on the bill over the Ulster question did 
not necessarily negate the federalist cause; as a means to
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destroy the bill it would clear the way for a truly federal one. 
Finally, for most of 1912 many of these federal sympathisers were 
more concerned with the question of Tariff Reform . This would 
explain Chamberlain's reluctance to play the 
federal/devolutionist card and even to reciprocate Churchill's 
overtures (as he was to do in 1913). With the Tariff issue tipped 
in his favour, as he saw it after the February shadow cabinet 
agreement, he was not going to rock the boat on Ireland only sink 
Tariff Reform.
Another group ill at ease with the leadership's
concentration on the Ulster issue were Southern Unionists, many
of whom sympathised with the moderate or even federal supporters
in the party. They were in a difficult position. On the one hand,
Ulster was the best, if not the only, means of destroying the
bill outright. 'Without Ulster's agreement' , James Mackay-Wilson,
elder brother of Sir Henry Wilson, told the crowds at Balmoral
on April 9th, 'Home Rule is impossible. We look to you to make 
111it so' . And The Times wrote, during the September campaign m  
Ulster, that 'they (Southern Unionists) admit the truth of Sir 
Edward Carson's claim that Ulster, in fighting her own battle, 
has fought also for Dublin and the South' But allowing 
Ulster to dominate resistance gave rise to the suspicion that 
there was little real opposition in the South, and this pointed 
to a possible basis for settling the Irish problem by excluding 
Ulster. Southern Unionists were therefore at pains to show the 
strength of their hostility to Home Rule. Various demonstrations 
were held across the South. One at Cork in April, according to 
The Morning Post, 'dispel(led) the fiction that opposition to
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Home- Rule is confined to Ulster'133. Later that month 
J.B.Powell, secretary of the I.U.A., referred to Unionists 
outside Ulster as a force which 'had to be reckoned with'13*. 
And Lord Middleton, who was emerging in Unionist circles as a 
fierce defender of the South, claimed after demonstrations in 
Cork, Waterford, Sligo and Limerick that although 'Ulster holds 
the field... Unionists outside Ulster have rallied as they have 
never done before'133.
It was this precarious balance between the tactical 
advantages of supporting Ulster's resistance, and fears of being 
sidelined, which was to dominate Southern Unionist opinion during 
1912, and to foster at certain times a fear of desertion. 
Acceptance of the Agar-Robartes amendment was one such occasion, 
endorsing, so it seemed, the passage of the bill as long as parts 
of Ulster were excluded. 'I could not betray my friends in the 
south', Walter Long informed Bonar Law on June the 4th133. Three 
days later, he argued that 'by clever tactics we shall disgust 
our friends in the rest of Ireland and seriously weaken our 
position in Great Britain'131. Long, as an ex-chief secretary 
and staunch defender of Southern Unionism, was ready to make a 
stand against accepting the amendment. Speaking at the Albert 
Hall on June 14th, he assured the audience, though it was clearly 
aimed at Bonar Law, that 'no bribe would buy them, no temptation 
would seduce them'13®. Yet Long was a lone dissentient. Most of 
the leadership, including Lansdowne, saw the tactical value of 
supporting the amendment. Carson was careful, when speaking on 
the Agar-Robartes amendment, to point out that 'we do not accept 
this... as a compromise of the question. There is no compromise
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possible., because he offers what would be merely a simple act 
of justice to a portion of Ulster, why should we on that ground
abandon our position in regard to a policy which we believe
11Qharmful to Ireland'.. ? Long quickly fell into line, seeing 
that his stand drew no support; in a letter to Mackay-Wilson he
now felt that by supporting the exclusion of the Ulstermen 'they
would be in a stronger position to stand up for their brethren 
in the south and west if they were outside an Irish
Parliament' .
But apart from Long's brief protest in June, and some
rumblings by southern Unionists in the autumn, there was no 
organised movement to defend their position, such as was to 
emerge in 1913. Both Bonar Law and Carson stressed, privately, 
the tactical value of Ulster as regards the bill as a whole. 
Responding to Mackay-Wilson' s concern that Unionists in the South 
were being neglected, Bonar Law neatly captured the substance of 
this tactical use of Ulster: 'I can assure you that the point of 
view which you put before me is always present to my mind. When 
however one is engaged in a great conflict it is necessary to use 
the means which are most effective; and after all it is not 
Ireland which we hope to influence but England and Scotland... 
There is no difference, I am sure, of view on this question 
between yourself and me; it is simply a question of the best way 
in which to win the fight'***. And while things seemed to be 
going against the Government, there was always the chance that 
the decision to fight the bill on the Ulster issue would succeed.
For the Right of the party, enlarged and broody since 1911, 
the campaign against Home Rule, both inside and outside the
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House, was everything they hoped from their leadership: partisan 
and aggressive assaults on the Government, seemingly unlimited 
pledges of support for Ulster, reminiscent of the no-surrender 
movement of July and August 1911, and leaders able to capture the 
public imagination. It was the activism and enthusiasm which the 
party exuded, in all spheres, particularly the performance of 
their leader at Blenheim, which locked even the most recalcitrant 
member of the Right into loyalty to the official leadership. But 
using unconventional and perhaps even un-Parliamentary methods 
to channel and direct extremely discontented Tories and Ulster 
Unionists into constitutional directions was a precarious feat 
for Bonar Law to execute. The speedy launch into second reading, 
only two weeks after completion of first reading, and again when 
Asquith moved the closure resolution in October, saw Bonar Law, 
and Balcarres strain to keep control of their party. When the 
Prime Minister tried to reverse the defeat of his Government in 
November, control was only maintained by orchestrating grave 
disorder in the House and having the sitting suspended for the 
week. Overall, however, with the cooperation of Carson who 
handled the Ulstermen and the able Balcarres as chief whip, Bonar 
Law kept a fairly tight rein on the various right wing groupings 
in his party.
VI
The first circuit of the Home Rule bill had been a successful 
period for Bonar Law. His performance as leader had strengthened 
his position. Tough, incisive in debate and popular on the
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platform, he had carved respect and influence for himself in the 
party, as gauged by the fact that few wished for Balfour's return 
or even noticed his re-appearance in Parliament in March. Under 
Bonar Law's generalship the Government had done badly at most by- 
elections throughout the year. Demoralised, rattled and at times 
divided, it had been for the Liberals perhaps the most 
unsuccessful and difficult year since 1908. Moreover, Bonar Law 
had helped to forge party unity; divisive issues were put aside, 
and a sense of loyalty established through the struggle against 
Home Rule.
Tough resistance to Home Rule had also shown Bonar Law 
several important things. First, the need to maintain the public 
appearance of rectitude. His extreme warnings and threats were 
always neatly circumscribed by a strong populist appeal for a 
general election. He had also been concerned to limit and control 
rows and scenes in the House, so avoiding an adverse affect on 
public opinion. Second, he had observed the strength of 
Nationalist influence with the Government, recognising them as 
a force against compromise and especially against the exclusion 
of all or part of Ulster from the bill. On both the Agar-Robartes 
amendment and the Carson amendment, Redmond had refused to see 
Ireland as anything but a seamless garment. This was important 
knowledge, and would prove useful in the future.
However, by the end of the opening circuit three problems 
presented themselves to Bonar Law. First, despite all the 
pressure and threats, the Government's position on Home Rule had 
not changed. The bill was still on its rigid Parliamentary 
timetable in essentially the same form, and the Government was
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still firmly in power. This raised the problem of how to force 
the Government to an election if intimidation and dire warnings 
of civil unrest had not worked. In addition, the Parliament Act 
dictated that the first circuit would be the easiest stage to 
revise the bill. After 1913, changes in the bill, or even its 
withdrawal, would be more difficult for the Government. This 
situation seemed to presage troubles for Bonar Law: splits in the 
Tory party might widen, and protest against his line on Home Rule 
might increase, given that certain groups were only committed to 
it as long as it held out the possibility of success.
A second problem was the position of Ulster. By late 1912, 
the threat of Ulster, so important to the campaign, was far from 
assured. The sectarian violence of the summer and autumn 
suggested that Ulster might simply 'collap(se) in some opera 
bouffe fiasco, police court proceedings, cabbage garden rebellion 
or so forth1 well before the time came to defend their province
1 JO
against Home Rule1 . Moreover, the threat might dissolve (and 
the Government was clearly hoping for this) through 'the 
difficulty of keeping Ulster at the boil for this period (two
1J0
years)' . How was Ulster to be kept simmering, without going 
cold or bubbling over? This was to be mainly the task of Carson, 
Craig and the Ulster Unionists, who channelled enthusiasm into 
the Solemn League and Covenant and who, early in 1913, would set 
about the detailed planning for arming Ulster and constructing 
a Provisional Government. But they were also tasks for Bonar Law, 
who had tied his colours firmly to Ulster's mast. Would Ulster 
really contain itself? Would it avoid lawlessness and the 
justification of martial law being imposed? Would it really be
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a threat? How would English and Scottish public opinion react to 
the increased militarisation of Ulster? All these would concern 
Bonar Law over the coming session.
Finally, and most dramatically, the problem of Tariff Reform 
reared its fractious head, much of this problem of Bonar Law's 
own making. In carrying out the resolution of the February shadow 
cabinet, Bonar Law and Lansdowne decided publicly to drop the 
referendum pledge at two speeches in the middle of November. The 
decision threw the majority of the party into open rebellion. 
With its basis in Lancashire, the forces opposed to dropping the 
referendum and in favour of dropping food taxes instead, could 
count on the support of Derby, Long, Salisbury, Hugh and Robert 
Cecil, Curzon and Balfour. With their concern to keep attention 
fixed on Ulster, Carson and Smith also stood with them. Bonar Law 
had boxed himself into an impossible corner where, over December 
1912 he sat, at odds with his own party and with most of his 
leadership, his credibility and influence impaired and his 
position as leader in serious doubt. He had little choice but to 
offer his resignation if the party would not follow his policy. 
Yet this proved his salvation, for a deputation led by Carson and 
McNeill drew a distinction between policy and leadership. Whilst 
rejecting his policy on food taxes, Bonar Law was urged, in a 
memorial signed by most of the party, to remain as leader. It was 
the escape clause he had been searching for. By early January, 
out had gone the policy of food taxes (they would now be put to 
a meeting of colonial Prime Ministers) and Bonar Law and 
Lansdowne remained leaders of the party, bruised and diminished 
but still in place.
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CHAPTER FOUR
I
The Home Rule bill ended its first circuit on January the 16th 
when it passed the Commons by a majority of 109 only to be 
rejected in the Lords after just three days' debate. The first 
session drew to a weary close on February 14th, before the 
shorter 1913 session was launched on March 10th. The Tories began 
on a low ebb. Once the dust had settled, the session of 1912 was 
seen to have altered little. The country had hardly stirred: 'We 
made little progress', wrote Chamberlain, 'there was no marked 
revulsion of feeling to our side'*. The truth that only a few 
Tories would contemplate was that Home Rule, divorced of its more 
blood-curdling associations, aroused little passion. The popular 
interest of 1886 would only return with the mutinies, plots and 
gun-running episodes of 1914. The loss of Londonderry city on 
January 30th seemed to underline this fact. The bill itself 
remained firmly on course. Despite numerous amendments being 
tabled, it stood unmolested, as Bonar Law noted bitterly: 
'comparison of the bill as it leaves the House of Commons with 
the draft originally laid before the House shows very clearly how 
little the measure represents the mind and will of the 
legislature. And most disappointing of all for the party, no 
general election had been called. In fact Government support had 
held firm, though their majority had diminished slightly from by- 
election losses. If anyone's position was looking precarious by 
early 1913, it was Bonar Law's. More ominously, several issues
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arose to distract attention from Home Rule. Tariff Reform became 
once again a contentious issue. Lloyd George's Land campaign, 
continued to exercise many in the Tory party, and the Marconi 
scandal was, for one of the whips 'the chief, in fact the only
•j
excitement. Home Rule, it seemed, had lost its glow.
Much of this lost enthusiasm was caused, so Tories argued, 
by the Parliament Act, which dictated an altered battle-ground 
for the second Parliamentary session. A bill now had to begin the 
remaining two sessions as it had left the Commons after the first 
circuit (effectively dispensing with the committee and report 
stages) so making the second and third circuits duplicate runs. 
The Times neatly captured the absurdity of the new situation: 'It 
certainly looks as ingeniously silly as putting a bill which may 
not be amended, through stages intended for its amendment'*. 
Unable to alter the bill, a sense of despair built up within the 
party. It also bred lethargy and a feeling that the Commons no 
longer really counted in affairs; with the increased preparations 
of Ulster this was to a large extent true. 'We are like 
Strasbourg geese which are fed to make pate de foie gras' 
Chamberlain noted drily^. Of course, as Dicey pointed out in a 
series of articles in The Times towards the end of March, the 
bill could still be amended by suggestions put forward by Asquith 
at any point during the bill's progress, but would require the 
agreement of the upper House to pass^. A compromise, in other 
words, could still be hatched. In addition, and as again outlined 
by Dicey, the Parliament Act rendered the alternative of a 
dissolution far more difficult once the third circuit had begun, 
estimated to be the start of 1914. The Government stood to lose
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the entire bill by dissolving during the third circuit, whereas 
dissolving before the final round meant that the bill could 
simply continue on its path. For some this served to underline 
that passage of the bill was inevitable. It was with such an 
awareness of these changing circumstances that on January 1st 
Carson moved his amendment for the exclusion of all nine Ulster 
counties. But for those like Dicey it meant that the second 
session had to see an all-out campaign for a dissolution.
With the failure of 1912, the new Parliamentary conditions, 
and the increasing retreat of the Ulstermen behind their own 
ramparts, the relative party unity of the first circuit began to 
crumble. Divisions of opinion centred on the way forward. 
Traditional and Southern Unionists, were increasingly fearful at 
what appeared to be Ulster's narrowing vision for resisting Home 
Rule. These sections pressed for greater resolution by the party 
in demanding a dissolution, and a broadening of the attack of 
Home Rule to encompass Unionists in the South and West. 'To show 
the Government', as one of their leaders put it, 'that they are 
not only against Ulster but against every Unionist in Great 
Britain. .. we are as much in earnest as the Ulstermen and intend 
to stand by them until at least we have had an opportunity of 
voting against the repeal of the Union'7. On the other hand, the 
new situation of 1913 served to encourage the assorted moderate 
and federalist groups and individuals keen for a settlement.
Bonar Law had to steer his party through this changing 
environment, always focusing on the need to bring the Government 
to an election. In fact, his calls for a general election became 
more determined during 1913, given Dicey's warning that a
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dissolution during the third circuit would be almost impossible 
for the government to grant. With this knowledge in mind, and the 
seemingly inevitable and lifeless Parliamentary situation, Bonar 
Law began to look towards other ways of inducing an election, 
particularly the use which could be made of the King, in private 
discussions with various leaders, the viability of the manoeuvre 
was widely debated. It came to a head in July when a joint 
memorandum, by Lansdowne and Bonar Law, was sent to the king, 
arguing that his power to change ministers with the sole object 
of requesting a dissolution was simply 'reserved' and by no means 
'abolished'8. For many, this was a dangerous precedent for the 
Tory leader to dabble with, though one he justified by the 
failure of the Government to hold an election and return to 
Constitutional paths. Amid the extremism, then, there was a 
constitutional rationale. But this did not stop sections from 
rallying against the initiative.
II
The moderate and federalist elements in the party enjoyed far 
more favourable conditions after January 1913 than they had 
during the 1912 session, when extremism had carried all before 
it. Now, with the apparent failure of extremism, the path forward 
for the party was either greater extremism, which few could 
relish, or of a search for a compromise. The logic of this 
conclusion was reinforced by the political stalemate engendered 
through the Parliament Act, the general apathy on the 
backbenches, and the amendment moved by Carson in favour of
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exclusion at the start of January. The idea of a settlement was 
more visibly in the air at this time.
It was also reinforced, towards the end of January, by the 
closing debate in the Lords before the bill entered its second 
circuit. Calls for settlement came from Lords Dunraven, McDonnell 
and Brassey. Earl Grey, in his first public speech on the issue 
since returning from Canada, gave a forceful plea for a federal 
system of rule^. Mild speeches also came from by Curzon, St 
Aldwyn and Devonshire, who seemed intent on reducing the partisan 
temper between the parties. 'Do you think' Curzon declared, 'that 
we equally with you would not like to clear the decks of all the 
troubled questions of Irish administration, finance, Land and 
education which so often have taken up the time of the House of 
Commons? Of course we would. The interests of our country as well 
as our party demand it'1®. Aberconway, noticing the moderate 
tone, commented: 'the question of Home Rule today has, I aim glad 
to say, been approached entirely from the point of view of 
detail'; divisions of principle apparently no longer existed11. 
This angered the Southern Unionist Peers and some of the diehards 
of 1911, especially given Curzon's prominence in the debates. 
Willoughby de Broke seemed all too aware of the 1911 precedent: 
'you have found yourselves up against a thing (Ulster) that no
promises of Peerages or presents of money can possibly dissipate
11or do away with'16.
During the brief recess in February and early March the 
forces for settlement continued to agitate. Strachey informed 
Lord Stamfordham that he was getting up a movement of moderate, 
non-partisan men, led by the Archbishop of York, to press Asquith
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into a more consensual path13. Of more substance was the All- 
Irish League, of Dunraven and O'Brien, which met in Cork in March 
and passed a resolution in favour of a convention to settle the 
issue by consent- a method which privately would have attracted 
much support right across the political divide14. O'Brien tried 
to facilitate this by several letters to The Times. In 
particular, he referred to a recent speech by Long as a 'call for 
peace and conference' and to a letter he had received from Bonar 
Law as a 'marked encouragement from that quarter without whose 
assent a conference there cannot be'13. And it may have found an 
echo within Tory circles. Lyttleton, in early June, delivered a 
speech in Cork praising the work of Horace Plunkett, who was 
particularly close to Dunraven, and shared many of his 
constructive ideas for Ireland13.
The problem for moderates and federalists was that most of 
the pressure for a settlement came from outside the party 
leadership, and was addressed to two front-benches which had 
moved apart from each other, since the bitterness of the autumn 
session and the personal recriminations over the Marconi issue. 
These difficulties were compounded by more familiar problems of 
the federalists. Debate in the Lords, when Dunraven, Grey, 
Brassey and Selborne had all spoken of federal solutions, 
revealed how great were the varieties of federalism on offer. For 
all the positive signs, then, in early 1913 conditions were still 
not opportune for settlement. Yet behind the glare of public 
attention, opinions were beginning to alter and discreet hints, 
even overtures, were being made. Though febrile and hesitant, it 
was upon these currents that more substantial moves towards a
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settlement would develop in the autumn.
Early in February, Churchill again attacked Bonar Law in a 
speech at the Hotel Cecil, this time over references he had made 
on the position of the sovereign with regard to the Home Rule
17
crisis . As with his earlier attacks, particularly after the 
Blenheim speech, Churchill was using Bonar Law to drive a 
constitutional wedge between sections of the Tory party, and so 
move sufficient opinion towards a compromise. His concerns found 
an echo in several Tory circles. One was the Strachey-Cromer 
group, who in the pages of The Spectator warned against tinkering 
with the King's prerogative. Churchill still enjoyed informal 
contacts with the Round Tablers, who in April were joined by 
Chamberlain in their regular moots. The Churchi11-Chamberlain 
axis was to be of prime importance in later attempts at 
compromise. Both were keen to reconstruct the U.K. along some 
type of federal lines, and had been enthusiasts for the 1910 
attempt. Both were alarmed at the tone Bonar Law was employing: 
in August 1912, Chamberlain had privately criticised Bonar Law's 
speech at Blenheim to Lansdowne: 'like you I should have
expressed myself differently, but I hope that Ulster will offer 
a stubborn, passive resistance'1®. In February Churchill, 
through Gwynne of The Morning Post, had sought some form of 
cooperation with Chamberlain over military affairs, but it seemed 
that more might be in the air. 'G(Gwynne) thinks that they 
(George and Churchill) both would like a coalition; but of this 
I gave no encouragement, saying that I did not think anything of 
the kind was possible whilst they stood committed to the Home 
Rule bill. If they were ready to come down to three or four
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Provincial councils... it would be a different thing'2®. Of 
interest here is the closeness between Chamberlain's conception 
of a settlement and the terms offered in Churchill's Dundee 
speech of September. Yet Chamberlain was at that time, perhaps, 
too conservative for the step Churchill had planned for him and 
was still sulking over Tariff Reform. Such reservations did not 
apply to F.E.Smith.
After his displays of 1912 Smith melted somewhat into the 
background during 1913, a position from which he began to look 
towards the centre-ground. He was close to Lloyd George, 
Churchill and, significantly if a solution was to be reached, to 
Carson. Churchill recognised that Smith (and indeed Carson) were 
forces working for a settlement, as can be implied from his 
disproportionate concentration upon Bonar Law as the wild, 
intemperate actor, despite both Carson's and Smith's equal 
extremeness. What served to build bridges between these two 
leaders and Liberal ministers was not, however, Churchill's 
favour but the Marconi episode.
The decision by Smith and Carson to defend Isaacs and Lloyd 
George in their libel action against Le Matin angered many 
Tories. 'There is a good deal of feeling', Sanders noted, 'about 
Carson and F.E. appearing for Godfrey Isaacs in the Chesterton 
case'2®; Sir George Younger also felt that 'this feeling is very 
strong among our men' . During his campaign in Scotland in the 
middle of June Carson was publicly criticised by the chairman of 
the Edinburgh Conservative Association, Sir John Stirling- 
Maxwell22, and Smith felt it necessary to justify his action in 
a long letter to The Times on June 17th22. In spite of this,
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both men accepted the briefs. Although their belief in the 
independence of the bar was perhaps genuine, it was also a useful 
excuse. For by absenting themselves from the bitter censure 
debates, they undoubtedly sent the right people the "right" 
signals. To Garvin, Lloyd-George spoke of 'his higher 
conception... of his (Smith's) character' as a result of
i j
Marconi“ . Marconi now moved Smith closer to Lloyd George. Late 
in May, no longer waving the Ulster flag, Smith spoke to the 
Primrose League on the need for cooperation over Land reform, 
welcoming Lloyd George's earlier appeal for a cross-party 
solution to this problem^.
But it was Carson who was most important to this bridge- 
building exercise. By 1913 he may well have been feeling the 
pressure of his position, committed as he was to armed rebellion 
in the last resort, a scenario which loomed far larger than it 
had a year previously. Nor did Carson have the luxury of the 
retreat, as did Bonar Law and the Tory leaders, into a general 
election. He would have to defend Ulster whether or not there was 
an election. Yet he was the leader of the Irish Unionist party, 
at a moment when Southern Unionism was beginning to become more 
assertive. Pulled in several different directions, it is little 
wonder that the idea of settlement might have grown in Carson 
during 1913. The amendment he moved in January, though strategic 
and relating to Ulster's military preparations, had indicated 
that exclusion would be one such line of compromise^. Nor was 
Carson averse to a federal system (indeed, this was perhaps the 
best solution to his predicament) as long as, within the federal 
structure, Ulster remained under the Westminster parliament and
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had nothing to do with a Nationalist assembly. Others at this 
stage saw him as open to suggestion, and not some rigid diehard. 
Edward Campbell, an ex-Irish Nationalist, urged him in April 1913
77to see federalism as a possible compromise , and Dunraven wrote 
to Walter Long asking him to try to move Carson towards a 
constructive solution to the Irish problem^®. Both evidently 
thought Carson persuadable, within certain limits. Marconi, then, 
advertised his good intentions without saying anything concrete 
or compromising his position as leader of the Irish Unionists. 
It was a difficulty he would again encounter: looking to advance 
the compromise process while remaining publicly aloof from such 
"grubbing".
By the early summer of 1913, then, the elements from which 
a settlement might be made were evolving. A dialogue, of sorts, 
was tentatively in motion between selected Tory leaders and 
certain members of the government. Attempts in the autumn to 
reach a compromise (especially Loreburn's public appeal for a 
conference) did not, of course, come out of the blue. They fell 
on fertile ground. But not all was leading inevitably in the 
direction of a compromise; the deaths of Wyndham and Lyttleton 
during 1913, both keen federalists, was a blow to any move at 
this stage. Milner and Oliver still thought it tactically the 
wrong time to advance federal alternatives. While Milner and many 
of the younger, constructive Tories were concentrating on the 
Land issue.
Ill
With the amendment for full nine county exclusion rejected by the
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Government, Ulster began fully to mobilise her resources. She 
began to look decisively to her own interests regardless, by 
implication, of events at Westminster or in the south and west 
of Ireland. But Carson, as leader of the Unionists of all 
Ireland, was committed by the Covenant to 'using all means which 
may be found necessary to defeat the present conspiracy to set 
up a Home Rule Parliament in Ireland' . The direction Ulster 
was intent upon going was thus inappropriate to Carson's 
abilities and importance. The closer Ulster came to actual civil 
insurrection, the more Carson risked becoming a figurehead.
The preparations pushed through by Ulster in this period 
were of critical importance to the crisis. At the end of January, 
the U.U.C. formally accepted the report of the special commission
1A
appointed to devise a Provisional Government structure . 
Organisation could now go forward based on a concrete scheme; as 
Carson declared at Willowfield Unionist Club in May, 'we have 
never stopped day or night making such possible preparations as 
will enable us firmly, determinedly and with success to carry out 
the Covenant into which we have entered'^. But the most 
important development was the formation of the U.V.F. and their 
centralisation under one commander, Sir George Richardson, 
appointed in July 1913^. The force was limited to 100,000 men 
and organised on a local basis into regiments, divisions and 
battalions, with medical, signalling, and dispatch rider corps. 
Money to pay for this came from an extension of the Sir Edward 
Carson Fund which appointed a five man committee to examine where 
fresh sources could be tapped^. But cash also flowed into 
Ulster via the U.D.L., following a deputation from the joint
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committee of the I.U.A. at the start of February.
Guns had been entering the province in relatively small 
numbers since 1910. The start of 1913 saw an escalation of these 
shipments. Craig, speaking in Antrim on March 25th, declared that 
the time had 'now arrived when £10,000 would be a thousand times 
better spent on rifles than education'®*. On June 3rd twelve 
cases, amounting to nearly 1,000 rifles, were seized at Belfast 
docks®®. Three weeks later four large cases of arms were seized 
at Drogheda, addressed to people in the north®6, and at the 
beginning of July Lord Leitrim’s steamer was intercepted, 
following intelligence from Glasgow where it had reputedly left 
with 2,000 rifles on board. The inspection found nothing, but it
77was suspected that the arms had already been landed*” .
This activism and organisation was reflected on the Right 
of the Tory party with the formation in March of the British 
League for the Support of Ulster and the Union®®. The League was 
a means of giving active help to Ulster, as Basil Peto, the vice- 
president, explained. 'There were in this country many men who 
did not desire to see Ulster fight her battle alone if the
qg
Government carry the Home Rule conspiracy to the bitter end' . 
Military support, and not just financial assistance, was 
therefore contemplated. The League was led by many who had taken 
a prominent role in the Halsbury Club; Bedford was chairman, 
Willoughby de Broke the secretary and amongst its leaders were 
Northumberland, Comyn-Platt, F.E.Smith and Peto. Within the party 
they claimed the allegiance of 120 M.P.'s and nearly 100 Peers. 
The League quickly established local agents to enlist members, 
who were then drilled and equipped. It was also a fund-raising
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association, drawing upon the extensive and well-placed contacts 
in British society enjoyed by many of its leaders.
The formation of the B.L.S.U.U. had its roots in the changed 
political conditions at the beginning of 1913. Many on the Right 
thought they were seeing the beginnings of another betrayal. 
Carson's amendment, the moderate tone of the Lords debate on the 
bill, and the widespread rumour that a compromise was being 
hatched, all fuelled this suspicion. Willoughby de Broke wrote 
to Bonar Law early in January recommending the formation of such 
a group to reassure the party: 'people think., negotiations are 
succeeding between you and the government'*®. But as 1913 rolled 
on, apprehension grew at the apathy and the sense of resignation 
amongst Tory members; the party was clearly not doing enough to 
defeat Home Rule, and its growing interest in Marconi and the 
Land issue, forcing Ireland into the background, compounded these 
fears. The only response was even greater effort and sacrifice, 
as Dicey urged constantly in the columns of The Times: to meet 
Government stubbornness with equal determination.
Therefore the League was a warning against compromise to 
their leaders. Organising active help for Ulster outside official 
party channels was intended to reduce the leaderships1 power to 
control affairs. Yet it was not necessarily a threat to Bonar 
Law; there is no reason to think he would have been hostile to 
the formation of the League. Willoughby de Broke's letter in 
January, recommending its formation, obviously encountered little 
resistance: two months later it was launched. His letter to The 
Times on May 27th, stating that the League 'intend(ed) to stand 
by them (Ulster) until at least we have had an opportunity of
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voting against the repeal of the Union', brought the aims of the 
group within the pale of Bonar Law's justification of 
'unconstitutional' behaviour**. The League was following the 
same policy as Bonar Law: violent threats to intimidate the 
Government into an election. In July, Willoughby de Broke 
informed the House of Lords that most people 'would sooner see 
it (the crisis) fought to a finnish at a general election, but
if that means of settlement is denied us, then we must fall back
i?on the only other means at our disposal’ . Later in September 
he informed a worried Robert Cecil that 'those who are acting 
with me think that the stronger the forces arrayed against Home 
Rule the more likely the Government are to avoid the extreme 
touch and to appeal to the constituencies' . It is possible 
that the movement had Bonar Law's unofficial backing; the 
rejection of Carson's amendment and constraints of the Parliament 
Act justified, for Bonar Law, raising the stakes and further 
intimidation of the Government. It reinforced his constant 
insistence that forcing Home Rule onto Ulster would result in 
civil war. And by allowing the League to form he was channelling 
the growing frustration on the Right into a permanent structure, 
with an eye to containing the more extreme and independent 
spirits: what the Covenant did on the ground in Ulster.
In addition to threats and intimidation, the Tory right 
actively involved itself with the militarisation of Ulster. The 
U.D.L. was already a conduit to Ulster for Unionist money and 
expertise. The B.L.S.U.U. involved itself in recruitment, and in 
drilling supporting forces. Much active work was also done by 
prominent individuals. Ronald McNeill, Conservative M.P. for St.
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Augustine, was an influential mover on the backbenches, rallying 
support to the cause and encouraging friends and colleagues to 
make financial commitments. Colonel Hickman, Tory M.P. for 
Wolverhampton South, was instrumental in securing the services 
of Sir George Richardson as Commander-in-Chief, and arousing 
sympathy for Ulster in military circles4*. He also served on the 
Provisional Government, and was to act as recruiting officer for 
the U.V.F. Sir William Bull, Tory M.P. for Westminster, helped, 
with safe houses, transport and the passage of arms through 
Britain to Ulster4^ . Bull’s connection is of interest because of 
his closeness to Walter Long and his active involvement with the 
U.D.L., showing again the overlapping of groups and of 
individuals. He also enjoyed much influence amongst more 
traditional Tory sections.
But the Right was not concerned solely with the military 
aspects of Ulster. If their aim was to intimidate the Government 
into an election, then additional tactical courses presented 
themselves; two in particular gained popularity from March 1913 
onwards. First was the idea of embroiling the King in the 
political crisis. With the constitution suspended, the Royal 
prerogative, many argued, was reactivated. In this situation it 
was the King's duty either to veto the bill or to replace his 
ministers with ones who would recommend a dissolution. Behind 
this was, perhaps, a feeling that the King had neglected his duty 
in 1911 in promising Asquith that he would create more Peers. 
Second was the idea of suspending the Army Annual Act in the 
House of Lords, so prompting an immediate dissolution of 
Parliament. This idea had first surfaced in July 1911 in the
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fertile minds of Goulding and Garvin, as a means of frustrating 
the Parliament bill. By 1913, Lord Hugh Cecil began to look with 
favour upon the tactic. In June he wrote a memorandum arguing the 
case for suspending the Act, which he distributed amongst the 
Unionist leadership^. Cecil was aware that it was a dangerous 
and radical step: he argued that the Act could only be suspended 
as long as public opinion was carefully prepared, and a series 
of prior moves effected. In particular, the King should first be 
petitioned to withhold his assent until an election, and only 
then should they consider suspending the Act. No action was taken 
upon Cecil’s suggestion, largely because moves to involve the 
King were already underway, and because the likes of Salisbury, 
Bob Cecil and Lansdowne had been concerned about what reaction 
such a tactic would provoke in the public and the party. But the 
idea was to revive more strongly during the first months of 1914.
Interest in the Army Act also fed into the Unionist attack 
upon the question of how the bill was to be implemented, if 
Ulster refused it: would the Army be used to coerce Ulster under 
Dublin? Tories taunted the Government with the likelihood of mass 
resignations, in the process helping to blur the sanctity of 
obeying orders. We can only speculate on the social pressure 
applied to officers not to coerce Ulstermen. If nothing else, the 
constant references to and public debate on such hypothetical 
situations made simple obedience far more difficult and 
uncertain. Birrell and Asquith tried to counter by rejecting the
i 7
likelihood of ever coercing any part of Ireland into the bill , 
but this seemed less plausible when Carson announced that taxes 
would not be paid to the Irish Government (which would still be
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under Imperial collection) but to the Ulster Provisional 
Government: 'Then if the Government did not intend to use force, 
let them try to collect the taxes without force'4®. Could any 
Government stand passively by once Imperial revenue was being 
withheld? Was this not the way the thirteen colonies had been 
lost?
IV
The new environment of 1913 created some anxiety among Southern 
Unionists. Lords Midleton, Templetown and Barrymore, along with 
other more traditional sections of the party such as Long and 
Salisbury, shared a concern that Ulster was looming far too large 
in the Unionist armoury against Home Rule. The tough campaigns 
throughout Ulster during the autumn of 1912, the signing of the 
Covenant in September and Carson's amendment on January the 1st, 
clearly suggested this. By the start of the second circuit the 
impression was widely felt, especially since Liberal ministers 
were playing upon it, that no credible resistance to the bill 
existed in the south and west of Ireland. Midleton complained to 
The Times that 'the Prime Minister, admitting the animus against 
the bill in Ulster, has assumed that the Unionist population in 
the other three provinces views the bill with composure'4®. To 
reverse this perception, Southern Unionists tried to raise their 
own profile. Midleton arranged loyalist meetings throughout the 
South of Ireland and, with Devonshire, tried to organise them 
locally into a strong political movement; however, as he 
admitted, his efforts '(had) hitherto been very feeble'®®. 
G.Stewart, chairman of the I.U.A, wrote to Carson at the
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beginning of March for support: 'we Southern Unionists are badly 
in need of encouragement'^. To James Campbell he was less 
delicate in his demands for recognition of the South: 'things
have never been in so critical a condition as they are now. If 
Mr Bonar Law does not hold us together it is hard to say what
Cl
might happen' . At the same time he led a deputation of 
Southern Irish Unionists to Bonar Law to register their fears: 
'A great feeling of uneasiness exists amongst the Unionists of 
the south and west of Ireland at the present crisis. We believe 
that this feeling is due to a very large extent to the attitude 
of the leaders towards Ulster and the feeling which is stated to 
exist in England, that there is no opposition to Home Rule except
CQ
the opposition of Ulster' . Southern Unionists were keen to
convince Tory leaders that there was more to the Irish question 
than Ulster.
The situation was not helped by Ulster increasingly turning 
away from the Westminster arena and looking to her own defence. 
'Those who are behind the scenes in Ulster', Midleton reminded 
Bonar Law, 'believe that such terrible events are impending that 
nothing very much matters here (London). This may prove to be so, 
but is it not just as much our duty as a party to exhaust all 
constitutional means of opposition before a rupture...?1^ . The 
Carson amendment, as a prerequisite of the "forward move" in 
Ulster, had dismayed and shocked many Southern Unionists to such 
an extent that on February 19th the U.U.C. felt it necessary to 
pass a resolution 'that the position of Unionists in the south 
and west of Ireland has not been lost sight of and when the time 
comes, have the support and sympathy of Ulster brethren'^.
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Despite such assurances, Southern Unionists believed that over­
concentration on Ulster would bring about a settlement based upon 
exclusion. Dicey warned Long that Asquith might be ’meditating 
some unexpected trick with a view to divide the Unionist
opposition. Is he thinking of some concessions to Ulster? We must 
certainly be prepared for this'®®. A worried Midleton reminded 
Hugh Cecil, one of the champions of the Ulster line, that 'if it 
were possible to exempt Ulster from the Home Rule bill we should
be guilty of a most outrageous crime against the loyalists
c  7
through-out the south' . Lord Templetown, at the Council of
Unionist clubs, tried to squash all such rumours: 'He repeated
as he had said in the lords, that of compromise, of devolution 
or of a separate Ulster, they would have none. . that while it was 
for their leader Sir Edward Carson to state the policy of Ulster, 
he ventured to think that what he had stated was unquestionably 
the views of the Unionist clubs of Ireland'®®. This marked a 
difference between Carson (who was apparently making policy only 
for Ulster) and the rest of the Unionist movement; Carson himself 
was increasingly aware of such southern anxieties. 'I think they 
are disturbed over the question of compromise', he told Bonar 
Law®®. This fear was strengthened by the general air of apathy 
in the party; passage of the bill was inevitable and little could 
stop it. Ulster had responded to this listlessness by preparing 
to stop it unilaterally; the rest of Ireland, to fight its 
battles, was reliant upon a Tory party which, by early 1913, was 
far from encouraging. This explains the calls for renewed 
activism. Dicey, writing to Walter Long in early April, reminded 
him that 'nothing but great energy both in leaders and followers
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will avert this calamity'^. And again on the 30th: 'What I
deprecate is the saying... that somehow the passing of the Home 
Rule bill would be prevented; such feats we all know are not 
achieved somehow but by energy and concerted effort'^1.
This concern for greater energy surfaced in May over tactics 
towards the second reading (9th and 10th of June). Bonar Law and 
Carson had planned to walk out of the chamber without registering 
their votes in the lobby, to make an unusual protest. Both Long 
and Midleton objected to this passive resistance. 'I suggested', 
the latter wrote, 'that it would not be understood in the country 
if no vote were given by those chiefly affected on the second 
reading'^; Long felt that 'if we abstain our policy will be 
misunderstood'^. The policy gave the appearance of resignation 
and 'the electors will surely think that our opposition to the 
bill is played out'^. In the event, the second reading passed 
off in normal fashion, outstanding only for the very bitter 
speech delivered by Carson on the 10th.
Closely aligned to calls for renewed activity were 
intensified demands for a dissolution. This was not a new demand, 
but by 1913 the request had greater resonance. Dicey was a 
leading force behind this, concerned that once the third session 
began a dissolution would be far more difficult to win. Writing 
in The Times under the title 'Facts for Unionists1, he harangued 
them constantly to demand a dissolution^. In private Dicey 
worked to convince the leaders of this necessity, pestering Bonar 
Law on March 25th: 'to my mind we have one course open to us and 
one only; that is openly and avowedly to agitate for a 
dissolution and raise the perfectly legitimate cry of an appeal
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to the people'^. Bonar Law took the advice, and during his 
major speeches of 1913 continually challenged Asquith to such a 
remedy for the crisis. In the atmosphere of 1913, with so much 
going against the Government, not least the humiliating defeats 
at Newcastle and Altrincham and the revelations over Marconi, he 
must have been confident of success. Other Tory leaders followed 
his line, Curzon declaring to the Primrose League in May: 'our
<57demand is that the matter should be put to the test' . Long 
went so far as to prepare a manifesto of policy initiatives 
(land, housing, Insurance), obviously with an eye on an election
£fi
campaign in the near future °.
Giving the demand for an election, a higher profile served 
to soothe many Southern and traditional Unionist worries. It 
avoided direct reference to the Ulster problem, treating Home 
Rule in general as the point at issue. This shifted the focus 
away from notions of settlement and, crucially for these elements 
in the Unionist coalition, lessened the prominence of exclusion. 
In any case, Southern Unionists had little alternative to a 
dissolution and the return of a Tory government as a means of 
securing the Union.
Putting the call for an election more squarely to the fore 
helped cushion and appease those traditional Unionists unhappy 
with Bonar Law's strong support for Ulster resistance. Midleton 
spoke of the need to exhaust all constitutional means before 
adopting novel tactics for resisting the bill^. Salisbury was 
even more forthright: 'I strongly disapprove of Home Rule for
Ireland but I cannot support political lawlessness and I shall 
either disenfranchise myself or vote Liberal at the next
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election, rather than encourage armed resistance in Ulster'7®. 
For leaders such as Salisbury and Midleton an election would 
defuse the whole political crisis, removing much of the 
bitterness and, whether they won or lost, at least saving the 
Parliamentary system from irreparable and irreversible harm. An 
election was vital not just to try and save the Union but to save 
the political and social order itself, before the Ulster 
blunderbuss destroyed everything.
However, demanding an election exposed the differences 
within the Unionist forces, in particular by dividing the 
Ulstermen from other parts of the Unionist coalition. Sanders had 
perceptively remarked on this distinction towards the end of 
1912: 'Lloyd George tried to draw Bonar Law as to whether he
would approve of resistance if at a general election the country 
decided for Home Rule. Law refused to be drawn. But as a matter 
of fact he has said both publicly and privately that in that case 
he would not support resistance. There he differs from
71Carson" . As Ulster increasingly looked to its own
preservation, an election became less pressing; the election,
after all, might be lost, and such a result would not change 
Ulster's decision to defend her interests. But for other 
Unionists, as Ulster began to organise and arm, an election 
became even more central. 1913 these distinctions became more 
apparent. Carson, speaking during second reading on June 10th, 
recognised these differences: 'he preferred to fight this battle 
out with the whole of the Unionist party behind him, rather than, 
as they might have to fight it out eventually, alone in
7?Ireland". Bonar Law, replying to Asquith's question as to the
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value of an election when Ulster was determined to resist in any 
case, also admitted this divergence of intent. 'I cannot say what 
the attitude of Ulster will be but I can at once say what my 
attitude will be if I am leader of the Unionist party...if that 
is done we shall not in any way, shape or form encourage the 
resistance of Ulster. I say that without hesitation...if you put 
it before the people of this country as a clear issue, then it
71
is a problem for Ulster and not for me' . And Lansdowne, who 
along with a growing band of Unionists was worried at the 
implications of an Ulster rebellion, assured the House of Lords 
that 'if the country wants the bill we are ready to let them have 
it. We ask you to put the question to the test and we are
7 *
prepared to abide by the result' . It was Lord Londonderry, 
however, who gave the clearest indication of differences of 
interest. To his threat that 'if Home Rule is granted it is 
absolutely certain there will be civil war in Ulster', Lord 
Morley responded: 'even after a general election?'. 'In any
circumstances' came the blunt reply7^ . Inconveniences like 
elections were not going to stop the mighty Ulster military 
machine from defending its interests. It was on this issue that 
Ulster and the Tory party were shown to stand apart.
Of interest here was the position Lansdowne seemed to be 
adopting. By the summer of 1913 he was at last moving away from 
the land issue and, perhaps for the first time, towards the 
Irish question. He moved to defend traditional and Southern 
Unionist concerns, aligning himself with Midleton, Long and 
Salisbury against what all three saw as the dominating, and 
increasingly dangerous, influence of Ulster. His clear and
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forceful acceptance of the bill, if the Tories lost an election, 
was meant as a gesture to those alarmed at the ramifications the 
party was contriving for itself. It also suggested a weakening 
of support for Ulster, a hint that even if there were no 
election, assistance for their rebellion would not be 
forthcoming; unlike Bonar Law, he never claimed that Tory backing 
was contingent on an election, nor did he reinforce his analysis 
with blood-curdling threats of civil catastrophe. Lansdowne thus 
rose as a counter-weight to Carson within leadership circles, 
with Bonar Law the fulcrum between them: a tension which would 
become more focused and important during the autumn.
It was this combination of a strong move from traditional 
and Southern Unionist circles for an election and a growing 
anxiety about the consequences of a revolt in Ulster which led 
some to advocate a greater role for the King in the crisis. 
Ideas about the King's role had continued to circulate in 
Unionist circles since the Parliament Act, especially on how his 
constitutional position had been changed by the new Parliamentary 
landscape. The summer recess of the first session, a time to 
reflect on the looming political crisis, saw these comments begin 
to surface. Carson told Lady Londonderry in August 1912 that, 
when faced with giving his assent to Home Rule, the King could 
no longer exercise his veto but was fully entitled 'to call on
1C
his P.M. to relieve him of an impossible situation' . Three 
days before, Edward Saunderson had also broached the subject of 
the King with Lady Londonderry. Knowing she was to see him soon, 
he wrote: 'if you put your mind to it to make the little man put 
his foot down. He has a great opportunity. He will either be a
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77man or a mouse. Let us hope he will be the power1". And Lord St 
Aldwyn, in an article in The Times, 'doubted if ministers dare 
advise the king to give the Royal assent to the measures and 
thought that if they did they might be told to consult the
78country' . But it was Bonar Law who first brought the topic 
into wider and more influential councils.
On November 16th, following the snap victory against the 
Liberals, Bonar Law wrote to the King's secretary, Stamfordham. 
Designed to intimidate the monarch into re-assessing his 
position, it was a blunt and alarmist letter. 'Sooner or later... 
we shall have to decide between breaking the Parliamentary 
machine and allowing these terrible results to happen. When faced 
with a choice of such evils as these we shall not hesitate in 
considering that the injury of the House of Commons is not so 
great an evil as the other'7®. He then delivered the punchline:
' the Speaker felt he had to intervene and there is always the 
risk that the time will come when the nation will expect His 
Majesty to take, in regard to the whole nation, the same attitude 
which has been taken by the speaker'®®. The tense political 
atmosphere at that time might explain the more excessive aspects 
of this extraordinary letter; but it reveals how early Bonar Law 
saw the King as a possible means of securing a dissolution.
Not until his speech on January 24th at the Queens Hall, 
Edinburgh, did he express such views publicly. Hypothesising on 
the situation when the bill was presented for Royal assent, he 
asked his audience: 'what would then be the position of the
sovereign of this country? Whatever he did half of his people 
would think he had failed in his duty... that any loyal servant
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should put his sovereign in such a position would have been, till
a year ago, incredible... but... can we be sure that the present
01
Government will not commit that crime?0 ' Reaction to Bonar
Law's speech was swift. Lord Esher saw it as 'a new departure1
01
and not one he particularly liked. Dicey echoed these
01
sentiments, seeing it as 'a dangerous mistake1 . Bonar Law also 
received more fulminations from Churchill, who referred to his 
comments as 'criminal advice'®*. For Strachey it was 'a mad 
movement', got up by ' Garvin and the other hotheads' who were 
simply 'gambl(ing) with the Monarchy'®®. In the pages of The 
Spectator he rallied against the idea of involving the king in 
party political controversy. He also compiled an eight page 
memorandum criticising the scheme, which he disseminated to 
certain Unionist leaders, notably Lansdowne, whom he obviously
oc
saw as a force working against extremism in the party00.
But the discussion in the party which Bonar Law's speech had 
initiated showed clearly that opinion was moving in favour of 
some type of action by the King. Nor was this movement of opinion 
limited to a few extremists, as an anxious Stamfordham noted: 'I 
fear the feeling that he (the King) should take some action will 
not be confined to the Diehards and Garvin1®7. Carson, aware of 
the Sovereign's position, applied similar pressure on him from 
the public platform. At Willowfield drill Hall on May 16th he 
concluded that 'every monarch rests upon certain ground so long 
as he makes his maxim "the will of the people shall prevail". But 
no monarch rests upon certain ground who says the will of a 
coalition Government must prevail1®®. Lansdowne, Salisbury, Hugh 
and Robert Cecil and Long all gave private support to the idea.
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Thomas Bowles even sent Bonar Law a closely argued memorandum, 
early in July, on the tactical advantages of involving the 
King®®. In fact, differences within the party over the King's 
role were not about whether but about how it ought to be used.
Some thought that the King could veto the bill and so force 
Asquith to dissolve. 'His Majesty', wrote Long, an early advocate 
of this line, 'might decide to tell the Government that he would 
not assent to the bill without a dissolution'®®. In May, Steel- 
Maitland informed Bonar Law of a petition which Carson, 
Chamberlain, McNeill and Locker-Lampson were planning to get up 
and present to the King in the autumn, asking 'that your Majesty 
may withhold your Royal assent to that measure until the 
Parliamentary electors of the U.K. shall have had an
qi
opportunity... of making known their wishes' . And even 
Salisbury recommended use of the veto in a letter to Sir George 
Younger: 'Does not the king's coronation oath., not give
Unionists the right to ask his majesty under the circumstances 
to withhold his signature when the H.R. for Ireland.. Act (is) 
presented to him'...®®? But for others, use of the Royal veto 
was a dangerous step, one not taken even in the politically 
charged atmospheres of 1783 and 1831. It might also be tactically 
fatal, 'suiting Asquith's game uncommonly well', by allowing him 
to play the King versus the People card and so ’throw the crown 
after the coronet' while for the party it 'would utterly destroy 
us at the polls'®®.
Dicey worked hard to steer ideas about the Royal 
prerogative into less constitutionally sensitive waters. Instead 
of the veto, the King might ask his ministers to dissolve to
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alleviate the political tension. If they refused, it would be a 
'perfectly constitutional manner' then to dismiss those ministers 
and call fresh ones (ie Tory ones) with 'wholly and solely1 the 
aim of immediately dissolving Parliament^. However, he 
deprecated overt pressure on the King by Tory leaders to achieve 
such an end. Rather they should 'let it be known that they are 
prepared at any moment if called to office to carry through a 
dissolution even though this measure may meet with Parliamentary 
opposition'^. Bonar Law concurred with this use of the 
prerogative. 'I do not think that it is a question really of 
using the veto, but in my view the one constitutional right which 
the sovereign undoubtedly still possesses is that if ministers 
have given him advice of which he does not approve, he should 
then see whether he cannot get other ministers who would give him 
different advice'^. Yet this concurrence with Dicey's approach 
did not deter him from applying pressure on the King, like 
Carson, from the public platform. Lansdowne was also a supporter 
of Dicey's views. Replying to entreaties from Strachey to 
mobilise against the movement, he admitted that the veto would 
'be a great mistake', but saw little problem with the King
Q7changing ministers to procure a dissolution . With Bonar Law 
and Lansdowne aware of the dangers of the veto, they were able 
to shift debate on the prerogative towards the safer line of 
changing ministers to induce a dissolution.
Despite the widespread discussion within the Tory leadership 
on this matter and the strength of opinion in favour of some type 
of royal initiative, it was not until after third reading and the 
end of the second circuit was anything tangible done. On the 31st
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of July Lansdowne and Bonar Law presented a joint memorandum to 
the King on his constitutional position with regard to the Home 
Rule bill and in the light of the Parliament Act. It put clearly 
the points: that the veto 'has no doubt fallen into desuetude1; 
and that 'as a constitutional monarch he can only act upon the 
advice of a minister, but it has never been questioned by any 
constitutional writer that if the king is not sure that in the 
advice which they have given him his ministers have the support 
of his people, he has the right to change his advisers, to give 
his new ministers the power to dissolve Parliament and so to 
ascertain whether or not they have the support of the
qo
country'70. The memorandum was a shrewd attempt to move the King 
towards exerting his prerogative, more subtle than Bonar Law's 
and Carson's platform intimidation, clearly revealing the hand 
of Lansdowne, but no less powerful. It came after several months 
of pressure on the King to act, not just from the platform but 
from the press, from informal talks with Tory leaders, from
'rumours of probable agitation in the country; of monster
petitions; addresses from the House of Lords; from Privy
Councillors; urging me to use my influence to avert the
qq
catastrophe1 . These pressures left the King increasingly
anxious at his own predicament. Birrell, meeting the King on July 
24th, was forced to discuss the Irish problem for nearly an hour 
during which the king referred to Government policy as 
'drifting'1®®. On August the 11th, clearly moved by the 
memorandum from Lansdowne and Bonar Law, the King wrote to 
Asquith urging that a way out of the present situation be found, 
and indicating his support for an election1®1.
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Involving the King was not as extreme or even as 
unjustifiable a course, in the circumstances of 1913, as many 
contemporaries and historians have thought. The constitution was, 
according to the preamble to the Parliament Act, in suspension;
and as Lansdowne argued, 'under a suspended constitution the old
1 0 ?customs cannot have the same force' . Also, the Parliament Act 
was only to be used on bills 'which had during two years been 
supported by a majority of the House of Commons and had also
in?
received the stable support of the constituencies' . This 
second point greatly concerned the Tory leadership; 'the question 
whether the last condition has been fulfilled can hardly be left 
entirely for decision by the Government of the day, and it will 
certainly be argued that some responsibility must also rest upon 
the crown'^. Whether or not it was tactically wise or secure 
constitutional ground, their attempts to persuade the King were 
largely based on the wording of the Parliament Act and the manner 
in which the Government had used it. And the King was seen, by 
many traditional Unionists, as a safety-valve in a situation 
which was spiralling out of control. 'No one wishes to drag the 
king's name into party-politics’, wrote Salisbury, 'but vital 
national and Imperial interests are involved which justify our 
laying our case before his majesty'*®^. With the social, 
political and even military order in jeopardy, urging the king 
to play a more active part seemed a small danger by comparison.
Attempts to embroil the king reveal several things about the 
Tory leadership. First, the general drift to the right by many 
who, under different circumstances, would have been alarmed at 
any prospect of tampering with the royal prerogative. Lansdowne,
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Salisbury, Long, Chamberlain and Midleton were all keen 
supporters of what at other times they would surely have 
resisted. They may all have wanted an election as the best way 
out of the crisis, but support for an initiative by the crown 
might also be an indication of their willingness to see a 
conference on the issue. The king could, after all, recommend 
a convention along the lines of 1910 just as easily as a 
dissolution. Such an outcome appealed to Midleton and other 
Southern Unionists, not least because, short of a Tory 
Government, it was the only way of keeping Ulster in a united 
Ireland and yet moderating the grant of self-rule.
Second, there is the problem of explaining Carson's 
behaviour in supporting initiatives towards the King's 
withholding his assent. This keenness to force an election was 
at odds with his clearly stated position that it would not 
necessarily end Ulster's resistance. An election held the risk 
of losing, so removing Unionist support for Ulster; and an 
election had too many pitfalls to be the ideal solution for 
Ulstermen. Nor was persuading the King to effect a dissolution 
the perfect basis to appeal to the country: it threatened a
Unionist election campaign vulnerable to a Liberal 'king versus 
the people' cry. Several reasons for Carson's position can be 
suggested. Forcing an election at that stage was clearly less of 
a risk than at other times. With the Marconi scandal so prominent 
and National Insurance still unpopular, they stood to gain from 
a strong anti-Liberal sentiment in the country. Carson might also 
have been feeling the difficulty of his position, made worse by 
the death of his wife in April. The rejection of his amendment,
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Ulster's military preparations, and the rigid parliamentary 
situation during the second session, created a desperate need to 
block or divert the seemingly inevitable progress towards Home 
Rule. Perhaps Carson was beginning to think longer-term about the 
position of Ulster and Ireland which would require, in the end, 
some form of settlement. Drawing the King into party politics 
might initiate a future conference or negotiations; this was 
consistent with his actions over Marconi. It does not, of course, 
explain his apparent willingness to see the King use his veto, 
unless he believed that by threatening George V with this more 
extreme option he made the safer course of calling a conference 
more attractive to the King.
V
The second session opened badly for Bonar Law. His leadership was 
weakened after the food tax crisis, the lack of success in the 
first session and a staid Parliamentary atmosphere at the start 
of the second. There was apathy throughout the party, many being 
resigned to the bill's passage; and divisions over Ireland were 
beginning to surface. As Marconi and the land campaign moved to 
prominence, he even had trouble in retaining attention on Home 
Rule.
He stuck tenaciously to his line on the bill. Winding up 
third reading on January 16th he declared: 'The reality of this 
situation does not consist in discussions in this house. It does 
not consist in your majorities.. It consists in the resistance 
of Ulster. That is the reality of the situation'1®*. And to
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Dicey in June: 'In my deliberate opinion., the best chance of
avoiding civil war., is to convince the ministers that we are in 
earnest and that if they attempt to carry this through under 
present conditions they will find themselves face to face with 
resistance of more than half the nation. I think they are now
beginning to believe it, then I think it is impossible for them
1fl7to persevere' . This continued the language of 1912. With his 
support for Royal intervention, his informal backing for the 
creation of the B.L.S.U.U. and the general hard-hitting nature 
of his speeches and threats, Bonar Law encountered few problems 
from the Diehards. His handling of the Right was based on 
leadership from the front, controlling the pace of escalation and 
slowing the drift towards unconstitutional methods. This could 
be seen when he directed interest in the King away from the veto 
and towards the dismissal of ministers. He did not simply 
'canalize the enthusiasm of the diehards into party channels, to
-i no
articulate their views' but shaped opinion on the Right . His 
role was not passive but assertive, guiding and encouraging.
If he faced problems of unity from any direction, it was 
from the more traditional and moderate sections of the party. 
Worried at the rise in militancy and the threat to civil order 
by Ulster, they had come out strongly for a dissolution. This 
demand was easily absorbed by Bonar Law, whose speeches had 
continually appealed for an election, but as a dissolution became 
more central to the Tory position, several tactical difficulties 
were raised. First, he was forced to announce that he would stand 
by its result. This injected a healthy dose of constitutionalism 
back into the party, but it also exposed a serious difference
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with the Ulstermen. Bonar Law could not risk alienating the 
Ulstermen, since that increased the danger of their coming 
independently to a compromise with Asquith on exclusion. Dicey
greatly feared this, realising that the Government could still
1AQmake suggestions to amend the bill . Yet there was little 
Bonar Law could do to offset this danger, except to ensure that 
his promises to Ulster were unqualified if no election came, to 
maintain a tough and bloodcurdling tone and to keep close to 
Carson and to developments in the province.
Second, out of the Tory demand for a dissolution had emerged 
the idea of using the King to procure it. Though Bonar Law 
quickly supported such a move, it was not necessarily compatible 
with his tactical line. His was a game of patience, of the 
"ticking-bomb" scenario: in the end, the horror of Ulster
resistance would move Asquith to an election. Why then upset this 
scheme with risky manoeuvres? Although it would prompt an
election, it would do so on uncertain terms; raising the issue
of the royal prerogative stood to eclipse Home Rule and place the 
Tories on a less hopeful, because less threatening, platform. 
Several reasons might explain why Bonar Law felt obliged to 
involve the King. It reflected traditional and Southern Unionist 
pressure to act before the entire, Ulster-dominated situation, 
erupted. The movement of Long, Salisbury, Midleton, Balfour, and 
(more warily) Lansdowne behind the idea showed a strength of 
opinion within the leadership to which Bonar Law could not fail 
to respond. And, like Carson, he may have felt that to have 
election in 1913, with the government so unpopular, would
outweigh the means by which it came about. The plan also had a
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good chance of succeeding; intimidating the King could, and 
eventually did, force him to act, although in the end not in the 
way Bonar Law wanted. In any case, by raising the position of the 
King, further pressure was brought on the Government as to the 
consequences of continuing with the bill. In addition, the
'ticking-bomb' approach could only succeed if all other
constitutional avenues had been explored beforehand. Bonar Law 
realised that eventual support for Ulster resistance had to be 
preceded by less extreme solutions for achieving an election if 
it was to justify their backing for armed rebellion and place 
them in a stronger tactical position. Imploring the King to act 
was Bonar Law traversing semi-constitutional paths before 
unconstitutional ones.
Bonar Law also speculated about whether Asquith's was merely 
a drifting, rudderless government with no settled Irish policy. 
At the Free Trade Hall in March he had thought that 'the 
Government by the methods by which they proposed to carry out 
their Home Rule policy were drifting without compass straight on 
the rocks'**®. If this was so (and it was what many thought to 
be Asquith's frame of mind) then there was a genuine fear that
Ulster would simply drift into civil war or, worse still, that
she would erupt before any election. Threatening civil war worked 
only if Asquith actually feared it; if he thought it impossible 
or containable, and was determined simply to wait and see what 
turned up, then drawing in the King to act decisively might alarm 
him. It might prevent Ulster from a premature explosion which 
would place Tories in a difficult position regarding their pledge 
of support This point again touched the basic problem faced by
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Bonar Law: what were Asquith's tactics and aims? He was never 
really sure how the Prime Minister might relieve the pressure of 
Ulster; all he could do was to manoeuvre so as to ensure that he 
avoided a compromise, kept public opinion on his side, and 
maintained unity in his party.
The 1913 Parliamentary session revealed many characteristics 
of Bonar Law's style of leadership. One particular method he used 
effectively was to allow issues to be freely debated within the 
ruling counsels, hoping that a clear line of policy would emerge. 
He had tried to do this with Tariff Reform during 1912, but had 
unfortunately plumped for the wrong opinion - though once in 
trouble, he had extricated himself from it by precisely this 
method of ' leaving the onus on the party of defining its 
position '***. To some extent he did this with land policy, 
refraining from making any definite policy statements - to the 
annoyance of Steel-Maitland. However, no consensus emerged over 
land, opinion being seriously divided between innovators and 
traditionalists. On the position and role of the King he also 
employed this method. But this sensitive technique and regard for 
party opinion was apt to be misinterpreted as weakness. Dicey, 
writing to Strachey, enquired: 'why are our leaders always too 
late? Is it not because the leadership is practically in 
commission? Surely. . the old system must be restored; we must
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have one leader of the opposition'114. And Salisbury, writing to 
his brother Robert, commented that 'the respective attitudes of 
Balfour and Bonar Law are gratifying to ones sense of humour. It 
seems to be easier to be definite when you are not 
responsible'113.
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By the end of the second session Bonar Law was in a far 
stronger position than at the start, even though no election had 
been called. The party remained united, and with their upper hand 
in politics reflected in the drift of by-elections in their 
direction. The Government were increasingly uncertain, coming 
close to breaking up over Marconi and feeling the tension from 
radical and Labour supporters at the lack of constructive reform, 
particularly the still-expected Land campaign. In the country the 
Government were unpopular as a result of National Insurance, 
Naval matters, Marconi, the suffrage question and Home Rule. Most 
important, Tory excesses did not appear to have alienated public 
opinion.
However, there were problems on the horizon. By the summer 
of 1913 a considerable movement in favour of action by the King 
had built up. But this did not mean that he would act under Tory 
prescription; in fact the more common precedent was for the 
monarch to arrange a conference***. This was the more worrying 
since the time - the end of the second session - seemed most 
suitable for a compromise attempt. The period between second and 
third circuit was recognised as the last moment to dissolve 
Parliament on anything like equal terms. The parties also now had 
a long six-month recess to ponder these and other problems, ideal 
terrain for flexible politicians to manoeuvre without the glare 
of party or public opinion. In fact, fragile links across the 
party divide had already been built during 1913, and forces 
within both parties were beginning to press for a settlement. It 
was against this background that the secret meetings between 
Bonar Law, Asquith and Carson took place.
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CHAPTER FIVE
I
By September 1913 Bonar Law and Lansdowne*s policy of manoeuvring 
the King into decisive action had met with little obvious 
success. Their insistence that the choice lay between civil war 
and a general election had unnerved the King but he had not been 
pressured into dangerous constitutional remedies. Instead, Tory 
pressure had moved him towards the safer exercise of Royal 
influence by calling for a conference of party leaders. Over July 
and August the King had sounded out many leading politicians to 
this end, gaining a variety of opinion, much of it both moderate 
and sympathetic. Events within high-political circles appeared 
to be moving in the direction of a conference.
The established view is that the publication by Lord 
Loreburn, a Liberal Home Ruler, of a letter in The Times on 
September 11th calling for a "settlement by consent", set the 
idea of a conference of party leaders on track1. However, two 
other factors were already pushing the conference idea into the 
foreground. Firstly Ulster had taken a further step forward 
during 1913, with the consolidation of the U.V.F. and 
establishment of a centralised political structure ready to 
assume control of all branches of civil and military government 
in the province. This was formally initiated on September 24th 
when the U.U.C. reconstituted itself as a Provisional Government. 
Alongside this came the traditional September campaigns in Ulster 
in the run up to Ulster Day on the 28th. It made Liberal
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depreciation of Ulster's claims seem blinkered and dangerous. A 
conference was now, for many, the best way out of a deteriorating 
situation.
Second, the procedural ground had been well prepared. The 
Parliament Act, by turning the first two legislative circuits 
into dummy-runs, made the interregnum before the third an obvious 
moment when a compromise could be hatched. Further, any amendment 
of the bill not incorporated before early 1913 had to have, 
thereafter, the agreement of the Lords. This pointed to the long 
delay between the second and third circuits as an ideal time to 
search for agreement. Loreburn's letter therefore fell upon 
fertile ground.
The letter immediately put Bonar Law on the defensive by 
raising an alternative to the equation he had propounded since 
early 1912: a general election or civil war. A conference
appeared more in tune with the lethargic public and the pro­
compromise stance of many leading papers. It stood to preserve 
the party balance and the Liberal Government, by removing 
pressure on the Liberals to retire or hold an election. It was 
also an attractive proposition to the King. He greeted Loreburn's 
suggestion with great enthusiasm, as a way of avoiding partisan 
interference in political affairs. Indeed, it is tempting to 
speculate that Loreburn's public announcement had the King's 
prior sanction, if it was not actually the product of his 
indirect pressure to bring the party leaders together. And 
Loreburn was an acknowledged Home Ruler, who had resisted 
exclusion during the formulation of policy towards Ireland early 
in 1912. If he was trimming, how many other moderates might be
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nestling on the Liberal backbenches? Rumours even circulated that 
Loreburn was acting under orders from Asquith, to open up an 
avenue the Government desperately wanted but could not publicly 
initiate without undermining their own credibility .
This perception of Asquith encouraged some Tories to 
pressure their leadership for a Conference, taking the exclusion 
of Ulster from the bill as a basis upon which negotiation could 
progress. Loreburn's letter swelled their ranks, gaining in 
particular the hesitant support of Balfour, who was fearful of 
the threat posed to the social fabric of the Nation and convinced 
that if such an attempt at conference failed then the 
justification for exercising the Royal prerogative would be 
greatly enhanced. Also, members close to the Army and Navy saw 
exclusion as an amicable way out, recognising the damage the 
present struggle was doing to morale, and conscious of the German 
military threat. Earl Roberts and Lord Beresford both thought 
along these lines^. Such military sympathy for a compromise 
might be explained by the growing connections between sections 
of the Army and the Ulster Unionists, who, despite their sabre- 
rattling, were keen for such a solution. Exclusion had long been 
the Ulster Unionists' bench-mark for an acceptable compromise, 
given their previous endorsement of Agar-Robartes' and Carson's 
amendments. To pull back now from such a suggestion would have 
been tactically disastrous, enabling Asquith more easily to 
justify continuing with his bill or even forcing it onto Ulster. 
Despite the bitterness and extremism of their campaign so far, 
Carson and F.E.Smith realised this. The former recognised the 
logic of his established hardline tactics, which depended on
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securing a political solution. Carson was also, as Bonar Law told 
Lansdowne, 'feeling more and more the responsibility of his 
position1, so strengthening his resolve to find a solution*.
What ran through these diverse sections of Unionism was 
a realisation that a conference was now the safest course of 
action in light of the increasing radicalisation of the crisis, 
and that exclusion for Ulster was the quickest method of securing 
an agreement. For the Ulster Unionists, exclusion was the only 
agenda on which they would negotiate. They were fearful of a 
federalism which could well leave Dublin with some power over 
Ulster, and sceptical of the outcome of a general election, given 
the failure of Unionist campaigning to rouse the country against 
Home Rule.
Many others in the party were horrified at the prospect of 
a conference, and even more so at the idea of exclusion. Diehards 
opposed to the idea, recognising the damage this would do to 
their present strong tactical position as regards Ulster and the 
Home Rule bill. Why throw away a year and a half’s gruelling 
campaigning and the rousing of popular indignation against the 
Government at the first hint of Liberal weakening? The situation 
for the Diehards dictated renewed determination, not running 
after Liberal "hares". Willoughby de Broke, speaking in Liverpool 
early in September, harangued the Government and any thought of 
a compromise over Home Rule^. Nothing but the removal of the 
entire bill and the collapse of the Liberal Government would 
satisfy the B.L.S.U.U.
It was Walter Long and Lansdowne who emerged as the leading 
voices from this section, Long drawing his support (as he always
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had) from the English squirearchy on the Tory backbenches who had 
been ruffled by the support for exclusion in early 1913 but held 
in check by Bonar Law’s advocacy of a general election. Lansdowne 
looked towards the entrenched Southern Irish Landowners within 
the Lords, and remembered the events of 1911 when his authority 
had been severely tested by a revolt in the upper house. This 
consideration was particularly acute, since Lords Midleton and 
Barrymore were already straining to give a lead to Southern 
Unionist discontent and Willoughby de Broke to the Diehards of 
1911. Lansdowne's anti-conference and anti-exclusion stance 
reflected the tenuous nature of his own authority in the upper 
house. By, then, the middle of September the fragile coalition 
of Tory opinion, which Bonar Law had established, disintegrated. 
A split began to take shape within leadership circles over the 
conference idea, a split which reflected earlier strains over 
Irish policy.
II
Following Loreburn's intervention, it was King George who 
continued to force the pace on the idea of a Conference. His 
first initiatives were towards Lansdowne, who reacted coolly, 
especially to the idea of excluding Ulster, and urged a general 
election instead. Undeterred, the King took advantage of Bonar 
Law's scheduled visit to Balmoral on September 15th, several days 
after Lansdowne, to sound out the Tory leader. On his way north 
Bonar Law visited Meikleour, and so was well acquainted with the 
King's thinking before he arrived. In Scotland the King, using
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his power to influence the Government as bait, urged him to take- 
up Loreburn’s request; ’H.M. informed me...that he intended to 
write a personal letter to his ministers which he would reserve 
the right to make public after the event as a justification of 
his own action'®. George was clearly willing to follow Tory 
advice as long as they supported a conference. In reply, Bonar 
Law did not reject the King's idea of a conference nor plans for 
exclusion, although he carefully outlined all the problems with 
these schemes and, like Lansdowne plumped for an election as the 
best solution: 'I reminded him also that the Unionist leaders had 
equally pledged themselves if there were an election and the 
people decided in favour of Home Rule, not to encourage or 
support the resistance of Ulster. Bonar Law's was a shrewder 
response than Lansdowne's; a moderate, open-minded attitude 
rather than an obstructive one to ensure that the Tories did not 
lose the King's goodwill or deter him from the future use of his 
prerogative powers.
Bonar Law treated Churchill, also present at Balmoral as 
minister in attendance, with similar open-mindedness, as the King 
had obviously expected by facilitating such a meeting in the 
first place. The Tory leader adopted plain speaking with 
Churchill, talking candidly through various policy options 
available to both sides, and learning that Churchill's overtures 
had originated with Asquith®. Bonar Law pointed out the grave 
dangers the country faced if the Government continued along 
present lines: Army mutinies, (with "active" support from the 
Tory party), and mass public outrage at any attempt to coerce 
Ulster. Yet he did not rule out either a Federal solution or the
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exclusion of Ulster from the bill, although he pointed out the 
serious obstacles involved. He left Churchill with the impression 
that he would not, if certain conditions were met, oppose a 
settlement. Again Bonar Law trod a middle path, between sympathy 
and resistance.
Support for a conference on exclusion was propelled from two 
other sources. One was Balfour, who went to Balmoral immediately 
after Bonar Law: the King assumed that to encourage a conference, 
someone of great influence was needed to galvanise support within 
the Tory leadership. Given Lansdowne's opposition and Bonar Law's 
lack of political weight, Balfour was the obvious choice. He 
retained authority within the party but, equally, had close 
working connections with the Government. Through Lords Esher and 
Stamfordham, discreet overtures were made to gauge his opinion. 
Balfour was not unreceptive when he arrived at Balmoral on the 
18th of September, where Churchill still lingered. He quickly saw 
that support for the King now stood to gain the Tories much 
future influence, especially if a conference was attempted and 
failed. He also recognised a new role for himself, as caretaker 
Prime Minister, if the King induced a new ministry.
Balfour's support for exclusion had a great effect on the 
King, who found Balfour 'serious and very sympathetic1. This 
positive reaction Balfour encouraged further by writing to him 
on September 23rd in support of exclusion^. On Churchill, it had 
the effect of raising hopes of a dialogue beginning, which he 
eagerly transmitted to Asquith. It also spurred him on in his 
efforts with like-minded cabinet members (Lloyd George, Grey, 
Morley). Balfour's sympathy might also have raised Churchill's
202
and others' hopes for a fresh attempt at coalition to settle the 
whole constitutional question. However, Balfour's apparent liking 
for exclusion drew a more considered response from Bonar Law. 
Balfour was a leader who held great sway with the moderate forces 
on the Tory backbenches, who still sat in the Commons and who 
enjoyed immense influence over the Crown, a leader whose views 
Bonar Law could not ignore if his position was not to be weakened 
or undermined. Nor was Bonar Law entirely clear how the party 
would react to such an idea, especially if the King and Balfour 
supported it. He had, therefore, to appear receptive to Balfour's 
support of exclusion.
The second and more important source of pressure for a 
conference on exclusion came from Carson. Replying on September 
20th to Bonar Law's account of his interview with the King and 
Churchill, Carson wrote: 'I am of the opinion that on the whole 
things are shaping towards a desire to settle on the terms of 
leaving Ulster...my own view is that the whole of Ulster should 
be excluded but the minimum would be the six plantation counties 
and for that a good case could be made. The South and West would 
present a difficulty and it might be that I could not agree to 
the i r abandonment. although I feel it would be the best 
settlement if Home Rule is inevitable'1®. Towards the end of the 
letter he was more forthright: 'I am fully conscious of the duty 
there is to try and come to some terms'11. Carson was impressed 
by Bonar Law's exchanges with the King and Churchill. Things were 
finally moving towards a compromise, and the moment had to be 
seized. His strong-arm tactics had brought the first glimmers of 
a political settlement.
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Yet the letter also reveals the delicacy of his position. 
He could not publicly come out in favour of a settlement, since 
that would destroy his Southern Unionist support as well as 
impair the credibility of Ulster resistance. In much the same 
manner as the Government, Carson had to be seen to come to the 
conference table in a position of strength rather than 
desperation if the best terms were to be extracted and his 
campaign kept together. This meant two things. First, he needed 
a well-connected spokesman to make overtures, put out feelers and 
manoeuvre on his behalf but without a direct connection with him, 
allowing Carson the freedom to campaign and preserve his image 
of granite determination while having the groundwork to a 
political settlement constructed around him. Second, as Balfour 
realised, the initiative for a conference had to come from the 
King. To both of these concerns F.E.Smith was invaluable.
Smith was a transmitter to Churchill, informing him of 
Carson's private moderation and willingness to reach a settlement 
on the exclusion of Ulster; Smith and Churchill worked to 
construct a basis upon which a conference could begin. Both were 
in favour of a long-term Federal structure for the U.K., but saw 
exclusion as only a short-term answer; both sought to rally 
support for such ideas within their respective political circles. 
They also had their eyes on a wider reconstruction of Government; 
Smith even wrote of such an idea to Lloyd George on September
1 7
26th , although talk of coalition at this stage might simply 
have been designed to loosen tongues and ease sensibilities in 
considering the exclusion plan itself. What was important was 
that both Smith and Churchill played a substantial role in
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establishing cross-party cooperation to facilitate a conference 
and a settlement. The fact that the cooperators were the same as 
in 1910 is clearly interesting and indicative.
Smith also worked hard on the King. At Army manoeuvres 
towards the end of September (Churchill was also present) he 
informed the King of the willingness of many Tory leaders to 
settle Home Rule along the lines of Ulster exclusion. In 
particular, 'F.E.Smith informed the King that Carson is all in 
favour of such an arrangement and thinks a solution on these 
lines could be arrived at which would be acceptable to his 
(Carson's) friends'; and promised to inform the King of Carson's 
'precise views..as to contracting out Ulster'*^. But Smith had 
no doubt that 'Carson would be quite ready to agree to leaving 
Ulster out and was sure a satisfactory solution could thus be 
arrived at'**. More important than simply convincing the King of 
everyone's good intentions, was Smith's attempt to push him 
towards convening a conference. 'He (Smith) said that the 
Unionists would not accept an invitation to conference from the 
Government; the King was the only person who could initiate such 
a meeting' . The effect of such disclosures upon the King was 
heartening, leading Stamfordham to write to Bonar Law, 
cultivating the idea of a conference*^.
From his willingness to express what Carson actually felt, 
Smith's activities would appear to have had Carson's private 
support. Carson and Smith had spent the first three weeks of 
September campaigning together in Ulster, before the latter 
returned to England. They remained in regular contact and shared 
much of Bonar Law's correspondence, in spite of its being
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addressed to Carson; and they cooperated in attempts to win over 
Bonar Law to the idea of a conference based on exclusion.
Along with Carson's very positive reply to Bonar Law on the 
20th, a five page memorandum in Smith's hand was included, 
outlining the tactical options open at the present^. The 
intentions of the memo was clear: to reassure Bonar Law that a 
conference held concrete tactical advantages for the party 
(suggesting that tactical arguments, not appeals to loyalty, 
would move Bonar Law) and to enhance the idea of exclusion as a 
practical basis for settlement. Three main arguments were 
employed to achieve this. First: a refusal to negotiate at this 
stage would mean 'great injury to the cause would follow'; Tory 
leaders had to enter a conference if one was offered if they were
17not to alienate public opinion. Second, a main obstacle to
exclusion, Southern Unionist opinion, was played down. This was
important, since Bonar Law had used the fear of a Southern
Unionist revolt to counter the arguments in favour of Ulster
exclusion, as Carson and Smith had observed from the letter Bonar
1ftLaw wrote on the 18th10. Finally, Smith recommended as a long­
term solution a devolutionary settlement, although the scanty 
treatment he gave the plan suggests that its inclusion here was 
simply an added sweetner.
Smith therefore played a major role early on: facilitating 
dialogue, establishing contact with like-minded leaders, laying 
the groundwork for a conference and focusing on the exclusion of 
all or part of Ulster. With support for this approach coming from 
Balfour, the King, various younger Tories (such as Steel-Maitland 
and Beaverbrook), the press (The Times, The Daily Mail and The
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Express). by late September Bonar Law was increasingly feeling 
the pressure of pro-exclusion forces. With Parliament in recess 
he had no way to gauge if such sentiment was felt throughout the 
party, especially given the support Carson had built up on the 
backbenches over 1912 and 1913.
In response, those opposed to exclusion and the convening 
of a conference began to organise. Central to this opposition was 
Lansdowne. His objections were three-fold. First, he was aware 
that if exclusion were agreed he would have the unenviable job 
of piloting the bill, now amended, through the upper chamber. 
Nothing could have been more ridiculous or dangerous to his 
position than that he, a Southern Unionist landowner and Unionist 
leader, should smooth the way for Home Rule for Southern Ireland: 
the problems of 1911 would be as nothing compared to such a 
retreat. Second, he still had faith that a general election could 
be forced; a conference would simply allow the Liberals to escape 
this responsibility. And even if a compromise was eventually 
agreed then, with the third circuit to run, better terms could 
be extracted later when the Government would be under far more 
pressure^ Finally, the basis of agreement was wrong. Lansdowne, 
sensitive to Southern Unionism, had less fear of an all-Ireland 
settlement on the lines of devolution or an emasculated form of 
Home Rule than he did of Ulster exclusion, which meant effective 
separation for Southern Ireland. By the autumn 1913, 
circumstances were likely to result in a quick-fix exclusion 
scheme than a wider settlement whereby Southern Unionists 
remained in some form of Union with Britain. An all-Irish 
solution required more time, and more pressure to build up on
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both sides.
His apprehension about exclusion had emerged at the time of 
the Agar-Robartes and Carson amendments and was fuelled by the 
militarisation of Ulster. Ulster increasingly looked less like 
a hatchet to break Home Rule than an end in itself. Then, at 
Balmoral, he was alarmed at the direction in which the King was 
moving; the King, in turn, had found Lansdowne 'not very
IQ
satisfactory1 in his response to Loreburn's suggestion . Bonar 
Law's report on his Royal audience, on the 18th, and his 
conversations with Churchill, did nothing to lessen Lansdowne's 
alarm. For Lansdowne, by September 1913 the Home Rule crisis 
appeared to be shifting towards a conference based on the 
exclusion of Ulster.
As a consequence, when replying to Bonar Law's letter on the 
20th, Lansdowne sought to emphasise the problems of exclusion and 
to steer the Tory leader away from such an idea. 'I am inclined 
to think that the practical difficulty of an arrangement.. 
(exclusion) ..would be even greater than you suppose. I doubt 
whether it would be possible to obtain for it the requisite 
measure of approval from Unionists of the South and West of 
Ireland'^®. His desire to fortify Bonar Law was reinforced after 
talks with Balfour and Curzon on the 21st and 22nd, where he was 
'perturbed by finding that, in his conversations at Balmoral, 
Balfour had apparently given a considerable amount of 
encouragement to this idea (exclusion)' . Nor could he be sure 
of Bonar Law's own views on exclusion, especially given the 
latter's closeness to Carson. Lansdowne became more determined 
to act against what he suspected was a pro-exclusion movement
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within the Tory leadership.
On the 23rd Lansdowne sent the Tory leader a four-page 
letter, explicitly warning him against exclusion. 'The idea of 
a conference on these lines fills me with alarm and I gladly call 
to mind that you made it clear that we could not entertain the 
project unless it were consented to by loyalists of the South and 
West. Nor ..could we do so without some kind of authorisation
from our own party, many of whom would..regard us of guilty of
11betrayal' . The party should stick to the same tactical line it 
had been pursuing. 'I told him (Balfour) that I thought it would 
never do to assume at this stage that a general election was out 
of the question and I regarded the idea of a restricted
1 'i
conference with the utmost alarm' . Lansdowne was not only 
cautioning Bonar Law against haste, but also hinting at an 
alternative path to follow if a conference was unavoidable: 
reject exclusion and move towards an all-Irish solution. In other 
words, a conference on Devolution or with no fixed agenda 
(unrestricted) were not as forcefully ruled out by Lansdowne as 
was exclusion. In his own guarded words: '(these) would also
probably come to nothing, but again I do not think we could
11
refuse to take part in such a discussion1 .
Lansdowne remained far from happy and was clearly worried 
that Bonar Law was moving along the path laid by Carson, Balfour, 
Smith and Churchill rather than responding to his own promptings 
for a wider conference. He sought to redouble his efforts. On the 
26 th he reiterated that the timing was wrong to begin a 
conference: the passage of the bill was by no means inevitable 
nor was their higher-risk policy obsolete^. He also employed
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two other methods to steer Bonar Law away from a conference on 
exclusion. First, he tried to separate Bonar Law from Carson. 'I 
have always felt that we have to be extremely careful in our 
relations with Carson and his friends. They are "running their 
Own show" and there is some advantage in our being able to 
say... that we are in no sense responsible for their
proceedings The fight which they are putting up in Ulster is,
from a party point of view, much the most important factor in our 
calculations'^. The objective here was subtle but clear: to
point out that the aims of Ulster were not necessarily the same 
as those of the Tory party. For Tories, Ulster remained a means 
of defeating Home Rule and removing the Government, nothing else; 
their overall intent was preservation of the Union. Devolution 
or watered- down Home Rule was compatible with Tory designs but 
Carson's idea of exclusion was not.
Second, Lansdowne was severely critical of F.E.Smith's 
activities, particularly his violent speeches on behalf of the
party and his gossiping with the King, which had drawn him into
77a 'fools paradise' over the chances of a compromise . Between 
Lansdowne and Smith there was little love. Generational and 
ideological differences separated them, and memories of 1911 
embittered their relations. Yet here, in the criticism of Smith, 
it is hard not to detect a deeper motive of criticism of Carson. 
Carson's speeches were of equal violence, and Smith's 
manoeuvrings were not seen as autonomous. In a letter on the 27th 
Lansdowne clearly tried to widen the blame for the recent drift 
in affairs: whatever 'the actual language used by Carson to F.E. 
or by F.E. to the King, it is interesting to collate them with
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the language of Carson's letter to you1 . And criticising 
Smith's (and implicitly Carson's) activities was designed to move 
Bonar Law closer to his position and against the drift towards 
an exclusion-based conference.
Lansdowne also worked hard within the leadership. He was 
quick to gain support from Curzon, whom he sounded out on the 
21st, and Salisbury. More important, Lansdowne made contact with 
Walter Long. Long's support was crucial, given his influence in 
the Commons. On the 3rd of October he warned Long that present 
events were not leading not to a workable solution but to a trap: 
'what I am most afraid of is an attempt to manoeuvre us into a 
position in which we might be made to appear obstructive and 
unreasonable - we might find ourselves in such a position if we
were to be offered the exclusion of Ulster, subject to our
70acceptance of the bill as it stands' . Long agreed and wrote to 
Bonar Law on the 5th of October: 'personally I do not believe in 
a conference except after an election or on condition that the 
bill is withdrawn'^. Yet this was an isolated lament to placate 
Lansdowne, not part of a concerted effort to galvanise pro-Union 
forces in the leadership. Long had been (and remained) silent 
over most of September, partly because he was recovering slowly 
from illness. However, he was in a precarious position as regards 
Lansdowne. Many of his closest colleagues (Samuel, Bull) were 
keen supporters of Carson, and Carson enjoyed by 1913 a greatly 
enhanced prestige on the Tory backbenches, rivalling Long's. The 
latter had to be very careful in deciding which way to jump if 
he was to preserve his traditional influence behind the front- 
bench. Long had to be sure of where others around him stood on
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the issues of conference and exclusion before he committed 
himself.
Other forces were also beginning to mobilise by late 
September, as rumours of a conference quickly spread. Willoughby 
de Broke began to agitate Diehard supporters in the Lords. 
Midleton told Salisbury that now was not the time to confer, and 
even showed sympathy with the idea amending the Army Annual 
Act . This scheme was most vigorously championed by Hugh Cecil, 
who again advocated it to both Lansdowne and Bonar Law^. Such 
plans reflected the depth of fear at this time that a conference 
with an agreed agenda was being negotiated behind their backs. 
By the start of October a clear division of forces had taken 
shape within the Tory leadership. One movement, led by Carson, 
Smith and Balfour was sympathetic to the King's desire for a 
conference, and saw exclusion as the best, or the only, basis on 
which to enter. The other, led by Lansdowne, Curzon and 
Salisbury, sought to avoid a conference at this time and rejected 
exclusion as a basis for negotiation.
Ill
Loreburn's letter of the 11th, Lansdowne's interview with the 
King on the 13th and then his own meeting with the King and 
Churchill on the 16th, convinced Bonar Law that a conference of 
party leaders was likely to be offered and that the Government 
was eager for one to be held^. Such an offer could not be 
refused by the Tories: it would undermine their public support 
and give the Liberals a fighting chance at an election, by
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enabling the latter to contrast their moderate, reasonable 
credentials with the Tories' extremism and irreconcilability. 
Bonar Law had no option but to follow the course the King and 
Churchill (with, perhaps, Asquith and Lloyd George) seemed to be 
following. It was also the course which Carson and the Ulster 
Unionists were following. If he refused to seek a political 
settlement, Bonar Law faced desertion by Ulster Unionists. 
Fellow-travelling towards a political solution was tactically 
necessary as regards the Liberals, but equally important in 
keeping Carson and his friends attached to the Tory party. On the 
other hand, acceptance of such an offer stood to undermine his 
entire policy, by offering a way out of the 'civil war or 
election’ equation he had espoused. And it stood to provoke grave 
party opposition to what looked like a withdrawal from a strong 
tactical position.
Although he could not prevent or refuse an invitation to 
confer, he had a degree of control over the basis of negotiation. 
In this respect, Bonar Law perceived that exclusion offered 
tactical opportunities. In November 1911 he had been attracted 
by Strachey's view of Ulster exclusion not as a basis of 
agreement but as a method of forcing an election by dividing 
Liberals from their Irish Nationalist supporters^. Carson and 
Smith had reaffirmed these advantages on the 20th. If a 
conference was likely, then exclusion might be the perfect basis. 
It negated the whole idea of Home Rule and thus had little chance 
of actual agreement with Irish Nationalists (although in the 
early stages Churchill and Asquith were saying otherwise). 
Support for exclusion could be a means not to settle, but to
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ensure that no agreement was reached. Also, exclusion as a 
negotiating basis would avoid the wider entanglements of the 
unrestricted conference which Lansdowne seemed to favour. This 
latter course offered a real hope of settlement, even the chance 
of a coalition, which Bonar Law did not want.
And exclusion enabled Bonar Law to appear sympathetic to the 
powerful pro-settlement forces developing from mid-September: the 
King, Liberals such as Churchill, and moderate Tories such as 
Balfour. It was important to ensure that Balfour did not become 
the leader of the vocal pro-compromise section in the party, who 
might look to him to repeat his 1911 role as the saviour of 
moderation. More particularly it kept Bonar Law in close 
cooperation with Carson and the Ulster Unionists. 'You know that 
I have not only so strong a personal friendship for you1, he 
wrote to Carson, 'but so much belief in your judgement that I do 
not think in any case I would go on with the proposal to which 
you were strongly opposed1^ . It was important to know exactly 
where Carson stood on the recent overtures by the King and 
Churchill, and to keep in close association with him. From 
another tack, through Beaverbrook, Bonar Law tried arrange a 
meeting with Smith on the 17th at Margate, obviously keen to know 
the state of Carson's mind from his trusty lieutenant^0. 
Telegraphing Beaverbrook, Smith informed him that he was not back 
from Ulster until the 20th, but suggested a meeting in London 
that evening.
Sensing that Carson accepted the principle of exclusion, and was 
keen for a political solution, a sympathetic approach to 
exclusion was useful in keeping the Ulster leader "on-side", and
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preventing any difference of policy between them from emerging. 
'As you know I have long thought that if it were possible to 
leave Ulster as she is... that is on the whole the only wav
07
out' . Exclusion, after all, had the potential not only to
divide Liberal from Irish Nationalist, but also Tory from Ulster 
Unionist.
At the same time, Bonar Law reaffirmed the problems with 
exclusion which he had imparted to the King and Churchill: 'the 
whole question as to the exclusion of Ulster really turns upon
this - whether or not it would be regarded as a betrayal by the
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solid body of Unionists in the South' . His position was then
a strange mixture of sympathy and pessimism, perhaps designed to 
slow the drift to a conference, and to raise problems in the way 
of the keener spirits and delay their advance while not 
alienating them from his leadership. After all, the best outcome, 
for Bonar Law, was still that no conference should take place. 
But if it had to come, then it would be on the basis of 
exclusion.
However, Bonar Law's response to the changed atmosphere of 
September encountered resistance from Lansdowne, who continued 
to react with deep pessimism and a preference for a wider, 
unrestricted all-Ireland conference. One method of retaining 
Lansdowne's support was to reassure him that the Unionists in the 
South and West were a vital consideration in any shift in policy. 
'I pointed out to him (Churchill) ', Bonar Law wrote to Lansdowne, 
'even more clearly than to the King the impossibility of our 
considering leaving Ulster out unless there should be a large 
measure of consent to it among the loyalists in the South and
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West1* 7. And on the 27th he maintained that 'agreement from the
South and West would be essential1*®. Emphasis on the Southern
Unionist obstacle tied Lansdowne to him. and was of critical
importance to his continuing authority. It was a hostage to
fortune which Bonar Law had to make.
The tone of Bonar Law's correspondence reveals the subtle
form of the alignment with Lansdowne. On the 24th he commented:
'I have received from him (Carson) a reply...and I am rather
surprised to find that, on the whole, he takes pretty much the
same view of the position that we do. There is nothing now for
us to do except to wait'**. This linkage was almost
imperceptible, reflecting Lansdowne's earlier attempt to draw a
wedge between Carson and Bonar Law. The latter was now invoking
this tension to keep Lansdowne with him. At the same time Bonar
Law played upon personal loyalty, in much the same way as he did
with Carson: 'there is nothing 1 am more anxious about than that
47I should make no move of any kind without your approval' . Both
were shrewd methods of preserving Lansdowne's loyalty and support
when the actual direction of policy was beginning to divide them.
This subtle association with Lansdowne can again be seen in
Bonar Law's attack on Smith. According to Stamfordham, Smith had
encouraged the King to believe that a compromise could be agreed
and set to work to draw the leaders together: 'I sun afraid F.E.
41Smith had not been discreet, ' Lansdowne wrote to Bonar Law . 
Bonar Law was quick to show sympathy for Lansdowne's concerns; 
'F.E.'s talk with the King seemed to me just about as unwise as 
anything could be'**. He went even further in his misgivings:
1 Stamfordham's letter makes me feel that I made a mistake in
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sending the copy of the talk at Balmoral to Carson'*®.
Cooperation against Smith drew Bonar Law and Lansdowne into 
a combined effort to scale down the raised expectations of the 
King. On the 26th Stamfordham had informed Bonar Law that 'the 
King is ready to help in any way possible to arrive at a 
satisfactory solution'*®. And, more explicitly, on October 1st: 
'the King is everyday more anxious to bring about a conference
17
especially in view of the trend in Ulster' . Stamfordham even
invited Bonar Law to initiate an exchange between party leaders, 
assuring him of the Liberals readiness to negotiate. Lansdowne 
now wrote to Stamfordham to dispel any misunderstanding about the 
difficulties of exclusion without the agreement of Southern
JQ
Unionists or the backing of a large section of the Tory party 0. 
And Bonar Law similarly warned the King, after conferring with 
Lansdowne. He rejected the view that it was the opposition's role 
to initiate a conference, though, anxious not to annoy the King 
he added that 'we should be quite ready to consider any proposal 
made to us by His Majesty'*^. He also tempered the idea that 
Carson was keen for a compromise: 'he (Carson) did not regard as 
impossible the proposal for a conference even with the idea of 
having some form Home Rule provided Ulster was excluded; but he 
was very far from being sanguine as to the possibility of such 
an arrangement'®®. It was a delicate move by Bonar Law, slowing 
the drift to a conference and restraining Stamfordham, keeping 
Lansdowne "on board", but not appearing so obstructive as to 
alienate the King and so close off all future attempts to push 
him into using his prerogative powers.
Over September divisions had certainly emerged within the
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Tory leadership, but containment had been achieved. Bonar Law had 
steered the party well, alienating neither Carson or Lansdowne, 
both of whom were capable of posing a major threat to his 
position and to party unity.
IV
The situation quickly changed at the start of October. A variety 
of circumstances served to convince Bonar Law that an offer to 
confer on the basis of exclusion was imminent. On the 30th of 
September Harcourt-Kitcher, editor of The Glasgow Herald, 
informed him of an interview with Lloyd George^. In it, George 
had supported a settlement based on exclusion, and was willing 
to help force it through against the Nationalists. It also 
appeared that strong forces within cabinet were moving in a 
similar direction: 'he (L.George) seemed to think that his
colleagues would be willing on this matter'^. Lansdowne 
certainly interpreted the interview in this light: 'it is another 
indication that events are moving in the direction of a proposal
Cl
for the exclusion of Ulster pure and simple .
The day before, Stamfordham1s letter to Bonar Law had 
suggested a similar trend. 'There is good reason to believe that 
it would be satisfactory to H.M.G. if the Opposition should 
intimate..that they would undertake to put down an amendment to 
the H.R.bill excluding Ulster but giving her a right to come in 
after a term of years and invite a conference on that 
understanding'^. This was more direct in tone than his earlier 
correspondence, specifying exclusion as the preferred basis for
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negotiation. It also reads as if he spoke with greater inside 
knowledge: 'on the other hand ministers seem to be prepared for 
a conference if it is proposed to them in some form by the 
Opposition1. On the 7th Stamfordham wrote a second, highly 
prescient, letter. 'The King as you know will do everything he 
can to help and the P.M. who arrived yesterday is evidently ready 
and anxious to arrive at a satisfactory settlement'**. It 
appeared that a meeting between party leaders would be called or, 
even worse, that the Government would make a snap compromise 
offer to the Tories.
These fears were reinforced by similar manoeuvrings within 
Unionist ranks. On the 7th Ian Malcolm, secretary to the U.D.L., 
argued strongly for exclusion: 'I cannot for the life of me see 
any inherent difficulty... or any serious violation of principle 
on the part of all the high contracting parties in accepting such 
a scheme as this'*®. And on the 3rd, Bonar Law received a 
telegram from Carson that he was returning to London on the 
4th*7. Up till then he had been campaigning in Ulster, if not 
exactly out of harm's way, then at least out of Westminster 
political circles. The prospect of Carson's return would 
strengthen the pro-exclusion forces. On the 5th, as arranged, he 
met Carson in London and found him eager for a settlement: 'he 
(Carson) naturally is feeling more and more the responsibi1itv 
of his position as it comes nearer the time when there is a 
likelihood of bloodshed'*®. The Ulster leader presented a 
forceful case for accepting exclusion. First, because 'the 
leading men in Ulster. .desire a settlement on the lines of 
leaving Ulster out'*^. Also, and of more importance to Bonar
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Law, Carson argued, having spoken to a group of Dublin 
businessmen, that the Southern Unionist position was no longer 
tenable. 'He (Carson) then said to them why is it that there has 
been nothing this time of the organised opposition to Home Rule 
which was shown by the Unionists in the South on the two previous 
occasions? There has been no resolution by the Dublin chamber of 
commerce; and he said further, can you undertake now, that when 
you go back to Dublin such organisation will be organised and 
come into the open. They had to reply to him that they could not 
give such an undertaking, for the Unionists dreaded the effect 
of it on their businesses'^. The implication was clear: it was 
time to cast the Southern Unionists adrift, and salvage what they 
could: Ulster. It was also a coded message to Bonar Law that 
Ulster would be willing to go it alone if the Tories stood out 
for more than exclusion, or blocked the attempt at a solution 
which seemed to be materialising. 'He (Carson) said to them, 
"tell me exactly what you want me to do, and as far as possible 
I shall do it. Do you want us in Ulster to say that we will 
resist Home Rule by force of arms even though the Government 
offer to exclude Ulster"...They, of course, replied that they 
could not expect the Ulster people to do..these things'^.
Carson's return provoked great press speculation about a 
conference and about moves to settle the crisis by exclusion. The 
Spectator. Times. Daily Express and Mail all promoted this 
solution. Bonar Law attributed the speculation to leaks from 
Smith, who was still working hard to draw both parties into 
negotiations^). Indeed, Smith had been active since returning 
with Carson on the 4th. On the 5th he wrote to Churchill,
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encouraging him to show greater public support for exclusion in 
his speech at Dundee on the 8th. And he tried to open direct 
negotiations between Carson and Churchill: 'Carson is most
reasonable. I think he would be glad to meet you1^ . His 
scheming was given a boost on the 6th, when he received a letter 
from Lloyd George supporting his ideas for a settlement on 
exclusion^. Smith was trying to establish contact with 
sympathetic ministers, outside traditional party channels, 
circumventing his own party leadership. By early October, it 
seemed, forces within both parties were moving much more 
purposefully towards an agreed settlement on exclusion.
Such developments presented Bonar Law with several problems. 
With Carson pushing for exclusion and for informal contacts 
between ministers and opposition leaders, his own position was 
coming under threat. Carson and Smith were forcing the pace over 
a settlement by laying the basis for an agreement, before any 
formal negotiations and without Bonar Law. To maintain his 
authority and preserve their support, Bonar Law had to show 
sympathy for the direction in which they were moving; he had to 
go beyond the sympathetic, but rather dilatory, stance he had 
taken during September. Otherwise, he stood to have a settlement 
hatched behind his back. Yet this might alienate Lansdowne and 
divide the leadership even further.
These considerations dictated two courses of action by early 
October. The first was to move the leadership more decisively 
towards exclusion as the best tactical response to any offer of 
negotiations, and to ensure the continued confidence of Carson 
and the pro-settlement forces. The second was to appease
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Lansdowne and carry him along in any conference on exclusion, or 
at least to neutralise him as a potential focus of revolt.
Moving the leadership (Lansdowne apart) towards a settlement 
on exclusion was less difficult at this stage: Bonar Law was 
helped by the apparent moderation of many other Tory leaders. 
Along with the opinions of Carson, Balfour and Smith (which he 
already knew) Bonar Law took soundings from others between the 
5 th and the 8 th of October. What emerged was, if not a 
willingness to accept a settlement, then at least a resignation 
that they might not be able to avoid one. 'Since I have come to 
London I have seen Curzon, Bob Cecil and Walter Long (who is very 
much better) and all of them (including Walter) I think would 
welcome a settlement much as in other conditions they would have 
objected to it'^. Clearly, a groundswell of opinion within the 
Tory leadership was moving towards a settlement. As Long informed 
Bonar Law on the 5th, 'it is a very difficult time for you and 
Lansdowne and the only thing your colleagues can do is to assure 
you of our cordial support whatever you decide to do'^. The 
attitude of Curzon and Long was particularly significant. Both 
tended to reflect opinion in the party rather than to shape it; 
if they were now softening, then so was opinion within the party. 
Moreover, both were highly influential figures carrying great 
weight on the backbenches, and both might have been expected to 
be on the obstructionist wing. Their rather unlikely support at 
this time was critical for Bonar Law's security; it meant that 
there was as yet little coordinated resistance within the 
leadership to his desire to concentrate on exclusion. Yet it did 
not remove the potential threat of revolt from Lansdowne.
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Writing to Lansdowne on the 4th, Bonar Law looked to draw 
him closer to his position, and lessen the gulf between the
£ 7
latter and Carson, Balfour and Smith . He now showed his hand 
more clearly, fixing his colours firmly to the exclusionist mast. 
•Probably I have looked upon the solution of leaving Ulster out 
much more favourably than you have1^ . He also sounded a more 
pessimistic tone about an election (up to this time the centre­
piece of their strategy): 'We must not forget, however, that even 
if we can force an election (and I think we can) difficulties are 
not removed. It is not certain that we should win it'^. It was 
more direct than previous letters, even, perhaps a challenge to 
Lansdowne to choose between outright support and opposition, 
although it was qualified by: 'I quite agree with you that such 
a solution is a last resort and nothing would seem to be more
foolish than to give the enemy the idea that we were not only
70ready but anxious for a settlement1 .
Bonar Law increased his pressure on Lansdowne, sending him
71on the 8th a four-page letter plus an eight-page memorandum1. 
Carson's evidence of the lack of resolve of Southern Unionists 
was put to good use; after all, this had been central to his 
method of reassuring Lansdowne. If he was going to soften his 
obstructionist stance, this point had to be answered: 'If this 
really represents the position it seems to me obvious that we are 
not justified in risking civil war for the sake of people who 
will take no risks even of a financial kind for themselves, and 
I do think it shows clearly that they have become more or less 
reconciled to the idea of Home Rule'7^. His memorandum ran along 
similar lines. It began by considering all the alternatives to
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a settlement, and dismissing each in turn. Continuation of the 
Government's present policy would be 'utterly impossible' whereas 
coercion of Ulster into the bill would be the 'worst possible 
condition'. Alternatively, if the Tories forced an election and 
lost it, 'the position would be desperate'. Yet even if they won 
it with a small majority (the most likely outcome) 'our position 
would be impossible'. 'These considerations ...make me feel that 
if it is possible to secure a settlement by consent we ought to 
secure it even if it should be a settlement which we dislike' . 
Having arrived at this point, he continued 'there are only two 
possible bases of settlement; first, a general system of 
devolution; and second, a form of Home Rule for Ireland from 
which Ulster, or part of Ulster, should be excluded. The first 
of these alternatives is not in my opinion possible, and it is 
only the second which can be seriously considered'7*. These 
sentences, following the careful appraisal of their tactical 
situation, represent something of a fait accompli. They certainly 
show the urgency of Bonar Law's wish to convert Lansdowne to his 
way of thinking.
As a closely reasoned analysis of the situation, its purpose 
was to persuade and cajole, and was not a reflection of what 
Bonar Law actually felt. Something of his deeper thinking can be 
gauged from a passage towards the end of the memorandum, 
initially crossed out then re-inserted later on (he was obviously 
concerned that it should have the right effect). 'There are of 
course many difficulties. What would the Government mean by 
Ulster? Sir Edward Carson believes that his supporters in Ulster 
would accept nothing short of the whole province... It may be
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that if there were to be a division, the Nationalists themselves 
would prefer that it should apply to the whole province, but if 
we found that the Government would only consider the exclusion 
of the 4 or possibly six counties... we ought not to enter a 
conference, for nothing could be worse for us than that we should 
be put in the position of having to refuse an offer which the 
people of this country would regard as fair and reasonable'7^ . 
Two things are revealed here. First, an awareness that defining 
Ulster might cause differences between the Nationalists and 
Government; the "geographical" puzzle might undermine any agreed 
exclusion formula ever being hatched. Second is that the sense, 
towards the end of the passage, is an almost fatalistic one: they 
had little real choice in the matter and to obstruct such an 
offer would impair their public standing. Public (electoral) 
concerns were paramount in Bonar Law's mind. His guiding motive, 
more subterranean now, was still that of keeping the party in 
line with popular sentiment in expectation of a general election. 
Subtly, then, while we can see a shift in approach, style and 
emphasis in Bonar Law's position by early October, a continuity 
in his long term aims can also be detected.
V
Pressure on Lansdowne from Bonar Law on the 4th and 8th 
coincided with a sudden lurch forward in events. The situation 
by October 9th had come to a head. That day, Bonar Law 
received an offer from Asquith to meet secretly; after months 
of speculation, at last a definite response7**. On the same
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day, Churchill's speech at Dundee, highly favourable to a 
solution through exclusion, was reported in the national
77press . Smith and Curzon greeted the speech with enthusiasm:
'a definite offer has been made by W.C., incomplete, obscure 
nor wholly satisfactory, perhaps perilous. But it cannot be
7ftrefused nor can it be passed over''0. And on the 11th Carson 
wrote to Lansdowne, strongly supporting a compromise on 
exclusion if one emerged from the talks between Bonar Law and 
Asquith. 'It is hard to see, if separate treatment was given 
to Ulster, how I could be justified in asking men to go on 
preparing for resistance where their only object could be to
7Qobtain that which was offered to them' . Even a softening by
Lansdowne can perhaps be sensed in the new situation. On the
10th he wrote to Bonar Law, showing sympathy for the tactical
use of exclusion: 'it would however be worth risking a good
deal to obtain a settlement by consent and if Redmond
shipwrecks such a settlement we shall find ourselves in a much
better tactical position'®®. And later that day, on hearing of
Asquith's offer, he observed: 'it is obvious that you cannot
refuse Asquith's invitation to meet him. It would in any
circumstances be a reasonable proposal on his part and all
that we have said to the King went to show that we were quite
01
prepared for an informal conversation'01.
Asquith's offer, and the groundswell of support it 
received inside the leadership, served to galvanise opposition 
into greater action. Lansdowne, despite the altered tone he 
had shown to Bonar Law, still lay at the heart of this
movement against a settlement on exclusion. On the 3rd and 7th
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of October he had tried to persuade Long into a tougher stance 
but without direct success . Long was lying low during this 
period, showing sympathy to both sides but little active 
support for either. Lansdowne had more luck with Salisbury. 
Writing on the 8th, he complained of the ’loose talking' which 
had done so much to bring about the present state of 
affairs . Cooperation with Salisbury was important. He was an 
influential leader, whose unhappiness Lansdowne used to good 
effect, informing Bonar Law on the 10th that 'I had a few 
lines from Salisbury two days ago which show that he and 
probably others are getting a little restless1®*. Contact with 
Salisbury also indicates that Lansdowne was looking ahead to 
rally opinion in the Lords against the automatic passage of 
Home Rule for the rest of Ireland which a compromise on 
exclusion might seem to entail. Southern Unionists and 
Diehards themselves were beginning to rouse for similar ends. 
Lord Arran wrote to Willoughby de Broke that 'this idea of a 
compromise on the H.R.Bill on the basis of the exclusion of 
Ulster., cannot be accepted by Covenanters except by breaking 
their oath which they have taken before God1®®. Lord 
Barrymore, chairman of the I.U.A., wrote to The Times on
October 10th greatly worried at the drift of events and
88sounding a note 'of warning which we cannot disregard' . On 
the 11th, Midleton showed equal anxiety to Bonar Law: 'Some of 
my friends in Ireland, outside Ulster, are a good deal 
concerned at the turn matters are taking and the concentration 
of men's minds on the exclusion of the 4 Ulster counties... It 
should certainly be made very clear that... our appeal to the
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constituencies is against H.R. for any part of Ireland1®7.
James Campbell, Carson's colleague at Dublin University, 
echoed these sentiments: 'our policy is to declare that on 
this question we will... sink or swim together1®®.
In private, Lansdowne remained adamant. While agreeing to 
an informal 'tete-a-tete discussion' between Asquith and Bonar 
Law, he was quick to stress that 'a conference is quite 
another matter' and would present Bonar Law with 'an extremely
OQ
difficult hand of cards to play' . Recent overtures were 
simply a trap to 'throw upon us the odium of having obstructed
QA
a settlement' .  He also continued to drive a wedge between 
Bonar Law and Carson, and, at the same time, to hint at party 
rebellion. 'He (Carson) evidently means to fight on his 
"inner-lines" and it looks as if he does not anticipate much 
articulate objection from his brother Unionists outside 
Ulster...These Unionist "outsiders" would find their voices if 
they were to discover suddenly that they had been left in the 
lurch and their cry would find a vociferous response amongst
Q1our own Diehards' . On the 13th he continued: 'It will be 
impossible for us to agree to any course which would involve a 
betrayal of our friends, whether in the South and West of 
Ireland or in "larger" Ulster. Quite apart from the party 
disadvantage of such a betrayal, it would I am sure be, on its 
merits, odious to most of us' . Lansdowne was applying great 
pressure to fortify Bonar Law against exclusion. As much as 
Carson, he was trying to move Bonar Law towards his way of 
thinking.
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VI
Bonar Law faced an unenviable situation as he entered talks 
with Asquith. On the one hand Carson, Smith, Balfour, Curzon, 
Selborne, Londonderry, Bob Cecil, Steel-Maitland and (more 
hesitantly) Long and Derby, all pressured for (or accepted) a 
political solution now, if a reasonable one could be agreed.
On the other hand, Lansdowne, Salisbury, Midleton, various 
Southern Unionists such as Campbell and Barrymore, and 
several Diehards (Willoughby de Broke and Hugh Cecil) resisted 
attempts to negotiate at the present moment or to agree a 
compromise on the basis of exclusion. The latter group, though 
united by hostility to exclusion, were far from united over 
alternatives: some preferred an attempt at a wider, all-Irish 
settlement, others a simple obstruction, whilst still others 
argued for more extreme solutions such as amending the Army 
Annual Act. The leadership was badly split along roughly 
"Commons versus Lords" lines. Southern Unionism was centred in 
the Lords, and it was the Lords, after all, who faced the 
humiliating task of actually ratifying Home Rule for the rest 
of Ireland, if Ulster was excluded.
In spite of the balance of advantage which Bonar Law 
enjoyed in the Commons, it was vital for him to keep 
Lansdowne's support during his meeting with Asquith. Not only 
did he have the ability to raise grave party difficulties, but 
Lansdowne's dogmatic obstruction served to weaken Bonar Law's 
negotiating position. If Lansdowne could be relied upon to 
resist a compromise in the Lords, Bonar Law's ability to
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appear reasonable was gravely undermined. It provided the 
Liberals (who would surely have known of Lansdowne's position 
from contacts between Smith and Churchill) with room and 
security to do exactly what Lansdowne so feared: 'to offer us 
terms which they know we cannot accept and then throw upon us
qo
the odium of having obstructed a settlement' . Bonar Law thus
worked hard to moderate Lansdowne and to keep him relatively 
quiet before his meeting with Asquith.
In a letter of the 11th, he outlined 'the line I should
take when speaking to him (Asquith)1, giving a detailed
account of what he would say in an attempt to assuage
Q4Lansdowne's anxieties . And to this end, Bonar Law returned 
to the "sheet-anchor" he had used with Lansdowne over 
September and early October: 'Even, however, if all these 
conditions were fulfilled and though we did enter into 
conference, we would not be under any obligation before to 
agree to a settlement; and we might find it impossible to 
agree to it if we found that the Unionists in the south and
qc
west were vehement in their hostility to it' . Once again, 
Bonar Law was giving hostage to fortune by tying his whole 
policy to Southern Unionist reactions; such firm commitments 
suggest that he had little hope (or desire) of anything 
concrete emerging from his talk with Asquith.
When Bonar Law met Asquith on the 15th he had many 
factors to bear in mind. He was aware that public opinion was 
increasingly weary of the Irish crisis; it would not react 
well to the party which obstructed a settlement. He was aware 
that many in his party were deeply worried at the turn of
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events, and poised to raise revolt if anything in the nature 
of a compromise took place. He also realised that his meeting 
with Asquith would not remain secret for long. He could not 
afford to have extended discussions with Asquith, since it 
would simply exacerbate party feeling, and his view of the 
Liberal position was equally problematical. He had a clear 
idea that Liberals would find it difficult to settle with the 
Nationalists on exclusion: recent speeches from Redmond and 
Devlin had done little to convince Bonar Law that exclusion 
was now possible. *1 understand1, Balfour informed Bonar Law, 
'that Redmond has quite explicitly rejected any suggestion of 
excluding Ulster from the operations of the bill. If he means 
all he says - and presumably he does - Asquith will find
qc
himself in a very delicate situation' . But he was never 
totally sure that Asquith might not pluck the rabbit from the 
hat, that he might be able to square the Nationalists to a 
compromise formula which, if 'the people of this country 
regard as fair and reasonable', he would be unable to
Q7refuse ; Churchill had told him in September that they could 
get Redmond to agree to exclusion. Also, the strength of 
forces (on both sides) now lined up in favour of a reasonable 
settlement made its chances of success more likely.
Nor was Bonar Law a natural negotiator; his strength came 
from plain-speaking and platform addresses. Many viewed this 
as a serious problem, coming up, as he would, against a highly 
experienced and crafty Asquith. Yet he had great foresight. He 
also had a coherent bargaining strategy: he realised that 
exclusion would be difficult for the Government on three
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counts. First was the definition of the area to be excluded; 
second was what was meant by exclusion, particularly whether 
it was to be temporary or permanent; and third was whether 
alterations to the original Home Rule bill would render it a 
different bill, and thus void. In other words, there were 
three areas where Liberals and Nationalists could conflict 
with each other and cause the negotiations to collapse. With 
this reasoning behind support for exclusion, his strategy on 
meeting Asquith stood a good chance of forcing the Government 
back into its dilemma of civil war or a general election.
Bonar Law travelled to Cherkely to meet Asquith on the 
15th. The conversation between the two was exploratory, 
although historians have criticised Bonar Law for his openness 
at these talks, putting it down to 'nervousness and 
inexperience'®®. Yet Bonar Law clearly followed the line he 
had pursued since 1912. On the one hand, he advocated a 
general election as 'the real way out', even sweetening the 
pill by saying that all Tory support for Ulster was 
conditional upon this: 'while we pledged ourselves to support 
Ulster to the utmost if there were no election, that pledge 
was contingent, and if an election took place and the 
Government won, our support would be withdrawn'®®. On the 
other hand, he threatened disorder in the Commons, mutiny in 
the army and civil unrest in Ulster, if no election was 
called. 'We should have to try by all means to force an 
election and to be successful we should have to take means 
which would be distasteful to all us'^®. It remained the 
policy of the carrot and the stick.
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Bonar Law was also eager to focus their discussion of 
possible compromise formulas onto ideas of exclusion. 
Accordingly, he went beyond expressions of sympathy to 
actually recommending it. At the very start of their meeting 
he quickly steered the talks onto this area: 'On mv part the 
conversation then took the form of mv pointing out how 
difficult such an arrangement (exclusion) would be for us, and 
I called his attention to these difficulties1*®*. It is true 
that he was conveying the negative aspects of such a solution, 
but the important point is that they were talking about 
exclusion and not a "larger" or "wider" type of political 
settlement. Bonar Law had narrowed the debate, and Asquith 
clearly left the meeting under the impression that exclusion 
was the avenue down which Bonar Law might travel towards a 
successful settlement. He (Asquith) 'repeated his declaration 
of our position., "subject to the agreement of your (B.L.'s) 
colleagues whose concurrence is essential to you, if there 
were not a general outcry against you in the South and West of 
Ireland, if Ulster (which we can at present call X) were left 
out of the bill, then you would not feel bound to prevent the 
granting of Home Rule to the rest of Ireland". I accepted that 
statement as correct and that is where the interview 
ended1 *®^ .
For Lansdowne, as for later historians, Bonar Law had 
gone too far in showing his hand to Asquith. 'The most 
important paragraph in the memorandum is that with which it 
concludes. Read literally, it rather suggests to my mind the 
idea that we are ready to ask our colleagues, if Ulster is
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left out of the bill, to agree to a proposal for "the granting 
of Home Rule to the rest of Ireland"...I do not think I could
ini
bring myself to concur in such a proposal' . Yet given his 
objectives, Bonar Law's first meeting with Asquith appears 
more of a success. He reinforced the Tory party's strong 
desire for an election, and gave a balanced, even enticing, 
argument why one was necessary. Lansdowne was forced to admit 
that 'the case which you made for a general election was 
really unanswerable1*®*. He also avoided the discussion moving 
onto an all-Irish basis and, most importantly, exclusion was 
identified, at the very beginning, as the only area from which 
a settlement by consent might come.
In doing this, Bonar Law achieved two crucial objectives. 
First, he placed exclusion firmly at the centre of any 
discussion of a political solution: he had focused on a 
project which (he assumed) stood little chance of being 
successful. He thus preserved his ultimate ambition of forcing 
a general election. Second, he had shown a willingness to 
negotiate and even a willingness to reach a solution. Asquith 
thus had no room to outmanoeuvre Bonar Law with a "dummy" 
compromise offer, designed to make Liberals appear reasonable, 
to keep Nationalist support for the Government (since it would 
be a dummy not a real offer) while provoking a rejection from 
the Tories which would label them, in the public mind, as 
obstructive. As Bonar Law explained in the letter to Lansdowne 
accompanying his notes of the meeting, 'Even if we did decline 
to enter a conference .. when they (the government) had made 
up their minds with the consent of the Nationalists to exclude
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Ulster, they could then definitely make that proposal public 
and appeal to the country with this new proposal and I should 
have very little hope of winning an election under such 
conditions'*®^. Instead, a show of agreeableness removed this 
weapon from Asquith's armoury; and in removing it, he forced 
Asquith actually to formulate a scheme. The onus of finding a 
solution was thrown decisively back upon the Government's 
shoulders by Bonar Law's appearance of moderation.
However, his moderation was qualified. He did not move 
the discussion on to defining what was meant by exclusion or 
to what each side meant by Ulster; he even tried to steer 
their talk away from definitions. 'In the course of 
conversation he spoke of the "North East counties". I was 
afraid of that line of discussion and said that I had not 
seriously considered what was meant by Ulster. He showed that 
he had carefully considered that, for he had figures for the 
different counties and I passed from that subject without 
going into it at all, for it is quite evident to me that he 
had in his mind only the four counties'*®®. In addition, he 
threw powerful obstacles in the way of any smooth agreement on 
exclusion: the need for the agreement of his colleagues; 
opinion in the South and West of Ireland; and the problem that 
with Home Rule solved, Welsh Disestablishment would pass 
quickly through under the Parliament Act, which would alienate 
many members of the Tory party. Nor can we seriously level 
against Bonar Law the charge, which is implicit in Lansdowne's 
reaction, that he was manoeuvred into admitting the principle 
of exclusion while receiving nothing in return from Asquith.
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Support for Agar-Robartes' and Carson's amendments had already 
conceded the principle. And from Asquith, Bonar Law wanted 
little: his strategy was based on the assumption that the 
Liberals and Nationalists would split over exclusion, and this 
required patience and nerve on his part, not information.
Despite what appears to have been a successful meeting, 
Bonar Law showed immediately afterwards signs of momentary 
doubt. In a very pessimistic covering letter to Lansdowne, he 
said: 'I do not like the position and I'm sure that the next 
move will be for Asquith to sound out the Nationalists. There 
is therefore a very great danger that we shall be invited into 
a conference in which they have made up their minds to exclude 
Ulster. They would, I am sure, be reasonable in their 
definition of Ulster ... that the four counties remain in the 
Union and as regards the two counties a plebiscite should be 
taken .. I don't think Carson could possibly accept this
solution; and yet it would be so reasonable that I think we
107should be in a hopeless position if we had to refuse it' . 
Perhaps Bonar Law still feared that Asquith would secure 
Nationalist agreement to a compromise. After all, at their 
meeting Asquith had stressed Liberal freedom of action. 'If he 
(Asquith) or the Government decided on any course which
commanded the support of their own party the Nationalists
108would have no choice but to accept it' .
Yet such fears do not really reflect how Bonar Law 
thought that events would run: they represent lingering and 
momentary doubts. In a letter to J.P.Croal, a close friend and 
editor of The Scotsman, he confided: 'my view is that it is
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all to the good that we should seem to be open to compromise 
and that irreconcilableness should come from the Radicals as a
1 AQ
result of their connection with the Nationalists' . And more 
positively still: 'my own impression however is that Redmond 
cannot agree to the solution of excluding Ulster; and if so 
everything in the nature of moderation on our part will be an 
advantage1*^. Written three days after his interview with 
Asquith, Bonar Law appears confident and surefooted. Clearly, 
he believed that the attempt to find a political solution 
would come to nothing and that his task was to avoid the party 
being labelled obstructive, thus alienating public opinion.
In addition, on the 19th Bonar Law heard from his Chief-Whip, 
Edmund Talbot, that the speaker 'has said that the exclusion 
of Ulster would entail a new bill'***, while from Croal he 
received the confident reply that 'if the Government were to
act on the lines of the (Churchill's) Dundee speech there
1 1 ?would be open feud between them and the Nationalists' . Both 
reinforced his approach that exclusion, whichever way it was 
applied, was unworkable.
Bonar Law's handling of his first meeting with Asquith 
was much more sophisticated than many have perceived. Previous 
accounts of him as amateurish have rested on the belief that 
his support for exclusion represented a keen desire to escape 
from the increasingly exposed position which he had taken up 
over Home Rule. Yet exclusion was simply the best means in the 
changed circumstances of the autumn of 1913 of keeping his 
original strategy on course. It was a wrecking mechanism, not 
a solution.
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CHAPTER SIX
I
The period after Bonar Law's meeting with Asquith on the 15th of 
October and before their second meeting on the 7th of November 
was something of a hiatus. The intervening three weeks were rich 
in speculation. In this suspended political atmosphere, many 
believed that a settlement was being constructed behind their 
backs: but there was no tangible base for these suspicions*. 
Tories eagerly awaited Asquith's next scheduled speech, at 
Ladybank on the 26th of October, and Bonar Law's reply at 
Newcastle on the 29th, for glimmers of light onto the situation.
Asquith's speech (one of 'delphic obscurity' ) drew a variety 
of responses from within the Tory leadership4. Balfour saw the 
seeds of an anti-Irish alliance; Lansdowne and Chamberlain 
detected a devolutionary basis for settlement; and Milner saw it 
as 'merely playing with the question'^. Bonar Law, after much 
discussion, replied at Newcastle three days later. It was a neat, 
measured but decisive response, appearing open-minded towards 
compromise yet repulsing any definite move.
The leaders met for a second time on November 7th and a 
third on December 10th, with no obvious success, but provoking 
a great deal of debate. After this third futile meeting (and one 
between Asquith and Carson five days later) the initiative 
towards compromise was widely seen as dead; Bonar Law asked 
Asquith in late December for permission publicly to announce this
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fact in his Bristol speech on January 15th.
Perhaps the most important development over this period was 
the emergence of a wide movement against a compromise on 
exclusion. This grew steadily from late October onwards, turning 
the leadership away from its hesitant, non-committal attitude of 
September. The movement had several different foci. One was the 
unshakeable Lansdowne, looking towards devolution; a second was 
the returning Chamberlain who allied, somewhat hesitantly, with 
Lansdowne in a common anti-exclusion stance, although the former 
was keener to move the Tory leadership closer towards a 
constructive 'federalist' alternative. Another was Long who, 
sensing the hardening of opinion on the Tory Right, tirelessly 
informed Bonar Law that the party would be smashed if he 
compromised over Home Rule. And Lord Milner looked to stiffen the 
leadership and to galvanise the Tory Establishment. Milner also 
had contact with a vague assortment of extremists such as 
Willoughby de Broke and Hugh Cecil, dedicated to ventures such 
as amending the Army Annual Act and mobilising commando bands to 
defend the Union. For Bonar Law this shift in opinion was 
particularly dangerous. Although made up of both federalists and 
diehards, they were able to unify against exclusion; yet for 
Bonar Law to appear reasonable he had to pursue exclusion as his 
response to Asquith's overtures. A serious gulf was widening 
between party feeling and his own tactical necessities. Yet Bonar 
Law grew in confidence that his tactical line was correct. Any 
scheme to exclude Ulster would, he increasingly realised, meet 
with immovable Nationalist resistance, made obvious by Asquith's 
failure to go any distance towards a compromise plan: 'He is
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quite at sea and does not in the least know what he can do1, 
Bonar Law could declare to Selborne on December the 22nd*. But 
many in the leadership did not share his optimism. Some began to 
doubt that Asquith was as weak as everyone expected him to be, 
suggesting that he was shrewdly wasting time to avoid an 
election, or in the hope that the Tories might split- following 
the course, so some believed, of 1910. A general mistrust of the 
Prime Minister grew over this period, hardening opinion against 
any contact with him.
II
Opposition to a compromise on exclusion emerged on the Right of 
the party. Bonar Law had long been acutely aware of this danger. 
It had periodically surfaced during progress of the bill. Walter 
Long had agitated against accepting the Agar-Robartes amendment, 
and the Southern Unionists, in January 1913, against Carson's 
exclusion scheme. By the autumn, another diehard revival seemed 
likely. Public overtures from Loreburn and Churchill, and then 
rumoured secret meetings with Asquith, did much to raise alarm. 
Bonar Law had expected such problems. At his first meeting with 
Asquith he admitted that a 'strong survival ... of the Diehard 
movement' existed within the party^. And to Croal on the 18th of 
October he had spoken of a 'violent echo in England' if they were 
forced to accept exclusion^.
On October 24th Milner, previously heavily involved with the 
Land Commission, wrote Bonar Law an eighteen-side letter on the 
Irish situation. Milner's concerns were threefold. He was worried
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that other issues stood to divert attention from the Ulster 
question. 'Ulster holds the field and if only Unionists can 
succeed in keeping public attention concentrated on that subject 
as our supreme injury, they must win the g a m e .  He was also 
worried that recent overtures to search for a settlement, by the 
government, were being taken seriously: 'all these vague
expressions of sympathy are merely playing with the question1®. 
Lastly, and as a consequence of these two, the Tory party had to 
re-double its efforts towards Ulster. 'That is the weak spot in 
the enemy's line, where they are already beginning to run, and 
against that point all the attacking forces should be
q
directed'7.
To closer friends he was less guarded in his call for a 
revitalised campaign. On October 25th he despaired to Colonel 
Denison: 'we are, of course, extinguished as a political force. 
We were perhaps bound to be extinguished any way. The choice was 
between a painless, gradual but inglorious extinction and a sharp 
fierce struggle, in which there was just a chance of victory and 
in any case an honourable death'*®. Salvation lay with Ulster:
' It seems to me very probable that the Ulstermen, if they are 
real Diehards and not sham ones, like our noble selves, will 
bring about an impasse. And a deadlock is just now, in my 
opinion, the one thing that can save us. The party game is for 
the moment played out - its old rules are all broken to pieces 
and if we are to have constitutional Govt at all, we simply must 
put our heads together and agree to some rules that everybody 
will respect. Of course if Ulster collapses, this log-rolling 
business may go on for a while longer. But I don't think Ulster
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will collapse1^ . The message was clear: Ulster was the means to 
repair the constitution by driving it to a halt, and from the 
stalemate some form of coalition would rebuild the political 
system. Everything hinged on the Ulster campaign succeeding. As 
he informed a sympathetic Oliver on the 23rd, 'there is only one 
word of salvation for Unionists just now and it is to shout 
"Ulster, Ulster" all the time'^.
Within this mixture of fear and bravado, Milner was 
beginning to think more practically towards Ulster. 'If the Govt 
do ultimately go through with their scheme un-modified, and war 
results, I for one, shall not feel satisfied to wave my arms 
importantly in the air and cry "how dreadful", and I fancy there 
are a great many people on this side of the water in like case 
if anything effective is to be done six months hence it will have 
to be thought-out beforehand. You may hope the worst will not 
happen but if it does happen it ought not to find us 
unprepared' .
Nothing definite emerged until the new year, when moves to 
institutionalise preparations began with the Covenanter movement. 
But he began to sound opinion and draw around him like-thinking 
men, in particular men of influence and specific skills, useful 
in any future Ulster campaign. Lord Roberts, with whom he worked 
in the National Service League, was a leading target for 
recruitment. He had great influence within the British Army and 
was in a position to undermine the resolve of Army officers if 
ever they were ordered to coerce Ulster. On the 30th of October 
Milner wrote to Roberts of the consequences of militarily 
imposing Home Rule on Ulster: 'If they tried to do so, I really
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don't know what we over here, who think the Ulstermen are 
perfectly right, would do. One thing is evident to me and that 
is that we could not allow them to be coerced without doing 
something to help them more than talking'1*. Roberts replied 
favourably to Milner's subtle enlistment: 'you are quite right, 
we could not allow the Ulstermen to be coerced without doing 
something to help them, more than talking'15. To which Milner 
responded the next day by inviting him to lunch; 'by that time 
I hope I may have consulted some other serious people and found 
out what they are prepared to do, if the Government pushes things 
to extremes'15. Milner also became a beacon to young Tories and 
activists (Amery, Comyn-Platt, Winterton) frustrated at the 
Government's dogged hold on office and what now appeared to be 
their own leaders' willingness to compromise.
From other directions the right began to mobilise itself 
against the threat of a compromise. Willoughby de Broke had, 
since the creation of his B.L.S.U.U. in March, by October rallied 
over 7,000 volunteers to his movement, and they were continuing 
to recruit men from all over the UK17. But the movement lacked 
influence inside leadership circles. Accordingly Willoughby de 
Broke invited Lord Salisbury on the 29th of October to 'join our 
committee? A little help from men like you would be 
invaluable'15. Appealing for Salisbury's help was particularly 
significant. It revealed a desire to rally opinion within the 
Lords in much the same manner as he had done in 1911. And a more 
general desire to muster feeling within the Tory leadership 
against any form of compromise on Home Rule. This was a 
particular concern after Asquith's Ladybank speech, which hinted
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at a.willingness to compromise.
Lord Arran informed Willoughby de Broke early in October 
that 'this idea of compromise on the Home Rule bill on the basis 
of exclusion of Ulster . . cannot be accepted by Covenanters 
except by breaking their oath'15. He also wrote to Carson, Craig 
and Londonderry along these lines ('Carson has not replied and 
I do not expect him to do so either')20. And Midleton, similarly 
unnerved, pressured Bonar Law to establish a body made up of the 
three Southern Irish Provinces to coordinate with Carson2*. 
Interestingly, both Arran and Midleton showed an increasing 
disapproval with Carson's apparent willingness to compromise over 
exclusion, emphasising the extent to which Southern Irish 
Unionists were unhappy with their leader. And Salisbury, though 
ignoring Carson’s role, threw in a word of warning about the 
'abandonment of our friends in the West and South' of Ireland 
after Bonar Law's Newcastle speech22. 'I do not think we must 
ever use language implying that we believe that any solution on 
these lines (exclusion) can in fact be found and I am inclined 
to think that we should not promise even if it can be found, to 
abandon our Parliamentary opposition to the bill' .
Ill
Other forces opposed to exclusion were quick to mobilise from 
mid-October onwards. In particular, federalists mounted a 
determined effort to push their ideas into the centre of 
political debate. They were encouraged from several quarters. 
Churchill's Dundee speech had appeared the first crack in all the
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partisan manoeuvring: 'Very courageous', thought Oliver, 'and I 
should say not only that he means to stick to it but that he has 
the P.M. behind him'^. But it was Carson's letter to Earl Grey 
on the 26th of September ( 'which shows that he is prepared 
(provided the present bill is withdrawn) to accept federalism') 
which ignited the enthusiasm of the federalist troop (Oliver, 
Grey, Craik, Robinson and Dunraven)^. It implied that Carson 
was not after all just fighting for Ulster; that he was not, as 
Lansdowne had alleged, fighting on "his inner-1i n e s . His 
attitude was not surprising* Federalism was a means to satisfy 
Ulster as well as the Southern Unionists. It offered Carson a 
solution to many problems.
With such good omens, Oliver set to work agitating in high 
political circles. Robinson was an obvious target, the one person 
who might create the right atmosphere, leak suggestions and 
generally advocate a constructive solution. As Oliver told Craik, 
'it is very important that there should be agreement between us 
and that great organ of public opinion which Robinson
71controls' . On October 10th he sent a copy of Carson's letter
to Robinson, and urged strong support from The Times for the
10
initiative taken by Churchill . Robinson also received letters 
from Grey and Dunraven, for publication on the 11th, which 
advocated a federal solution^. Earl Grey was particularly 
active during early October; in cooperation with Oliver he 
utilised his extensive cross-party contacts. Late September he 
urged Haldane to begin to think 'federally' about the problem^*. 
And on October 15th he asked Page-Croft, of the United Empire 
Club, to 'build up an interesting programme (of speeches) for the
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winter in the hope of focusing the attention of Unionists upon 
the federal principle'21. However, by the 17th of October their 
impact was slight, as Oliver lamented to Grey: 'things have not 
gone particularly well so far (and) is not at the present time 
very hopeful and unless some push is given from the outside 
(things) are likely to drift into a deplorable impasse'22.
Oliver was despondent for several reasons. The first was 
tactics: federalists were still by no means in agreement about 
federalism. This was made clear when both Dunraven and Grey had 
letters published in The Times on the 25th advocating 
fundamentally different schemes. Another tactical problem, for 
Oliver especially, was that Unionist leaders might commit 
themselves to the federal alternative too early. 'At this 
juncture would be fatal.. (because) if the Unionist party proclaim 
in advance their willingness to accept federalism then of course 
federalism will become their maximum demand and they will have 
to be content with something less'22. Federalism had to 
embraced, but held back until the optimal moment; timing was 
crucial, as the experience of 1910 had shown. Federalism also 
faced the danger of the Government preferring to dissolve. 
Previously, Oliver had seen this as good, since from electoral 
stalemate would come a fresh initiative for a conference. By the 
autumn 1913 he thought differently: 'one can hardly hope that the 
temper of politicians and the conditions generally will be 
favourable for success after a bitter electoral struggle, as they 
are at the present time'2*. Grey, Craik, Grigg, Milner and 
implicitly Carson all agreed with this line that a settlement had 
to precede an election. It placed pressure on federalists to
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seize the moment since 'never was there such a chance1^ .
Yet the federal initiative still required someone to set the 
ball rolling. As Oliver bemoaned to Grey 'the difficulty., (is) 
of getting the thing begun'^. He urged Grey to take the lead as 
'someone whom they all trust to go between them, to bring them 
together and to give them ideas'^7. But Grey, although a 
respected and influential pro-consul, was not a party politician. 
What was needed was inspiration and strong leadership from the 
Tory side, to respond purposefully to Liberal intimations. 
Smith's speeches had shown courage, but he was trusted even less 
by his own side than by the other. Balfour was an exclusionist; 
Carson was too closely associated with Ulster and thus not an 
obvious force for compromise; Lansdowne, though keen to change 
the policy approach, was neither a federalist nor a charismatic 
leader. The obvious choice was Chamberlain, but he was abroad 
until October 20th and, in their first contact for over a month 
on the 21st, thought the present moment inauspicious for a 
conference upon a federal basis^®.
This situation quickly changed towards the end of October. 
Asquith's speech at Ladybank reinvigorated belief that a 
conference on federalism could be arranged. On the 27th Moreton 
Frewen urged Bonar Law to support a federal scheme, claiming that 
it had the active sympathy of Tim Healy^: fear of exclusion
seemed to have drawn the independent Nationalists away from 
Redmondite Home Rule. The next day, Oliver kept up pressure on 
Robinson*®. He urged The' Times to interpret Asquith's speech in 
a favourable light and to reject an election as worthless at the 
present time (again forcing the spotlight onto a political
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settlement). On the same day, Oliver worked for cross-party
support by writing to his friend Murray Macdonald*1. The
objective was to establish some common ground for moderate men;
'that the lunatics on both sides of politics may be blessed by
providence with a lucid interval somewhere between now and next 
17summer' . In this vein he assured Macdonald that Carson's 
activities had moved the more extreme Liberals to a compromise; 
his true intention ' is a serious attempt to settle the whole 
thing' . Interestingly, Oliver again made use of the Grey-
Carson letter of the 26th, to convince sceptics of a settlement 
that the rock of Ulster was actually a marshmallow.
More significantly, Oliver worked harder on friends near the 
centre of power. He wrote to Churchill at the end of October, 
receiving an encouraging reply. 'I think', wrote Churchill, 'that 
there is a strong undercurrent setting in a good direction; and 
that many of the obsolete Victorian quarrels are passing 
altogether from men's minds'**. Oliver also contrived to bring 
Chamberlain round. On the 22nd he invited him to dinner*^; next 
day he enclosed a copy of the Grey-Carson letter. This, 
Chamberlain found 'highly important', mentioning it in his letter 
to Lansdowne on the same day*^. Coming on top of these 
preliminaries, Asquith’s speech at Ladybank had a good effect. 
Oliver told Chamberlain that a meeting between him and 'the aged
47Squiff' could be arranged and 'might do good' . Chamberlain was 
far more responsive: 'don't do anything unless you hear from me 
again. At present I am trying (to get) what support I could get
JO
among my own friends' . Although not keen to meet Asquith (he 
knew of Bonar Law's meeting with him whereas Oliver clearly did
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not)/ Chamberlain had been moved by his speech and was ready to 
play a role, perhaps even the role that Oliver had in mind. By 
the end of October Oliver had done much, tending cross-party 
roots, stimulating a groundswell of pro-federal opinion, and 
easing Chamberlain out of a self-imposed wilderness towards 
leading a constructive movement within the Unionist party.
Pressure on Chamberlain to take such a lead also came from 
Lansdowne. He had been alarmed by Bonar Law's meeting with 
Asquith on the 15th, with its implication (incorrect in 
Lansdowne's view) that the Tories were keen on exclusion. Writing 
to Bonar Law the day after, Lansdowne was less reserved. On the 
proposals talked over at the meeting he felt that: 'I do not
think I could bring myself to concur in such a proposal'*®. He 
pressed instead for a devolutionary approach, admitting that ' if 
we are still to be asked to treat Ireland as a separate nation 
no local exclusions would remove my objection'5®. Lansdowne was 
employing the same combination of threatening revolt and advocacy 
of an all-Irish scheme. He was also worried by the emergence of 
the Land issue after a speech by Lloyd George at Swindon on the 
21st of October, which he referred to as 'the most unscrupulous 
proclamation that I have ever encountered'5*. The Liberals, he 
thought, were preparing a platform for an election. Yet this 
suggested that Home Rule had to be neutralised if it was not to 
lose them votes, which in turn pointed firmly in the direction 
of a compromise on exclusion as the quickest means. By late 
October Lansdowne's stand against exclusion was in grave need of 
support. A consensus existed within the Tory leadership for a 
solution based on the partition of Ireland. The return of
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Chamberlain gave Lansdowne the opportunity to undermine this 
consensus and to construct a pro-Devolutionary alliance within 
the Tory leadership.
This cooperation had many motivations. Chamberlain was a 
Liberal Unionist (as was Lansdowne) and a federalist. Without 
Tariff Reform, since early 1913, he had been drifting and 
disillusioned with politics, a leader in search of a policy. A 
federal solution to the Irish question was his new policy; it 
would allow him to play "peacemaker" and at the same time 
undermine Bonar Law's authority. This was particularly relevant, 
given that he was still vexed by Bonar Law's dropping of taxes 
on food.
Lansdowne, though not a fully-fledged federalist, 
sufficiently recognised its compatibility with devolution to see 
it as a bridge to political cooperation with Chamberlain. And 
this was useful: what he feared was that Bonar Law, backed, as 
Lansdowne supposed he was, by Balfour, Carson and F.E.Smith, 
might quickly push through an exclusion plan behind the backs of 
the leadership to prevent any resistance from building up. His 
repeated requests (on the 16th & 23rd) for a meeting of the Tory 
leadership (a request which Midleton and Salisbury also made to 
Bonar Law), arose from the urge to check any independent 
action^. To this end the support of Chamberlain was important; 
the latter was a powerful colleague who would support Lansdowne 
if such a party meeting took place. Lansdowne also felt that 
Chamberlain had a greater degree of influence over Bonar Law (if 
only through fear) than anyone else except, perhaps, Carson. With 
Chamberlain alongside him Lansdowne stood a better chance of
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moving the Tory leadership away from exclusion; Chamberlain 
enjoyed better relations with Carson, Smith and Churchill, again 
important if the pro-exclusion drift was to be switched to 
another tack.
The Lansdowne-Chamberlain alliance was created to shift 
Bonar Law away from exclusion^. Their first meeting on the 23rd 
of October, though tentative and probing, established a degree 
of cooperation. The next day, when Chamberlain met Bonar Law for 
the first time since returning from holiday, he could write; 'in 
my first conversation with Bonar Law last Friday morning (24th) 
he and I went over the ground which you (Lansdowne) had covered 
the evening before, with the amplifications which you invited me 
to seek from him^. Asquith's speech at Ladybank encouraged 
their cooperation even further. Writing to Lansdowne afterwards, 
Chamberlain detected in the speech seeds of a new basis of 
agreement with the Government. 'If there are to be conversations 
and if those conversations are to have any chance of a successful 
result, the best plan for both parties is to try to reach a new 
solution or in other words so to change the issue that each will 
be able to claim that they have substantially got not indeed all 
they desire but the essentials of their claim' . The way to 
achieve this would be to 'draw Asquith onto the lines of general 
devolution'^. Only devolution 'can fairly be represented to 
Asquith as the most advantageous to him', since exclusion would 
be 'the most difficult course for him1 (Asquith) and although a 
'victory for us (it would be) a hollow victory'. Clearly, 
Chamberlain thought that a settlement with Asquith upon 
devolution rather than exclusion was both preferable and
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achievable. Interestingly, he rounded off this appeal by 
revealing the Grey-Carson letter on the feasibility of such an 
approach. 'Carson clearly indicates that he thinks that this 
(Home Rule all round) is the right solution and expresses the 
hope that if there is a conference it may proceed on these broad 
lines'55.
Asquith's speech at Ladybank inspired Lansdowne. He 
'detect(ed) a gleam of daylight ... indicated by the third of 
Asquith's "governing considerations" ... that he recognised the 
importance of the extension of the principle of devolution in
C7
appropriate forms to other parts of the U.K.'3 . It was a basis 
upon which a conference might safely be convened since it avoided 
exclusion; as he asked Chamberlain, 'might we not fasten on this 
and say that we are prepared to allow Ireland to be served first 
but only upon condition that whatever system of self-government 
is granted to her must be applicable to other parts of the 
U.K....?5®' Like Chamberlain he sought to change the ground on 
which the party had been arguing- the Ulster 'faultline'- and 
open discussions on a devolutionary settlement.
On the 27th Lansdowne sent Bonar Law a careful appraisal of 
Asquith's speech, knowing that the former was to reply at 
Newcastle on the 29th5®. Unravelling the speech, he inferred 
that hidden beneath the Prime Minister's rhetoric were seeds for 
a devolutionary settlement: 'I do not think that Asquith is
altogether unreasonable in stipulating that, if there is to be 
devolution, Ireland should be served first'5®. He also tried to 
persuade Bonar Law in another way. 'As Carson (I think) said to 
me the other day, it might be possible to set up some kind of an
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Irish Administration the existence of which would placate 
moderate Home Rulers without doing much harm'^. Two things are 
important here. First, like Chamberlain at his meeting with Bonar 
Law on the 24th, Lansdowne was actively trying cultivate a new 
basis for settlement, one which Asquith himself appeared to 
desire and which, for Lansdowne, would be less difficult for 
Tories to accept. Second, Lansdowne, like Chamberlain, mentioned 
Carson's willingness to agree to a solution of devolved power 
rather than exclusion for Ulster. Both realised the influence (or 
threat) which Carson had over the Tory leader; dangling his 
preference for devolution in front of Bonar Law was a means of 
shifting the Tory leader onto the latter track.
But whereas Asquith's speech raised their hopes that a new 
direction might be engineered, Bonar Law's reply at Newcastle 
dashed them. Chamberlain was angry that the speech had included 
no coded devolutionary language, especially, as he informed 
Lansdowne, since he, Bob Cecil and Selborne had implored Bonar 
Law to 'stress the Imperial danger quite apart from the Ulster 
opposition'^. Accordingly, he 'very much regret(ed) that B.L. 
after all said nothing of this side of the question and confined 
himself entirely to Ulster. I wonder whether it was accident or 
design^?' To Oliver, Chamberlain seems to have felt that the 
omission was almost a personal slur. 'What B.L. said was well 
said but after all he omitted practically all reference to the 
Imperial question. He may have reverted deliberately to his 
original purpose after I saw him or having got his first sketch 
firmly in his mind., felt unable to bring it in later'^. It 
certainly did little to placate Chamberlain, and spurred him on,
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in a fit of pique, clearly to outline a constructive alternative 
to the scenario offered by Bonar Law at Newcastle, in two 
speeches he delivered in Wales during the first week of
cc
November . On his return, he boasted to Oliver : 'look at my
Newport speech. .1 have said nothing I do not believe or mean, but 
if anyone is inclined to consider a federal solution, I have said 
enough to provide him with a text'^. The Newcastle speech also 
pushed Chamberlain into opening contact with like-thinking 
moderate Liberals. Knowing Oliver's line of communication with 
Churchill, and of his subsequent invitation by Churchill on the 
12th to dine on The Enchantress, the postscript to his letter of 
November the 6th to Oliver seems pregnant with meaning: 'As
things stand I shall go no further.. It is now for others to 
a c t .
Despite this early cooperation, several differences existed 
between Lansdowne and Chamberlain. Lansdowne favoured a general 
election, and only in response to the threat of a conference had 
he promoted devolution. Chamberlain saw a constructive federal 
policy as a solution in itself, not simply as a response to the 
danger of a conference. Such differences were obscured by a 
common dislike of exclusion and a common fear that a settlement 
along those lines was being hatched. Nor did Chamberlain see his 
position as being solely in tandem with Lansdowne. The latter was 
useful support, but it was to the more overtly constructive 
elements that Chamberlain was also looking, especially his old 
friends from 1911: Smith, Selborne and Carson. Chamberlain 
certainly saw Carson less as an Ulster bigot than a constructive 
politician. And yet by late October and early November 'things',
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as Oliver said, 'are beginning to move' .
IV
Several things emerged from his meeting with Asquith on October 
15th. First, he perceived that Asquith would try to reach a 
settlement on 'the four counties remain(ing) in the Union and as 
regards the two counties a plebiscite should be taken'®®. This 
he believed was Asquith's maximum compromise stance, and was a 
basis which, if genuinely offered, he would have to accept. As 
he said to Croal, such a formula 'would be so reasonable that we 
would be in a very bad position if we had to refuse it'7®. Yet
he also observed that this minimum was impossible, given ’that
71Redmond cannot agree to the solution of excluding Ulster". It 
was, then, immaterial whether Asquith played with nine, six or 
even four county exclusion when the Nationalists appeared to 
reject the "principle" of exclusion itself.
This impression was reinforced by colleagues. Some saw the 
Nationalist stance against exclusion as an inviolable principle. 
Balfour on the 17th of October exclaimed, 'Mr Short tells me that 
the Westminister declares, in emphatic terms, against the 
exclusion of any fraction of Ireland, from the home rule bill. 
If Redmond says this as representing the Nationalists and the 
Westminister says it as representing the ordinary moderate 
Liberal, I presume the last chance of the Govt making a proposal
7?even about the four counties has vanished1/4. Others expanded on 
this Nationalist obstruction. 'This assumes he (Redmond) wants 
Home Rule', wrote Croal, 'about that I have always been
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sceptical. He is a big figure just now, he has a large salary 
from the Nationalist fund; in Dublin he would be eclipsed by
Devlin and very soon driven into retirement. If this belief is
71right a continued feud over Home Rule will suit his purpose' .
Strachey also doubted the Nationalist desire actually to see Home
Rule enacted, arguing that exclusion offered them a means to
'avoid H.R. and keep the sentimental grievance and what more
could they want - especially as when you go in you will have to
74find them a handsome pecuniary solution' .
Alongside these doubts was a more general disbelief that the 
bill as it stood could accept an exclusionary amendment. Edmund 
Talbot heard that ' the speaker has said that the exclusion of 
Ulster would entail a new bill‘d. For Strachey also 'it 
(exclusion) will.. I am convinced, act as a measure which will 
wreck both the bill and the Govt if they can be got to adopt
76it... Do nail the Government to exclusion and so smash them' . 
Both seemed to presage that, one way or another, exclusion was 
not a realistic basis for compromise. This strengthened Bonar 
Law's conviction that exclusion was a tactical "loophole" which 
displayed his reasonableness but stood no chance of forming a 
basis for settlement.
Another feature to arise from the meeting was his altering 
perception of Asquith, less the weak old Whig, and a far stronger 
politician, willing (or forced) to take events to their 
catastrophic conclusion. 'If he (Asquith) is compelled to have 
an election before the bill becomes law and if he were beaten in 
that election, then his position will be the most humiliating it 
is possible to conceive. He and his party have staked everything
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on the Parliament Act and in that case their whole action in the
last three years would have been simply futile. He must realise
this, and therefore nothing but compulsion of the most extreme
kind would make him to submit to an election before his bills are
carried; and there is a great danger that rather than face that
risk he will go straight on and land the country in something 
77like disaster' . It began to seem that Asquith might be playing
70
the same high-risk game as himself0. Was Asquith willing to 
take the crisis as far as it could go, to push the Tories into 
submission? If so, it was becoming a battle of nerves.
Yet despite such anxieties Bonar Law held a strong tactical 
position. This was a waiting game; even if exclusion was 
impossible, he still had to go through the motions of appearing 
to work towards it. And if Asquith's present overtures were not 
genuine (a smokescreen to hide his more determined course), then 
he still had to respond to them. There were dangers; would his 
party be satisfied with a waiting game? The mobilisation of 
forces against a compromise along exclusionary lines suggested 
that they would not. Also, a waiting game was based on 
assumptions all liable to prove unfounded or wrong: might Asquith 
square the Nationalists? Would Ulster remain calm and give no 
excuse for imposing martial law? Could the Tory party's nerve 
hold, especially with their leader seemingly working for a 
compromise? This last point was of particular concern. Appearing 
moderate had led many to assume that he was "selling-out". The 
increased activity of many on the Right was a sign of distrust 
in Bonar Law's leadership, and Lansdowne, Salisbury, Midleton and 
Willoughby de Broke remained suspicious. By early November,
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dissatisfaction was beginning to grow steadily. Bonar Law was 
keen to check this growth of a bellicose right wing, yet was 
impeded by the continuing need to appear both moderate (for the 
public and Asquith) and sympathetic to exclusion (for Ulster 
Unionists).
His position was eased by Parliament being in recess and by 
building up informal contacts. He was in regular touch with 
Carson (speaking from the same platform at Newcastle). This 
sympathy for Ulster Unionism brought him the benefit of their 
influential connections on the Tory Right (McNeill, Bull, Page- 
Croft), and from Milner's diary we know that Bonar Law was 
regularly in contact during November and December. Perhaps, then, 
the forces of the Right were not as serious a threat to Bonar Law 
as those, like Chamberlain and Lansdowne, who were keen to shift 
policy from exclusion to devolution. Since exclusion was defended 
as a wrecking tactic, there was fear and anxiety rather than 
simmering party rebellion on the Right.
Of much concern as well was the sudden rise of the Land 
Question, following a speech by Lloyd George at Swindon on the 
21st of October. On the one hand, this suggested that the 
Government were preparing for a snap election, with the Irish 
problem temporarily obscured or even about to be settled. On the 
other, it distracted public attention from Home Rule. Pretyman 
considered 'the Governments Land Campaign dangerous. Their 
exaggerations and misstatements., are swallowed by thousands who 
know nothing of the facts'^. More worryingly, it served to 
divide the Tories: 'I am afraid', Pretyman observed, 'there are
OA
great differences in the party about Land policy' . Differences
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over land were inevitable, with the landowning section still so
01
strongly represented . Speaking for this section, Walter Long 
warned Bonar Law of 'the danger of estranging or even alarming 
the Landowners and Farmers who are the backbone of our party1 
especially at a time when an election was not far off. Long's 
position implied safe, conservative reform with no attempt to 
out-radicalise Lloyd George. Others, however, were less 
reverential to the traditional landed basis of the party. A 
radical programme of land reform was an issue to revamp the Tory 
image and portray them as a modern, progressive, industrial 
party. Joynson-Hicks, Steel-Maitland, Woods, Astor, Bentick and 
Baldwin (members of the U.S.R.C. Land committee) all looked to 
a fresh initiative to meet the challenge thrown down by Lloyd 
George; and in not a few of their minds was the desire to be rid 
of the futile struggle over Ireland: land reform was where the 
next election would be won or lost.
On top of these various currents came Asquith's Ladybank 
speech of the 26th. Certainly it contained much of what 
Stamfordham called 'high pitch m u s i c ' A s q u i t h  talked of 'a 
complete Constitutional case for proceeding.. in regard to the 
Irish Government bill' and scotched (what Loreburn had suggested 
a month before) any idea of a formal conference between
0i
leaders . Yet towards the end he appeared to throw out 
something of an offer: 'if there is a genuine disposition in all 
quarters, by an interchange of views and suggestions, free, 
frank, and without prejudice ... I invite that interchange and 
both I and my colleagues are perfectly ready to take part in
oc
it'03. This was an offer to which Bonar Law had to reply, in
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favourable terms, if he was not to alienate public opinion. It 
drew a variety of responses from within the leadership. 
Salisbury, deeply suspicious, rejected any idea of a compromise 
on exclusion®**. Lansdowne and Chamberlain both saw it as 
'conciliatory1, and it encouraged them to think that Asquith
07
could be converted to a devolutionary measure . Chamberlain, 
along with Selbome and Bob Cecil, urged Bonar Law in his reply 
at Newcastle to emphasise the 'all-Irish' rather than the solely 
'Ulster' nature of their opposition, and give a clear signal to 
Asquith that only a devolutionary plan would remove their 
objections®®. Along different lines, Steel-Maitland and Oliver 
saw an opportunity to wrong-foot Asquith by 'making an assumption 
on the statement' that he refused exclusion, then wait for him
QQ
to challenge this . If he did, then Bonar Law would look 
moderate; if he did not, then he ran the risk of alienating the 
Nationalists; for Oliver, 'another peg driven in for us to climb 
by'®®. And from higher quarters came more moderate advice: 'The 
King. . feels certain that you will continue to try and cultivate
Q1the ground which has already been broken'71.
Bonar Law sought to balance all these pressures with his 
speech at Newcastle, his first since meeting Asquith. In tone it 
was vintage Bonar Law, aggressive and at times venomous ('he
(Asquith) can always be trusted to speak like a statesman; but
9 ?to act like a statesman - well, that is different') . As 
previously, he stuck firmly to the Ulster problem, ignoring 
Chamberlain's advice about dropping devolutionary hints. He 
warned Asquith that exclusion, not devolution, was the desired 
path, and ensured Ulster Unionist loyalty to the Tory party at
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a delicate moment: 'I happened to read a few weeks ago., the
first duty of the Unionist party was to express its disapproval 
of "Carsonism" in Ulster. This meeting at which Sir Edward Carson 
and I speak from the same platform, is the best answer 1 can give 
to that suggestion1” .
Bonar Law also reaffirmed that a general election was still 
the best way to prevent civil war: 'He says the people are behind 
him. Why not test them?' . Such a call for an election was a well- 
used popular and populist cry; sympathy and trust for the people 
were good qualities to emphasise with an election possibly close 
at hand. More controversially, he backed up his call for an 
election with a watertight promise to Ulster. 'The pledge which 
I made at Blenheim still holds good.. If the Government try to 
drive the people of Ulster out of the Union.. before they obtain 
the sanction of the electors., the whole Unionist party will 
support her in her resistance'^. It was the tactical line he 
had used since April 1912: civil war or a general election. Now, 
however, with the bill's implementation only months away and 
Ulster seemingly well prepared to resist it, it marked a dramatic 
raising of the stakes. It shows Bonar Law as a very tough-minded 
politician, confident that he had a tactical formula from which 
Asquith might wriggle and writhe but could not escape.
A similar tough-mindedness was apparent in his treatment of 
Asquith's offer. Careful not to repulse it and yet not to be seen 
to be endorsing it, he threw the initiative for settling the 
issue decisively back onto the Government . 'If he does mean to 
extend to us an invitation.. then we shall not decline to respond 
to it and we shall carefully consider any proposals he may make
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to us and consider them with a real desire to find a solution, 
if a solution be possible'^. His reasonableness had been 
demonstrated, but no conditional acceptances or promises had been 
given. And by decisively putting the burden of responsibility 
back onto the Liberals, Bonar Law had reasserted the waiting 
game: to watch the government struggle with its allies, to agree 
a solution, free of obligation. When unable to agree, the 
Government would again be facing the alternative of an election 
or civil war. In addition, he threw scorn and ridicule on recent 
Liberal references to the land question. 'What is the meaning of 
their wonderful Land campaign? What is the meaning of springing 
it on the country now, just when the Home Rule question is 
becoming critical^?' He warned colleagues and potential 
supporters alike not to chase Lloyd George's 'hares' at this 
precarious moment.
The reception of his speech was generally good. George 
Younger spoke for many: 'your speech last night has given the
greatest possible satisfaction . . it is most certainly up to them
07
and not to us to formulate proposals for a settlement'3 . 
Lansdowne was pleased that he had decisively called for a general
election. Even Salisbury, rarely supportive of anything Bonar Law
QAdid, was forced to admit that he 'admired' his speech. 3 . 
Newcastle went far to restore the shaken nerves of the Right.
Others, however, remained unconvinced. Lord Ashtown was 
angry that the speech had said nothing for the Southern Irish 
Unionists: 'there is a very bitter feeling amongst the Unionists
qq
here1,3. Lansdowne remained worried that Bonar Law's
concentration on Ulster would simply ensnare them in a conference
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on exclusion. To a sympathetic Chamberlain, he lamented two days 
later that 'we shall make nothing of this plan (devolution) so 
long as the Ulster red-herring is being trailed backwards and 
forwards across the track'*®®, a point of view Chamberlain fully 
reciprocated. But their disapproval was a nuisance rather than 
a threat, given the support Bonar Law had from Carson, Balfour 
(who appeared to endorse what Bonar Law said in a speech several 
days later) and, more hesitantly, from Walter Long. With the 
initiative firmly back on the Government's shoulders, there was 
little room or excuse for Lansdowne or Chamberlain to agitate 
hard against Bonar Law. Nor had Asquith's speech contained enough 
substance for any sort of pro-devolution bridge to be built to 
him; forced to wait upon the Government's next move, their 
ambitions of changing track from an Ulster line to an all-Ireland 
approach seemed inopportune.
Bonar Law did not have to wait long for the next move. On 
the 30th of October Asquith suggested another meeting*®*. After
luncheon on the 6th of November, both leaders again motored out
10?to Cherkley Court. The meeting was friendly and specific1 . At 
first glance, Bonar Law appears to have been unusually frank and 
open (a not unimportant image to project). He indicated that 
Carson would probably accept a six-county exclusion scheme, with 
a plebiscite at the end of ten years. He even implied that Home 
Rule for the rest of Ireland would be acceptable if the Post 
Office and Customs duties were left out of the bill and a Land 
Conference, along the lines of 1903, convened immediately; to all 
of which Asquith agreed. Yet Bonar Law's stance must be placed 
in the context of his own tactical position.
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He already realised (from his first meeting) that the four- 
county exclusion scheme with a plebiscite in two others was 
Asquith's maximum. His proposal of six counties therefore 
suggests an element of "out-bidding" a known position: pitching 
a plan just outside what he thought Asquith could accept. In any 
case, his offer never moved away from a permanent exclusion. 'The 
further conversation was on the assumption that the exclusion is 
only to be terminable by a plebiscite by the people of Ulster in 
favour of joining the Irish Parliament'^ . And permanent 
exclusion he surmised to be beyond what the Nationalists would 
ever agree. Thus he could advertise moderation to Asquith, fully 
convinced that there would be little chance of a settlement.
In addition, he avoided an arrangement on the third reading of 
the bill. Asquith was keen for cross- bench support to ensure the 
passage of any amended bill against Irish resistance (be it 
Unionist or (more likely) Nationalist). This Bonar Law rejected. 
'In the House of Commons the position was different, that we 
might think it was possible the bill would be defeated.. and that 
therefore we should like to be free to vote against the third 
reading. As I expected he did not agree to this'1®*. Bonar Law 
was not going to implicate himself in a "pro-order", anti-Irish 
understanding, or even coalition to help the Government out of 
a sticky situation: they would have to face the Nationalists 
alone. He even went further. 'It is obvious that any settlement 
of this kind is out of the question if the Nationalists are 
determined not to have it; for the Unionists do not wish it and 
you cannot impose a settlement which nobody wants'1®^ . Asquith 
had to agree a reasonable scheme with the Nationalists first
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(which Bonar Law thought to be impossible) before the Tories 
would consider it. The initiative for a compromise plan was again 
thrust decisively back onto the Government; as a result, no 
'conditional acceptance1 of a settlement plan was requested by 
Asquith (something Bonar Law had feared would be asked). As he 
celebrated to Long, two days after the meeting, 'so far we are 
committed to nothing '*®®.
Appearing reasonable remained vital for Bonar Law. No leeway 
could be given to allow Asquith to present the Tories to public 
opinion as intransigent. Strachey pointed out the danger of this: 
'What Asquith would probably like best of all would be to be able 
to say that he had made the most frank and free offer to exclude 
Protestant Ulster but that the Ulster people and English 
Unionists would not accept it and that therefore he had no option 
but to go on with the bill, the whole bill and nothing but the 
bill. I am afraid that if he could get apparently good ground for
107saying this a good many "wobblers" would go with him11 . 
Therefore, discussing (positively) various exclusion plans, 
showing sympathy for a settlement and implicitly blaming those 
'elements of a Diehard movement1 for being unable to go further, 
all helped to reduce the likelihood of Asquith being able to do
1 AO
this1 . If Asquith was relying on a Tory rejection, the 
semblance of moderation and even encouragement, on Bonar Law's 
part, undermined Asquith's certainty that a compromise plan would 
actually be rejected. It gave no room to paint the Tories as 
unbending, and thus the only way for Asquith to ensure rejection 
would be to make the proposal so unreasonable that it would fail 
to be seen, as a genuine compromise initiative. In a similar
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vein, Bonar Law's approval of exclusion gave Asquith the 
impression that there was no difference in objectives between 
Tories and Ulster Unionists. This dissuaded him from trying to 
reach an agreement with the latter (which was by no means 
inconceivable) to leave the former high and dry.
Secondary accounts of the meeting have tended to concentrate 
on Bonar Law's assumption, towards the end of the meeting, that 
Asquith would put the scheme of six- county exclusion to his 
Cabinet*®^, then, if no agreement was reached, go to an 
election. 'And he (Asquith) replied.. "I shall definitely make 
this proposal to my Cabinet on Tuesday and I think I can carry 
my Cabinet with me.. As soon as I have got the agreement of my 
Cabinet Birrell will approach the Nationalists".. ray impression 
is, that he has definitely made up his mind that a settlement on 
these lines is the only alternative to a general election'**®. 
Jalland is right to suggest that it was incredibly naive of Bonar 
Law to accept this***; and yet with no obvious reason to suppose 
that Asquith would purposely deceive Bonar Law (apart from simple 
disinformation), historians have fallen back on the explanation 
that it was due to Bonar Law's inexperience and lack of 
negotiating skill. But it might be that Bonar Law deliberately 
gave a distorted account, knowing that what he wrote of the 
meeting was not solely for his eyes but would be seen by others, 
and disseminated to a wider Tory audience.
As he assumed that no settlement would come after 
consultation with Nationalists, emphasising Asquith's readiness 
to go to an election would do him little harm. If Asquith 
subsequently did so, then his prime objective had been achieved.
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If he did not, then the Prime Minister was made to seem 
duplicitous, which might have reinforced support for Bonar Law. 
He had, seemingly, extracted something tangible from Asquith, 
thus enhancing his own credibility; and he could not be blamed 
if an election did not eventuate, since Asquith would have broken 
his promise. More dangerous, from Asquith's point of view, was 
that the fact that he had apparently put a formal compromise 
offer to Cabinet and then promised the leader of the Opposition 
an election if it was rejected might become known in high 
political circles. 'Of course we could never make any use of the 
knowledge of his intentions communicated to me', Bonar Law 
assured Balfour, ’yet if the proposal is definitely made to the 
Cabinet it really cannot be secret; and they would be in a 
hopeless position if they fight an election on proposals which
111
they themselves tried to alter'14. Hardline Liberals (McKenna, 
Runciman, Harcourt and Samuel) would have been incensed that he 
had made such a promise to Bonar Law. Nationalists might have 
stiffened in their resolve to have the full Home Rule bill, ever 
more suspicious that Asquith was concocting a compromise behind 
their backs. And moderate or centrist Liberals might have been 
demoralised that Asquith had appeared to wilt in the face of 
Ulster threats, and, in the process, had also broken his word. 
As a means of destabilising the position of Asquith and his 
Government, it might well have been a shrewd piece of distortion.
From his second meeting with Asquith, Bonar Law's basic 
objectives were secured. The initiative lay firmly with the 
Government to formulate a plan. By throwing them back onto their 
Nationalist allies the chance of a reasonable compromise
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diminished, and Asquith would find himself back where he had been 
all along: facing the choice of an election or civil war. All 
seemed to rest on the Nationalists behaving like Nationalists, 
an ironic twist of history. As he wrote to Walter Long, 'from a 
party point of view I hope the Nationalists will not agree, for 
if they do our best card for an election will have been 
lost'113.
V
Despite the relatively strong tactical position into which Bonar 
Law had manoeuvred the party, opposition grew more vocal after 
his second meeting. The unrest which had manifested itself after 
the first meeting now hardened into full blown resistance by 
November. It was fuelled from several sources. First, the 
speculation and rumour surrounding the meetings which, 
unanswered, continued to nourish fears of a sell-out. Second, 
there was a growing feeling that Asquith might be manipulating 
Bonar Law, wasting time, or even drawing from him an acceptance 
of the principle of Home Rule rather than actually attempting to 
solve the crisis.
More important was the impact of two by-elections, 
Linlithgow and Reading on the 7th and 8th of November 
respectively. At Linlithgow there was an 8.3% swing to the 
Tories; at Reading, Liberal- held in 1910, a Unionist was 
returned with an 11% swing***. Together they were interpreted as 
the country might be waking up to the Irish situation; Reading 
in particular was interpreted as a popular rejection of Liberal
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Home Rule^. Signs of Government difficulty merely served to 
stiffen resolve against a settlement and for an election; as 
Balfour anxiously pointed out, 'if the bye-elections continue to 
bring unpleasant results to the Government it will of course make 
it yet more difficult for the Unionist leaders to assent to the 
Ulster c o m p r o m i s e . And this persuaded some that Asquith 
would soon call an election and pass the poisoned chalice. If an 
election was looming, the time was not right for a settlement.
Sanders, on the 13th of November, wrote that 'most of the 
men I speak to on our side think there will be no compromise but
117a great many expect a January election'11 . Lansdowne relayed 
similar information: 'Long, who reflects the "grip" of the
Carlton, tells me that a lot of our people are ready to become
diehards and to send us, if we entertain any proposals for a
110
settlement based on the exclusion of Ulster1110. Leslie Wilson, 
on the 9th, interpreted the two by-elections as proof 'that the 
country will not have this Home Rule bill'^. From a different 
angle, John Gretton attacked the prevailing pro-compromise 
leaning of the Unionist press, and Raymond-Greene was 'convinced 
that any compromise made at the expense of the Union. . will
completely take the heart out of the Unionist party in the
170constituencies' . Lord Weymss informed Bonar Law on the 28th 
that a friend of his had raised '30,000 fully armed men' in
171support of Ulster111. Bonar Law recognised the drift in
sentiment, confiding to Balfour that in response to a compromise
177'there might easily be an active movement against it' .
On the same day, the 18th, came more serious evidence of 
backbench ferment. The Morning Post published a "Call for
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Service", on behalf of the B.L.S.U.U. 'We call on our able-bodied 
fellow countrymen who think that the Ulstermen are arming in a 
righteous cause to enrol themselves'122. It continued, 
pointedly, 'those who rely on the belief that the crisis can be 
relieved by a process of bargaining. . are building on a very 
slender chance and indeed are helping the fatal policy of 
drift,12*. It was a serious warning to Bonar Law, rejecting his 
willingness to meet Asquith and what appeared to be his desire 
to reach a compromise. It was also an attempt to promote a tough 
line as much as an attempt to recruit 'able-bodied men'. More 
dangerously, it suggested that Bonar Law was unable to control 
his own troops and to keep the conflict within Parliamentary 
boundaries.
Yet all this, as Willoughby de Broke told Salisbury, was
lie
simply giving "flesh" to the Blenheim speech163. There was a 
large element of bluff: 'some of us are convinced that the best 
wav to prevent a civil war is to back Ulster in deed as in 
word'12^ . Oliver also noted the dramatic side of things, with 
Willoughby de Broke asking his friends 'to get their horses ready
and practise with firearms.. I rather suspect that nothing
177serious is really being done at all' . It was intimidation 
rather than insurrection, the tactic Bonar Law had been pursuing 
with both the Government and the Crown. They were still playing 
the Parliamentary game, looking to alter things at the centre not 
the periphery. 'The enroling of men in Ulster has brought the
1 JO
Radicals to their senses' . Willoughby de Broke also claimed 
that he had spoken to Bonar Law in March, gaining his unofficial 
blessing for the movement. No evidence survives, but there is no
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reason to doubt de Broke's statement, especially as Bonar Law was 
giving unofficial encouragement to Milner. They were not 
antagonistic to Bonar Law's "deeper" tactics; if anything, they 
reinforced his case that Asquith only had two options, civil war 
or an election.
These backbench sentiments were reflected in the Tory 
leadership. Hugh Cecil, showing the distance that had grown 
recently between Ulster Unionists and the Tory Right, offered his 
'very earnest hope that you will not and that Carson will not be 
tempted into making any positive proposal for a settlement. I am 
sorry Carson went as far as he did' . But the clearest sign of 
this shift to the Right came from Walter Long. Previously, Long 
had been rather non-committal in the face of moves towards a 
compromise on exclusion. As late as October 31st he was more 
concerned with Land policy and Lloyd George's campaign, barely 
mentioning the Home Rule crisis^®. By November 7th his tone had 
altered. 'I have seen a great many of our most reliable men' (a 
familiar manner in which Long challenged the opinions of his 
leader), 'and their unanimous opinion is that if Asquith makes 
any overtures and we accept them the result would be absolutely 
fatal to our p a r t y T w o  days later he reiterated his concern 
'that if we come to any arrangement with the Government we shall 
rum grave risks of splitting even smashing our party'1 . What 
moved Long was, first, Bonar Law's tactics. During his second 
meeting with Asquith he had appeared willing to talk about 
exclusion schemes, ignoring the obvious signs of Nationalist 
hostility to any form of exclusion. Such an approach was 
foolhardy, because 'if Asquith offers exclusion of Ulster and we
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accept, of course Redmond will turn him out and the consequences 
will be that both English parties will be irretrievably dammed 
as intriguers'***. The irony here was that Bonar Law's 
understanding of the situation was remarkably similar to Long's. 
A second influence was the impact of Linlithgow and Reading on 
the party. 'I think these two elections will show them the 
feeling against any agreement. The general view seems to be "give 
them no quarter and drive them out"'***.
Long looked to stiffen Bonar Law away from compromise. On 
the 14th of November Long pestered him publicly to announce that 
he had met Asquith, realising the likely uproar in party feeling 
this would provoke***. On the 20th he sent Bonar Law a strongly 
worded memorandum***. If Bonar Law agreed an accommodation with 
the Liberals, Long was now willing to threaten rebellion. ' In all 
probability any attempted compromise will be followed by a
schism, even greater and more deep seated than that which
117occurred at the time of the passing of the Parliament Act' . 
It was clearly a direct warning against exclusion: 'How then can 
we possibly agree to force Home Rule upon the other three 
provinces, more especially as we believe that this bill is the 
very worst and most unworkable form of devolution. . The great 
object we all have now is to get the Government out, is it 
not'***. The last sentence reveals the extent to which Long had, 
by early November, shifted from his traditional centrist 
position; the Home Rule issue was represented not as a danger to 
Ireland but as a means of removing the Government itself.
Long was now more sympathetic to Southern Unionist concerns. 
This reflected the pressure on him from prominent Southern
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Unionists and leading diehard Tories. The Earl of Arran wrote a 
stinging letter to him, saying that exclusion was a betrayal of
1 iq
the Covenanter oath . Also, Long now extended a hand to 
Lansdowne, an alignment of traditional Unionist beliefs against 
any "clever" tinkering with the Union, whether through exclusion 
or (it is hard not to see an anti-Chamberlain motive in Long's 
calculations here) full federal experiments1*®. 'I am alarmed at 
the prospect of some compromise being arrived at. The language 
used by Lord Lansdowne at Brighton exactly expresses my feeling 
in regard to the exclusion of Ulster. The proposal has no 
attractions for me; it is a clumsy expedient at best1**1. Their 
cooperation began to consolidate after the second meeting. The 
basis of this is unclear, although if Lansdowne was a 
devolutionist rather than a federalist, and preferred an election 
to a settlement, Long could have found little fault with these 
objectives.
VI
After the second meeting between Asquith and Bonar Law, 
sympathy for a settlement increased. Balfour replied on
November the 8th in highly favourable terms: 'Asquith seems to
14?me to be showing both courage and statesmanship' . He still 
saw an election as the best option, but maintained that a 
compromise based on exclusion was possible; as he informed 
Bonar Law, in his own ambiguous way, 'if however compromise be 
really the proper course, the thing could, I think, be 
done'1*^ . Even a sympathy for coalition can, perhaps, be
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detected. He agreed with Asquith that cooperation in 
Parliament would be necessary to push through 'the Home Rule 
measure, mutilated as it will be1 against 'the representatives 
of Ireland', and speculated that 'if Home Rule and the Welsh 
church were out of the way the differences between the two 
parties (putting T.R. aside) would seem to be mainly as to the
methods by (which) Social reform.. and Constitutional
revision., were carried out'***. Balfour, close to the crown, 
in regular contact with moderate Liberal ministers, and 
increasingly fearful of the dangers of the present situation, 
looked favourably to a pro-order, anti-Irish alliance. His 
dislike of party, a feature of his later career, had 
apparently set in early.
The danger of a pro-coalition sentiment gaining support 
within the leadership was something Bonar Law could not
ignore, especially as the likes of Smith, Chamberlain - and
perhaps even Carson - would have supported such an initiative. 
Balfour would have been a highly influential focus for such an 
alliance, securing much moderate party support behind him and 
alienating it from Bonar Law, probably forcing him from the 
leadership. The likelihood of a moderate backlash within the 
party, something Bonar Law had worked to reduce by appearing 
fairly open to discussion, was greatly enhanced by Balfour 
showing himself ready to accept a move towards a compromise or 
coalition. But the threat never materialised. Balfour was 
perhaps too much of a lone actor and a convinced exclusionist, 
which meant that (with Bonar Law at that time talking along 
such lines to Asquith) there was little room for a distinct
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Balfourian focus. More important still, the initiative for a 
settlement was coming more strongly from federal sympathisers.
The political impasse and the danger of civil strife gave 
federalism a new relevance by late November 1913; yet for all 
the sympathy, nothing seemed to be happening. Tactics, timing 
and definitions of what federalism meant divided the 
supporters, and prevented anything but sympathy being given. 
Lansdowne's laconic comment touched the root of federal 
weakness: 'we are, I suppose, in the abstract, all of us 
supporters of devolution.. but I hesitate to talk glibly about 
the adoption of the federal principle until I really know what 
I mean by the words'^. Oliver shared these doubts. 'What 
strikes me rather with wonderment about them all is that they 
don't seem to have thought much., of the actual way out. They 
don't seemed to have realised or visualised what federalism or 
anything else means. Consequently things are in a very fluid 
and uncomfortable condition'1*®.
But where Lansdowne was content to watch, Oliver was 
active. Chamberlain was the main focus for his efforts, and he 
manoeuvred hard to ease the latter into a more vigorous role. 
'The great advantage of Austen is that when once he grips an
idea and accepts it he doesn't wobble. I regard him as the
1 ngreatest standby at the present juncture' . Oliver urged him 
to contact the opposition: 'Among people who count, upon the 
opposite side, you and the Ancient one (Asquith) are the two 
who have the strongest respect for one another'**®. He even 
suggested an informal dinner at Aubrey Herbert's, (a close 
friend of Asquith's), where they might talk alone. 'Let me
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know if you object to this attempt being made'^. Chamberlain 
shied away from such direct contact with Asquith, knowing of 
his meetings with Bonar Law. Instead, in two speeches in Wales 
during the first week of November, he sent clear signals to 
the other side of his interest in a constructive settlement. 
Churchill (who had been in recent contact with Oliver) took 
the bait. On the 12th of November he invited Chamberlain to 
dinner on board The Enchantress on the 27th, hoping for 'one 
of those frank, free and unfettered conversations which are so 
much in fashion now'^®.
This contact marked an important stage in the crisis. For 
Chamberlain, it was an attempt to shift the basis of 
negotiation between leaders onto a devolutionary path. He had
already tried to do this with Bonar Law, on the 9th of
November, having read the latter's memorandum of the second 
meeting. In urging Bonar Law to take up the offers by Asquith 
to give way on Customs and the Post Office, Chamberlain was 
arguing for a change of tack, away from exclusion, yet to 
little avail. Contact with Churchill (and thus indirectly with 
Asquith) was a similar attempt to shift the basis towards 
devolution; as he and Lansdowne had agreed, to 'begin again on 
different lines
Before the meeting on the 27th, Oliver remained active in 
creating the right atmosphere, telling Grey on the 24th that 
'there will be work to do early next week. Things have moved a
good deal' . To Robinson he urged better reporting of
Chamberlain's speeches, while he flattered Northcliffe that 
'your legions have lent powerful aid'*^. He also arranged a
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private dinner for Chamberlain, Milner and Grey in order to 
'discuss things over c l a r e t B u t  it was the publication of 
his pamphlet "The Alternative to Civil War", a passionate 
appeal for a Convention on the present crisis rather than a 
general election, which did much to keep the federal cause 
moving. The pamphlet attracted a great deal of support, not 
all of it Unionist: 'Generally I agree' wrote Macdonald, 
sentiments which were shared by his fellow Liberal Munro- 
Ferguson1^ . It also helped, given its timing, to prime both 
Chamberlain and Churchill before their meeting. To reinforce 
this, he wrote to Churchill on the 24th (enclosing a copy of 
the pamphlet): 'I imagine that in your mind, as in mine, the 
two things which loom the largest are (a) the need for 
securing our defences., and (b) the disastrous consequences of 
threats of lawlessness., upon the authority of executive 
Government.. I am only an advocate of putting heads together 
in a convention.. If men could take responsibility and agree, 
it would be much better'^.
Lansdowne also threw his weight behind the initiative, 
showing the extent of his cooperation with Chamberlain. At 
Brighton, on the 18th of November, he delivered a powerful 
pro-devolution speech*®7. 'Lansdowne has committed the 
Unionists to the consideration of the federal plan', rejoiced 
Grey on the 22nd, '(he) has waved the federal flag, the next 
step is for Asquith to act'*®®. Lansdowne's blessing gave the 
talks greater significance by publicly stating an alternative 
Unionist position in advance. On the 20th he also, "by 
accident", met Asquith at Windsor, a comfortable atmosphere in
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which to talk relatively freely. Chamberlain also prepared the 
ground before he met Churchill, with a speech at Bromsgrove.
'I have been scolded for the speech by my friends and praised 
by my enemies, so I ought to be ashamed of it, but I'm
ICQ
not'1 . But his speech did win praise from friends: Lansdowne 
agreed with much of it, showing how closely they were working 
together at this time. And Avery 'particularly liked the 
notion that what is to be done for Ireland should only be what 
can presently., for the other divisions of the U.K.'1^ . In 
addition, Bromsgrove brought Chamberlain firmly back into the 
public limelight as a force for moderation and compromise. But 
by keener spirits on the Right (with whom Chamberlain had been 
close in 1911) he was increasingly seen as a trimmer. 'If the 
party are now going to be asked to ground their arms', 
Willoughby de Broke asked, 'and consider a new instrument of 
Government for the whole of the U.K., I believe many of us 
will be bewildered and demoralised'1^1.
By the time Chamberlain and Churchill met, much 
preliminary work had been done. Churchill even mentioned that 
both the Bromsgrove and Brighton speeches, which he thought 
'very important1, had been considered in cabinet1^ . The 
conversation was more constructive than the Bonar Law/Asquith 
talks. Chamberlain argued forcefully against any exclusion of 
Ulster; it 'was the worst and most humiliating solution for 
them and it did not satisfy us. The bill without Ulster was 
only one degree worse than the bill with Ulster. So we must 
change the issue' . His proposed change was towards a form 
of Home Rule all round, 'the old Liberal Unionist policy'1^ .
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If Asquith offered a 'federal settlement’ where powers were 
reserved to the Imperial Parliament over customs, the Post 
Office, the Judiciary and ’all powers not specifically 
delegated', then 'I believe B.L. who doubtless would be in 
consultation with his colleagues could not refuse such an 
o f f e r A  clear offer of settlement was thus laid on the 
table by Chamberlain; also important was his belief that the 
initiative would have to start with Asquith (he knew Bonar Law 
to be hostile) and that Bonar Law could not resist pressure 
from other leaders if the offer was made. Churchill was 
receptive to such plans, but was unsure of their timing: 
'leaders might be prepared but parties were not., "a little 
red blood had got to flow" and then public opinion would wake 
up and then-'1^ . Chamberlain, sensing the growing unease 
within the Tory party, rejected any delay: 'if the House once
meets the opportunity for peace will be gone. You will break
1 £*7
the H of C in the process' . The interview ended with 
agreement on the need for cooperation and both clearly implied 
that a more formal type of cooperation was not uncongenial.
'The idea of fusion with an extreme wing left out on either 
side is obviously constantly in his mind and would be greatly 
liked by him'^®.
The meeting was important in several respects. First, a 
basis for settlement, which did not include exclusion, was 
made to Churchill and, through him, to the Government. 
Chamberlain implied that it had support from inside the Tory 
leadership, and gave the impression that Bonar Law could be 
forced away from exclusion and into agreement on the scheme.
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However, given Bonar Law's unqualified stand on Ulster and 
exclusion this was by not a possible course of action for him; 
as with the food tax, he had boxed himself in over Ulster 
(though the latter issue he felt better placed to defend). It 
is hard not to see Chamberlain, here, challenging Bonar Law's 
authority by undermining his tactical line over Home Rule. Was 
a federal scheme a means for Chamberlain to reassert his 
authority and contest the leadership?
The hopes raised by the Churchi11-Chamberlain meeting 
received an early disappointment. That same day Asquith spoke 
at Leeds in an aggressive, uncompromising tone. 'Asquith's 
speech has blown conciliation sky high', Austen bemoaned to 
Oliver169. To Churchill he revealed more bitterness: 'he has
1 7 A
slammed the door in our faces'1". It appeared as a 
contradiction to the signals Liberals had sent since October, 
especially when compared with Asquith's Ladybank speech. 
However, much of this was overreaction: Chamberlain was, after 
all, politically exposed by meeting Churchill. Yet Lansdowne 
reassured him that the initiative still had momentum behind 
it: 'I am inclined to think that Asquith probably believed 
himself to be doing exactly what Winston apparently thinks the 
leaders of both parties ought to do, viz: "to make speeches 
full of party claptrap and No surrender with a few sentences 
at the end for wise and discerning people to see and
1 7 1
ponder"11'1. Chamberlain accordingly replied in a speech on 
the 1st of December, attacking Asquith's Leeds outburst but 
maintaining that a federal solution was desirable and
17?possible1'*.
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Despite Leeds, the initiative did not grind to a halt. 
Lord Grey contacted Chamberlain on the 4th of December, having 
met Haldane who contradicted the interpretation given of the
Leeds speech: 'he told me that Asquith had not withdrawn..
171from the Ladybank position11 . Spotting a sympathetic ear 
close to Asquith, Grey proceeded to encourage Haldane. Writing 
the next day, he informed him that Unionists 'are prepared to 
swallow the federal plan in order to avert civil war', 
information he had clearly received from Chamberlain1 . 
Churchill was also eager to convince Chamberlain that 'the 
P.M. has not withdrawn in the slightest degree from the 
Ladybank position', and even conveyed confirmation of this 
from Asquith*75. He also invited Chamberlain to dinner at the 
Admiralty on the 8th of December, along with Morley (also 
sympathetic to a solution) and Smith.
Oliver contrived to keep events moving; he kept up 
pressure on Austen to work for a constructive settlement. On 
the 2nd he told him of the serious state of the Army, faced 
with the possibility of coercing Ulster (this was particularly 
relevant, since Bonar Law had clearly hinted at disobedience 
to orders in a speech in Dublin on the 28th)*75. On the 4th, 
Oliver informed Chamberlain of Milner's latest ideas about 
amending the Army Annual bill, a scheme of which he already 
knew a little from other Tory sources*77. Oliver's aim was to 
convince Chamberlain of the urgency of the present situation, 
pushing him towards a more public declaration of federal 
intent. Oliver also tried to build bridges between Carson and 
Chamberlain. The former had already shown sympathy for a
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federal solution in his letter to Grey, and in hints given out
170
in recent speeches . On the 3rd of December Oliver received 
a highly positive response to his pamphlet from Carson: 'I do 
not know that I genuinely differ - so long as we Ulstermen are 
treated in the same way as other citizens of the U.K.'*^. 
Carson would have realised that Oliver was a transmitter to 
Chamberlain, and sure enough the former passed on the 
favourable sentiments: 'he is very cordial and amplifies your 
point., about the difference it would make to Ulster's 
feelings - all the difference in the world - if Wales,
Scotland etc were being treated as an equal party with 
Ireland' .
By early December, the federal initiative was still 
moving forward. Haldane, Morley, Churchill, Lloyd George and 
perhaps Edward Grey appeared enthusiastic, and all had either 
direct or indirect contact with Chamberlain. Asquith 
reaffirmed his good intentions at Manchester on the 5th of 
December. On the Tory side Lansdowne, Selborne, Carson and 
Smith were also sympathetic to a constructive settlement. 
Kendle even claims that Long 'was beginning to think there 
might be something attractive in f e de r al i s m ' a l t h o u g h  this 
seems unlikely. Yet it does reflect the fluidity of ideas and 
positions at this critical time; moreover, a clear basis of 
agreement had been outlined at the meeting of the 27th, with a 
large measure of support from both sides. Much of the press 
supported such a move, and with Parliament still in recess 
there was more chance of containing the uproar within both 
parties: if a federal settlement was to be constructed from
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the ashes of the Home Rule bill, now was the time. As Oliver 
observed to Chamberlain on the 4th: 'If they (the Government) 
are anxious for a settlement there is enough material to make 
a settlement.. Things must be set a going forthwith (ie) 
certainly a going before Christmas'^ .
The dinner of Chamberlain, Churchill, Morley and Smith on 
the 8th carried high hopes, as Garvin speculated; 'perhaps 
Monday night's dinner is the foundation of it'*®*. Morley and 
Churchill were hostile to coercing Ulster into the bill, and 
believed that if a settlement was agreed both Dillon and 
Redmond 'might sulk a bit but would not oppose'*®*. There was 
some division over what constituted federalism, Morley being 
against any notion of it, though he supported a solution along 
devolutionary lines, and both he and Churchill were 
increasingly alarmed at Asquith's willingness to delay.
Churchill followed this up with another dinner on the 11th, to
1 A1}which Chamberlain and Robinson were invited03.
During the first weeks of December, Lord Grey sounded out 
Stamfordham, in particular about whether the King could at 
this critical moment formally invite both leaders (or 
leaderships) to a conference, to be what Oliver called 'the 
flea., to jog things'*®®. Oliver relayed these manoeuvrings to 
Chamberlain together with two letters written by Spender of 
The Westminister Gazette to Oliver's close friend Grigg, in 
which the Liberal editor showed his moderation*®^. 'I thought 
and think the federal line as opened up by Oliver, Austen 
Chamberlain, Lansdowne and Carson, quite hopeful. It seemed to 
offer a basis for discussion which saved us all from coming
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straight up to an aye or no on the Ulster Question - total
exclusion or total inclusion, on which at this stage we should
100
certainly break' . These were intended to push Chamberlain 
towards more definite public statements on the federal 
alternative, but oddly received a chilly response: 'I have
i oq
said all I have to say either publicly or privately'1 .
Chamberlain's uncooperative reply on the 10th of December 
was evidence of how ephemeral the federal enthusiasm of late- 
November/early December had been. The various meetings were 
not the start of closer cooperation, but the climax. From this 
point onwards, contact between leaders dwindled and the 
initiative lost direction. Chamberlain tried to keep the 
movement going; he entered into a correspondence with Morley
iqn
after December 9th, urging greater haste m  matters .
'Asquith has met Law three times I believe. This isn't 
business. If our leaders proceed in that leisurely way events 
will take the reins out of their h a n d s H e  also tried 
another approach, looking to Morley to help draw Carson and 
Asquith into direct conversation, by-passing the implacable 
Bonar Law. 'He (Carson) has proved himself most moderate and 
deeply sensible of his heavy responsibility.. Make no mistake 
about Carson's object. He wants peace-on terms of course, but
iqi
on terms which I believe the Government could accept' . He 
laid out the basis upon which Carson might agree, namely 'the 
principle that Ulster was to be treated like the other parts
1<n
of the U.K1 . ' Morley, though sceptical of the "Carson 
principle", conveyed this message to Asquith who subsequently 
invited Carson for an interview^. They met on the 16th of
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December, but seem to have progressed along lines not 
envisaged by Chamberlain; Carson argued for exclusion, Asquith 
for a form of veiled Home Rule within Home Rule, which he sent 
on to Carson several days later in the form of suggestions: 
the wider federal basis to the negotiations did not 
materialise. Carson, after consulting with Bonar Law, sent 
back Asquith's suggestions with little encouragement. 'Mr 
Bonar Law is also of opinion that for the same reason he does 
not think any useful purpose would be served in calling his 
colleagues together to consider them'*^. In the collapse of 
the Carson-Asquith meeting (never very auspicious in any case) 
the moves within the leaderships to find a federal solution 
dried up.
Several fundamental problems had not been solved. The 
first was the definition of federalism. Some, like 
Chamberlain, Milner, Carson, Oliver, Churchill and Selborne 
thought in terms of a fully federated U.K., with provincial 
parliaments and an Imperial parliament at Westminster to guide 
the fortunes of the Empire. Others such as Lansdowne, Morley, 
Derby, and possibly Asquith himself preferred a more 
devolutionary solution, a form of watered-down Home Rule. 
Similar debate centred on whether Ulster was to be included in 
the new structure (Dunraven) or excluded from it (Grey)^. 
Timing also divided sympathisers, Churchill calling for 
patience, Chamberlain and Oliver calling for no delay. And 
tactics proved a block to effective action. Selborne thought a 
'settlement of the Irish Question before the general election 
will be no benefit to the Conservative p a r t y O l i v e r  and
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many others viewed an election as pointless and believed a 
settlement could only come by consent and not from electoral 
stalemate. Because these problems were never overcome, neither 
side would move beyond endorsing or discussing general 
principles or rough "frameworks" of a federal scheme. There 
was, then, a hollowness about the effort to bring both sides 
together around a federal settlement. Thus Lansdowne could 
write, 'I have always myself felt that no one has yet worked 
out a scheme for the establishment of such local 
legislatures'. This found an echo on the other side:
'Haldane., insists and not without reason that none of the 
Unionist leaders have yet produced anything intelligible in
1Q0
the shape of a federal plan'”0.
More fundamental was the attitude of the two leaders. 
Bonar Law remained hostile, as Lansdowne told Chamberlain: 'I 
do not think B.L. likes "these devilments of local
1 qq
parliaments" ' . Asquith's attitude was more complex. He had 
shown enthusiasm at certain points, such as Ladybank and 
Manchester, and appeared close to Churchill (it was easy for 
Chamberlain to believe that Churchill spoke with Asquith's 
knowledge, even sympathy). Yet Asquith never committed 
himself, and was increasingly seen as dragging his feet. Leeds 
had thrown doubt on the whole process, and at his third 
meeting with Bonar Law on the 9th of December, where little 
progress was made, Asquith's attitude was less forthcoming.
'My reading of the situation1, Chamberlain wrote on the 10th, 
'is that some members of the Govt are fully alive to the 
danger of delay and are doing their best to see that no time
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is wasted, but that the P.M. himself has been, and still is, 
inclined to take the "wait and see" line'^®. Oliver was less 
reserved: 'The aged one (Asquith), if not yet hibernating will 
do so by nature'. His 'habit is that of the vampire, he sucks 
the blood out of his opponents by.. blandishments, and then 
curls up like a dormouse and goes to sleep
The federal initiative quickly ebbed from Tory minds 
after Bonar Law's third meeting with Asquith. Lansdowne was 
perceptive enough to see that Asquith might be stringing the 
Tories along; on the 10th he admitted that he could 'see 
nothing ahead but rocks-reefs upon reefs of them'^. On the 
16th he sent Bonar Law and the other leaders a ten-page 
memorandum on the recent talks . It was a very pessimistic 
view, different to the optimistic sentiments he had shared 
earlier with Chamberlain. Little 'light' could be detected in 
Asquith's approach, which he now described as 'procrastination 
on our party.. Whenever the P.M. has spoken with any attempt 
at precision his suggestions are of a kind that fill me with 
alarm.. One of the few things which Mr Asquith has said 
distinctly is that he means to press forward with the Home 
Rule bill under the Parliament Act'^*. Asquith should now be 
challenged on what changes in the bill he would contemplate, 
and if these proved unsatisfactory, as was likely, then 
'negotiations should not be continued'^ .
Lansdowne's much harder line corresponded to a growing 
scepticism within the Tory leadership as a whole. 'Asquith is 
simply playing with us', wrote Selborne on the 21st^.
Balfour, on the 18th, found that 'it is tolerably clear now..
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that the Govt think they will get into the least trouble by
707letting things slide1 , but it was Chamberlain who gave the 
clearest indication of this reaction: 'I am doing no politics 
at present.. I suspect Asquith has missed his mark and lost 
all chance of a settlement by consent'^®. By the middle of 
December the initiative had clearly dried up.
VII
With the end of any realistic chance of a federal settlement, 
opinion swung back to the Right and against a compromise. 
Central to this rightward drift by the leadership was the 
cooperation between Long and Lansdowne. By early December 
Lansdowne had effectively achieved one of his objectives since 
September: the consolidation of the leadership against 
exclusion and even against Bonar Law's meeting Asquith at all. 
Others gravitated towards this firmer line, notably Selborne, 
Curzon, Balfour and Bob Cecil, all previously favourable to 
some kind of settlement. This change within the leadership 
owed much to the altered political environment following Bonar 
Law's third meeting with Asquith.
Discussions on the 9th shattered the impression of 
Asquith as sympathetic to a devolutionary settlement. 'He must 
have known', Lansdowne despaired to Bonar Law after their 
meeting,'when he proposed to you that Ulster should come in 
automatically after a certain number of years, that his 
proposal would not be looked at'^. Curzon expressed similar 
sentiments: 'it is going back from what Asquith had previously
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71f lled you to think' . Lansdowne felt particulary bitter, and 
his memorandum of the 16th captured this. Asquith's statements 
had been little more than 'desultory and tentative' (compare
711this with his reception of the Ladybank speech)*11; equally, 
he doubted whether a meeting would have occurred at all 'had
it not been for the feeling of consternation with which the
717Prime Minister's Leeds speech had., been received'* .
Lansdowne, Long and Curzon now came to see Asquith's line as 
designed not to reach a solution but to delay. 'All the
evidence goes to show that the latter means to sit tight and
711do nothing for some time to come' . As Selborne said, he 'is
01 i
simply playing with us'. .
But this movement was more than just an irritation with 
Asquithian procrastinations; grave tactical questions were 
raised. If the Prime Minister was not looking for a 
settlement, what was he trying to do? Clues to this could be 
sensed from Chamberlain's dinner with Churchill and Morley. 
'There is a real danger', wrote Chamberlain to Lansdowne the 
next day, 'of the Government trying to solve the difficulty by 
the mere excision of Ulster and attempting to cast on the 
House of Lords the onus of rejecting this by not accepting the 
Second Reading of the bill. This idea smiles on Winston more 
than it does on Morley'^. A similar tactical assessment was 
apparent from Bonar Law's memorandum of the third meeting. 
Asquith appeared willing to offer an exclusion plan 'which 
probably would not satisfy Ulster., (but) which people in 
England will consider reasonable., (and thus) if they were 
rejected there would be less sympathy in England with Ulster
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resistance'^ . Selborne, in a letter to Bonar Law, explained 
this new course: 'It looks as if he means to allow his 
communications with you to drag on indefinitely.. Then when 
the session is in full swing he will make suggestions for 
alterations in the Govt of Ireland bill, for the acceptance of 
the Lords but which will be quite unacceptable to our Ulster 
friends and to us. He will then try and turn the National 
disappointment that there has been no settlement by consent
7
against us1 . In effect, Asquith would be presenting a fait
accompli to the Lords, daring them to reject it (which was 
likely) and thus suffer the onerous responsibility having done 
so. Such a sequence of events would, as Bonar Law observed,
71 o
'give them a greater chance of winning the election' Ll°.
Two things made this assessment of Liberal tactics 
plausible. First was the realisation that under the Parliament 
Act, any amendment to a Government bill not made in the first 
Parliamentary circuit had to be made in agreement with the 
House of Lords, was placing the Lords in a highly dangerous 
position. If they rejected Asquith's compromise proposal over 
Home Rule (whatever it was), they stood to be dubbed by the 
Liberals as extremist and lose public sympathy. If they 
accepted it, Lansdowne would encounter a mutiny in the Lords 
of far greater proportions than in 1911, probably splitting 
the Tory party in the process. Lansdowne faced an acute 
dilemma: 'I have grave misgivings as to the attitude of the 
House of Lords. We should be offered a measure which is 
fundamentally wrong in principle and which is tolerated by Mr 
Asquith's Irish supporters only because it is from our point
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of view fundamentally wrong.. If., it is found impossible to 
obtain the acquiescence of Irish Unionists outside Ulster, our
11Q
difficulties will be immensely increased' J.
The second was the example of the 1910 Conference. For 
Lansdowne and Long, Asquith had prepared the ground well in 
1910 for the passage of the Parliament Act in 1911. By 
dragging out negotiations he delayed the inevitable general 
election. He had also improved his standing with the 
electorate, appearing conciliatory and willing to find a 
solution to the crisis. And he had managed to label the Tories 
as unreasonable when the talks broke up (the rumour spreading 
that Tory hostility to any Irish reform had caused the 
conference to end). When the election came in December 1910 
the Liberals were in a better position and reaped the benefits 
by returning to Government. It was the possible replay of this 
scenario which loomed large for Lansdowne, Long, Cecil and 
Selborne: 'It looks rather like an attempt to repeat the 
tactics of the Constitutional Conference'22®. Lansdowne warned 
Bonar Law to keep a detailed record of his conversations with 
the Prime Minister; 'you will remember the unscrupulous manner 
in which our opponents took advantage of the absence of 
records in the case of the Conference of 1910'221. The 
vulnerability of the Lords and the experience of 1910 
convinced some that Asquith was trying to wrong-foot them.
These concerns led Long and Lansdowne to press Bonar Law 
to demand a statement of intent from Asquith and, if none was 
forthcoming, break off talks. 'Invite (Asquith), if he still 
desires a settlement by consent, to state definitely in
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writing what changes in the bill he has in contemplation. If 
as I anticipate the changes which he would be in a position to
offer prove to be., wholly inadmissible, we shall have to
i l ldecide whether negotiations should not be discontinued' .
Long also saw little point in meeting Asquith again 'unless
there was evidence to show that they could be continued with
n\some prospect of success1 . Selborne even requested that 'he 
ought to make proposals to you in writing on which you can 
consult your friends'. Such was the increased mistrust of 
Asquith^*.
Asking Asquith to declare his intentions was a means to 
bring talks to a speedy end (they had little faith he would 
grant their wish), and on an issue which could not reflect 
badly upon the Tories. After all, requesting a compromise 
proposal could not be represented as unreasonable. Ending the 
talks would also reduce party disaffection, which both 
Lansdowne and Long emphasised in their correspondence, hoping 
to use it to move Bonar Law. 'W.Long is here', wrote Lansdowne 
on the 11th, 'and tells me that he learns from many sources 
that any settlement based on the acceptance of H.R. with 
special treatment for Ulster, would be bitterly resented by
IOC
our supporters'443. Bob Cecil warned that 'some of your 
colleagues on the front benches are getting a little anxious 
to know what exactly is going on.. this makes an additional 
reason why Asquith must say something definite without undue 
delay so that we shall all know where we are and what line we 
should take on the platform'^.
Breaking off the talks, on a basis favourable to the Tory
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party, would undermine the reassuring image which the 
Government had cultivated in the press. Selborne observed on
the 21st: 'I think the other side are running the press very
incarefully over the matter' . He urged that the Tory papers 
'should be taken more into our confidence over these 
negotiations and be given a definite line'^®. Bob Cecil 
noticed a similar conspiracy: 'The Ministers who have always 
managed the press very skilfully are spreading abroad the 
impression that all is peace - a compromise in the air'^. By 
hinting to the press that a compromise was close, Asquith 
hoped to create strong public expectation of a settlement. A 
Tory rejection of his compromise scheme in these conditions, 
whatever its the nature, would prove difficult and risk the 
loss of public support. Therefore, forcing a break over what 
would appear to be Asquith's refusal to advance a proposal, 
would pre-empt such a confident atmosphere.
Calls to end discussions were also, in part, rooted in a 
mistrust of Bonar Law, a fear that he would agree a settlement 
on exclusion and even enter a coalition with Asquith. The 
Cecil brothers rounded on Bonar Law; Hugh saw it as 'for Home 
rulers to make Home Rule workable not for us'^®, and Robert 
agreed that 'he (Asquith) should not be allowed to forget that 
on the Govt of the day the responsibility rests of governing 
the country and we must clear ourselves, before the country, 
of all share in a policy of drift'^. Forcing Asquith to take 
the initiative made good tactical sense; it threw on him the 
impossible burden of agreeing a compromise scheme with his 
coalition partners, which in turn ensured that any scheme
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agreed would be very limited in scope and easily rejected by 
the Tories on grounds of unreasonableness.
The pressure on Bonar Law to force a definite proposal 
and end the meetings had an epilogue in the meetings between 
Asquith and Carson. Bonar Law answered such appeals with a 
call for patience. Asquith on December 10th wrote to Carson 
suggesting a meeting, a switch of negotiators which Bonar Law 
found !a little strange'; but given his close contact with
717Carson he can hardly have been seriously alarmed6 . But it 
kept party apprehension high, and was for Lansdowne and Long 
simply another delaying manoeuvre by Asquith. Carson and 
Asquith met on the 16th of December. Carson offered very 
similar terms to those Bonar Law had suggested to Asquith at 
their second meeting: that "specified" Ulster counties be 
permanently excluded until they decide otherwise. Asquith made 
no attempt to negotiate, but instead promised to send to 
Carson his own speculations ('a few rough suggestions1), which 
arrived on the 23rd22^ . As with Bonar Law's third meeting, 
Asquith did not advance anything more serious than a form of 
Home Rule within Home Rule which both Bonar Law and Carson had 
already firmly rejected. This "phoney war" situation has led 
Jalland to conclude that Asquith's intentions here were 
disinformation, a "smokescreen" for a longer term strategy 
which by this stage the Tory leadership had guessed22*.
After consultation with Bonar Law, Carson refused 
Asquith's terms on the 27th, hardly a surprise to the Prime 
Minister . This refusal he used, at a second meeting on 
January 2nd 1914, in much the same way that he had used Bonar
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Law’s rejection of Home Rule within Home Rule. He tried to
place the responsibility for the present situation onto the
Tories (since they had refused his scheme), raising the threat 
of public hostility. Yet he also invited Carson to 'present in
black and white’ his own proposals. This Carson again refused
to do, mistrusting the use which then might be made of such a 
commitment. Instead, he followed the line Bonar Law had taken 
and requested that the principle of exclusion be accepted 
before any proposal came from him, effectively putting on 
Asquith the onus of agreeing a compromise formula with the 
Nationalists. There the talks ended, inconclusive and more to 
do with the manoeuvrings by both sides than with any serious 
attempt to find a settlement by consent. Bonar Law now acted 
formally to end them (feeling the weight of the pressure 
behind him) by asking Asquith if he could announce their 
termination during his speech at Bristol on the 15th of 
January. Asquith agreed.
VIII
Following his second meeting with Asquith, Bonar Law's 
confidence that his tactical approach of the last few months 
was working, grew. His reasonableness had been well 
advertised. Public sympathy had not been lost; from recent by- 
elections it even appeared particularly strong. No compromise 
plan had been agreed; Asquith, he thought, would wrestle with 
Redmond but would never reach agreement. An election looked 
likely, and Steel-Maitland had begun sending out circulars
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asking for speaking dates. This confidence can be detected in 
his letter to Balfour of the 18th of November: 'It looks now 
as if the Nationalists would not have the exclusion of Ulster 
at any price, and if so that will greatly simplify our 
p o s i t i o n A n d  to Walter Long three days later: 'it seems 
to me as if there were no chance of the Nationalists even 
considering the exclusion of Ulster; and if so our course is 
plain and indeed I think there must be an early election1 L3'. 
This attitude was reinforced by his third meeting with 
Asquith. 'I really do not understand why he took the trouble 
of seeing me at all. The only explanation I can give is that 
he is in a funk about the whole position and thought that a 
meeting might keep the thing open at least'^®. Bonar Law now 
saw little chance of a compromise, and that Asquith was thus 
back to facing the choice of civil war or an election. Despite 
earlier speculations that he might prefer civil war, on 
December 1st Bonar Law could declare that 'there is so much 
likelihood of an early election
His main problem, however, was party opinion. Knowledge 
of his secret meetings with Asquith was, by mid-November, 
widely known and resented. The idea of a compromise, 
especially on exclusion, was greatly disliked. Linlithgow and 
Reading added to this pressure, realising what Bonar Law had 
been arguing since early 1912 - that Home Rule was an issue 
which would rouse the country and win them an election. But 
this realisation came at a stage when Bonar Law was having to 
exhibit moderation and statesmanship. It was this dichotomy 
between party opinion and his necessary public stance which
299
taxed him, not that his tactics were in danger of being 
externally undermined. Another concern was that some in the 
leadership were pressing him to change course. Lansdowne, 
Selborne and Chamberlain were calling for a devolutionary 
solution, Balfour for a pro-order alliance, and others for a 
shift away from exclusion. Steel-Maitland and Hills sought to 
drop Home Rule altogether, and focus on Tariff Reform and Land 
policy. Bonar Law faced the problem of minimising or negating 
these competing claims.
Bonar Law’s speech at Norwich on the 13th of November had 
tried to impose a via media on the competing factions over 
land policy, which had divided the party after Lloyd George's 
Swindon speech. It called for an inquiry into wages in those 
areas where they were notoriously low. On November 29th Hills 
wrote to Bonar Law asking him to clarify the position of the 
inquiry and its remit to investigate wages boards, worried 
that Bonar Law's move would be a shelving and not an
740initiating device . Bathurst followed this up with a grave
warning that if nothing constructive was done the party's
741position in the countryside would be destroyed4*1. Clearly,
Norwich had not given a clear 'pronouncement on the matter'
and many in the party remained determined to agitate for a
coherent policy^. Bonar Law's solution was to show sympathy,
and to demand concentration on Home Rule: 'What we have to do
is show a real interest and appreciation of the problem while
at the same time doing our best to prevent its being used to
741obscure the main issue which ought to be Home Rule' . He 
exerted pressure on Central Office (home of many of the more
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radical Tory land reformers) to push the Home Rule issue in 
the constituencies and to ignore others; 'Talbot and Steel- 
Maitland sent out a circular to Unionist candidates asking 
them to ridicule or pass over George., and concentrate on Home 
Rule'2**. Disagreements over land were to bubble on into 1914 
and beyond, so damage-limitation was perhaps the best course.
A precarious consensus had been arrived at, which Sanders 
described as 1 local inquiries in each district and if 
conditions are very bad.. to go for some compulsory means of 
improving them'2^ . Bonar Law succeeded in concentrating 
attention upon Home Rule, albeit at the expense of storing up 
problems for the morrow.
The threat from Lansdowne and Chamberlain grew intense 
towards the end of November. They had established contact with 
leading ministers, and attracted into their circle much 
influential support (Balfour, Long, Selborne, Lord Grey). They 
had the informal support of Carson in exploring the 
possibility of a devolutionary solution, and sections of the 
press were sympathetic, notably The Times, Observer and Daily 
Mail. Bonar Law reacted in two ways. First, he appeared to 
give great scope to Lansdowne's and Chamberlain's activities. 
He allowed them freedom to agitate, remaining uncritical of 
their speeches at Bromsgrove and Brighton, despite the 
different line they took. He was content to watch the 
Chamberlain-Churchi11 conversations take place, even 
commenting, rather curiously, 'I agree with every word of it', 
after reading the transcript2^ . Yet Bonar Law had the feel of 
the party. He knew that federalism or devolution was
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unacceptable to them at this juncture, when they had the 
Government in such a difficulties; the party wanted an 
election not a settlement. Freedom to Lansdowne and 
Chamberlain gave them the rope to hang themselves. Moreover, 
to have come down with a heavy hand would have been self- 
defeating; it might have forced them into a more independent 
line and a more direct attack upon his leadership, signalling 
to Asquith that the Tory leadership was hopelessly divided, 
thus allowing him the opportunity to play one off against the 
other.
Second, Bonar Law showed determination. He remained fixed 
to the line he had followed since 1912, offering Asquith the 
choice of civil war or an election. His Newcastle speech on 
October 29th, though replying to Asquith's hopeful overtures 
at Ladybank, stuck firmly to this basic option, much to the 
annoyance of Chamberlain and Selborne. Nor, in private, did 
Bonar Law move away from Ulster as his negotiating base. At 
his second meeting with Asquith exclusion remained as firmly 
at the centre as it had in their previous conversation on 
December 9th. 'The end of our interview was a statement by him 
(Asquith) that he understood that nothing could be considered 
by us except the exclusion of Ulster and he would carefully 
consider whether a settlement on that basis was possible'^7.
To Balfour, he sent clear warnings against any form of 
cooperation: 'It remains to be seen whether he (Asquith) will 
show the courage and statesmanship which were indicated in the 
previous conversation with him.. for undoubtedly anything in 
the nature of a compromise - whatever the nature of it - would
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be very distasteful to a large number of our supporters and 
there might easily be an active movement against it1^ .
Bonar Law's resolve to cling to his own tactical line was 
a severe obstacle to a "pro-order" or federal agreement 
between the front-benches, especially since by the middle of 
December Asquith was appearing less compromising than before. 
Without the active support of at least one party leader, the 
federal initiative was not well placed to succeed. Carson, 
sympathetic, even eager for a settlement along these lines, 
could not publicly descend the Ulster battlements to talk 
compromise. Nor could Balfour, Lansdowne or Chamberlain hope 
to rally the party against its leader. On this cause Bonar Law 
was in line with party sentiment. His position was far 
stronger than others realised, and this strength flowed from 
his understanding of where backbenchers stood. It was an 
awareness which would be demonstrated many times throughout 
his leadership (often against Chamberlain), and it meant that 
he could confidently resist pressure from the devolutionary 
movement.
Pressure from the Right was also a serious consideration 
for Bonar Law. Long warned Bonar Law that any agreement on 
exclusion would foster a party rebellion, likely as not with 
him at its head. Around him he grouped like-thinking Tories 
worried about Southern Unionists, Imperial disintegration or 
the electoral consequences of a sell-out: Salisbury, Bob and 
Hugh Cecil, Curzon, Midleton and Willoughby de Broke. Yet 
resistance to exclusion also brought within Long's circle 
Lansdowne, Selborne and Chamberlain. Therefore, while the
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enactment of a devolutionary or federal solution was a highly 
unlikely threat to Bonar Law, his willingness to discuss 
exclusion united much of the Tory leadership against him.
Yet, although much closer tactically to Long than the 
latter believed, Bonar Law had no choice but to keep meeting 
Asquith and to keep appearing moderate. This dilemma he was at 
pains to spell out to Long: 'They (the party) probably do not 
realise, however, that by refusing to negotiate with the 
Government we should only make our position worse; for 
undoubtedly if Asquith can square Redmond and we refuse to 
assist him in making arrangements with the exclusion of 
Ulster, they would do it on their own account and go to the 
country on that issue. In that case we should equally lose our 
best card for the election and worse than that we should seem, 
at least I think so, to the majority of people unreasonable in 
the attitude we take'^. Two things are evident from this 
passage. First, it reveals Bonar Law as still wedded to 
Constitutional methods; present tactics were to secure power 
through electoral means, not alternatives to them. There was a 
point beyond which he would not go in resisting Home Rule: if 
Asquith squared the Nationalists and Ulstermen over exclusion, 
the same benchmark he had explained to J.P.Croal after his 
first meeting^. Second, it was a clear outline of the 
"waiting game", a reliance on Nationalists and Liberals 
falling out with each other and on preserving public sympathy 
in the meantime. It was a level-headed and shrewd tactical 
line which required patience and nerve, though one beyond the 
grasp of Long. He replied to Bonar Law with a memorandum: 'one
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of our best, ablest.. supporters told me yesterday, that he 
realised the difficulty of offering a simple negative to any 
reasonable offer but he added, "the great mass of the people 
will not understand it, they will think our leaders have sold 
the pass and our party will be smashed for twenty years"
In reply to the latter's memorandum, Bonar Law was forced 
to disclose his hand, showing frustration at Long's constant 
harrying. Yet it provides a rare and valuable insight into his 
thinking. 'I really do not think I differ in any way from the 
views you express and as far as I can judge the situation is 
developing quite satisfactorily for us. I think so.because it 
seems to me as if there were no chance of the Nationalists 
even considering the exclusion of Ulster; and if so our course 
is plain and indeed I think there must be an early 
e l e c t i o n ' I m p l i c i t  in Bonar Law's admission was an appeal 
to Long for trust and restraint; no settlement was coming, but 
it was better to wait on events.
Long still maintained his pressure, now demanding that 
Bonar Law's meetings with Asquith be made public^. This was 
a clear rejection of a waiting game, and designed to rally 
party opinion strongly behind himself. Such requests were 
echoed by Lansdowne in his memorandum of the 16th and his 
letter of the 21st^*. Again Bonar Law sought to appease with 
delay. To this end, Asquith's further conversations with 
Carson provided a ready excuse: 'I think we must wait 
therefore and see what comes of this1^ .  From Long he asked 
for patience and understanding: 'As regards making the meeting 
public I do not think that that would be wise. If I saw any
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chance of a settlement then there would be no harm.. but I see 
none; and my impression is, to have it known that I was 
meeting Asquith would only tend to diminish the fighting
occ
spirit among our people, which would be very undesirable' . 
This seemed to placate Long, for in reply he admitted to be 
'delighted to hear what you tell me of the prospect. This
jtn
quite alters the case' . Yet by the 31st he was still 
pestering Bonar Law with memoranda and threats.^®.
The threat from the Right did not persuade Bonar Law into 
a tougher, less consensual approach. He continued to appear 
moderate, willing to meet Asquith, negotiate on exclusion and 
avoid declaring publicly his conversations with the Prime 
Minister. The line he took was very much of his own making, 
suggesting that the threat was more apparent than real; after 
all, Long, Lansdowne and Selborne had been calling for a 
public declaration since early December. Bonar Law managed to 
string them along until the talks had effectively driven into 
the sand, following Asquith's second meeting with Carson. Only 
then did he seek Asquith's approval to announce that the 
meetings were at an end. Accusations that Bonar Law was weak 
and mesmerised by Asquith appear unfounded; he simply realised 
how vital it was to present an image of reasonableness to the 
public and to Asquith. Arguably, he showed much the most 
perceptive grasp of the situation from a party standpoint.
His determination stemmed from an awareness that agreement 
over exclusion was not possible, of which he was increasingly 
confident from mid November. His only concern was to keep 
party unity while he was posturing, hence his willingness to
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take Long into his confidence and to colour public speeches 
with tough rhetoric. Dublin on the 28th of November was an 
'uncompromising1 and 'impassioned outburst', though made in 
reply to Asquith's hostile Leeds speech the day before^.
Bonar Law also enjoyed close, even secretive, relations 
with key figures on the Right. He was in regular contact with 
Carson. Great sympathy existed between them, based largely on 
Bonar Law's unshakable advocacy of Ulster's position; with 
Carson behind him, he had a cushion against right-wing 
attacks. With Lord Milner also Bonar Law had kept in contact, 
either directly or through others, notably Carson. In 
addition, the possibility that an election was imminent served 
to dampen potential party unrest; Bonar Law made it seem that 
his stance had actually achieved what they had been arguing 
for from the start. Steel-Maitland began to stir Central 
Office into activity, which gave Bonar Law's confidence some 
substance^®. The Right would champ at the bit, and foam at 
the mouth, but would not bolt from the stable.
It was a delicate balance between party animosity and 
political (public) necessity, a balance at which he was 
successful. The meetings formally ended after Bonar Law's 
Bristol speech on the 15th of January, on favourable terms for 
the Tories: they could not be sneered as unreasonable and as a 
force against compromise (as in 1910). Party unity was 
strained but not broken; Liberal splits became more 
perceptible, and Asquith's difficulties in squaring the 
Nationalists more apparent. Nonetheless, Bonar Law faced 
dangers in the future. The leadership had shifted, markedly,
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to the Right, as the result of mistrust for Asquith and an 
awareness of the subtle tactical line he was following.
308
ENDNOTES CHAPTER 6.
1..B.L.P. 33/6/81 Law to Balfour October 15th 1913
2..R.Blake The Unknown... pg 163-4
3..B.L.P. 30/3/50 Milner to Law October 24th 1913
4..B.L.P. 33/6/116 Law to Selborne December 22nd 1913
5..R.Blake The Unknown... pg 161: B.L.P. 33/6/80 "Notes on 
the Conversation with the Prime Minister" October 15th 1913
6..B.L.P. 33/6/84 Law to Croal October 18th 1913
7..B.L.P. 30/3/50 Milner to Law October 24th 1913
8..1.id
9. Ibid
10. M.P. Ms Pep 40 Milner to Denison October 25th 1913 (160-3)
11. Ibid
12. M.P. Ms Pep 13 Milner to Oliver October 23rd 1913 (42-3)
13. Ibid
14. M.P. Ms Pep 16 Milner to Roberts October 30th 1913 (211)
15. M.P. Ms Pep TT Roberts to Milner November 2nd 1913 (212-13)
16. M.P. Ms Pep T5 Roberts to Milner November 4th 1913 (214)
17. Salislmry Papers 73/187-189 Willoughby de Broke to
Salisbury October 29th 1913
18. Ibid
19. W de B.P. WB/6/5 Lord Arran to de Broke October 4th 1913
20. IbicT
21. B.L.P. 30/3/61 Midleton to Law October 28th 1913
22. B.L.P. 3Q/3/&0 Salisbury to Law October 31st 1913
23. Ibid
24. P.P. 7726/86 Oliver to Robinson October 10th 1913 (19)
25. O.P 7726/86 Earl grey to Oliver October 3rd 1913 (34)
26. B.L.P. 367j/16 Lansdowne to Law October 10th 1913
27. P.P. 7726/8& Oliver to Craik October 10th 1913 (90)
28. 0.P* 712b!86 Oliver to Robinson October 10th 1913 (19)
29. J.Kendle Ireland and the Federal... pg 163
30. Ibid
31. O.P. 7726/86 Earl Grey to Oliver October 15th 1913 (36)
32. A.C.P. 60/114 Oliver to Chamberlain October 17th 1913
33. O.P. 1726/86 Oliver to Craik October 26th 1913 (99)
34. O.P. 7126/66 Oliver to Craik October 27th 1913 (104)
35. O.P. 7l2b/66 Earl Grey to Oliver October 15th 1913 (36)
36. A.C.P. 60/1T4 Oliver to Earl Grey October 17th 1913
37. Ibid
38. O.P. 7726/86 Chamberlain to Oliver October 21st 1913 (24-6)
39. B.L.P. 30/3/54 M.Frewen to Law October 27th 1913
40. P.P. 7726/8& Oliver to Robinson October 27th 1913 (44)
41. O.P. 7726/^6 Oliver to M.Macdonald October 27th 1913 (107)
42. TbicT
43. Ibid
44. O.P. 7726/86 Churchill to Oliver November 1st 1913 (40)
45. A.C.P. 60/l04 Oliver to Chamberlain October 22nd 1913
46. A.C.P. 60/l05 Oliver to Chamberlain October 23rd 1913:
A.Chamberlain Politics from... pg 569
309
47. A.C.P. 60/107 Oliver to Chamberlain October 29th 1913
48. P.P. 7726/66 Chamberlain to Oliver October 30th 1913 (28)
49. B.L.P. 30/3/31 Lansdowne to Law October 16th 1913
50. Ibid
51. B.L.P. 30/3/47 Lansdowne to Law October 23rd 1913
52. Ibid: also B.L.P. 30/3/31 Lansdowne to Law October 16th 
1913 and B.L.P. 30/6/$6 Lansdowne to Law October 27th 1913
53. A.Chamberlain Politics from... 02 567-568
54. Ibid
55. Ibid
56. Ibid
57. Ibid pg 570
58. Ibid
59. B.L.P 30/3/56 Lansdowne to Law October 27th 1913
60. Ibid
61. Ibid
62. A.Chamberlain Politics from... pg 572
63. Ibid
64. O.P. 7726/86 Chamberlain to Oliver October 30th 1913 (28)
65. A.Chamberlain Politics from... pg 571
66. O.P. 7726/86 Chamberlain to Oliver November 6th 1913 (30)
67. Ibid
68. M.P. Ms Pep 13 Oliver to Milner October 23rd 1913 (38-41)
69. B.L.P. 33/6/%() "Conversation with...* October 15th 1913
70. B.L.P. 33/6/84 Law to Croal October 18th 1913
71. TbIH
72. B.L.P. 30/3/33 Balfour to Law October 17th 1913
73. B.L.P. 30/3/44' Croal to Law October 21st 1913
74. B.L.P. 30/3/58 Strachey to Law October 27th 1913
75. B.L.P. 30/3/37" E.Talbort to Law October 19th 1913
76. B.L.P. 30/3/46 Strachey to Law October 22nd 1913
77. B.L.P. 33/6/84" Law to Croal October 18th 1913
78. M.P. MS Pep 40 Milner to Glazebrook June 14th 1913 (7-8)
79. B.L.P. 30/3/73 Pretyman to Law October 21st 1913
80. Ibid
81. M.Fforde Conservatism and Collectivism 1886-1914 Edinburgh 
chap 5
82. B.L.P. 30/3/77 Long to Law October 31st 1913
83. B.L.P. 30/3/57" Stamfordham to Law October 27th 1913
84. The Times October 27th 1913; Ladybank speech
85. Ibid
86. B.L.P. 30/3/80 Salisbury to Law October 31st 1913
87. A.Chamberlain Politics from... ph 570
88. Ibid pg 567
89. B.L.P. 30/3/55 Steel-Maitaland October 27th 1913
90. P.P. 7726/66 Oliver to Robinson October 27th 1913 (44)
91. B.L.P. 30/3/57 Stamfordham to Law October 27th 1913
92. The Times October 30th: Newcastle speech
93. Ibid
94. Ibid
95. Ibid
310.
96. Ibid
97. B.L.P. 30/3/73 Sir G.Younger to Law October 30th 1913
98. B.L.P. 36/3/#0 Salisbury to Law October 31st 1913
99. B.L.P. 30/4/3 Lord Ashtown to Law November 2nd 1913
100. A.Chamberlain Politics from... pg 571
101. B.L.P. 30/3/75 Asquith to Law October 30th 1913
102. B.L.P. 33/6/93 "Notes on 2nd Conversation with the Prime 
Minister" November 7th 1913
103. Ibid
104. Ibid
105. Ibid
106. B.L.P. 33/6/97 Law to Long November 8th 1913
107. B.L.P. 35/3/5# Strachey to Law October 27th 1913
108. B.L.P. 33/6/93 "Notes on the 2nd.." November 7th 1913
109. R.Blake The Unknown... pg 165-166
110. B.L.P. 33/6/93 wNotes on the 2nd..1 November 7th 1913
111. P.Jailand The"Liberals... pg 156-7
112. B.L.P. 33/6/£3 Law to Balfour November 7th 1913
113. B.L.P. 33/6/94 Law to Long November 7th 1913
114. P.Rowland The Last Liberal Governments: Unfinished
Business 1911-1914 London (1971) appendix B pg 370-1
115. Viscount Long of Wraxell Memories London (1923) pg 200
116. B.L.P. 30/4/16 Balfour to Law November 8th 1913
117. J.Ramsden Reaf Old... pg 66
118. A.C.P. ll/l/50 Lansdowne to Chamberlain November 24th 1913
119. B.L.P. 30/4/2"0 Leslie Wilson to Law November 9th 1913
120. B.L.P. 3o/4/55 J.Gretton to Law November 26th 1913
121. B.L.P. 30/4/57 Lord Weymss to Law November 28th 1913
122. B.L.P. 33/6/9# Law to Balfour November 18th 1913
123. The Morning Post November 18th 1913
124. Ibid
125. Salisbury Papers 73/187-9 Willoughby de Broke to Salisbury 
October 29th 1913
126. Ibid
127. O.P. 7726/86 Oliver to Craik October 24th 1913 (99)
128. Salisbury Papers 73/187-9 Willoughby de Broke to Salisbury 
October 29th 1913
129. B.L.P. 31/1/14 Hugh Cecil to Law December 8th 1913
130. B.L.P. 35/3/// Long to Law October 31st 1913
131. B.L.P. 30/4/II Long to Law November 7th 1913
132. B.L.P. 30/4/1# Long to Law November 9th 1913
133. B.L.P. 30/4/II Long to Law November 7th 1913
134. B.L.P. 35/4/1# Long to Law November 9th 1913
135. W.L.P Add Mss~"62404 Long to Law November 14th 1913 (38)
136. B.L.P. 30/4/46 Long to Law November 20th 1913
137. Tbi3
138. Ibid
139. W.L.P. Add Mss 62416 Earl Arran to Long November 12th 1913
140. W.L.P. Add Mss 624l6 Long to Law November 20th 1913 (38)
141. Ibid
142. B.L.P. 30/4/16 Balfour to Law November 8th 1913
311
143. Ibid
144. Ibid
145. A.Chamberlain Politics from... pg 570
146. M.P. Ms Pep 13 Oliver to Milner October 23rd 1913 (38-41)
147. O.P. 7726/86 Oliver to Earl Grey November 24th 1913 (66-7)
148. A.C.P. 6O/1O8 Oliver to Chamberlain November 3rd 1913
149. Ibid
150. A.C.P. 11/1/20 Churchill to Chamberlain November 18th 1913
151. A.Chamberlain Politics from... pg 570
152. O.P. 7726/86 Oliver to Earl Grey November 24th 1913 (66-7)
153. O.P.7726Z&6 Oliver to Northcliffe November 28th 1913 (158)
154. P.P. 7726/86 Oliver to Earl Grey November 24th 1913 (66-7)
155. P.P. 7726/86 M.Macdonald to Oliver November 26th 1913
(137): Munro-Ferguson November 28th 1913 (163)
156. O.P. 7726/86 Oliver to Churchill November 24th 1913 (138)
157. The Times November 19th 1913
158. O.P. /7T6/86 Grey to Oliver november 22nd 1913 (48-9)
159. O.P. 7726/86 Chamberlain to Oliver November 24th 1913 (32)
160. A.C.P. H / 1/3 Amery to Chamberlain November 21st 1913
161. A.C.P. 11/1/4 Willoughby de Broke to Chamberlain November 
21st 19l3
162. A.Chamberlain Politics from... "Memo of conversation 
with Mr Churchill” pg 572-7: also B.L.P. 31/1/3 November 
27th 1913
163. Ibid
164. Ibid
165. Ibid
166. Ibid
167. Ibid
168. Ibid
169. O.P. 7726/86 Chamberlain to Oliver November 29th 1913 (34)
170. A •Chamber1ain Politics from... PR 579
171. A.Chamberlain Politics from... Pg 578
172. The Times December 2nd 1913
173. A.Chamberlain Politics from.•• Pg 583
174. Ibid pg 584
175. Ibid pg 579
176. A.C.P. 60/117 Oliver to Chamberlain December 2nd 1913
177. A.C.P. 60/lift Oliver to Chamberlain December 4th 1913
178. i m
179. O.P. 7726/87 Carson to Oliver December 3rd 1913 (1)
180. A.C.P. 60/II8 Oliver to Chamberlain .December 4th 1913
181. J.Kendle Ireland and the Federal... pg 167
182. A.C.P. 60/118 Oliver to Chamberlain December 4th 1913
183. O.P. 7726/87 Garvin to Oliver "Friday” December 1913 (2)
184. A.Chamberlain Politics from... pg 586
185. O.P. 7726/87 Robinson to Oliver December 10th 1913 (57)
186. A.C.P. 60/120 Oliver to Chamberlain December 9th 1913
187. A.C.P. 60/l21 Spender to Grigg December 11th 1913
188. Ibid
189. O.P. 7726/87 Chamberlain to Oliver December 10th 1913
312.
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
A.Chamberlain Politics from... pg 587-588 
Ibid
Ibid pg 590-591 
Ibid
Ibid pg 591-592
B.L.P. 33/6/117 Carson to Asquith (n.d.)
J.Kendle Ireland and the Federal... pg 163-164
O.P. 7726/8/ Maud Selborne to Oliver December 8th 1913
Tioi-TT
A.Chamberlain Politics from... pg 589-594 
Ibid
O.P. 7726/87 Chamberlain to Oliver December 10th 1913 (36)
O.P. 7728/87 Oliver to Chamberlain December 11th 1913
Tl22); and December 12th 1913 (123)
A.Chamberlain Politics from... pg 589-594
B.L.P. 31/1/38 Lansdowne to Law December 16th 1913
Tbia
Ibid
B.L.P. 31/1/47 Selborne to Law December 21st 1913 
B.L.P. 31/1/41 Balfour to Law December 18th 1913 
O.P. 7728/87 Chamberlain to Oliver December 21st 1913 (40)
B.L.P. 31/1/25 Lansdowne to Law December 11th 1913
B.L.P. 31/1/32* Curzon to Law December 15th 1913 
B.L.P. 3l/l/38 Lansdowne to Law December 16th 1913
TbTa
B.L.P. 31/1/46 Lansdowne to Law December 21st 1913 
B.L.P. 31/1/47" Selborne to Law December 21st 1913
A.Chamberlain Politics from... pg 586
B.L.P. 33/6/111 "Notes on Conversation with the Prime 
Minister" December 10th 1913
B.L.P. 31/1/47 Selborne to Law December 21st 1913 
B.L.P. 33/8/11 "Notes on..." December 10th 1913 
B.L.P. 31/1/38 Lansdowne to Law December 16th 1913 
B.L.P. 31/1/54 R.Cecil to Law December 24th 1913 
B.L.P. 31/1/38 Lansdowne to Law December 16th 1913 
Ibid
B.L.P. 31/1/31 Long to Law December 14th 1913 
B.L.P. 31/1/47" Selborne to Law December 21st 1913 
B.L.P. 31/I/25" Lansdowne to Law December 11th 1913 
B.L.P. 31/1/54" R.Cecil to Law December 24th 1913 
B.L.P. 31/I/47" Selborne to Law December 21st 1913
TbiH
B.L.P. 31/1/54 R.Cecil to Law December 24th 1913
B.L.P. 3i/l/14" H.Cecil to Law December 8th 1913
B.L.P. 31/1/54 R.Cecil to Law December 24th 1913
B.L.P. 33/6/115 Law to Lansdowne December 22nd 1913
B.L.P. 31/1/52"""Asquith to Carson December 23rd 1913 
P.Jalland The Liberals... pg 180
B.L.P. 33/6/117 Carson to Asquith December 27th 1913 
B.L.P. 33/6/98 Law to Balfour November 18th 1913
B.L.P. 33/6/99" Law to Long November 21st 1913
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238. B.L.P. 33/6/110 Law to Lansdowne December 10th 1913
239. B.L.P. 33/6/103 Law to Hills December 1st 1913
240. B.L.P. 10/4/60 Hills to Law November 29th 1913
241. B.L.P. 3l/l/6""Bathurst to Law December 4th 1913
242. J.Ramsden Real Old... pg 67
243. B.L.P. 33/6/9^ Law to Ashly November 8th 1913
244. J.Ramsden Real Old... pg 67
245. Ibid
246. A.Chamberlain Politics from... pg 582
247. B.L.P. 33/6/111 ^Notes on...' December 10th 1913
248. B.L.P. 33/6/98 Law to Balfour November 18th 1913
249. B.L.P. 33/6/9*3 Law to Long November 8th 1913
250. B.L.P. 33/6/84 Law to Croal October 18th 1913
251. B.L.P. 30/4/18 Long to Law November 9th 1913
252. B.L.P. 33/6/99 Law to Long November 21st 1913
253. B.L.P. 31/1/31 Long to Law December 15th 1913
254. B.L.P. 31/l/3ff Lansdowne to Law December 16th 1913:
3l/l/46 Lansdowne to Law December 21st 1913
255. B.L.P. 33/6/115 Law to Lansdowne December 22nd 1913
256. B.L.P. 33/6/114 Law to Long December 15th 1913
257. B.L.P. 3l/l/3~Long to Law December 16th 1913
258. W.L.P. Add Mss 62404 Long to Law December 31st 1913 (43-5)
259. P.Jalland The Liberals... pg 178
260. B.L.P. 31/1/10 Steel-Maitland to Law December 6th 1913
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CHAPTER SEVEN
I
When Curzon forecast, on January 14th, that the coining session 
would be ’one of the most eventful and momentous in British 
history1 few could have predicted just how momentous*. Yet it 
was the Irish Question, not the prospect of war, which dominated 
political attention until July 1914. By early January the secret 
conversations between Asquith, Bonar Law and Carson had ended 
with a renewal of bitterness within each party. Yet Tory concern 
focused more intently upon the question of how Asquith would 
escape this looming catastrophe. With the start of the new 
Parliamentary session on February the 9th, the Prime Minister's 
intentions became clearer when he announced that he would bring 
forward 'suggestions’ for a settlement. This created a great deal 
of panic within Unionist ranks. Supporters of a constructive 
solution still believed that Asquith could be pushed in a federal 
direction. Others thought that he could still be pressured into 
an election, if only all talk of a compromise was avoided. For 
Bonar Law there was much danger. What if Asquith, against all 
expectations, had actually squared the Nationalists to permanent 
exclusion of six Ulster counties? Or, if Asquith presented a plan 
far short of this basic minimum, what would be the public 
reaction when Bonar Law rejected it? Would Asquith go to the 
country on this plan as a compromise to the Irish problem, as he 
had threatened both Carson and Bonar Law in the autumn? 
Speculations such as these stirred many to toy during February
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and March with amending the Army Annual Act to force an 
immediate dissolution.
Asquith finally introduced a compromise scheme on March 9th, 
though details of what was on offer had been leaked to The Daily 
News five days earlier. It called for a plebiscite on any Ulster 
county contracting out for six years (effectively four- county 
exclusion along the lines of the Agar-Robartes amendment), but 
with the proviso that the excluded areas would automatically come 
in after six years. It amounted to what Asquith suggested at his 
second meeting with Bonar Law and was met with derisory treatment 
from Unionists: 'We do not want a sentence of death with a stay 
of execution' was Carson's telling phrase4. Bonar Law met the 
scheme with a demand for a referendum on the entire bill, thus 
firmly rejecting Asquith's overture but preserving public 
sympathy. Liberals, however, were incensed at his rebuttal of 
what for them was a genuine and far-reaching compromise offer, 
so much so that Churchill was moved to bloodthirsty threats in 
a speech several days later at Bradford. In this Liberal 
exasperation lay the seeds of the bungled attempt to reinforce 
troop emplacements around Belfast, sparking the Curragh mutiny 
on March 19th.
II
The federal initiative had received a set-back with the collapse 
of talks at the start of January. Asquith's procrastination had 
annoyed Chamberlain, Lansdowne and Selborne, who now saw his 
intentions as less to reach a constructive solution than to delay
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or to place them in a false position. Bonar Law's Bristol speech, 
which formally announced the end of talks, also helped to scotch 
ideas of an agreement, with its open threat to support armed 
insurrection in Ulster. Spender complained to Oliver at the start 
of January that 'the opposition front-bench has no intention of 
coming to terms and that any further overtures beyond what the 
P.M. will make., will simply be used to trip them up. This they 
infer from Bonar Law's speeches and the tone and temper of the 
opposition generally' . Thus it appeared that the initiative had 
ended, as Garvin told Oliver: 'I fear our business is making
little progress and more grave warnings are required'*. Asquith 
left for Cannes, accompanied by Churchill, during the second week 
of January. Chamberlain went off to sulk in Folkestone, where he 
'did not want to talk politics'*.
Yet for all these i11-omens, the political environment was 
maturing into one well-suited to another attempt at constructive 
compromise. After all, talks had taken place and, once the ice 
was broken, renewed conversation was easier to begin a second 
time. The breakdown of talks underlined that a stalemate had been 
reached, a situation which many federalists (such as Oliver) had 
always seen as a pre-requisite to agreement, and more politicians 
on both sides now had a genuine fear of civil war in Ireland*. 
Bridgeman noted the changed atmosphere on the Government benches:
'it was clear that they had realised at last the gravity of the 
situation. Instead of laughing... they listened with
7
extraordinary attention.
Round Table members continued to advocate a federal 
solution, and 'busily carried on with their conferences and
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consultations and conversations' and in the pages of The Times 
and Observer®. O'Brien and Dunraven continued their well-worn 
practice of letters to the press calling for a conference, and 
Oliver carried on whispering encouragement to Chamberlain. 
Writing to him on January the 7th, he looked to restore 
Chamberlain's faith in the negotiating process. 'If you want 
agreement you must employ "agreers"... No good employing
Q
"disagreers" for the j o b .  It is interesting to note whom 
Oliver saw as an agreer: 'Without you and the dam little fool of 
a goat... they were bound to fail'. Lloyd George was now more 
clearly recognised as someone who might work for a constructive 
solution, a possibility Garvin had suggested to Oliver on New 
Year's day; 'he is worth any other three in politics for courage, 
imagination, seizure and zeal'*®. However it was not the lure of 
cooperation with Lloyd George that focused minds at the start of 
the 1914 session, but anticipation of what the Government would 
do next.
From mid-January it was widely believed that, when 
Parliament met, Asquith would announce terms for a settlement: 
'an offer more or less on the lines already indicated1 during his 
private conversations with Bonar Law and Carson, namely Home Rule 
within Home Rule, or what Asquith termed "veiled exclusion"**. 
Bonar Law and Carson had already denounced this as inadequate, 
and would have little choice but to reject it if it was brought 
forward. Yet that would place them in a poor tactical position; 
Asquith might then go to the country and fight an election not 
on the bill itself but on his compromise proposals, a far more 
favourable platform and more likely to win support from a bored
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public. A speech by Birrell in North Bristol on January 26th,
where he hinted at generous terms already made to the Ulstermen,
1 ?suggested that such a tactic was being contemplated . As The 
Times wrote on the 27th, 'the Government and their supporters are 
assiduously disseminating impressions which are intended to 
depict their own attitude in a singularly favourable light' , 
creating the public appearance of great concessions (despite the 
limited nature of Home Rule within Home Rule) to win support for 
the Government in any election contest and to make rejection by 
the Tories far more difficult.
This worried the Tory leadership. At the shadow cabinet 
meeting on February the 5th, Salisbury sensed 'a feeling of 
considerable uneasiness'^. It was particularly worrying for 
those, such as Chamberlain, Selborne and Lansdowne inclined to 
a devolutionary solution; they saw the terms as unworkable, yet 
realised that many federalists could well be taken in by such a 
scheme. Moreover, moderate sections of the party, increasingly 
anxious, might support the scheme as a way out. After all, the 
plan avoided the partition of Ireland and could be adapted in 
practice once in place. It gave Ulster extra safeguards, and to 
public opinion would seem a reasonable solution. Hythe, writing 
to Oliver, reflected just this attitude; he criticised the 
Unionist leaders for their hostile attitude, and recounted a 
lunch he had recently had with Sir Edward Grey (the originator 
of the Home Rule within Home Rule plan). 'I know the government 
are reasonable' whereas the Unionist party 'go(ing) the whole hog 
on the Ulster ticket is unreasonable'^. Oliver riposted that 
such changes would not advance a federal system and that Grey
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'had done more mischief than anyone'^.
To meet this threat they had to convince federalists that 
Asquith's proposal of Home Rule within Home Rule was inadequate, 
and would not solve the crisis; that it tinkered with the 
original bill, leaving financial relations untouched, and 
provided no federal template to be extended to the rest of the 
U.K. More importantly, it would not satisfy Ulster; and unless 
her threat of resistance could be bought off no compromise, 
whether federal or not, would succeed. They therefore supported 
real exclusion for the short term (quite a step towards Carson's 
position) combined with a federal recasting of the entire bill, 
as a workable solution for the longer term. Exclusion, so 
Chamberlain and Selborne began to argue, could safely be 
introduced under the guise of the wider scheme of Home Rule all 
round.
Early in February Selborne wrote to Lord Charnwood, a 
Liberal federalist and Round Table member who was working with 
a group of "experts" to frame a federal blueprint, arguing 
against Home Rule withn Home Rule. Instead he insisted that 
'civil war in Ireland can quite certainly be averted by taking 
Ulster out of the Government of Ireland bill., by leaving it 
attached for all purposes to G.B., or, by giving it the machinery 
of a subordinate Government in Belfast'^. Only through such 
changes would a constructive solution 'by national consent' be 
achieved. He was trying to shape federal opinion in advance of 
Asquith's expected plan.
More surprisingly Carson, acutely worried by what Asquith 
might do when Parliament re-opened, began to reveal federal
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sympathies. He could never accept Home Rule within Home Rule, 
since it left Ulster subordinate to Dublin and would appear, as
he told Garvin, a 'surrender of principle in the mind of
10
Ulster110. Yet if Asquith brought it forward as a compromise, 
sections in the Unionist party might well support it; or if 
Asquith went to the country on it, as already noted, it would 
place Carson in a dangerous tactical position. He sought, 
therefore, to persuade Tory waverers and federalists that only 
a package incorporating real exclusion would avert civil war and 
so allow reconstruction. Early in the new year Carson met Garvin, 
looking to use the editor's extensive contacts to spread these
IQ
ideas . Garvin wrote to Oliver soliciting support for Carson's 
view: 'exclusion pending federation.. If he seemed to take
anything less than..(this).. his people would sling him
7flaside' . That same day, January the 19th, in a speech at 
Belfast Hall, Carson sought to endear himself to the federal 
cause. It was no use, he declared, talking unless 'they give us,
as a basis, the preservation under an Imperial Parliament of
71those rights which our ancestors won for us' . This was a 
signal to Liberals and Tories that settlement could only be 
achieved if Ulster's integrity remained unimpaired, perhaps 
through Home Rule all round, not through Home Rule within Home 
Rule. This line was consistent with his earlier private admission 
to Earl Grey and Oliver that he saw Ulster's future lying within 
a general scheme of devolution. Still, his more public stance on 
Home Rule all round at this point was a useful counter-proposal 
to what was expected from Asquith.
Parliament opened on February the 9th in an atmosphere of
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great excitement and with much manoeuvring on both sides. The 
next day, during debate on the address, the Prime Minister rose 
to speak. 'We were all convinced that Asquith would announce the
proposals for dealing with the Ulster difficulty on which the
11Government had decided. He did nothing of the kind14 . Instead, 
he declared that he would bring forward new "suggestions" which 
he would soon submit to the House. These, he hoped, would provide 
for a peaceful settlement. The move threw the opposition forces 
into confusion. Bonar Law, having prepared an assault on veiled 
exclusion, declined to speak. Carson also refrained, pleading 
illness, leaving Chamberlain to deliver an impromptu reply. 
Asquith's cryptic announcement led to a great deal of speculation 
as to the substance of his suggestions; 'The general impression
is that the Government will be forced to adopt exclusion... and
i\that the bill cannot pass in its present form' . This 
impression was reinforced by several rumours. The first was that 
the Government would not contemplate coercing Ulster, the logical 
conclusion from which was that they had decided to exclude 
instead^. A second was the rumour that the Nationalists 'were 
very sick', again suggestive of far-reaching compromise by the 
Government^. Chamberlain felt that 'the impression is universal 
that they cannot now attempt the coercion of Ulster and that they 
must propose its exclusion'^. It appeared that Asquith might 
after all go further than his scheme of the autumn.
Federal sympathisers, encouraged by the political outlook, 
tried to whip up support. Dunraven published eulogies to 
federalism in The Nineteenth Century and in letters to The 
Times^7. Both The Times and The Observer ran sympathetic
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articles, and even the strongly pro-Government Westminister 
Gazette expressed sympathy. Spender wrote to Oliver admitting 
that although there were obstacles to federalism, ’there are so
many people well-disposed in high quarters on both sides' that
00
a solution was possible0. Lord Charnwood and Murray Macdonald 
issued a pamphlet in the middle of February called "The Federal 
Solution", and Oliver made a forceful attack on veiled exclusion 
in a pamphlet "What Federalism is not"^. From higher quarters, 
Stamfordham wrote supporting the current initiative, reflecting 
a growing anxiety about the King's position: 'I have never
swerved from the total exclusion of Ulster as the sole expedient 
in the difficulty; but better still if she could be left out 
until the federal system has been applied to Ireland'^. As in 
1910 and, to some extent, the autumn of 1913 a moment of possible 
political compromise by the front benches was accompanied and 
even encouraged by intellectuals, press men and influential 
observers.
Similar anticipation was evident within the Unionist 
leadership. Carson, hopeful that the Government were 
contemplating exclusion, saw the need to encourage them. His 
reply to Asquith, on February 12th, whilst confirming 'that 
nothing short of exclusion of Ulster would induce her to lay 
aside her purpose', was distinctly moderate in tone and 
interpreted as such by ministers: 'they professed to find in the 
debate and especially in Carson's speech, a new situation which 
offered a prospect of a friendly solution'^, an interpretation 
shared by Stamfordham^. Carson also wrote to Oliver reiterating 
his support for a type of Home Rule all round; 'If we were being
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treated similarly to all other elements of the U.K. we could 
hardly assert the right to resist by force something which was 
equally being given to all members of the community in which we 
live' . Carson was preparing elements in the party; he was 
surely aware that they would find exclusion easier to accept if 
it came in a devolutionary guise, or if he himself was committed 
to devolution in the long term. It would certainly have helped 
appease Chamberlain, Lansdowne, and Southern Unionists who were 
hostile to the simple exclusion of Ulster from the bill.
Chamberlain also saw developments as hopeful. He realised 
that "actual" rather than veiled exclusion had to form the core 
of any agreement if it was to procure Carson; as he told Oliver:
11 regard the present exclusion of Ulster as absolutely 
essential1^ . Yet he recognised that if the Government were 
going to exclude Ulster, then they could well be persuaded to 
present it within a structure of devolved government, as argued 
by Selborne and, more pragmatically, by Carson. After all, 'by 
itself it (exclusion) was a most humiliating surrender for the 
Government'^, whereas 'federalism makes the exclusion of Ulster 
easy'^. He therefore sought to encourage Government thinking 
towards Home Rule all round. 'Lansdowne, Selborne and I have 
given in our public speeches some favour to the idea, for it 
would be absolutely destructive of the separatist features of the 
present bill, would fulfil Carson's conditions and, indeed, has 
been privately favoured by him'^. Yet Chamberlain remained 
concerned. Would the government offer only four- county 
exclusion, which Carson would find very difficult to agree? And 
how would alterations to the bill be carried? Simply to absorb
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them into the original bill would necessitate the Lords' helping 
to pass it, an impossible task for Lansdowne, even if he had 
desired it. Better, then, to incorporate alterations into an 
amending bill to be passed at the same time as the original bill. 
The Lords could then pass the amending while rejecting the Home 
Rule bill, though with the knowledge that the latter would pass 
under the Parliament Act. The importance of this was outlined by 
Chamberlain: 'thus they would take no responsibility for the
passage of Home Rule but would provide the means by which... an 
amending bill embodying the concessions would take effect'^. It 
would save the party's face by abnegating liability for passing 
Home Rule, and would allow repeal if the Tories were returned to 
Government.
More seriously, Chamberlain feared that the Government might
simply exclude Ulster alone, in the hope of splitting Carson and
the Ulstermen from the Tory party. 'I agree. . as to the exclusion
of Ulster being no settlement', he wrote to his stepmother,
'provincial councils... would be infinitely preferable to this
bill with or without Ulster exclusion... as Balfour says, there
IQis a United Kingdom question as well as an Ulster question' .
Long, writing to Bob Cecil, reflected similar concerns; 'For some 
time we have been put in rather a false position because first 
the whole Home Rule controversy has lately centred around Ulster 
and second... the press have argued that if Ulster be excluded 
we are bound to accept Home Rule'*®. There was a danger of 
federalist pressure ending not in reconstruction but in partition 
and thus the splitting of the Unionist coalition. Whereas if 
Asquith went for Home Rule all round, there was a growing
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consensus of opinion in its favour inside the Tory leadership . 
The combined forces of Chamberlain, Carson, Lansdowne, Balfour, 
Selborne and moderates like Curzon and Derby would have been more 
than enough to convince Bonar Law of the need to accept it. But 
if Asquith offered exclusion (six counties with no time limit), 
leaving the rest of the bill intact, Carson would surely have 
deserted, regardless of his earlier support for Home Rule all 
round, in consequence splitting the leadership. Certainly 
Chamberlain, Lansdowne and Long, from their private statements, 
would have been in a very difficult position and unlikely, as 
Jalland suggests, 'to end their resistance to Home Rule for the 
rest of Ireland, if Ulster was excluded'*^. The situation was 
one of great possibilities and great danger. As Oliver described 
it to Chamberlain: 'this strange situation... the most anxious
and at the same time in some ways the most hopeful I have ever 
known'*^ .
Others, such as Oliver, Garvin, Astor and the Round Table 
movement, saw bigger prospects in the situation. Oliver was 
greatly encouraged by Carson's letter of the 10th, seeing in him 
a powerful addition to the group of known federalists . On the 
21st he urged Chamberlain once again to move more boldly towards 
a federal solution**, and on March 3rd he enclosed a thirty 
eight- page memorandum pleading that Tories should take up the 
federal cause and not wait on the government or rely on an 
election*^. The memorandum had several aims. First, it 
reflected a suspicion that Asquith might not move towards a 
federal scheme and that the initiative could therefore only come 
from the opposition; Chamberlain, Oliver felt, had far too much
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faith in Asquith's doing the 'federal t h i n g ' S e c o n d ,  the 
memorandum pin-pointed those who were a force working for a 
constructive settlement: Chamberlain, Lansdowne, Selborne, and 
Carson along with Lloyd George and Churchill. Oliver was 
visualising a broad-bottomed coalition, a theme which he pursued 
in his covering letter: 'I see no way out of national danger
except a Government which omits Squiff, W.Long, Haldane, Curzon, 
Grey, Lord Halsbury, Runciman etc, etc and Leo Maxse etc and 
which contains yourself, Lloyd George, Carson, Winston and 
possibly one or two more, Milner.. Crewe, Jameson, Bob Cecil'*7. 
Such speculations of national government were fuelled by a lunch 
in the middle of February between Oliver, Astor and Lloyd George. 
The Chancellor voiced great enthusiasm for a federal scheme, 'but 
unless we agreed to this in principle beforehand Asquith could 
not possibly put it forward as it would wreck the Govt if we 
refused his offer if made publicly1*®. This episode showed 
Oliver that the right people were thinking along the right lines; 
if only they could be persuaded to work with each other.
By March, speculation on what Asquith would do was causing 
much apprehension within the opposition. 'Our party will lose', 
warned Lord Charles Beresford, 'if we allow Mr Asquith to go on 
as he is doing frivolling, humbugging and using the most 
dishonest methods1*®. However, the impression slowly grew that 
Asquith might not after all go so far in his suggestions; both 
Sanders and Bridgeman noted a hardening in the Prime Minister's 
attitude®®. On the 25th of February, Chamberlain noted that 
'from secret information we gather that the present intention., 
is to propose a very wide scheme of safeguards giving to Ulster
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Home Rule within Home Rule1^ , and more tangible intelligence 
came on March 4th when Asquith's scheme was leaked to the lobby 
correspondent of The Daily News. It consisted of temporary 
exclusion, which amounted to four counties, based on county 
plebiscites^. An angry Chamberlain wrote to Oliver on the 6th: 
'the Government have finally and deliberately shut the door on 
any federal solution.. If Asquith had acted on the hints thrown 
out by Lansdowne, Carson and myself and had confronted us with 
a definite proposal to cooperate in that solution, I think it 
might have been carried' . If the leak was indeed Asquith's 
offer, then the outlook for a devolutionary compromise was grim. 
It appeared that Asquith was trying to place the Tories in a weak 
tactical position by drawing them into rejecting his compromise 
suggestions.
When his announcement came on March the 9 th it was 
disappointing to federalists: temporary exclusion for six years 
for those counties which, following a plebiscite, demanded it; 
the rest of the bill remained intact. The limited nature of the 
offer, and Asquith's reluctance to elucidate details, quickly 
pushed the front benches apart once again. Carson dramatically 
flung the offer back at the Government (with words that even 
F.E. Smith felt went too far)^, though he added that if 
permanent exclusion was inserted and county option altered to 
:nine counties he would take it to the Ulster convention for 
consideration, thus retreating from Home Rule all round to simple 
•exclusion. Bonar Law was more cautious, aware of the battle for 
public opinion in which Asquith was engaged. Hence, instead of 
•outright rejection, he demanded more details about the plan and
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a referendum on the proposals. From the Government side both 
Lloyd George and Churchill were outraged at the Tory response to 
the exclusion scheme. Churchill was particularly bitter, given 
all his pressure on Asquith inside cabinet, and lashed out at 
Bradford on the 14th in a speech which Lloyd George had 
encouraged him to make. If the opposition could only refuse any 
concession made, then ‘let us go forward together and put these 
grave matters to the proof‘d. It was a speech full of the 
spleen for which he had rebuked Bonar Law, and one destined to 
haunt him over the next few weeks. It also bred acrimony on the 
other side, Chamberlain writing several days later that 
'conciliation vanishes and the forces are once more drawn up in 
battle array‘d. The federal initiative was lost beneath the 
growing political bitterness. Yet there was a sense of 
inevitability beginning to surround all attempts at compromise; 
an "unbridgeable gulf" was increasingly coming into sharper 
focus. The Nationalists were not going to agree to the real 
exclusion of Ulster, while the Ulstermen would never accept 
anything less. As Sanders lamented three days after Asquith 
presented his proposals: 'the fact is neither the Nationalists
nor the Ulstermen want to compromise., the feeling in our party
*57now is stronger against compromise than it was' .
Ill
Early 1914 saw the expansion and organisation of a militant 
section within the party. The secret meetings, finally admitted 
by Bonar Law on January the 15th, had led many on the Right to
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fear that a compromise was being hatched. Asquith's statement of 
February 9th, announcing his suggestions, served to reinforce 
this mistrust. Some backbenchers thought that Bonar Law's and 
Carson's refusals to reply to him suggested collusion between the 
front-benches. Less charitably, Lord Arran felt 'sure the
cq
pass had been sold' . Such conjecture was enhanced by increased 
federal activity in the press, and among the Round Tablers and 
some of their leaders. Carson and Chamberlain both effected a 
softer tone after February the 9th, significant to the suggestive 
Tory benches. And these suspicions drew upon a deeper sense of 
mistrust of their leaders amongst the Right that, when events 
became critical, they would surrender. Crawford (the former 
Balcarres) sensed 'a feeling that our leaders will go too
far'^®, and Lord Leconfield felt that 'we must not give way but
I do not trust our leaders a yard and they will do so for
certain, unless we can stop them'^.
Suspicion as to what Asquith was about also provoked the 
Right into greater activity. The idea that he was simply
vacillating, using delay in the hope of Ulster exploding or of 
the Unionists splitting apart was widely felt. Alternatively, he 
might be delaying with the intention of introducing an amending 
bill of limited scope at the last moment, so placing onto the 
Lords the decision (and thus the odium) of rejection or 
acceptance: civil war or peace^. Only nerve and the refusal of 
all attempts at compromise would call Asquith's bluff and destroy 
the bill.
To avoid the Lords becoming once again the arena of Tory 
capitulation, from the beginning of January Diehards began to
330
organise themselves. 'Yes I think it worth while to tout our 
brother Peers', Lord Stanhope replied to suggestions from 
Willoughby de Broke; 'I think it is necessary to dot the i's and 
cross the t's as to the possible move of the Government in again 
trying to corner us' . He recommended Lord Crawford as one to 
rally the Peers to a diehard line. Throughout January, discreet 
soundings were taken as to the strength of numbers of those who 
would back them. Receiving a favourable response from various 
quarters, the four ringleaders of this new Diehard revolt- 
Stanhope, Ampthill, Arran and Willoughby de Broke- issued a 
"Letter to Peers" on February the 4th^. The circular asked for 
support for their plan to move an amendment on the Address in the 
Lords, calling for an election. This represented a new procedure 
in the upper House, designed largely to advertise the intense 
feeling on the issue^. It was also aimed to forewarn the 
Government that settlement in their House would only come after 
an appeal to the people. Yet the letter did more: it sought to 
galvanise the Lords against a compromise on the exclusion. 'It 
is hardly necessary to point out to your Lordship that to vote 
for the exclusion of Ulster from a Dublin Parliament is to accept 
the principle of Home Rule for Ireland.. It is impossible so to 
alter the present bill as to make it acceptable to all parties 
in Ireland as well as to the Unionist party as a whole. We submit 
that if Unionist Peers abandon the Union by passing a Home Rule 
bill before a general election is held it would be an act of 
b e t r a y a l .
In response, Lansdowne gave notice on February 5th that a 
meeting of front-benchers had decided to move just such an Irish
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amendment on the address0': 'The same idea has occurred to our
leaders', Selborne wrote to Willoughby de Broke^®. The same day 
Lansdowne sent a similarly curt letter: '1 should have thought 
you might have held your hand, say for twenty-four hours, until 
you had ascertained the intentions of the party leaders., we 
should have avoided an appearance of disunion, which, at such a 
moment as this is surely to be regretted'^. Thus when Long 
moved the opposition's amendment to the address in the Commons, 
Lansdowne moved one in the Lords. This pressure on the official 
Tory leadership in the Lords reflected several things. First, it 
was the beginning of a revived diehard campaign. Second, the aims 
of the movement showed an overlap of interest with Southern 
Unionists, who were growing in assertiveness early in 1914 and 
heavily represented in the Lords. Midleton, writing to Willoughby 
de Broke on the 7th, stressed such contact: 'I look as you do to
70a general election as the only solution1 . This overlap came 
from a suspicion that the Ulstermen were fighting the cause of 
Ulster not the Union. 'The Ulster party will never agree to the 
paragraph in our whip explaining that to accept Ulster exclusion
71is also to accept the principle of Home Rule' . Such a growing 
concentration of opinion in the Lords goes far to explain 
Lansdowne's consistent refusal to agree to the simple excision 
of Ulster as a compromise, and his refusal to accept 
responsibility for passing the bill as a part of a deal over 
exclusion.
The Tory Right was also active outside Parliament. The 
B.L.S.U.U. reputedly had by the start of 1914 over 400 agents 
nationwide and up to 10,000 men organised and prepared to
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77fight . In February, according to an advert in The Morning Post 
it had 15,000 volunteers, drilled, armed and ready to fight in 
Ulster7^ . Relatively speaking it was a small scale operation. 
Yet the network of agents were a useful channel of information 
and an important structure on which the Covenanter movement would 
build. It also gained sympathy at the very top of the party; 
Bonar Law met a delegation in January and extended clear support 
in his speech at Bristol on the 15th7*. Willoughby de Broke 
looked to expand it still further. On January 6th he wrote to
7c
Milner inviting him onto the League's council . Milner was 
already involved with the U.D.L., which brought him into regular 
contact with Long, its chairman, but he agreed to attend as an 
observer and immediately saw the potential for a big, nationwide 
movement.
By January such ideas were beginning seriously to occupy 
Milner. The plan was for a mass movement based on the signing of
a British Covenant. Two days later he met Bonar Law 'in
76connection with the movement for the support of Ulster' , and
by the 16th Amery was already writing to Bob Cecil, Chamberlain
7 7and Lord Crawford with plans for a British Covenant . Milner 
left for a holiday on January the 16th, but immediately upon his 
return in February met Long and Bonar Law. On the 5th of February
he informed Sir Henry Wilson and Lord Roberts of the idea for a
78covenant, persuading the latter to involve himself . By the 
Ibeginning of February, then, things were already moving. At a 
imeeting of the U.D.L. on February 19th Milner was formally given 
their services and organisation to run the British Covenant.
The initial response to the idea of a covenant was mixed.
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Crawford declined because he did not trust Amery's or Milner's
judgement7®; Chamberlain saw little purpose to petitions/
informing Amery that 'they count for little or nothing'®®. Bob
Cecil refused, declaring that 'the English hate illegality' and
that he himself had too many 'scruples' to sign such a 
01
document. Even Selborne was far from favourable. Milner 
complained to Carson that it was hard to persuade many people to
ft?sign such a pledge; 'the thing must go on without them' .
Ian Malcolm of the U.D.L. noted a disturbing trend; 'territorial 
objections to signing., are even more widespread than I thought
among the officers.. I need hardly say they are all ready to be
00
persuaded by a good argument' .  The good argument came in the 
form of Lord Roberts, whom Milner targeted as friend of the 
soldiers. His signature to the appeal in the press on March the 
3rd was designed to win over the doubts of the officer class. On 
the other hand, Bonar Law was more positive. His speech at 
Bristol had been an encouragement to the scheme; for Amery, it 
'practically appeals to the Unionist party to strengthen the 
hands of its leaders'®4, and he told Bob Cecil that Bonar Law 
was even willing to give it his official blessing and the 
financial and organising help of Central Office®®. On the 17th 
of January, Bonar Law argued to Lansdowne that such a development 
if 'started by the right people and on the right scale... would 
be decisive'®®; but he added, showing his acute sensitivity to 
public opinion, that 'it would be worse than useless unless it 
received an overwhelming response'®7. Lansdowne remained 
distinctly lukewarm. 'I agree with you in thinking that such a 
movement could only succeed if started by the right people., and
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I am inclined to add at the right moment -I do not think the 
right moment has arrived yet1®®.
Nevertheless, it was launched on March the 3rd in the press, 
calling upon young men to sign a declaration against Home Rule 
and their willingness to use 'any action which may be effective 
to prevent it being put into operation1®®. The Covenant was 
intended by Milner to 'frighten the Government and its 
supporters' in order, as he told Oliver, 'to make them realise
that persistence in their present policy.. would meet with
Qflinflexible resistance' .  It was also 'bound to be a factor in 
the kings judgement of the situation', helping to move him 
towards resisting the bill if it was presented to him- though 
little thus far had so influenced him®*. 'Lastly they will help 
to keep Ulster confident and steady and prevent the danger of 
precipitate action', revealing an anxiety that Ulster could still 
break out into sporadic violence and spoil her case .
Gauging its success in raising signatories is difficult. 
There is little evidence about numbers, and what there is is 
highly subjective. Walter Long, in his Memories, suggests a 
figure of two million signatories by July, but this seems a 
'wildly exaggerated claim by the person who had overall charge of 
collecting signatories®®. Milner informed Selborne that the 
imovement was 'assuming enormous proportions' and ' the response 
to our appeal has been so strong that I think it only needs a 
little more support to become decisive'®*; yet in the same 
letter he complained of an 'absence of certain leading names'®®. 
The May edition of The Covenanter referred to 'an enormous number 
who are prepared to make real sacrifices'®®; yet the day before,
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Milner complained to Oliver about 'those blessed Unionists what 
a crowd and the Times and everybody and everything have gone
Q7
absolutely limp'5 .
More ambitious was Milner's project of organising a mass 
movement to defend the Union. The signing of the covenant was to 
be the stepping stone to an organisation 1 analogous to the 
signing of the Ulster Covenant which was the first step in the
qo
organisation of Ulster for resistance” 0. Milner hoped to build 
on the framework established by the B.L.S.U.U., but to extend and 
centralise its organisation under him, and work more closely with
QQthe U.D.L . His plan was to 'strengthen and transform1 the 
British League's committee 'by the accession of a number of 
influential people'1®®. This meant, in addition to F.E.Smith, 
Peto, McNeill and Bedford, who were already members of the 
committee, the incorporation of himself, Long, Hugh Cecil, Amery, 
Lord Lovat, and Mark Sykes and, most importantly, Lord Roberts 
as president. Given this roll-call, it is hard not to sense that 
Milner was drawing around him the old band of 1911, providing 
them with a degree of unity and a power-base to influence the 
party leadership. 'I want the stalwarts', he told Selborne, 'to 
begin to have some sort of rudimentary organisation, not to leave 
everything to the last moment'1®1: they would not be caught
napping as in July 1911. There was also an overlap with the 
National Service League and strong contacts with the Army, not 
only through Roberts but also Sir Charles Hunter, a member of the 
executive and his go-between at the War Office, and Sir Henry 
Wilson.
On April the 3rd, a month after the Covenant had appeared,
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the League of British Covenanters was finally launched at a 
meeting in Caxton hall. The movement was to be a propaganda 
vehicle, and it organised the very next day the huge 
demonstration at Hyde Park where members of the shadow cabinet 
spoke to an estimated crowd of nearly £ a million. It was active 
in by-elections, particularly at Ipswich where the Liberal was 
ousted by a Unionist at the end of May. The organisation was also 
designed to raise money, of which, it appears, the Ulstermen were 
running increasingly short. Given its connections the League was
able to appeal to society. On February the 25th a huge list of
in?possible contributors was drawn u p a  balance sheet in the 
Milner papers (unsigned) reads like a seating plan at a society 
ball: £30,000 from Astor, £25,000 from Sam McCaughly, £10,000 
from Lords Rothschild, Bedford and Iveagh, £5,000 from Lord 
Portland and a mere £4,500 from E.Cassell^. A great deal of 
money was therefore flowing from society and various Tory sources 
into Ulster, via the Covenanter movement, the U.D.L. and the 
B.L.S.U.U.
Behind the financial and propaganda role lay a far more 
sinister function for the movement: the raising of a military 
force to be used to aid Ulster if an attempt were made to coerce 
her.The movement might even have been planning to export civil 
war to mainland Britain should hostilities in Ulster occur, 
though this would ensue in any case if troops were shipped to the 
province. A memorandum in the Milner papers contains some highly 
provocative suggestions on the role of such a movement: 'In the 
last resort the same organisation which has been created for the 
purpose of demonstration could be used to furnish a really
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effective resistance to the action of the Government., (and)., 
an organised and immediately successful national uprising 
Milner, of course, like Willoughby de Broke before him, was quick 
to point out that 'the main object of the whole movement is to 
avert civil war if it can possibly be averted'
IV
Bonar Law greeted the New Year with a mixture of satisfaction and 
growing unease. Tactically, the situation held some advantages. 
His negotiations with Asquith had revealed that real exclusion 
was beyond Asquith's scope. Permanent six-county exclusion was 
the absolute minimum concession to the Ulstermen, yet the 
Nationalists it seemed would never accept this. Bonar Law also 
believed that the Prime Minister would never coerce Ulster under 
a Dublin Parliament; as he pointed out to Du Pre the South Bucks. 
Tory candidate: 'they are hesitating between the dread of armed 
resistance and the fear of losing the Irish vote'^. If both 
assumptions were true, then there was a very good chance that 
Asquith would opt for an election, although he would not move 
easily to this alternative. Against this optimism stood the 
rumblings of the Right and the Southern Unionists. And more 
worrying, the fear of what Asquith might be doing to extricate 
his Government from its difficulties. He conveyed these worries 
to Balfour on January the 7th: 'What probably he has already made 
up his mind is to happen is that at the right time they will make 
public some proposals, such as those suggested to Carson, which 
they think will improve their position in G.B. by giving the
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impression that under such an arrangement Ulster will have no 
real grievance and then they will have an election'7®7. What he 
feared was a "dummy" compromise offer by Asquith, unacceptable 
to Unionists but likely to buy off party and public hostility 
sufficiently to go to an election.
It would be a shrewd move. Bonar Law could not accept the 
compromise, since it would be unsatisfactory to Ulster, would 
shatter party unity and possibly overturn him. But to reject it 
would brand the Tories as extremist, undermine public sympathy 
and render their support for Ulster's continued resistance 
unpopular: 'He (Asquith) wants to advertise his own
reasonableness and the bigotry of the Unionist party in general 
and Ulster in particular'7®®. The move played upon a common 
perception that the public were bored by Ireland, and that 
anything which appeared reasonable and likely to remove the issue 
would attract support. It also suggested to Bonar Law a more 
malign tactic, one he explained to his audience at Bristol. 'The 
Government.. are looking forward to the possibility of the 
seething passions of Ulster boiling over, of their doing 
something which will put them in the wrong and that then they may 
be able without alienating the sympathy of this country, to put 
them down by force'7®®. An inadequate compromise formula might 
be the spark to set Belfast's fragile sectarian tempers ablaze.
Events early in January seemed to support these fears. The 
Times editorial of January the 27th noticed that 'the government 
are assiduously disseminating impressions which are intended to 
depict their own attitude in a singularly favourable light'77®. 
And two days later: 'they hint, nod and whisper that they alone
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are righteous.. The way is being deftly prepared'^*. Balfour, 
Selborne, Lansdowne and Bob Cecil all sensed that Asquith was up 
to some such trick.
To meet this threat Bonar Law sought to squash the plan in 
advance, before any scheme was introduced publicly, by a blunt 
statement of the probable consequences. In his tough speech at 
Bristol (clearly intended for Asquith) he declared that whilst 
dummy compromise schemes would improve the Prime Minister's 
tactical position, he would still be left with the reality of 
Ulster, supported by the Tory party, threatening civil war^. 
This might well strengthen Asquith's immediate political 
situation, but only at the expense of the collapse of everything 
in the future. The struggle went well beyond mere Parliamentary 
tactics. 'We shall not be beaten in that kind of game for this 
reason that we shall play no game.. In my belief we are drifting 
rapidly to civil war which will shatter to its foundation the 
whole fabric of our National e x i s t e n c e ' T h e  to Asquith he 
gave a blunt warning, 'we must now assume that it is their 
present intention to carry out their policy to the bitter end and 
on that assumption it becomes our duty.. by every means in our 
power to prevent them from committing what., we believe would be 
a great crime'***. The speech rejuvenated his image on the
Right. Amery interpreted it as 'marching orders' for the 
party*1^ ; it provided the impetus for the British Covenant and 
its para-military arm the League; and Willoughby de Broke thought 
it 'was the best, the very best you have ever made'^. At the 
same time it was a warning to moderates, like Chamberlain, who 
sought a compromise with the Government; and any hopes that
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Asquith might have had of cooperation with the Tory leader were 
quickly dashed. Its extremism sits alongside his 1912 Blenheim 
speech, and was similarly justified by the absolute necessity of 
holding an election. Government supporters ignored this 
constitutional safeguard and construed it instead as an assault 
on Parliamentary government. This was no bad thing, as Bonar Law 
realised, since it hardened Liberal "forward" elements and 
Nationalists against giving concessions: after such threats,
concession would appear as surrender to aggression. 'A more 
strident note finds an echo', lessening Asquith's ability to
secure any form of compromise package, let alone one which public
117opinion would see as reasonable .
And yet Bonar Law was not satisfied solely with tough 
speaking. He had been doing that since 1912, without obvious 
success. He now came to believe that Asquith's "expected" tactics 
could only be countered by amending the Army Annual Act. This was 
no impulsive response, plucked from the pages of The Observer. 
He had suggested such a course in 1911 in a letter to The Times, 
during the Parliament bill struggle**®. His allusion at Bristol
to 'every means in our power' indicates that he was already, by
1 IQthe beginning of January, thinking seriously of such ideas1 . 
On the 30th he more formally advocated it to Lansdowne and 
Balfour*^®.
This decision has been seen by most historians as a 
desperate step, one that stood to lose the Tories public support 
and provide the Government with just the sort of diversionary 
issue they so desired. These considerations were outweighed, for 
Bonar Law, by the prospect of preventing Asquith from forcing an
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election on his own compromise proposals. He explained his 
thinking to Lansdowne: 'The Government will have an election
selected at their own time, after they have made in the most 
elaborate way the proposals for the protection of Ulster which 
were suggested to Carson. Such an election would seem to me to 
be as bad for us as anything could be under present 
circumstances, for I am afraid that a great many people would 
think that these proposals were so reasonable that Ulster would 
not be justified in resisting and that it would settle the Irish 
Question'?^. The party therefore had a choice: 'an election
more or less forced by us on what we will try to represent as the 
plain issue; shall the army be used to coerce Ulster without the
consent of the electors or on proposals for Home Rule which to
1nmoderate men will not appear unreasonable'LLL. It was not merely 
a method of forcing an election, but also a means of fighting 
that election on a basis favourable to the Tories. His decision 
over the army act was dictated by the need for public observance 
of constitutional limits. 'Here is a method', he told Craik, 
'which is strictly constitutional, for nothing is clearer than 
that the method in which the army is maintained has been adhered 
to for the express purpose of putting a check on the executive 
government and preventing it from using their army against the 
will of the people
Many in his own party increasingly doubted that these 
subtleties would sway the ordinary voter; after February the 5th, 
resistance to his plan increased. But no immediate action was 
taken. In fact he might well have welcomed a debate on the 
scheme, given his technique (used during the food tax crisis and
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over- the King's veto), of standing back to allow a clear party 
line to materialise.
Asquith's intimations of February the 10th, that he would 
shortly bring forward suggestions, confirmed what Bonar Law had 
feared. The announcement raised hopes of a compromise. Many 
Tories looked to a satisfactory settlement between the parties; 
large sections of the press were hopeful for a solution; and the 
King pressed both sides to look for a middle way. Despite his 
private intentions over the army act, Bonar law could not afford 
to alienate this opinion or those in the party who sought a 
settlement, such as Chamberlain, Selborne, Lansdowne and, more 
hesitantly, Carson and Smith. He was forced, as in the autumn, 
to appear reasonable and conciliatory. Replying to Asquith in the 
Commons on the 10th, he reiterated his demand for an election and 
warned against dummy compromise plans; he also confirmed that 
exclusion was the only way of avoiding civil war. In fact, so 
conciliatory was he that some in his party thought that he had
1 liconcocted a secret deal with the Prime Minister1**. Thus, 
through February and early March Bonar Law was following a dual 
tactical line. In public he presented a reasonable face, willing 
to seek a realistic settlement. In private there was a 
willingness to amend the army act, and to force an election not 
on Asquith's compromise formula but on the issue of the coercion 
of Ulster.
It was little surprise to Bonar Law that when Asquith 
finally announced his scheme in the Commons, the terms were, as 
Dicey argued, 'from his merely party point of view clever. He 
apparently has squared the Nationalists. He has a fair chance of
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dividing the Unionists'^ . Bonar Law could not reject them 
outright through fear of losing public and Tory party support. 
Some might welcome it as a basis for negotiation, as Dicey 
implied; the moderates were a particular worry in this respect, 
but so too were the Ulstermen, who, feeling the vulnerability of 
their position, might well welcome it as a first step. There was 
also the problem of the Liberal moderates. Rebuff to Asquith's 
apparent hand of friendship would send them firmly back into his 
fold, whereas a more conciliatory reception could draw them out 
of hiding and annoy the radicals and Nationalists enough to 
undermine the Government's stability. On the other hand county 
opt-out for six years would be repugnant to the majority of the 
party, and would split it if accepted. The dilemma Bonar Law 
faced was the same as in the autumn: how to defeat a compromise 
offer whilst preserving a public face of reasonableness, and not 
alienating those Tories keen on a compromise.
In reply to Asquith, he ridiculed the time limit on the 
scheme but did not rule out exclusion as a solution, knowing full 
well that real exclusion was an obstacle, not a basis for 
settlement. He then demanded that Asquith flesh out the details 
of his plan. This line of attack had two advantages. First, it 
would reveal the hollowness of the proposals behind Asquith's 
hyperbole, or, by clarifying details, destabilise the Government 
coalition: either by showing Liberal doubters that there was 
little real concession to Ulster or revealing to the Nationalists 
that they were conceding more than was acceptable. Asquith 
refused to be drawn on the details. But this enabled Bonar Law 
to depict him as unreasonable and insincere in his attempt to
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reach a settlement. To advertise this, they called for a censure 
motion on the 19th, where Bonar Law declared his willingness to 
stand by the verdict of the people, challenging Asquith to put 
his proposals to a referendum. Inevitably, Asquith refused, 
reinforcing Bonar Law's populist credentials.
It was a shrewd counter-attack by Bonar Law, preserving 
public sympathy and party unity yet blocking the advance of the 
concessions. As Asquith refused all his requests, so he could 
safely become more vigorous and outspoken: his attack on the 17th 
was especially bitter. We can also detect Bonar Law laying the 
groundwork for amending the army act, particularly in his call 
for a referendum. He wanted public opinion to focus on the basic 
Tory position that there must be an appeal to the people, and in 
so doing ignore the method used to secure it. This suggests that 
despite his success in repulsing the March the 9th compromise, 
Bonar Law was still committed to amending the act. However, 
opinion on this within the leadership had begun to change. The 
shadow cabinet on March the 12th took a more forceful line 
against the manoeuvre*^. By the 14th Craik told Bonar Law that 
'the rumours are creating disquietude amongst many and I confess 
I share it.. Mutiny and rebellion may at times be justified.. but 
if we begin to impose limitations on discipline by law where are 
we to end'*^. Bonar Law himself recognised that there was much
resistance to plan; 'I think there is a sufficient amount of that
128feeling at the present to make it impossible to do it' . By 
the time of the Curragh mutiny, with the force of party opinion 
against it, he recognised that the plan was no longer practical 
politics.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
1
The Curragh mutiny, with its subsequent claims and counter­
claims, had a radicalising effect on the whole situation, pushing 
the parties further apart and injecting a great deal of 
bitterness into politics. With the gun-running exploits of the 
Ulstermen coming just a month later, events appeared to be 
escalating out of the control of the politicians at Westminster. 
In this tense atmosphere a demoralised Asquith sought to impose 
a settlement on the political parties by introducing an amending 
bill to be passed alongside the Home Rule bill. The amending bill 
was introduced into the House of Lords, as required by the 
Parliament Act, on June 23rd. The fact that proposals were the 
same as those of March 9th, lent a certain inevitability to the 
Lords' repudiation of them; but instead of outright rejection, 
they amended the amending bill permanently to exclude of all nine 
Ulster counties, terms which they knew were well beyond what 
Asquith or the Nationalists would ever agree. In a last desperate 
effort to avert the impasse, with the mauled amending bill 
scheduled to re-enter the Commons for consideration on July the 
20th (presumably to be rejected by the Government and its 
supporters) Asquith, under pressure from the King, agreed to meet 
the other political leaders. The Buckingham Palace conference of 
July 21st to the 24th brought together Asquith, Lloyd George, 
Bonar Law, Lansdowne, Redmond, Dillon, Carson and Craig for a 
last-ditch effort. But it never had a chance of success; 
positions by this eleventh hour were well dug in: Nationalists
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had the unmolested bill almost in port, and many Unionists were 
convinced that Asquith would retreat to an election when the 
crunch came. The vast majority of politicians were bewildered and 
dumbfounded, perhaps fatalistically resigned to civil war in 
Ireland. But when war came it was, to everyone's surprise, 
European and not civil. The Great War broke out to the 
accompaniment of a huge sigh of relief from all political 
quarters. The unexpected cabinet unity on entering the war on 
August the 3rd represents above all this collective relief that 
a way out of the quandary had after all been found.
11
The party leaderships were already drifting apart before 
news of the Curragh mutiny, which broke in London on March the 
20th, injected renewed bitterness into politics. These events 
shocked those who sought a compromise. Curtis was so annoyed at 
Churchill that he threatened to sign the British Covenant, then 
being organised*. Ironically, however, it was as a consequence 
of the Curragh mutiny that another last surge of federal opinion 
began to emerge. Events worked to scare the Round Tablers into 
re-doubling their efforts. On March the 23rd Craik, Curtis and 
<Grigg wrote a 'biggish document damning both parties and saying 
that it is time to quit the present mess and start making a new 
(one of the Constitution14. On April 3rd and 4th Grigg and Curtis 
were invited onto The Enchantress to discuss their proposals with 
the First Lord : a plan for six- county exclusion, to last until 
Parliament decided otherwise, and the striking of the Customs and 
Post office clauses from the bill. Then, an all-Irish assembly
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to be convened 'to consider the terms on which Ireland might be 
constituted a single self-governing unit in a scheme of 
devolution embracing the whole U.K. . In essence, it was a form 
of exclusion pending federation. Grigg and Curtis, following the 
meeting with Churchill, posted copies of their scheme to other 
leaders and to Bonham-Carter, Asquith's private secretary. These 
efforts were reflected in a renewal of relations between the 
front benches. On April the 1st Sanders noted that 'everyone is 
talking again about conciliation'*. Less graciously, Dicey 
sensed that 'the air is full of cant about compromise'^. On 
April the 2nd, Smith (who had been uncharacteristically quiet for 
the last few months) and Churchill drafted an appeal to M.P.s 
suggesting that 'a solution of a federal character for the U.K. 
offers the best prospect of a settlement'^. Aware of the plan by 
Grigg and Curtis, they were trying to re-create a favourable 
political atmosphere, if not to show their leaders the extent of 
federal sympathy which existed in the House. The appeal had the 
support of 78 Liberals, including Lloyd George, and 56 Unionists, 
including Chamberlain who saw here the seeds of a renewed 
agitation. 'There is a growing feeling of sympathy with this idea 
(federalism) in our party and among the Liberals, say something 
like eighty men on each side of the House who openly avow their 
wish for it besides many who would accept it or any other course 
advised by their leaders and there is a large body of opinion 
outside Parliament which is increasingly favourable to it1 .
Chamberlain sent Carson a copy of the Grigg/Curtis 
memorandum. 'They have suggestions to make which are worth 
consideration at any rate and on some points.. your opinion would 
be decisive'**. Carson also came under pressure from Selborne,
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who had played a role in devising the plan. 'I believe you and 
I think much alike on the question of devolution'; and he 
reassured Carson that there 'really would be very little 
difficulty in setting the proper division of functions between 
a Parliament for the U.K. and an English Parliament or
Q
council. Carson reacted positively to these ideas and dining 
soon after with Selborne, he assured him that if such ideas were 
brought forward he 'would bring them before his friends'*®. 
Carson also sent the plan on to Bonar Law, and recommended that 
he meet Grigg, Brand and Curtis**. Thus by the middle of April, 
opinion within the Tory leadership seemed once again to be moving 
in a constructive direction. Even Walter Long advised against a 
censure vote for the end of April, perhaps keen not to fuel 
partisanship at a moment when tentative moves were in progress. 
Not all the Tory leaders were in favour, as Chamberlain pointed
out: 'Balfour, Law, Lansdowne and Curzon all dislike it in
1 ?varying degrees' . We can speculate that Lansdowne's dislike 
was of a smaller degree: he had preferred a devolutionary,
watered-down version of Home Rule to federalism.
The initiative received an added, if surprising, boost 
towards the end of April from the gun-running episode in Ulster. 
It was peculiarly ill-timed, occurring just days before a censure 
motion against the Government on April 28th and 29th. Nonetheless 
the events at Larne focused minds on the realities of the 
situation; 'It has given an immense momentum to the pacifists', 
wrote Sir Almeric Fitzroy*^, and Chamberlain noted hopefully 
that 'once again the more responsible people seem overwhelmed by 
the imminence and the greatness of the danger which confronts 
us'**. Such pressure it was hoped might move Asquith to alter
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his terms. It also helped to balance the moral indignation on 
both sides; and by drawing the sting from the opposition's 
censure motion, it took ’all the edge off the attempt to prove 
the existence of the plot', so providing the opportunity for 
conciliatory overtures^. Knowing that Chamberlain was to move 
the censure, Oliver urged him to build bridges rather than to 
rake over the past: 'It is one of those occasions on which the 
life of the country., is literally hanging in the balance'^. 
The next day he openly denied that it was a plot, hoping that 
Chamberlain would, if not follow suit, at least be measured and
17limited in his criticism .
It was however not Chamberlain, but Churchill, who broke 
ground. Speaking during the censure debate, he asked directly 
whether Carson would be willing to accept a federal solution: 
'Winston has taken the first step towards re-opening the paths 
of peace' . Carson would respond favourably if six Ulster 
counties were excluded, as (he already knew) had been proposed 
in the Grigg/Curtis plan. Sanders felt that Carson 'went very far 
towards conciliation', and for Chamberlain it 'was hardly less 
remarkable. Its frankness and its obvious sincerity made a great 
appeal to the House'^ . That same evening Chamberlain spoke at
Wolverhampton, where he gave strong encouragement to a federal
20solution . There was much truth in Chamberlain's observation 
that 'there is now in all quarters an impression that a
71settlement must somehow be made' ; the forces for compromise 
were once again in the ascendant. Pressure now mounted on Asquith 
and Bonar Law. As a consequence, on May 5th a meeting took place 
between Asquith, Bonar Law and Carson at Edwin Montagu's house. 
Yet Chamberlain feared, as he had before Asquith's
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announcement of March the 9th, that the present sympathy for a 
constructive settlement would be diverted into 'some form of 
compromise (exclusion) which we shall be unable effectively to 
resist and which will be hardly less bad than the original 
b i n 122c he despaired that although 'there is much loose
talk of federalism, nobody attempts to concentrate opinion on the 
changes which must be made in the Home Rule bill' This
threat of exclusion was greater by April. The Curragh mutiny had 
rendered the coercion of Ulster impossible, and without this 
alternative, exclusion seemed an inevitable consequence. A 
reference by Chamberlain hints at a change in Carson's tone, with 
the latter becoming more attracted to simple exclusion. 'He 
(Carson) feels.. that we have been on the very brink of civil war 
and there is no time to be lost if the danger is to be averted. 
He is perhaps not less impressed with the impossibility.. of 
simply reverting to the old Unionist policy in the South and 
West, and, though opinions differ.. as to what would be the 
results in Nationalist Ireland of the rejection of the bill at 
this stage, he himself takes a very gloomy view of the 
consequences'^. Such nuances might explain Midleton's renewed 
concern. Writing on behalf of Southern Unionists, he rejected the 
idea of simple exclusion, and informed Bonar Law that he and Lord 
Barrymore had established a committee of about 30 Peers to 
protect their interests^; he also sent a letter to The Times on 
April 15th headed "The Duty of Unionists"^. Lansdowne feared
that Southern Unionism might be on the march, and even that
nanother Diehard campaign was beginning .
At the shadow cabinet convened on the 5th of May, just 
before Bonar Law was to meet Asquith, Chamberlain and Lansdowne
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raised these fears about 'acceptance of the bill as a condition
JO
of the exclusion of Ulster'40. Carson retorted that he could 
never accept the rest of the bill even if Ulster was excluded. 
But seemed willing to concede the inevitability of the rest of 
it passing under the Parliament Act. Lansdowne pressed instead 
for 'some scheme of devolution', for a settlement, to prevent the 
automatic passage of the bill under the Parliament Act, so saving
jq
the Unionists of the South and West . Echoing him, Chamberlain 
urged both Bonar Law and Carson to come out, at the meeting, for 
the exclusion of Ulster and cooperation in a federal recasting 
the bill. '1 ask whether it would not be right for Law and Carson 
to play what I call the "great game" and to make that suggestion 
themselves to Asquith'^. Bonar Law and Carson refused to 
consider this option. Carson in particular had shifted from his 
earlier devolutionary sympathies; much difference of opinion 
therefore existed within the Tory leadership before the meeting.
In the end, the talks were a damp squib. Though inspired by 
growing federal support, the meeting brought together three who 
were essentially opposed to federalism. Only Carson claimed to 
sympathise, and that was more a product of tactics than of 
principle: 'Asquith by temperament is unfitted for agreement.
Equally so is Bonar Law. And obviously each makes the other worse 
the more they come into contact'^. There was therefore little 
chance of constructing a federal solution and the meeting limited 
itself to discussion of Ulster exclusion. Yet here, too, as Bonar 
Law and Carson realised, there was little chance of agreement: 
Asquith was prevented from going any distance on that basis by 
the Nationalists. As Bonar Law told Henry Lygon before the 
meeting, 'It does not seem to me probable that the Nationalists
will agree to the real exclusion of Ulster1^ . With Asquith 
intransigent and Bonar Law and Carson holding firm to exclusion, 
the initiative collapsed. Little future prospect for the 
federalist cause could be seen at this stage, although there was 
an epilogue in the shape of the Buckingham Palace conference of 
July 21st to the 24th. But this did not originate from the 
federal movement, and busied itself with finding a makeshift 
formula for exclusion in which few of the participants had any 
faith. The talks of early May therefore represented the end of 
an extended attempt to reach an agreed settlement of the Irish 
and constitutional questions along federal lines, begun in 1910.
We can speculate on the failure of the federal panacea. 
Differences over what federalism actually meant separated all its 
sympathisers. Over the last few months Chamberlain and Lansdowne 
had spoken with dissimilar voices. If the two had been closer in 
their aims, perhaps Bonar Law might have been forced to play what 
Chamberlain called 'the great game1. This, of course, relates to 
another fundamental failing: the inability to convince either of 
the two leaders. Both Asquith and Bonar Law remained unconvinced 
by federalism. Their scepticism was a product of tactical 
considerations; both thought that they could gain more by not 
moving towards a federal solution. Federalism was also weakened, 
particularly during 1914, by the increasing drift to the Right 
by sections in the party under the stimulus of the Curragh 
mutiny, the prevarication of Asquith, and gun-running into 
Ulster. Perhaps the clearest illustration of this was the 
attitude of Milner and Amery, both to be counted amongst the keen 
enthusiasts of federation for the U.K. By 1914 they saw 
federalism as a dead end, and were committed instead to
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organising the British Covenant. At the root of the problem, 
however, was the incompatibility of Ulstermen and Nationalists. 
A federal settlement would therefore have to come at the expense 
of one or both of these groups, most likely in the form of party 
cooperation or even coalition. Yet too little trust to effect 
this existed between the front benches, despite the varied 
contacts and speculations.
Ill
The Curragh episode at the end of March, and then the later gun- 
running into Ulster had a galvanising effect on the Right. In 
particular the episode added a sharpness to the League of British 
Covenanters' activities, and gave real force to their resolutions 
to protect Ulster. Those who had been faint-hearted in February 
now saw ample reason to lend support, if not to sign the 
Covenant. Selborne became more involved, accompanying Milner on 
a tour of various northern cities. Demonstrations and speaking 
tours attracted the likes of Bob Cecil, Worthington-Evans, 
Bridgeman, James Campbell, Ormsby-Gore, Sir William Bull and Sir 
Harry Samuel33. Constituencies badgered the League for 
literature, speakers and finance. And all the while, behind- the- 
scenes preparations to aid Ulster continued: code-names were
established3*, and questions of food supply and fodder for 
animals for Ulster, financial and currency arrangements and the 
timing for the establishment of the Provisional government were 
all subjects debated by the committee35.
Two points, however, need emphasising. First, the "playing 
.at soldiers" by martial elements in the Tory party was an
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effective outlet for their frustrated energies and exclusion from 
office for nearly ten years. Organisation meant that those 
energies were now channelled and controlled. Second, a problem 
of definition (or what Gollin neatly describes as 'the moral 
frontier1) vexed all the various groups and individuals on the 
Right^: over what would they fight or offer practical
resistance? Was it a fight for the Union in toto or just a fight 
for Ulster? If Ulster was excluded on a basis accepted by the 
Ulstermen, would they resist Home Rule for the rest of Ireland 
by force or by passive means? These questions were never 
satisfactorily answered, largely because there was little 
agreement across the broad spectrum of the Right; and with the 
outbreak of war, they never had to answer them. Some, such as 
Willoughby de Broke, Milner, Bedford, Stanhope, Arran and other 
Southern Unionists, undoubtedly wanted to fight for the whole 
Union. With others, including Bonar Law and Carson, Smith, Hugh 
Cecil, Selborne, Amery and Midleton - all supporters of the 
League and all politicians rather than ideologues - would not 
fight over the rest of Ireland if Ulster was saved. They would, 
instead, promise repeal, or drastic reform when the party came 
in, and hide behind the argument that exclusion would wreck the 
entire bill. These basic divisions suggest that the extreme Right 
was more fragile and splintered than the image they projected 
through the press, and were a group of individuals more reliant 
on bluff than a united movement of devoted volunteers.
Another focus for right wing interest was the Army. The 
question of relations with the Army had arisen at several 
points during the struggle; Tory speakers - Bonar Law, Carson, 
Smith and Hugh Cecil in particular - had posed the question of
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whether troops would obey orders if commanded to act against 
Ulster. However, the Army was an ambivalent card for Unionists 
to pursue; it exposed them to the cry of "tampering", which 
many on the Radical and Labour benches were only too keen to 
exploit. It also upset the ingrained sensitivities of many 
Tories, what Bonar Law described to Craik as 'the instinctive
feeling that nothing ought to be done to bring the Army into
17party politics' . In spite of such dangers, connections 
between the Tory leadership and the Army, if somewhat shadowy, 
grew ever closer during 1913. Bonar Law, Carson, Milner and 
Amery were in regular touch with Lord Roberts and Sir Henry 
Wilson, D.M.O. at the War Office. Through Roberts and Colonel 
Hickman, General Richardson had been recruited to lead the 
U.V.F. Roberts was president of the N.S.L. and so in close 
touch with Milner and others, and along with Admiral Seymour, 
a signatory to the covenant. The King, who regularly met and 
spoke with officers, had full knowledge of Tory opinions 
concerning the army. Thus many channels existed down which 
information concerning army affairs could flow (and vice 
versa), and the anxieties of officers and men relayed to the 
very highest political levels.
With the growing suspicion, by January 1914, of Asquith's 
intentions, interest revived in what role the army might play 
in events. The role in question was amending the Army Annual 
Act when it came before the Lords, which was to be not later 
than May 1st. This possibility had first circulated in 1911 
from Garvin and Goulding^; it had resurfaced in June 1913 and 
again in October, when Hugh Cecil had advocated its use, and 
by 1914 it arose yet again, as a method of forcing an
3ST
immediate dissolution. On the 30th Bonar Law wrote to 
Lansdowne and Balfour in support: 'it is indeed a very serious 
step; but after all it is not so serious as allowing the 
Government to drift into a position where force is used in 
Ulster1; he receiving grudging agreement from both2®. On 
February 2nd he claimed the (reluctant) backing of Curzon;
'the three Cecils, Selborne, Austen Chamberlain and Carson1 
were, he told Lansdowne, in favour*®. He also asked Finlay to 
prepare a memorandum on the feasibility of such a tactic**.
Nor was he unsuccessful in moving the shadow cabinet towards 
it. At the meeting, Long was in general agreement, though 
concerned at when and how it was to be introduced; and 
Finlay's memo supported it provided that great care was taken 
in its wording. The scheme was then accepted in principle by 
the shadow cabinet, on February 5th, although the doubters, 
led by Curzon, Derby and possibly Lansdowne, managed to avoid 
an immediate decision by establishing a small committee of 
lawyers (Cave, Cecil, Carson, Finlay and Halsbury) 'to go into 
the whole subject and after they have done we shall have 
another meeting and decide upon our action'*2.
The plan drew support from the Right of the party; Milner 
saw it as a practical measure, as did Smith, Garvin, Amery and 
members of the B.L.S.U.U. The amendment was a means of 
securing an immediate election, something the Right had long 
been pressing for as a way of avoiding any type of compromise. 
The Tory right was determined to regain power, and were 
willing, by 1914, to use any instrument to achieve it. Already 
some were again talking of the King refusing his assent to the 
bill. Amending the army bill was a method to be tried before
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the more dangerous one of a royal veto.
Most historians have considered it a dangerous manoeuvre. 
But a careful look at what was being contemplated suggests 
that it was not such a wild and hazardous course. It was, 
after all, a plan to "amend" the Act, not to repeal it, and to 
amend it specifically to prevent the army coercing Ulster. It 
was not intended to paralyse the entire British Army, and the 
change allowed for the absolute freedom to respond to any 
foreign threat. The plan might have restored army morale, 
given the anxiety felt within all ranks, particularly the 
officer corps, about their possible role in Ireland. 'It seems 
to me', Bonar Law informed Craik, 'that this is the best and 
perhaps the only chance of saving the Army'*^. And what was 
the purpose of the Act in the first place? Chamberlain, a 
surprising advocate of this course, neatly explained his 
actions according to its primary purpose: 'the Army Act is an 
annual bill which was voted originally.. as an annual bill in 
order that Parliament might have the opportunity of preventing 
the crown or executive of the day using the standing army to 
the injury of the liberties of the subject. As a matter of 
constitutional law., no case could be clearer than ours'**.
Of course, it was perceptions which counted and, as the 
rumour of what was being considered spread, so resistance to 
the plan mounted. Strachey of The Spectator rallied against 
it, spurred on by Curzon who, as in 1911, saw himself as the 
guardian of moderate Toryism. In this, according to Sanders, 
they drew much support from the backbenches*^. And other 
editors, notably Croal of The Scotsman and Robinson of The 
Times, were also not in sympathy with amendment. Oliver
361.
pleaded with Milner and Chamberlain to drop the scheme^, as 
did Dicey: 'I ami certain that the English public will never 
tolerate the dictation of the army. I think the public are in 
this right'*7. Rumours were picked up by the Liberal press and 
used to good effect; Spender, writing to Oliver, assured him 
that 1 the threats of violent action by your Diehards are 
heartily welcomed by those who call themselves "fighting 
politicians" on our side and that they see many advantages in
iO
another election forced by the House of Lords' . By the start
of March such anxieties were widespread, and were reflected at
the shadow cabinet meeting of the 12th. Here, Curzon, Derby,
Selborne, Acland-Hood, Midleton and Devonshire all expressed
iq
dissent, and Carson some concern'7; opinion was clearly 
beginning to turn. Yet Bonar Law remained determined to keep 
the option open, and again carried the day: 'Decision: 
provisionally to agree to amendment of army act but to leave 
details and decision as to moment of acting to Lansdowne and 
B.L. (This I fancy was against the general desire of those 
present)'50.
More serious for Bonar Law was the news that Ian Malcolm 
had told Robinson that if the party touched the army act, 'he 
(Malcolm) would leave the Unionist p a r t y ' S u c h  action would 
have gravely damaged the Unionist cause, which perhaps 
explains why Carson became less convinced, writing to Milner 
on the 18th, expressing doubts that the party would 
tolerate^. In the end, the decision was overtaken by events 
at the Curragh, which at a stroke rendered useless any plans 
the Government might have had had to use the army in Ulster. 
'It has had a magical effect', Colonel Repington wrote to Lady
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Craigavon, 1 for whereas a good part of the army might have 
marched before, I do not believe that wild horses will drag 
the army into Ulster now. The feeling against the Government 
is intense in the army'^. It gave a wonderful propaganda 
weapon with which to attack the Government, but it brought one 
major disadvantage for Bonar Law: it removed a means of 
forcing an election.
The so-called Ulster plot or Curragh mutiny has had many 
historians. Jalland has effectively dealt with the Liberal 
side, Beckett with actions within the army and Stewart with 
the responses in Ulster itself^. Less attention has been 
focused on the role of the Tory party, particularly in 
provoking or encouraging the actions of Brigadier-General 
Gough, who on March the 20th, along with 53 of his officers, 
refused to reinforce positions in Ulster.
The Government's action to secure depots in March 1914 
was not a surprise to Unionists. As an obvious target for the 
Ulstermen whenever they set up their Provisional Government, 
their reinforcement was to have been expected. Since the 
beginning of the year troop movements had received wide 
coverage in the press; on January 3rd The Times noted 
detachments of the 1st Dorsets moving into Carrickfergus 
Castle, on the outskirts of Belfast, which provoked 'much 
comment in Belfast'^. Intelligence from B.L.S.U.U. agents 
during February detailed unusual army manoeuvrings; Hugh 
Ridgeway wrote to Milner on the 2nd: 'reports are reaching 
this office from honorary agents to the effect that the 
Government is beginning to take steps as regards the Ulster 
movement'. He confirmed that notices had been sent out and
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that 'military concentration is to take place at Glasgow'56. 
Churchill's belligerent speech at Bradford indicated that 
something might be afoot. Craig certainly thought so, 
returning immediately to Ulster57, and Milner's contacts, Sir 
Henry Wilson, Lord Roberts and Sir Charles Hunter always 
passed any relevant information on. By the middle of March 
rumours were circulating about the imminent arrest of Carson 
and Craig, and about the army being sent to Ulster; sufficient 
for Carson to declare in the Commons during the censure debate 
on the 19th, with great prescience: 'your army is welcome 
there (Ulster) as is your fleet'5®. Before March the 20th and 
21st there were enough straws in the wind to indicate that 
something was going to happen.
Against this expectant background, Tories helped 
condition the actions of the army; or as Gollin writes, 'to 
make certain that the officers did not make up their minds in 
a political vacuum, isolated from the opinions of those who 
were anxious for them to disobey the orders of the Liberal 
Government'5®. The frequent assertion by Tory speakers that 
any attempt to coerce Ulster would see the army refuse, became 
prophecies of a self-fulfilling nature. But more concrete 
evidence of undermining army loyalty can be adduced. Towards 
the end of January, Bonar Law wrote to Lord Roberts suggesting 
that he might sign a letter to The Times, which Bonar Law 
composed, defending an officer's right to disobey orders under 
certain conditions: namely when ordered to move against 
Ulster6®. Then, if the Lords did amend the army act, Roberts 
would publish his letter as support. The letter was never 
published, but Roberts' ideas would have been known within the
officer corps, especially given the close social and political 
contacts between the army and party. It provides 'vivid 
evidence of the lines upon which the leading Unionists were 
thinking in the early months of 1 9 1 4 prepared to challenge 
the sanctity of army obedience for their own ends®*.
Such a willingness can be detected in a memorandum in the 
Milner papers written in January 1914. Concerned with the aims 
of the Covenanter movement, it noted at one point: 'there 
should be no attempt to do anything at this stage which could
in anyway impair its (army) efficiency or that of the
territorial force'®^, the inference being that at a later 
stage it might be necessary. It certainly reveals that such 
plans were being discussed. In addition, the idea of a 
guarantee fund to support officers who resigned rather than 
move against Ulster had been mentioned to Sir Henry Wilson in 
November®5; Carson passed the idea to Milner in March®*. The 
reinstatement of officers who resigned over Ulster was also 
discussed at this time. These were not new ideas; Long
reminded Bonar Law that they talked of this 'some months
ago... and you approved the policy'®5. Guarantee funds and 
reinstatement made the resigning of commissions far less 
hazardous for doubtful officers. Claims that the opposition 
were tampering with the army had some foundation, however 
subtly and indirectly it was done. And although much of the 
blame for the Curragh mutiny falls on the incompetent 
shoulders of Sir Arthur Paget, it was Tory speeches, 
initiatives and promises that provided the climate and "mind- 
frames" for the officers who decided to hand in their 
commissions.
. Events moved to London on Saturday the 21st, as news of 
the resignations at the Curragh filtered into the press, and 
the Tory party now looked to expose if not to fuel the crisis. 
Gough was summoned to the War Office for interviews on the 
22nd and 23rd. There, Paget's actions were countermanded by 
Ewart (Adjutant General), French (C.I.G.S.) and Seely, who 
told Gough and his men that they would be reinstated and 
should quietly return to their regiments. Gough, 
understandably mistrustful, demanded a written pledge that the 
army would not be used to coerce Ulster; an extraordinary 
request for an officer to place before his commanders and the 
Government. Greatly worried at the state of the army, Seely 
and Ewart agreed, drawing up a fairly vague memorandum to that 
effect on the 23rd. This Gough rejected until, without cabinet 
approval and with only Morley's recommendation, Seely added 
two extra sentences declaring in crystal-clear words what 
Gough had wanted: that the army would not be used to crush 
political opposition to Home Rule.
Gough's actions after the 21st are open to much doubt . 
Resignation at the Curragh was the result of a choice offered 
by Paget, but his actions at meetings on the 22nd and 23rd in 
pressing for a written pledge are more difficult to explain. 
Perhaps it was a genuine concern for the state of the army.
Yet equally plausible is the possibility that Gough was 
influenced by the hot-house atmosphere he encountered when in 
London and the recognition that he could dictate terms to the 
Government. In these respects, Tory leaders and press were an 
important ingredient in fostering crisis.
The fierce press reports on the 22nd and 23rd hardened
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Gough in his line at the Curragh. But he was also in contact 
with Wilson, at the War Office, who pointed out the political 
possibilities of the situation. Wilson was already in daily 
contact with Tory leaders; on the 19th he dined with Milner, 
Carson and Lovat, informing them of the orders to reinforce 
points around Belfast. On the night of the 20th Wilson learnt 
of the resignations from General John Gough, Hugh's brother 
stationed at Aldershot, who had received telegrams that 
evening from the Curragh (in fact it was through John Gough 
that the news broke in London)^. On the 21st Wilson met Tory 
leaders at Lansdowne House, and briefed them on the situation; 
the next day he was present at the War Office when Gough was 
interviewed^. It was also on the 22nd, well before the 
memorandum capitulating to Gough's anxieties, that Wilson had 
spoken to Seely in reply to the latter's enquiries about the 
means of restoring army unity: 'General Wilson had replied 
"the reinstatement of the dismissed officers and a declaration 
that the army would not be asked to coerce Ulster to submit to 
Home Rule"'^®.
Gough was not alone in pressing Seely and the War Office 
for a clear statement ruling out the coercion of Ulster. It 
also seems clear that Wilson was strengthening Gough and 
pushing for the same type of pledge. Carson, writing to Bonar 
Law on the March the 26th, recounted :'they (Gough) refused to 
go until they got it in writing... General Wilson at the W.O. 
kept whispering to them "get it in writing"... at last Sir J. 
French and Col Seely drew up a declaration full of words and
CQ
some flattery107. Wilson was also (along with John Gough) 
fanning the flames of sympathy-resignations, which quickly
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spread to Aldershot. These developments placed Seely under 
greater pressure, and so more vulnerable to extracting 
promises of non-coercion. Wilson was, then, a key player in 
the crisis and was in close and regular contact with Tory 
leaders throughout. He was not their puppet, but he was 
clearly not acting impartially.
Nor was it just through Wilson that Gough's attitude was 
hardened on the 22nd and 23rd: his brother John was also in 
close contact with Tory leaders. On the evening of the 20th, 
the night he received his brothers' telegrams, John Gough 
called at Salisbury's house, informing Chamberlain of 
events7®. The next day (the 21st) Chamberlain again met John 
Gough, advising him to see Lord Roberts, another far from 
impartial source7*. On the 22nd, Chamberlain was visited twice 
by Mrs Gough, Hugh's mother, and informed of the War Office
77meetings with her son . Here then was a direct line to Hugh 
Gough, through which the situation could be explained, and the 
political benefits of squeezing from the Government a 
declaration never to coerce Ulster, pointed out. Jalland 
writes that 'the Curragh officers did not mutiny or refuse to 
obey orders. However, their own behaviour also became 
questionable once they took advantage of the situation to 
demand pledges limiting the Government's policy'7^ . In 
pressing for such pledges the influence of Tory leaders and 
partisans in suggesting, hinting and priming Gough was of 
great importance.
If some Tory leaders had helped to foster the crisis, how 
well did they take advantage of it when news of the Curragh 
ibroke in London? We now know it was a bungled affair designed
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to reinforce certain military installations. But to all 
appearances, the Government were attempting to place Ulster 
under martial law. It was a propaganda scoop for the 
Unionists, and there was even the possibility of the 
Government falling if the Tory onslaught was sufficiently 
accurate and effective. The opposition was helped by the mass 
of information that flooded into their leaders from officers 
and their parents.
Scenting blood, Unionists planned an all-out attack on 
the Government in the Commons. Bonar Law informed Asquith on 
the 22nd that 'it will not be possible., business can proceed 
tomorrow in the ordinary way and I propose to ask you., that a 
statement can be made by the government upon the serious 
position which has arisen in the army and that this statement
74can at once be discussed' . Asquith tried pass the episode 
off as a 'misunderstanding', and to bluff his way through by 
delay and equivocation, which simply made things worse7*. When 
the Commons met on Monday the 23rd the Tories launched 
themselves into a bitter assault on ministers, particularly 
Churchill, who quickly emerged, for them, as the ringleader. 
Events during the debates of the 23rd through to the 27th went 
disastrously for the Government. Seely assured the House on 
the 23rd that all was now well and that the officers would be 
reinstated (having secretly promised never to use the army 
against Ulster). On the 25th Asquith published a hopelessly 
inadequate white-paper contradicting much of what had already 
been said, and providing great ammunition for the Tories. The 
same day, he repudiated Seely's promise to Gough, prompting 
the Minister of War's resignation along with Ewart and French
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(but not Morley). Dismay spread amongst Liberal backbenchers 
at what looked like submission to the army (on Seely's part) 
and then at the Government's floundering performance to 
extricate itself from the mess: 'the radicals are furious at
if.
Asquith' noted Bridgeman on the 24th . The cumulative effect 
of all these contradictions, inconsistencies, resignations- 
and, even, Haldane's alteration of speeches in Hansard- threw 
the coalition forces into a state of confusion. In addition, 
there were fierce attacks in The Morning Post and Daily Mail- 
even the more sober Times reached new levels of bitterness. It 
seemed to some that by Friday the 27th the Government was on 
the verge of collapse.
The Tories, however, did not capitalise on the situation, 
and ministers slowly regained their confidence. On March the 
30th Churchill delivered a tough exoneration of the 
government's position, denying absolutely the existence of any 
plot, and defending the right of any Government to restore law 
and order through force if necessary^. This raised the morale 
of Liberal backbenchers. The same day, Asquith declared that 
he himself would take over the running of the War Office, a 
shrewd move to restore the confidence of the army and the 
Liberal party. In addition, the Tories themselves came under 
fire, especially from Labour members John Ward and Will 
Crooks, for their tampering with army loyalty. Indeed, Bonar 
Law himself might have given them the opportunity to play the 
mutiny card when, during his attack on the 23rd, 'he had made 
a reference to the right of soldiers under certain 
circumstances to disobey, which was not approved by our side 
and gave the other side an opening' . The speeches of Carson,
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Bonar Law and Smith now came back to haunt them, as Sanders 
lamented the following week: 'Winston certainly got hold of a
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number of quotations rather damaging to our side' . The fear 
of their army connections being used worried many on the 
opposition benches, suggesting that they were far from 
innocent of the charges.
The consequences of the Curragh mutiny for the Tories 
were therefore more mixed. It gave good propaganda value, but 
what moral ascendency they won from the incident dissipated 
after the gun-running at Larne and with the growing suspicion 
of the party's relations with the army. The army issue pushed 
Liberals and Labour back together, after nearly two years of 
continued wrangling, holding out the prospect of renewed 
cooperation when the election came. Nor had the Government 
fallen during this bizarre and embarrassing episode. Instead 
of undermining the ministry, mistakes like Bonar Law's on the 
23rd allowed them to escape. Asquith's decision to take over 
the War Office gave the appearance of a confident man in full 
command, which did much to revive the nerve of the ministry.
These conclusions should not, however, be pressed too 
far: the Government was not left untarnished. Moreover, Carson 
emerged with his reputation enhanced. He had left for Belfast 
on the 18th, as rumours of his arrest spread round 
Westminster. The self-restraint which the province maintained 
throughout the crisis was attributed to his presence, 
advancing his image as a strong leader in full control of the 
situation. The Curragh episode also widened the breach between 
the parties, to the satisfaction of the Tory right: ideas of a 
compromise appeared to have received a set-back. And the
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Nationalists became more intractable as a result of what they 
saw as a Tory-army plot. This latter result served Bonar Law's 
purpose, making it difficult for Asquith to move them to a 
reasonable compromise. In addition, the army could not now be 
used to coerce Ulster into Home Rule. With Asquith no longer 
able forcefully to put Ulster under Dublin, and with the 
chances of exclusion lessened by increasingly obdurate 
Nationalists, the one course of action left was an election.
In this vital respect events at the Curragh worked to Bonar 
Law's benefit: the tactical strait-jacket was tightening 
around the Prime Minister.
The Curragh mutiny was a great test for Ulster. The fact 
that she remained calm raised her standing within Tory 
circles, and with the army threat neutralised the pressures on 
Ulster were considerably eased. This was a great relief, since 
her previous position had been precarious. Yet the situation 
remained tense. Since January Ulster had faced a severe 
shortage of cash and arms. While Belfast was becoming nervous 
as the bill entered its last circuit, with the Government 
appearing to be delaying and manoeuvring for position. In the 
context of these frustrations, the idea of a League of British 
Covenanters was developed to raise finance for the Ulstermen, 
to rally support and, if need be, to ship over volunteers. And 
it was these same frustrations which moved the central 
committee of the U.U.C. to endorse Richardson's and Crawford's 
plan for one huge shipment of arms into Belfast.
The smuggling of arms on April 24th, like the Curragh 
incident, reinforced Ulster's position and made her more 
intractable: unwilling to accept anything short of the "clean-
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cut" now that they could realistically look to their own. On 
the Tory right this was well received: it pressured Asquith, 
making the Government's position difficult if not untenable.
By making Ulster less tractable the Right's tactical position 
was strengthened; all the party had to do was to hang on and 
wait for Asquith to surrender. This made the further attempts 
at compromise, in April/May and again at the end of July, seem 
foolhardy. The Right were not going to give up the impregnable 
position gained from the Curragh and from the gun-running at 
Larne. In this they resembled the Nationalists, growing more 
not less intractable after March. Both saw their ship close to 
port, if only nerves would hold. They believed that Bonar Law, 
whom the Right trusted, would not sell-out at the last moment. 
Yet it was just as some thought that they could sniff the 
first sweet smells of office that the European situation 
erupted. It quickly absorbed the Tory Right in a struggle they 
had long predicted, even hoped for, but which caught them by 
surprise when it came.
IV
The Curragh incident brought many advantages for Bonar Law and 
the party. It removed the possibility of the army coercing 
Ulster into the bill; without this the Government had no means 
of implementing Home Rule in the north (although Bonar Law had 
long rejected the idea that Asquith was capable of such a 
move). The episode was, nonetheless, a great propaganda coup, 
depriving Asquith of any hope of appearing to the public as 
the reasonable conciliator. Tories played this up in the press
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and from the platform: a Government which talked of compromise 
but plotted coercion. The Government's bungling attempts to 
explain and justify simply added to the suspicion which many 
observers now entertained; it would not easily be erased and 
was serious for Asquith. It implied that his attempts at 
compromise were tactical after all, as Bonar Law had suggested 
on March 9th, rather than a serious effort to reach a 
settlement. The incident also allowed Bonar Law to talk tough, 
to soothe diehard nerves and keep in step with the appreciable 
rightward drift by many in the party. Derby is a good example 
of this, moving from scepticism on supporting rebellion in 
Ulster to a willingness to send men from Liverpool to help 
them7^ . As Commander in Chief, the King was also greatly 
alarmed and annoyed at events, moving him closer to the Tory 
position. This was important if, as some clearly hoped, he was 
a last resort to be persuaded to refuse assent to the bill 
before an election.
But the Curragh also brought serious problems. There was 
the problem of public opinion: would the mutiny backfire 
against the Tory party? In addition, it removed a means of 
provoking an immediate election on a basis Bonar Law thought 
favourable. More seriously, denying Asquith the ability to 
fall back on coercion made room for alternative and (to Bonar 
Law) menacing courses of action; Curragh brought politics back 
to where it had stood at the start of March, with compromise 
once again in many people1s minds.
Many thought along such lines: from mid-April onwards, 
Tory moderates and federalists began to organise, scenting a 
panic-stricken Government at last thinking seriously of a way
out. Carson's conciliatory tone at this stage suggested that 
the Ulstermen were also keen for a way out, and that if 
Asquith took the leap towards "real" exclusion they would 
accept it. Bonar Law admitted to Selborne at the start of 
April that he was '..inclined to think that some further offer 
will be made and very likely the exclusion of the six
no
counties' . But arrayed against a compromise stood the
swelled ranks of the Right and the Southern Unionists. The 
latter had become increasingly active since Asquith's offer of 
March the 9th, returning to their vocal fears of the autumn; 
these sections would accept nothing but an election. The 
aftermath of Curragh was a difficult time for Bonar Law. It 
created grave problems of unity, as Sanders noted on the 30th 
of April: 'there is serious discontent among a section of our 
party181.
Yet Bonar Law had faced these problems before, in the 
autumn and at the start of March. It was the same dilemma: how 
to avoid a settlement and maintain the party's unity and nerve 
during these the final stages of the bill, while appearing 
reasonable and open to a compromise for public opinion. Once 
again, he employed the formula of demanding an election (or a 
referendum) as the only way to solve the issue while admitting 
that the real exclusion of Ulster would avoid civil war. It 
was a statement of the obvious: if Ulster agreed to exclusion 
there was little he could do. Yet the repetition kept the 
Ulstermen close to the Tory party, and provided Asquith no gap 
between them to exploit. It kept the Tory moderate sections 
with him. And it indicated to the Government the direction in 
which a compromise could be forged, a direction which Bonar
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Law knew full well there was little chance of the Nationalists 
taking. As he told Hugh Montgomery at the beginning of May:
'it does not seem to be probable that the Nationalists can be 
brought to agree to the real exclusion of Ulster; and if they 
do not then there can be no question of compromise'®^.
The efforts of those seeking a settlement crystallised in 
the meeting between Asquith, Bonar Law and Carson on the 5th 
of May. By the time of the meeting the chance of a settlement 
on exclusion had receded even further; both the Ulstermen and 
the Nationalists were becoming more rather than less 
intransigent. After the Curragh and the gun-running, Ulster 
felt that she could stand out for her maximum demands (all 
nine counties); the Nationalists, with the bill about to pass 
the Commons for the last time on May the 25th and the 
Volunteers organising in Southern Ireland, would hold out for 
the whole bill. The two sides were farther apart than in the 
autumn. Bonar Law realised that the Prime Minister could not 
move closer to real exclusion, and with the Government unable 
to impose the bill on Ulster, the implications were clear: 'We 
said also to Mr Asquith is not the position really this. That 
you have only three possible alternatives, first to coerce 
Ulster, second to exclude Ulster and third to have a general 
election10'*. The latter option was looming larger than at any 
previous time, and Bonar Law's major problem in this context 
was to hold his party together into the election.
The meeting on May 5th was not entirely a waste of time.
Bonar Law and Carson learnt that Asquith was going to continue
with the Home Rule bill and then introduce a separate amending
bill in the Lords. This was subsequently announced to the
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Commons on May the 12th; both bills, Asquith assured the
House, would then be presented together for royal assent. It
was a subtle last effort by Asquith to place the Tories in a
difficult position. Incorporating the compromise measures into
a separate amending bill threw onto the Lords the burden of
rejection; yet any acceptance would cause grave party unrest.
The result was very serious. Southern Unionist and right wing
forces feared that the leadership would agree to the
compromise if it satisfied Ulster, so allowing the other three
provinces to "go to the wolves". Accordingly, they began to
organise the Lords to reject the amending bill. By the middle
of May, the Committee of Peers, 'connected with the three
01
provinces outside Ulster'” , established by Midleton and 
Barrymore, passed a resolution recommending that the amending 
bill could only be accepted if it included a clause for an 
immediate election88. Midleton assured Bonar Law 'that the 
view expressed herein is supported by a strong mass of 
opinion' and that 'we are in danger of a serious split in the 
party, if by any manoeuvring we shall find ourselves forced to
oc
support the amending bill without the promise of a G.E.100. He 
also, on behalf of the committee, published their resolutions
A7in the press on May the 25th . Midleton's canvassing of Peers 
converged with various right wing suspicions of the amending 
bill. Amery attacked the idea of helping the Government out of
DO
their hole ; Gwynne of The Morning Post rallied opinion 
opposed to any compromise or clever tactics over the amending 
bill89.
Midleton's activities in the upper House also overlapped 
with Willoughby de Broke's earlier attempts at rousing the
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Peers on the amendment to the address. Both now sought to make 
an election the centre-piece of their stand, regardless of 
what the amending bill conceded. On May 13th, Willoughby de 
Broke wrote to Lansdowne, declaring that 'we do not think it 
right to agree to repeal of the Union in any shape or form or 
to the promotion in Parliament of any new scheme which has not
QAbeen submitted to the electorate' . It was a replay of 1911,
with the "wild men" trying to stiffen the Lords against a 
sell-out and against the official leadership. Lansdowne 
certainly interpreted events in this light: 'he (Midleton) and 
others have been actively organising a "diehard" movement
Q1
which might become formidable171.
Bonar Law saw these developments as a threat; the diehard 
project of rejecting the amending bill was simply playing into 
Asquith's hands. It would blame the Lords for civil war, and 
'enable the Government to turn election cry against the Lords: 
"Lords have forced civil war"., it would pay in some
<n
constituencies and might seriously injure our majority' . The 
party's image of reasonableness would be destroyed, so 
undermining public support and consequently their ability to 
win an election. And such a manoeuvre was all the more 
pointless, since Bonar Law was convinced after May the 5th 
that Asquith could never agree to real exclusion. His amending 
bill would not therefore be a settlement but a decoy, designed 
to provoke rejection. 'The House of Lords must not fall into 
the trap and enable the coalition to say they have killed 
conciliation'^. Nor would inserting a referendum clause help 
much, since Asquith would represent it as a wrecking tactic 
not a solution, given that the Ulstermen would not stand by
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the result. The diehard revival of May and June 1914 placed 
Bonar Law's entire strategy of the last two years in jeopardy. 
Worse still, his ability to control events had diminished 
after May 25th, when the Home Rule bill finally passed the 
Commons. This left him reliant upon Lansdowne's ability to 
control the upper house; by no means certain if experience or 
current developments were any indication.
Lansdowne agreed with Bonar Law's understanding of the 
situation: 'Midleton and co fail to see that we desire not 
only to have a general election but to win it and that we 
shall probably lose it if we allow Asquith and his friends to 
out-manoeuvre us' . Both saw the need to play a waiting game, 
to see what Asquith's amending bill had to offer, then act 
accordingly. But this might suggest passivity towards the re­
grouping diehards, causing them to redouble their efforts. 
Lansdowne thus had to work hard behind the scenes to extend 
and impose his authority in the Lords.
In this he was fortunate to have Royal opinion behind 
him. The possibility of the Lords rejecting the amending bill 
filled the King with horror. It faced him with the awful 
choice between assent to Home Rule, provoking civil war in 
Ireland, and the veto, provoking a constitutional crisis which 
would see a "people versus the king" response from the 
Government. Through Stamfordham, the King was adamant that the 
amending bill should not be rejected55. Salisbury spoke to the 
King at the end of May, relaying the latter's anxieties to 
Lansdowne: 'It was he (the King) said everyone's duty to do 
their utmost to prevent civil war. Moreover it would help him 
very much - "it will save me"'55. Protecting the King was an
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effective plea with which Lansdowne could rally the Lords 
against rejection. It also would keep the King on their side 
for any future eventuality, as Salisbury clearly implied in 
his letter. Oddly, Milner seems to have concurred in this 
argument, writing to Willoughby de Broke on June the 3rd:
'what to do on the amending bill and on which both bills 
depends the possibility of our being able to ultimately appeal 
to him (the King) with effect. Tactics are very important at
Q7
this juncture' .
Lansdowne did not rely solely on the King's position to 
rally the peers to his side. He sought to galvanise more 
general support in advance. He contacted Salisbury, a prime 
mover in the 1911 episode, to draw him closer and to help 
'rope in Milner., he may not know much about procedure but his 
mind is acute and the more we can associate him with ourselves 
the better'®®. Milner had been another force behind the 1911 
crisis; drawing his sting early on was vital. Lansdowne moved 
quickly to bring Curzon, Balcarres, Derby and Devonshire 
behind him: all leaders with great influence in the Lords. 
These met at Curzon's house on June the 8th and again on June 
the 11th to talk tactics®®.
Overall, the leadership's position in 1914 remained far 
stronger than in 1911. They were not hopelessly split, and in 
the Commons they had the active support of the main spokesmen. 
But all was not well within the party; the last few weeks 
before the amending bill was presented to the Lords on June 
the 23rd saw intense manoeuvring. As in 1911, the main 
difference was tactical. Bonar Law and Lansdowne argued that 
they should wait to see what was offered on the 23rd before
1*0.
deciding their course of action, especially since they 
expected it to fall far short of anything they or Ulster could 
agree. If this transpired (which it did), it was tactically 
better to amend the amending bill to one which Ulster might 
accept (nine- county permanent exclusion). This course would 
prevent Asquith from branding the Lords' action as provoking 
civil war. Yet such a basis (real exclusion) would never be 
accepted by the Nationalists when the bill went back for re­
consideration by the Commons. As Long argued: 'if you stick to 
"Ulster as a whole and no time limit" I think we are safe as I 
feel sure that Asquith will never consent to this or rather he 
won't be let'*®®. The onus for rejection would be thrown 
firmly back upon the Government and their supporters. These 
were essentially the same tactics that Bonar Law had used 
during his secret meetings with Asquith: to outbid him on 
terms which he could never accept, but which would preserve 
the Tory image of reasonableness. If, on the other hand, 
Asquith did the unthinkable and satisfied Ulster (either 
before or after his own amendment), then they had little 
choice but to accept it. 'I have no doubt that a general 
election would result in our favour; but so far as I can judge 
the alteration in public opinion has been brought about simply 
by the position of Ulster and if we .. were to take up an 
attitude which the country thought unreasonable on that 
question then I am by no means sure that the result of an 
election might not be quite different'*®*. The Diehard line 
viewed tinkering with definitions of exclusion as playing with 
fire; Asquith and Redmond might well agree to the revisions 
the Lords made. Unionists in the country would lose heart at
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the Lords1 amending rather than rejecting a compromise package 
at this stage. The only straightforward and clear- cut 
approach was to insist upon an election.
It was a small but vital gulf between two points of view. 
Long, a known supporter of Southern Unionism, worked hard to 
convince the diehards of the safety and sense of the line 
taken by the leadership. On May the 29th he wrote to Midleton,
I AO
pleading with him not to split the party1 , and tried again 
on June the 10th: 'in this matter I think the principle of our
policy is perfectly plain and that there is no difference of
101opinion about it amongst us'1 . Lansdowne also called a 
meeting of leaders in the upper House to try to bridge the 
differences. When the amending bill was finally introduced on 
the 23rd, the problem eased slightly. Asquith had not moved 
beyond his March 9th position, confirming all of Bonar Law's 
assumptions about his constraints, and showing doubting 
diehards just how far Asquith was bridled by the Nationalists. 
At a shadow cabinet on the 24th, it was agreed to read the 
amending bill a second time and then to amend it on third 
reading to nine- country permanent exclusion, provoking angry 
dissension from Midleton*®*. Southern Unionists were greatly 
alarmed, and Carson, in particular, was bitterly attacked. 
Midleton and Barrymore sent Bonar Law a memorandum critical of 
the decision, and published in the press a resolution by their 
committee of Peers that the amending bill should be 
rejected1®5.
Lansdowne's authority, however, held, and July 14th the 
amending bill was duly mangled and sent back to the Commons 
for consideration on July the 20th. There was little chance of
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the new terms being accepted by the Nationalists, or by many 
on the Liberal backbenches: Asquith's last real chance was to 
patch an agreement on the amending bill before the Commons 
debated it on the 20th. He therefore accepted a Royal 
invitation to convene a conference of party leaders at 
Buckingham Palace on July 21st. But there was no basis for 
agreement. All sides had drifted further apart since March;
The Ulstermen felt that they could hold out for all nine 
counties (though they would probably have accepted six); 
Redmond could not realistically accept permanent exclusion, 
and would have faced immense difficulties in giving anything 
more than four counties. It was not simply a difference of the 
'muddy highways and by-ways of Tyrone and F e r m a n a g h ' t h e r e  
were unbridgeable gulfs between them. If Asquith could not 
secure a compromise, without the ability to coerce Ulster and 
without Unionist support for the imposition of a settlement 
onto Ireland (as Churchill had suggested on July the 22nd) he 
had nothing to fall back on but a general election.
Precisely when and how he would have dissolved is 
unclear. He still needed the King's assent, which would be by 
no means automatic, especially if he did not simultaneously 
submit the amending bill for him to sign; there was a strong 
possibility that the King might have insisted on a dissolution 
before he put his signature to the bill, particularly as he 
was coming under increasing pressure from Unionist 
sympathisers to do so. Asquith might have gone to the country 
on his original amending bill of June the 23rd, though little 
advantage can be seen in this course. He might even, supposing 
the King gave his assent, have carried on with Home Rule
without the amended bill, allowing Ulster to set up its 
provisional Government and hoping it would, in time, collapse. 
But to fight the election due by 1915 at the latest, after 
having allowed a Provisional Government to establish itself 
within the British Isles, would have alienated many Liberal 
supporters from such irresolute leadership and given the 
Tories an electoral advantage, able to contrast the state of 
harmony and prosperity in Ireland in 1906 compared to the 
present. It also presupposed that he could keep the south in 
order, and prevent conflict between Ulster Volunteers and 
National Volunteers. Perhaps the most likely course would have 
been to carry the bill onto the statute books, and then to 
dissolve immediately on a platform of removing the Irish 
Question from British politics. Yet the Tories would still 
have campaigned hard on the issue that Ulster should not be 
coerced, and they had probably done enough by that stage to 
remove the Liberals from Government. From any point of view, 
by July 1914 the Liberal Government was in a hopeless
107positionv . War provided them with a two-year stay of 
execution.
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CONCLUSION.
Bonar Law assumed the leadership at a critical time in the 
party*s history. With three election defeats and the loss of 
the Lords power of veto, grave internal divisions had erupted. 
More than this the party had few, if any, fresh policy ideas 
and faced a Government poised to launch an all-out attack on 
landownership and sustained in power by an effective electoral 
coalition of Liberals, Labour and Nationalists. However by July 
1914 Tories were assertive, confident and unified behind a 
leader who drew support from all wings of the party. The 
Liberals, on the otherhand, were unsettled and divided, not 
just from their partners, the Nationalists and Labour, but 
within their own ranks and seen by the attacks on Lloyd 
George’s budget of April 1914 and the great unease at what 
Asquith might do to escape from the Irish imbroglio. An 
election was widely predicted; ’most of our people expect it*, 
Sanders wrote on July 25th, ’and one of the lobby 
correspondents tells me the Liberals (also) expect an early 
election*. Under these circumstances the outcome (though 
impossible to predict) should not be viewed as automatically 
unfavourable to the Conservatives; on the contrary, despite the 
notion of a ’crisis* of Conservatism over these years, the 
Tories appear better placed to win an election late in 1914,
than the Liberals
That Bonar Law had helped bring the Conservative party to this 
position was itself an achievement. Yet the route had not been 
straight-forward; playing the Home Rule issue to restore the 
party to power had been the best option but by no means an easy 
or clear-cut path. He had been forced to counter-balance the 
competing claims of diehards, federalists, Southern Unionists, 
Ulstermen and party moderates whilst keeping the most important 
consideration, perceptions of public opinion, firmly at the 
forefront of any move. These tensions had been skilfully 
balanced and seen in particular during the crucial autumn 1913 
phase of the struggle. Bonar Law had also locked the party’s 
resistance to Home Rule into a broader struggle over the 
Constitution. This yielded several advantages. It enabled him 
to make a general election the centre-peice of his campaign, 
rather than Ireland or even Ulster, and so providing vital 
justification for endorsing extreme methods. He could then push 
Asquith to the very limit of Parliamentary practise (some both 
then and now would say well beyond that limit) aware that he 
was fighting according to a constitutional rational. And by 
making a general election his raison d ’etre, so his attack on 
Home Rule can clearly be seen as a means to an end; the best 
method of removing the Government from power. This 
consideration was, by 1912, paramount for many Tories, given
Liberal taxation and welfare plans, the perceived state of the 
armed services, concern for the unity of the Empire and threats 
to the Established Church and Constitution. The destines of the 
British state simply could not be left for a moment longer in 
the irresponsible hands of Asquith and Lloyd George. Extreme 
resistance to Home Rule was to unseat the Liberal Government.
Such an interpretation therefore views Bonar Law as a very 
tough-minded politician; a leader firmly in the counter- 
Revolutionary tradition of Lord Salisbury. 1911 marks a major 
break in styles of leadership; where Balfour looked for 
cooperation between front-benches and a bulstering of the 
moderates, across the parties, Bonar Law sought to polarise 
party politics and attack vigorously. It made him a superb 
leader in opposition but a less effective leader when in 
Government. Unlike Balfour, for whom a directly opposite 
reading could be made, Bonar Law's unique qualities were 
appropriate to fierce political conflict and not the 
administrative hum-drum of office.
Yet the story of the Tory resistance to Home Rule was more than 
just a reflection of Bonar Law's views. Party policy is rarely 
the sole dictation of one person. In this respect Lord 
Lansdowne was a far more important player in events than he is 
often credited with, especially as a counter-weight to Carson
and staunch defender of Southern Unionist interests. Carson 
himself, though massively influential, emerges in a slightly 
different light; less a diehard or Ulster bigot and more 
flexible and concerned with finding a political settlement, 
particularly along federal lines. Smith and Churchill also 
appear politicians of great importance during this struggle, 
clearly presaging their more famous efforts to reach an Irish 
settlement from 1919 to 1922. And Balfour's sympathy with 
coalitions or above-party ministries of National salvation 
appears well set during this period. Lastly the rise and 
consolidation of the Ulstermen, was a major factor in both 
party's tactical planning. For Tories, Ulster was the crow-bar 
to de-rail Home Rule, as Carson lamented to the Lords in 1921, 
'I was only a puppet and so was Ulster and so was Ireland, in 
the political game that was to get the Conservative party into 
power'. Though having summoned the Ulster genie up, it proved 
impossible, between 1918 and 1922, (and to some extent ever 
since) to put it back into the bottle.
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